
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TO

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AN INTRODUCTION

TO

ENGLISH POLITICS

BY

JOHN M. ROBERTSON

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1900

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"The sociologist has three main quests—First, he must try to discover the conditions that determine mere aggregation and concourse. Secondly, he must try to discover the law that governs social choices, the law, that is, of the subjective process. Thirdly, he must try to discover also the law that governs the natural selection and the survival of choices, the law, that is, of the objective process."—*Professor Giddings.*

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PREAMBLE

THE following treatise originated remotely in a lecture delivered as preliminary to a course on "Modern English Politicians" (from Bolingbroke to Gladstone), the aim of the prefatory address being to trace in older politics, home and foreign, general views which should partly serve as guides to modern cases, or at least as preparation for their scientific study; while the main course dealt with modern political problems as they have arisen in the careers and been handled by the measures of modern English statesmen. The opening exposition, developed into an essay, and published as a series of magazine articles, is now again expanded into a treatise, by way of covering the ground more usefully.

It makes no pretention, nevertheless, to a complete or systematic treatment of political history, or of political forms and theories. The object in view from the first has been, not the technical anatomy or documentary history of institutions, but the bringing into light of the ruling forces in all political life, ancient and modern alike. It seeks to help the reader to fulfil the precept of Montaigne: "*Qu'il ne luy apprenne pas tant les*

histoires qu' à en juger." Of learned political histories there are many, and of expert treatises on political theory there is no lack. While, however, I have profited by many such, I had long felt in my own studies the need of a survey which should bring some of the apparent lessons of past political history to bear on the problems of the present in a way that the works known to me have not ostensibly attempted, or at least have not followed out as one could wish. Dr. Freeman laid down the principle very fully, indeed exorbitantly, when he insisted that we ought "freely to employ every part of history to illustrate every other part[1]; " but the mere political history to which he limited himself is but one side of the process of evolution, which is what it really behoves us to understand. It would be unfair and ungrateful to make light of the very real help given to all students of our own history, for instance, by such works as Green's, and the recent compilation entitled *Social England.* With all its faults of hasty generalisation and self-contradiction, Green's work remains one of the most intelligent and most stimulating performances of our time, and is to be credited with inspiring much that has been done since. It is in the express treatment of problems of social evolution that there is need for new developments. Several members of the Marxian school have dealt very acutely and instructively with the element of economic causation in ancient and modern life; from a different political standpoint, the late Professor Thorold Rogers, in his lectures on *The Economic Interpretation of History* and the *Industrial and Commercial History of England*, has enlarged in a

[1] *History of Federal Government*, 2nd. ed. p. 274.

suggestive fashion on the same theme; Professor Ashley has treated the medieval period with much more thoroughness in his *Introduction to English Economic History and Theory*, wherein he brings to English knowledge much important German and other research; and Professor Cunningham in his *Growth of English Industry and Commerce* has supplied a most learned and illuminating study, which gives even more than it promises. On the other hand, a number of writers have studied periods of history and special societies with an eye to their interpretation in terms of human character as known to us in our experience.

Apart, however, from differences of opinion as to some of the data and dicta of many of these writers, I have found myself at times in need of a different method, of other analyses, of another aim, and of further colligations of phenomena, than they supply; and the following chapters are among the results of my inquiry. Since the book was planned, and even since it was first prepared for publication, there have appeared several English works, such as the *Western Civilisation* of Professor Cunningham (1898), and Professor A. J. Grant's *Greece in the Age of Pericles* (1897), which struck me as valuable and instructive performances of a kind I had craved. Had I met them earlier my own attempts would doubtless have been better guided. As it is, their method gives me more confidence in the rightness of my aim, whatever the failures of the execution.

It is very obvious that the present undertaking runs many risks. Touching on several fields of study which have been explored by accomplished scholars and by

experienced specialists, it cannot have escaped errors of historical detail such as the specialists impute to each other; and after finding fault with a good many of the inferences of experts from their special data I must needs incur similar objection in rather large measure. As regards such criticism my only anticipatory plea must be that, while I have not spared pains to compare authorities and check the primary sources at many doubtful points, my essay, as aforesaid, does not at all profess to be a manual of historical fact for the use of specialists. Rather it is a process of reasoning that seeks to bring home to the reader the nature of the historical developments dealt with, in terms of human life, of average happiness, of culture, of moral and social science, with a view to qualifying him in some degree for the great but little-regarded task of framing his own political and sociological opinions. To this end it has broken up the total problem into a variety of special inquiries, taken up in different countries and different ages, striving always, however, to indicate the organic connection of all social processes, mental, moral, and material, and to reach through analysis a synthesis.[1] If such an attempt should but serve to mediate in some degree between the schools which treat more or less exclusively the different processes here glanced at, it will perhaps sufficiently justify its existence.

At the risk even of failing in such mediation in

[1] When this was first written I had not read the definition of sociology by Professor Giddings, to which I desire to declare my general adhesion: "Specifically, sociology is an interpretation of social phenomena in terms of physical activity, organic adjustment, natural selection, and the conservation of energy. . . . It is strictly an explanatory science, fortifying induction by deduction, and referring effects to veritable causes" (*Principles of Sociology*, 3rd ed. p. 419).

some cases, I am fain to suggest that (save for such recent treatises as I have alluded to, which give encouraging proof of a counter-tendency, and for some which seem to me illaudable in their ideals and tendency), the line of specialism in political science of late years has been rather away from than towards a practical use of the research accumulated. Scholarly study grows more exact, more extensive, more burdensome to the student; but there is hardly a proportional advance in the thinking brought to bear on the facts established. One is at times almost driven to think that there has been a relative retrogression. In the first quarter of the century, Hallam prefaced his study of political history with a severe comment on the Scotch sociologists, in particular Millar, who had taken up his subject on the impulse of Montesquieu and Voltaire. Hallam made a much more minute research than Millar had done; and yet, though his generally robust judgment yields us manifold instruction, he at times falls into platitudes of comment and ineptitudes of reflection of which Millar could not have been guilty. Some energy of the speculative reason seems to have been lost, even for the Whig, in the reaction following on the French Revolution.

The documentary research of Hallam, in turn, is much less exhaustive than that of Bishop Stubbs; and Bishop Stubbs in turn sets up a troubled wonder by some of his moral and sociological generalisations. Behind the admirable learning of the later scholar we find a vaccillation of judgment which seems to be almost in the ratio of his research, and which can hardly be set down to scientific caution, seeing that on the deepest issues of

historical philosophy he habitually generalises with all the confidence of the pulpit. And the phenomenon is common. The earlier writers investigate slightly, but reason vigorously; the later writers investigate many details, but reason feebly or timidly on general principles. Even in the abundant and valuable sociological historiography of France we seem to see the same tendency. Guizot, like Hallam, was a more exact student than his predecessors; and, living in a less reactionary atmosphere, he was much more energetic than Hallam in the theoretic way. In our own day his history of French civilisation is ostensibly superseded by that of M. Rambaud; but it can hardly be said that M. Rambaud, with all his knowledge and good sense, is on the whole more luminous than his more erratic precursor. So, in Germany, Mommsen, erudition apart, is certainly not a sounder or deeper historical thinker than Heeren, or even than Niebuhr, both of whom, if they fell into errors of apriorism, were incapable of the indulgence in race prejudice which Mommsen so frequently permits himself, to say nothing of the chaos of pragmatism into which he falls when he would philosophise on such phenomena as those of Roman religion. And while some of the later German specialists have done much sound and sober work, the historians proper, perhaps recoiling from the verbalism of Hegel and his school, so entirely shun theory—unless it be of the blatant patriotic sort—that they hardly influence political philosophy at all.

Historiography is in itself a sociological phenomenon, and the patriotic or racial bias just mentioned is to be noted as a product of the special political conditions of our age. One of the chief of them is the deliberate

development, under the auspices of Bismarck, of a gospel of national egoism in terms of quasi-philosophy. Hegel gave the lead when he constructed a political philosophy in the interests of the reconstructed Prussian system; and since 1860 German historians have supplied the demand for patriotic and racial doctrine in a fashion not to be matched for *naïveté*, not to say puerility, since the Middle Ages. In Mommsen, though he has only incidental opportunities for airing it, the tendency becomes unpardonable. If we looked to the work of the first quarter of the century, when Germany was still cosmopolitan throughout, we should be inclined to say that nothing is more un-German than this prejudice; but it is really a degeneration not merely from the older German breadth of view, but from the temper of the whole historical science of Europe in the latter part of last century. The change is seen in French writers of the Restoration, and in some French and English writers of yesterday; the vitiating gospel of race, turned even to Teutonic account, is seen in the two Thierrys; again, with a difference, in Michelet; yet again in Taine; and among ourselves in Carlyle, in Froude, with special excess in Freeman, and in some degree even in Green. It all represents a descent below the imperfect science of Montesquieu and Voltaire.

Few students, I believe, have yet realised how comprehensive was the suspension of scientific thought on social law after the French Revolution—how abundant was sociological discussion before, how restricted and short-sighted under the reaction, at least in England. I have been at some pains to show at how many points I have found my own generalisations had been antici-

pated by the Scotch and French sociologists of last century. Such acknowledgments are seldom necessary as regards the historians of the latter half of the present century. They yield, as the old phrase goes, immense information but little knowledge, either treating the demand for generalising ideas as a dangerous taste or supplying ideas which stand for no effort of thought at all comparable to their pains in amassing facts. Had Freeman's General Sketch of European History been made as long as that of Koch (1790 and later) it would still have been, as it actually is, inferior to that in instructiveness, actuality, and real comprehension, however much it might make parade of the "comparative method" and of exact scholarship.

It is true that even during the period of maximum reaction against the French Revolution there was arising in England a school of economists who, taking their departure from the work of Adam Smith, really did contribute to the foundation of a social science. At a time when these thinkers are being obstinately disparaged because they did not go further, because they sought or were content only to elaborate a mercantilist economics without reconstructing social ethics or aiming at a complete humanistic economics, it becomes necessary in the very interests of a comprehensive social science to point out that they were substantially among its promoters, and not among its frustrators. A methodically restricted analysis is perfectly legitimate so far as it goes, and may prove the best means towards one more comprehensive. The criticism to which the "orthodox" economists were and are justly open is that their analysis was at some vital points unscientific

and erroneous; and that in particular they constantly evaded or obscured the vitally important mercantilist problem of the process of money-saving. With this error they were charged in their own day, but without any effect on their doctrine or its acceptance; hence, no doubt, a real retardation of social science. But on other sides they were not frustrative or fallacious; and in connection with their school there were produced many isolated works of unsystematic social science, which compare very favourably with the whole output of to-day.

Such works as those of the elder Samuel Laing (the *Notes of a Traveller*, the *Journal of a Residence in Norway*, and *A Tour in Sweden*), and Joseph Kay's *Social Condition and Education of the People in England and Europe* (1850), are not easily to be matched in their kind in our own time for constant breadth and sagacity of reflection on social phenomena; and even where they maintain what would in their own day and now be called Philistine positions they tend to do it with an amount of critical energy not always exhibited by their more æsthetically-minded antagonists. Laing, indeed, illustrates very strikingly the relative tendencies of the older speculative and the later narrative method. When he reasons *a priori* as to the conditions and aspects of early English rural life he naturally goes astray: we have only to consult such specialists as Mr. Seebohm and Professor Ashley to ascertain as much; but despite the blanks in his real knowledge he is a more philosophic and instructive observer of social life wherever he goes than almost any later traveller who can be mentioned. Less brilliant and less literary than M. Taine, he is a

safer guide. And alongside of such observers, English politics fifty years ago had in Richard Cobden a kind of popular publicist who, for his combination of comprehensive principles with really relevant knowledge, is not surpassed by his more literate successors on his own side. These men had a clear and arguable philosophy of conduct, national and individual; and we may say broadly of the Manchester school so-called that it was much more rationally conscientious, and therefore more truly humanistic, than the school now in the political ascendant, which really develops and exaggerates all the defects of the Manchester school under names which nominally repudiate its ideals.

The accumulated knowledge of the last generation, in short, has not been even partially assimilated in the sphere of practice; and there has been no steady development, in that sphere, of either the general sociology of last century or the best economic sociology of the "Manchester" period. Professor Vinogradoff of St. Petersburg, in the able introduction to his valuable study of *Villainage in England*, dwells on the growing superiority of the later historians of social conditions as regards exactness of knowledge and caution in generalisation. I am fain to urge that the process of generalisation is passing altogether out of use, leaving us mere masses of facts that do not instruct us. The Professor's own work compares significantly, on this head, with those of such of his predecessors as Palgrave and Kemble. Mr. Seebohm, again, prefaced his excellent treatise on *The English Village Community* with a plea for the study of the past to the end of regulating the present or guiding the future. But are the students or

the citizens in any way acting upon that counsel? My fear is that they are not. The latest historian of medieval London, expert in all matters of ancient documents, incidentally comments on the modern Irish problem in the language of ordinary English prejudice,[1] even as did Mr. Pearson a generation ago. Such students have gained no political wisdom from their research. Our students, roughly speaking, are apparently ceasing to be practical, and our practical men are apparently ceasing to be students.

Now, such lop-sided development cannot but be harmful in practice. The practical problem grows more pressing, more susceptible of hasty and incompetent handling by those who proceed on their first impulses; and all the while the student of past development gets further aloof from the issue which he ought to illuminate. By the very fact of his attitude and spirit of specialism he is in no expert attitude to the living problem, which he too often faces in what Professor Mahaffy calls the "elderly" temper.

The last-named writer has the high merit of handling things ancient in a living and vivacious way, feeling instinctively, one can see, the psychological continuity of politics, and carrying deeper, at times, than did his predecessors, that process of penetration by which Grote and other English historians, accustomed to democratic politics, admittedly comprehended Greek history more fully than did the Germans who lacked such experience. But Professor Mahaffy at the same time exemplifies the snares of such an undertaking. To one of another way of thinking, he seems a partisan

[1] J. H. Round, *The Commune of London*, 1899, pp. 138-40.

first and a sociologist afterwards; and he is himself at times an example of the "elderly" spirit, refusing to submit his own predilections to scientific treatment, and imposing them wilfully on his subject matter. In the end, after leading us at times to hope for a truly sociological survey of Greek history from his pen, he has produced one on "the Chatauquan idea," which is definitively inadequate.

The final sociological criticism of such treatises as those of Professor Mahaffy is that they are explicitly anti-progressive. Always insisting on the unfitness of masses for self-rule, they do nothing to make them more fit; preferring to wall in the ideal of progress and to consecrate social inequality. With such mere fulminations of class bias, social science can have little to do. If sociology stands for anything, it stands for the approving recognition of developments, of betterments, as well as of declines, in human affairs. If self-development is a good for any man, it is a good for all; and apart from any question of bias, social science of its very nature must contemplate the further extension of what has extended in the past, the continuance of social law, the further play of forces recognised as persistent. It must equally recognise, of course, the play of counter forces, the frustration of one tendency by another; but no experience thus far can entitle any man to predict a perpetual see-saw or balance of tendencies. If a scientific man should ever come to such a conclusion, he will put it as an avowal of reluctant pessimism, not as a complacent propaganda. But Professor Mahaffy does not scruple to ground his gospel of political

inequality and exclusiveness on his theosophy and his Christianity.[1]

On the other part, we have a valuable and growing sociological literature in which, despite striking exceptions, the prevailing tendency is still to discuss theory *in vacuo* or in abstraction as regards at least the higher civilisations. Far be it from me even to seem to make this a ground of detraction as regards such admirable works as the *Dynamic Sociology* of Professor Lester Ward and the *Principles of Sociology* of Professor Giddings, to both of which I owe no less encouragement than enlightenment. I do but urge that they should be followed by works of historico-critical verification, were it only to establish their sound lessons against error. In the words of Professor Giddings: "History without deductive illumination is chaos. Deduction without verification is undoubtedly the very 'light that never was on sea or land.'" The forceful example of Mr. Spencer, in seeking the principles of sociology among the lower societies—as if in the conviction that we thus get as it were the anatomy or permanent laws of all society—is still potent, despite great advances on his method; so that neither is our history truly sociological nor our sociology avowedly historical. Our sympathetic quasi-sociological historians, like Mr. Green, leave us asking for a more judicial method; our more judicial historians, like Mr. Gardiner, who has produced a very stimulating *Introduction to the Study of English History* (1881) besides offering an abundance of general verdicts in his valuable History of the Jacobean and Caroline periods, leave us seeking for a more scientific

[1] *Survey of Greek Civilisation*, 1897, preface.

analysis. Holding with Mr. Lester Ward that sociology runs a risk of becoming a dead science if divorced from constructive purpose, and holding with Buckle that history without scientific generalisation has little intellectual value, I have here aimed at turning history to sociological account, and at making sociology yield social guidance—that is, in the indirect way in which alone, as is well contended by MM. Langlois and Seignobos, history can give such lessons.[1] The sociologist will find, I hope, some illustrations in these pages for some of the most modern theories of his science, which I have not here discussed; and the special student of political science so-called will at least find a little concrete matter whereon to use his tools.

In the hands of some of its most accomplished cultivators, that science is found finally yielding a mere blank commission to the student who would fain be practical. A numerous and distinguished school continue to press upon us the quaint theory that the French Revolution came about because political theorists last century did not pay proper heed to Genesis as an historical document, and instead preached anew the formulas of the "State of Nature" and "The Social Contract." Sir Frederick Pollock, one of the chief ornaments of this school, begins and ends a survey of political philosophy, as did Mr. Tremenheere before him, with the advice "Back to Aristotle"—Aristotle, who could not see the unfitness of slavery as a foundation for the "good life" he inculcated, and whose formula of "the good life," by itself, is surely rather vaguer than any formula about the Rights of Man.

[1] *Introduction aux études historiques*, 1897, pp. 277-79, 288.

But where Aristotle is constructive, neither Mr. Tremenheere nor Sir Frederick has a word to say about acting on his teaching. For such conservative thinkers, Aristotle is a merely negative authority. Mr. Tremenheere considered himself to have disposed of nascent Socialism a generation ago by pointing out that it had been confuted two thousand years before; as if everything else had not been as much confuted when free Greece went under. To-day, with Socialism waxing and refusing to hold itself confuted by the ancients, Sir Frederick Pollock does not even suggest how much of the Socialism of Aristotle would be "good life" for us. The one thing he is positive about is that we must not again meddle with "the Social Contract."

Well, we are now as completely done with the Social Contract as with the cosmology and ethnology and sociology of Genesis; but the spirit which drove our predecessors to *a priori* formulas for grounds of social reconstruction is apparently as vigorous to-day as ever, albeit much less turbulent for the time being. The part of wise men, then, would seem to be, to think how best it can be helped rationally to its end, lest haply it should once more grasp thereat blindly and ruinously, to the cry of some newer formula than the Social Contract. That other of the Rights of Man has a great deal of adaptability, and is really not to be fought by the mere reiteration of Aristotle's "good life," which on the contrary would serve very well to the same end. Instead of tags of Aristotle, the situation seems to need concrete prescriptions in terms of a wider survey than Aristotle's, to be made, let us hope, with some gain from his method and sagacity.

As against the negative results reached by the school which handles only problems of abstract political ethics, it is significant that Dr. Cunningham, making his survey of Roman economic development without any bias in favour of Socialism—of which he notes rather the dangers than the possibilities—comes to the conclusion that "It is only under very special conditions, including the existence of a strong government to exercise a constant control, that free play for the formation of associations of capitalists bent on securing profit is anything but a public danger"; and he cautiously sums up that "The problem of leaving sufficient liberty for the formation of capital, and for enterprise in the use of it, without allowing it licence to exhaust the national resources, has not been solved." He even pronounces that "it was the disgrace of the Roman people in the time of the Republic that they made no attempt to solve this problem."[1] Without raising the issue as to "disgrace," we may surely say that there is a singular futility in all our studies of history if we cannot learn from them something as to our own problems, or at least as to the need of seeking to solve them.

This, it will be remembered, was the professed doctrine of the late Sir John Seeley. "It is a favourite maxim of mine," he wrote at the outset of his *Expansion of England*, "that history, while it should be scientific in its method, should pursue a practical object. That is, it should not merely gratify the reader's curiosity about the past, but modify his view of the present and his forecast of the future." Here, it may be said, is the very ideal that I have represented as

[1] *Western Civilisation*, p. 165.

missing recognition. It is with reluctance that I revert to this case; but I am constrained to urge, though the criticism may be turned against my own prescription, that the *Expansion of England* is rather a miscarriage than an application of the principle in hand. With much brilliancy and suggestiveness in narrative, it yields neither an induction nor a deduction. Entirely excluding all study of the essential problem, that of the reactions of expansion on home life; treating the whole political problem solely in terms of that very expansion of which we are to judge the expediency, it finally does but balance between ideals, alternately repudiating newspaper optimism and applying it. In so far as it turns for light to comparative history it makes no use of any sociological hint thereby obtainable; since it flatly takes for granted (p. 304) that Oriental empire cannot react on English methods as the Roman empire did on Rome. Substantially, the book is a vivacious study *in vacuo*, constantly suggesting a possession of superior light but communicating none; somewhat as, in the opinion of some of us, the accomplished author did in the discussions he raised on the problems of religion. Too intelligent and perceptive ever to fail of being suggestive and interesting, he somehow never reached solutions, or even conclusions. Even Freeman is at times more fruitful.

If it be replied that the failure of such a student in such an undertaking is a proof *a fortiori* that the undertaking is vain—that where Seeley miscarried, I need not think to fare better, and that I am discrediting my own advice,—I can but answer that the application given by English university thought at present to any critical

method is not in my opinion decisive of its possibilities. I am not presumptuous enough to doubt the presence of endless potentiality in the groups of highly trained specialists there assembled, but I venture to suspect the environment, the traditions, of standing in the way of vital criticism. When our English universities actually do seek to grapple with modern problems by the light of modern thought, it is surprising how far mere party prejudice can determine the procedure. Their "solid" work lies in the study of facts as to which students can be easily and effectively "examined"; when it comes to general principles, their methods seem to be far from "solid." I learn that in a certain Oxford college there was recently set as an essay-subject in preparation for "Greats" the question: "What support does Socialism receive from the doctrine of evolution?" and that the books recommended to the students for special study were Mr. Kidd's *Social Evolution* and Mr. Mallock's *Social Progress*—two treatises which, not to speak it profanely, are respectively pleas for customary irrationalism in religion and commercialist conservatism in politics, and both paralogisms at that. In no continental or American university probably could two such books be so founded on; and on such a basis no true social science can be reached. Such methods go some little way to explain the singular judgments on modern politics disclosed to us in some of the collected letters of the late Professor Jowett, so perspicacious a mind in the field of his special scholarship. For the time being, however, such books represent the output of English political thought as apart from the (latterly) dwindling literature of Socialism, Liberalism so-called being almost

destitute of scientific propaganda; and even when a learned and sober specialist like Dr. Cunningham puts a Liberal view of economic and culture-history, he is found to lend colour to the traditionalist view in respect of his occasional acceptance of the old formulas which explain national differences as innate, and national developments as the result of the qualities developed. Against alike the obscurantist and the verbalist forms of doctrine, the following pages are directed.

But let me not seem to claim for this scanty introduction anything like a fulfilment of what is here declared to be needful. It is but an effort to survey the ground in what I hold to be the right direction; and I can but hope that by setting up as it seeks to do a series of provocations to the study and discussion of tendencies and principles, it will help to provide what safeguards are needed to its own errors. In this concern for fresh discussion is to be found the only excuse I can offer for what may seem a disproportionate attention to certain historical problems and certain ethical issues.

JOHN M. ROBERTSON.

NOTE

The series of biographical studies to which this treatise forms the introduction, is in preparation.

PART I

POLITICAL EVOLUTION

CHAPTER I

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

§ 1

POLITICS, in its most general and fundamental character, is the strife of wills on the ground of social action. As international politics is the sum of the strifes and compromises of States, so home politics is the sum of the strifes and compromises of classes, interests, factions, sects, theorists.

This may seem too obvious and simple a truth to need formal telling; and yet no truth is more often missed or set aside by writers who deal with political history. The past course of nations, when it is sought to be explained at all, is by two writers out of three accounted for by certain supposed qualities of character in the given nation as a whole, instead of by the specially conditioned play of forces common to all nations. For instance, M. Taine, in the preface to the first volume of his fascinating work, *Les Origines de la France Contemporaine*, goes about to justify his own political indifferentism by stating that in eighty years his country had thirteen times changed its constitution. "*We*," he says, have done this; and "*we* have not

yet found that which suits *us*."[1] It is here implied that a body of men seeking for a fixed constitution have failed, and that the failure is discreditable—that those who thus seek and fail have been badly employed. It is by implication denied that successive changes of a constitution may fitly be regarded as a process of growth and healthy adjustment of parts: the ideal of political health is assumed to be a state of fixity. Thus does indifferentism, naturally if not necessarily, miss the point of view from which itself is to be studied as one of the forces whose conflict the true historian ought to analyse. There is no national "we" aiming collectively at a fixed and final constitution; nor are the successive constitutions of France as such more significant of failure or permanent harm than the successive changes in the professedly unchanged constitution of Great Britain, though the violent kinds of change are as such harmful. If M. Taine had but applied with rigour the logic he once before prescribed, soundly if wittily, for all problems alike, he could not have begun his history with that delusive abstraction of a one-minded community, failing to achieve "their" or "its" purpose. "*Je n'en sais rien*," he remarks with a shrug, over the protest of M. Royer-Collard that certain scientific reasoning will make Frenchmen revolutionary; "*Est-ce qu'il y a des Français?*"[2] In dead earnest he now assumes that France consists just of

[1] Similarly De Tocqueville begins *L'Ancien Régime et la Révolution* with "*Les Français ont fait . . .*" (Avant Propos, 2e éd. p. 5) and makes the successors of the Revolutionists "*les mêmes Français*" (p. 12). Soon he makes the Revolution an entity (p. 35). Compare with Taine's passage the programme of the first number of Le Play's *La Réforme Sociale*, 1881 (cited by H. Higgs, *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Boston, July 1890, p. 418), which might almost have been written by Taine. In the case of Le Play the ideal of a quasi-patriarchal order, very stable and very fixed, led to an attitude resembling at points that of Taine. It is easy to see how the natural recoil from political turmoil has, since the French Revolution, developed successive schools such as those of Saint Simon, Comte, and Le Play, all aiming at stability and order, all seeking to elbow out the cosmic force of Change. In Taine's case the result was an acceptance of Spencer's "administrative nihilism."

[2] *Les Philosophes Classiques du XIXe Siècle en France*, 3ième éd. p. 37.

Frenchmen, whose constitution-building is a corporate attempt to build a French house to live in; when all that is truly historical in his own book goes to show clearly enough that French constitutions, like every other, are products of ever-varying and conflicting passions and interests of sets of people in France who are "Frenchmen" merely when they happen to act in concert against other geographical groups. At no moment were all of the French people consenting parties to any one of the thirteen constitutions. Then there was no collective failure.

Of course M. Taine knew this well enough in his capacity of narrator; but as teacher he could not escape from the rut dug for his thought by his fatalism. He must needs make the synthetic abstraction of "we," which excludes the political analysis essential to any practical explanation; and it inevitably followed that his generalisations were merely pseudo-biological, and not what is most wanted in history—sociological truth rooted in psychology and biology. In denuding himself alike of hopes and fears, M. Taine really gave the great illustration of the truth of his own penetrating comment on Mérimée,[1] that he who will be duped by nothing ends in being the dupe of his distrust. He will not be duped by this ideal or that; he will not care enough for any to have a strong wish to see it realised; and so he comes to be duped by the wish to disprove all, to work down all sociology to the plane of cynical pseudo-biology. The enthusiastic amateur can show it,

[1] *Lettres de Prosper Mérimée à une Inconnue*, préf. *end.* When, however, M. Taine wrote on Sainte-Beuve's death (1869), he laid down, as one of the necessities of the search for "the true truth," this very determination "to be the dupe of nothing and nobody, above all of oneself" (*Derniers Essais*, p. 52). Years before an acute critic had said of his literary criticism: "M. Taine, at bottom, let us say it with bated breath, is the dupe of himself when he supposes himself to have given a rigorous formula, an exact definition, a chemical analysis of his author" (Frédéric Morin, *Les Hommes et les livres contemporains*, 1862, p. 33). Compare the brochure of Professor Edouard Droz, *La Critique Littéraire et la Science*, 1893, discussed in the present writer's *New Essays towards a Critical Method*, 1897, p. 13 sq.

can convict the critic of hearing only the devil's advocate in every moral process,[1] and of becoming at length the historic oracle of those, of all readers, who are most alien to his philosophy.

Such an outcome, in the work of such a critic, is vividly instructive. At worst, indeed, he has a positive value as the extremest reactionist against the merely partisan method of history, which is almost all we have had in England since the French Revolution, down to the other day. After M. Taine has passed, fools' paradises must needs fall in market value. But when the devil's advocate has made his round, we must still plough and eat, and the paradises must just be laid out for new sowing. The evil of theoretical extremes is properly not their falsehood, but their irrelevance. If we are to instruct each other in conduct, it must be in terms of sympathies and antipathies; and if we are to profit by a study of politicians, who are among the most generally typical of men, and of politics, which is the expression of so much of life, we must go about it as humanists and not as fatalists.

§ 2

Humanity, however, will not suffice to save us from false philosophy if, as humanists, we seek to gain our polemical ends by M. Taine's didactic methods. He, naturally so much of an analyst, took to pseudo-synthesis when he wished with little labour to discredit certain popular aspirations. But pseudo-synthesis is the favourite expository process of many men with ardent aspirations, and of many writers who are friendly enough to the aspirations of their fellows. By pseudo-synthesis I mean that process, above exemplified, of "cooking" an intricate moral problem by setting up one or more

[1] See *Napoléon et ses détracteurs*, par le Prince Napoléon, p. 13, and *passim*.

imaginary entities, to whose volition or potency the result is attributed. It was the method of medieval science; and it is still popular among the experts as well as the amateurs of historical science. It was the ordinary expedient of Comte, in whose pages history becomes a Jonsonian masque of personified abstractions. But hear a learned and judicious English Liberal, not suspected of doctrinary extravagance:—

"As in time past Rome had sacrificed domestic freedom that she might be the mistress of others, so now" [in the later empire] "to be universal she, the conqueror, had descended to the level of the conquered" [in respect of Caracalla's edict giving to all subjects of the empire the rights of Roman citizenship]. "But the sacrifice had not wanted its reward. From her came the laws and the language that had overspread the world: at her feet the nations laid the offerings of their labour: she was the head of the empire and of civilisation."[1]

The "she" of this passage I take to be as purely an imaginary entity as Phlogiston; and it is not easy to see how a method of explanation which in physical science is found not so much barren as nocuous can give any edification in the study of history. To say nothing of the familiar explanation that Caracalla's sole motive in conferring the citizenship on the provincials was the desire to lay on them corresponding taxes,[2] the proposition has no footing in political actualities. "Rome's self-abnegation that she might Romanise the world"[3] expresses no fact in Roman thought and deed: it is not the mention of a sentiment which swayed men's action, but the attempt to reduce a medley of actions to the semblance of a joint volition. There was no "Rome" capable of "self-abnegation" and susceptible of "reward." Why then should it be said? It is said either because the writer permits himself to fill in a

[1] Professor Bryce, *The Holy Roman Empire*, 8th ed. p. 7.
[2] Gibbon, ch. vi. (Bohn ed. i. pp. 201, 212-13).
[3] Bryce, p. 9.

perspective with a kind of pigment which he would not for a moment employ in his foreground, or because he is still too much under the sway of old methods to realise the nullity of their formulas when he is generalising conventional knowledge instead of analytically reaching new.[1] Either way the lapse is only too intelligible. And if an innovating expert, dealing with old facts, runs such risks, great must be those run by plain people when they seek to attain a generalised knowledge of facts which are the battle-ground of current ideals. Only by perpetual analysis can we hope partly to escape the snare of the pseudo-synthetic, the traps of rhetoric and exegetic fiction.

§ 3

The term pseudo-synthesis implies, of course, that there may be a true synthesis. What is necessary to such synthesis is that there shall have been a preliminary analysis ; but a synthesis once justly made is the greatest of helps to new analyses. Now there is one such, which may safely be brought to bear on the study of practical politics, because it is an axiom alike of inorganic physics and of biology, and a commonplace of human science, though seldom used as a means of historic generalisation. This is the simple principle that all energy divides ostensibly into forces of attraction and of repulsion.

The principle thus stated should be compared with the theorem of Kant as to the correlative forces of sociability and unsociability (*Idee zu einer allgemein Geschichte*), and the important and luminous formula of Professor Giddings, that all sociological processes, properly so called, turn upon "consciousness of kind" (*Principles of*

[1] A different explanation holds in the case of Hegel, who—after very pointedly affirming that "nothing great in the world has been accomplished without passion" (*Leidenschaft*), in the sense of individual interest and self-seeking aim, and that "an individual is such and such a one, not a man in general, for that is not an existence, but one in particular" (*Philos. der Geschichte*, 2te Aufl. p. 30)—proceeds to express historical processes in terms of universal spirit, abstract universality, and so forth. Here the trouble is the cherished tendency to verbal abstraction.

Sociology, 1896, 3rd ed. pp. 17-19, and Preface; and in earlier writings by Professor Giddings, there mentioned). The scientific value of that formula is obvious; but other ways of stating the case may still serve a purpose. The view in the text I find to have been partly anticipated by Shaftesbury, *Essay on the Freedom of Wit and Humour*, 1709, part iii. § 2 (*Characteristics*, ed. 1733, i. pp. 111-12), who is followed by Eusèbe Salverte, *De la Civilisation depuis les premiers temps historiques*, 1813, p. 53. Shaftesbury even anticipates in part the formula of Professor Giddings, in the passage: "If anything be natural, in any Creature or any Kind, 'tis that which is preservative of the Kind itself," and in the sequel. As Professor Giddings traces (pref. to 3rd ed. p. x.) the first suggestion of his "consciousness of kind" to Adam Smith's *Theory of the Moral Sentiments*, which is certainly in the line of descent from Shaftesbury, there may really be a causal connection.

That principle obviously holds of the relations of men in society as it does of their muscular action and of their moral and intellectual life; and so fundamental is the fact that when we study human history in view of it, we find it more and more difficult to suppose that it will ever cease to hold. That is to say, it is almost impossible to conceive a state of life in which the forces of attraction and repulsion shall not operate energetically in the moral and intellectual relations of human beings. And so difficult is it, that at once many observers leap from the general principle to the particular conclusion that all the *modes* in which the action and reaction, the attractions and repulsions of individuals and groups, have operated in the past, must needs operate in the future. They conclude, that is, that the particular phenomenon of WAR, above all, is chronic, and can never definitively disappear. Thus M. Zola, looking around him and finding strife everywhere, decides that all the past *forms* of strife are inevitably recurrent.[1] It may be well at the outset to insist that the general principle involves no such particular necessity.

War is simply a form in which the instincts of

[1] Cited by Tolstoi, *The Kingdom of God is Within You*, ch. vi. *end.*

attraction and repulsion have operated in human societies during ages in which certain psychological and physiological types have been normal. It may very well recur, with growing infrequency, for a long time to come; but it is not at all to be regarded as a necessary function of the grand biological forces. What does seem certain is a different thing, that the forces of attraction and repulsion will always operate in *some* form; and that the very fact of their finding less expression in the mode of physical strife will imply their coming into play in other modes, such as the strifes of ideals, doctrines, and class interests as they are expressed in politics without bloodshed. The general law is that the forces of attraction and repulsion, as exhibited in human thought or feeling, run during the earlier stages of growth in channels which may be broadly regarded as animal; and that when altered political and social conditions partly or wholly close these channels, the biological forces open for themselves new ones.

CHAPTER II

ROMAN POLITICAL EVOLUTION

§ 1

A GLANCE at the ancient history best known to us may help to make the point clearer. The habit of summing up all Roman history as so many actions of "the Romans," or of "Rome," is in singular contrast with the imbroglio of the records. In late republican Rome we see a society which has already exhibited changes in the channels of the forces of union and strife, inasmuch as after the prehistoric tribal coalitions and the Etruscan conquest there had occurred strifes of classes, of the "haves" and "have-nots," apart from tribal distinctions; and social and political concessions had been won by the plebs. The tyranny of the king unifies the patricians and free citizens: the increasing outlaw plebs is unified by its sheer need;[1] and the distinctions of family and clan are swallowed up in the common case of poverty, debt, and servitude. In the doubtful transition period, as the tradition goes, it is in the time of discontented plebeian subjection, after

[1] Sallust preserved the belief (accepted by Niebuhr) that the oppression of the poor by the rich had been restrained under the kings. (Cited by Augustine, *De Civ. Dei*, iii. 16.) Cp. Mr. Mahaffy (*Problems in Greek History*, pp. 81-83; *Social Life in Greece*, 3rd ed. p. 83) and Wachsmuth (*Historical Antiquities of the Greeks*, Eng. tr. i. 416) as to Greek despots.

the expulsion of the King (B.C. 510), that the Etruscan enemy captures the city (497); and the surmise that the battle of Lake Regillus was not really a Roman victory[1] is partly strengthened by the fact that soon after it there occur the tumults of the *nexi* and the successful Secession of the Plebs (493). Though that event follows on successful campaigns against the Volscians, there is a presumption that only from a weakened patriciate, forced to seek union, could the plebs have won their tribunate and enfranchisement. On the other hand, it is after victories over the Volscians that the consul Spurius Cassius, who had proposed to divide among landless men the land conquered from the Hernicans, is said to have been executed (485) by the triumphant aristocracy; and it is in another period of security, when the Veientines and Sabines are depressed (473), that the tribune Cneius Genucius is murdered, for having ventured to bring a consular to trial. While Rome thrives, a new project for democratic law reform is defeated (462); and it is after Cincinnatus barely saves the State (458) that the tribunes are raised from five to ten, and land is divided among the poor (456), though at the same time decemvirs are appointed and the conservative Twelve (at first Ten) Tables are drawn up (451-450). Thus partially strengthened, the plebs are able soon to force the abdication of the decemvirate (449) by the old menace of their withdrawal; and for a time the democracy sufficiently holds its own, getting the institution of military tribunes with consular power, and the legalisation of marriage between patrician and plebeian; though fresh distribution of land is prevented, and the patricians learn to divide the tribunes against each

[1] Niebuhr, *Lect.* xxv. 3rd Eng. ed. p. 134. So Ihne. Mommsen takes the traditional view. Compare Shuckburgh (*History of Rome*, p. 71) who remarks that the battle was at least not a decisive victory. Meyer (*Geschichte des Alterthums*, ii. 812) gives no verdict.

other, and class dissension goes on till the Gauls capture the city (390), multitudes of the Romans flying to Veii. Then it is that the plebeian party, after the Gauls have gone, are willing to transfer the seat of government to Veii; and the threat would doubtless win them some concessions in the rebuilding of Rome. But population always blindly increases; the cancer of poverty spreads, despite the planting of colonies; and at length, after minor measures of relief, the Licinian laws, relieving debtors and limiting estates, are proposed (376), and passed at the crisis (367) at which the Gauls (who themselves had in the meantime undergone dissensions) again attack Rome. This makes a temporary palliation, and in time the now privileged plebeians[1] lean to the patrician side and status; while fresh wars with Hernicans, Gauls, Etruscans, and Samnites, check class strife, and the patricians recover preponderance. But increase of plebeian poverty causes reactions; and after a mutiny, futile laws are passed prohibiting interest (342), which had previously been limited (347); the dictator Publilius carries popular political laws checking the power of the Senate; and debtors are once more protected (326). After many wars, popular distress causes a last Secession of the Plebs (287) and new political concessions to them; but still wars multiply, till Italy is Romanised (266): the now mixed warlike aristocracy of birth and office monopolises power in the Senate; and the plebs gradually ceases to be a distinct moral force, its last great struggle being made under the Gracchi, to whom it gives no valid support.

[1] Plebeians first admitted to the Consulate, B.C. 366; to the Dictatorship, 356; to the Censorship, 351; to the Prætorship, 337; to the Quæstorship, 321. This left the patricians in possession of the important privilege of membership of the sacred colleges. But that in turn was opened to plebeians in 296.

§ 2

The effect of continuous foreign war in sapping democracy is here plain. Not only is popular discontent put off by the prospect of foreign plunder, but the perpetual state of aggressive war, while tending first to pauperise most of the small cultivators who make the army, breeds a new public spirit on a low plane, a sinister fraternity of conquest. Ethics must needs worsen throughout the State when the primitive instinct of strife developed into a policy of plunder. When a political machinery was set up that conduced to systematic and extending warfare in which the commonwealth was often at stake, the community had a new but fatal bond of cohesion, and the destructive or repulsive energies for generations found a wide field outside of the State. It is when the aristocratic Republic, succeeding finally in the long struggle with Carthage for the wealth of Sicily and Spain and the control of the Mediterranean, has further overrun Greece and pretty well exhausted the immediate fields of conquest, that the forces of repulsion again begin to work within the body politic itself, and men and classes become the fools of their animosities. The wars of faction, the popular propaganda of the Gracchi, and the domestic strifes of Marius and Sulla, all in turn represent the renewed operation within the State of the crude energies of cohesion and strife which had been so long employed in foreign war. And the strife is worse than before, because the materials are more complex and more corrupt. The aristocracy are more arrogant and hardened, the free farmer class has in large part disappeared, and the populace are more debauched.[1] The

[1] A writer in many respects instructive (W. Warde Fowler, *The City State of the Greeks and Romans*, 1893, p. 194), in pursuance of the thesis that "the Romans" had an "innate political wisdom" and an "inborn genius" for accommodation,

perpetual wars had multiplied slaves; and the slaves added a new and desperate element to the social problem. But the fatality of war was as irresistible as the fatality of plebeian degradation; and the collapse of the slave war in Sicily (132), and the political movement of the Gracchi, alongside of the new warlike triumphs in Spain and Southern Gaul (121—the first great successes since the fall of Carthage) illustrate the general principle that a ruling class or house may always reckon on checking domestic criticism and popular self-assertion by turning the animal energies of the people to animal strife with another nation, in which case union correlates with strife. Wars imply comradeship and popular sympathy; and a war with Illyria was made the pretext for suspending the operation of the new land law passed by the elder Gracchus when the younger later sought to carry it out. The triumphs of Marius, again, over Jugurtha and the Cimbri, availed nothing to unify the parties in the State, or to secure his own. The tendency of all classes in Rome to unite against the claims of the outside Italians was from the first a stumbling-block to the democrats within Rome; and the final identification of the popular interest, in the period of Marius and Sulla, with an anti-Roman policy among the Marians, gave to Sulla, strong in the prestige of recent conquest, the position of advantage, apart from his own strength. Further, as Montesquieu very justly notes, civil wars turn an entire nation into soldiers, and give it a formidable advantage over its enemies when it regains unity.[1]

speaks of the process of democratic self-assertion and aristocratic concession as "leaving no bad blood behind," this when social disease was spreading all round. The theorem of "national genius" will suffice to wreck any exposition, however judicious otherwise.

[1] *Considérations sur les causes de la grandeur des Romains, et de leur décadence*, ch. xi. He refers to the many cases in point in modern European history.

§ 3

The animal energies themselves, however, are affected by domestic conditions; and when Cæsar comes on the scene, Rome is visibly far on the way to a state of things such as had long before appeared in older civilisations, a state of things commonly but rather loosely called degenerate, in which the animal energies are grown less robust, and the life therefore in some respects more civilised; while, at the same time, there has been such psychological variation as can begin to give new and ostensibly higher channels to the immanent forces of union and strife. This is the social condition which above all lends itself to imperialism or absolute monarchy; which system in turn best maintains itself by a policy of conquest, so employing the animal energies and keeping up the cohesive force of militarist pride throughout all classes. Even now, of course, in a semi-enslaved populace, as in a slave population pure and simple,[1] there were possibilities of insurrection; and it was empirically politic for the emperors to give the populace its daily bread and its daily games, as well as to keep it charmed with the spectacle of conquest. The expedient of doles of food did not at once condemn itself by dangerously multiplying mouths, because, although it was only in the upper classes that men commonly refused to marry and have legitimate children, population was now restrained by the preventive checks of vice, city life, and wholesale abortion,[2] which are so much more effective than the random

[1] Compare the slave wars of Rome in Sicily with the recent disorders (1892) in the same region, and with Aristotle's testimony as to the constant tendency of the slave populations in Greece to conspire against their owners (*Politics*, ii. 9).

[2] Juvenal, *Sat.* vi. 593-96. It is uncertain whether among the ancients any prudential preventive check was thought of. On the whole question see Malthus' fourteenth chapter. Malthus, however, omits to notice that the Romans probably learned the arts of abortion from the Greeks, Egyptians, and Syrians.

resort to infanticide, though that too had greatly increased.[1]

On the other hand, as the field of practicable conquest again approaches exhaustion, nothing can hinder that people of all classes, having no ideals tending to social and intellectual advance, and no sufficient channel for the instinct of union in the politics of the autocracy, shall find some channels of a new kind.[2] These arise in due course, and take the shape especially of religious combinations or churches. Such modes had appeared even in the earlier stages of civic disintegration, when the semi-private or sectarian cults had begun to compete with the public or civic. They did so by virtue of appealing more freshly and directly to the growths of emotional feeling (the outcome in part of physiological modification)[3] which no longer found outlet in primary forms, such as warfare and primitive revelry. After having themselves consented in times of panic to the introduction of several cults in the name of the public interest, the ruling classes, instinctively conservative by virtue of the law of their existence, take fright at the startling popularity of the unofficial Bacchic mysteries, and decide to stamp out the movement.[4] But the attempt is futile, the causal conditions remaining; and

[1] Malthus cites Tacitus, *De Mor. Germanorum*, c. 19; Minucius Felix, c. 30; Pliny, *Nat. Hist.* xxix. 4.

[2] Cp. Shaftesbury, *Characteristics*, Treatise ii. part iii. § 2 (i. 114). Guizot seems to find the process surprising. "Singulier phénomène! C'est au moment où l'Empire se brise et disparaît, que l'Eglise chrétienne se rallie et se forme définitivement. L'unité politique périt, l'unité religieuse s'élève" (*Histoire de la civilisation en France*, éd. 1874, i. 339.) He does not recognise the case as one of cause and effect. Of course the fall of the State is not necessary to set up new combinations. It suffices that men should be without political influence or national consciousness—*e.g.* the secret societies of China.

[3] An inquiry, or series of inquiries, into the physiological side of social and political development is obviously necessary, and must be made before sociology can on this side attain scientific precision. I know, however, no general treatise on the subject except an old essay on *Changes Produced in the Nervous System by Civilisation*, by Dr. Robert Verity (2nd ed. Edinburgh, 1839). This is suggestive, but of course tentative.

[4] Livy, xxxix. 8-18.

soon Judaism, Mithraism, Osirianism, the worships of Attis, Adonis, Bacchus, Isis, Serapis, all more or less bound up with divination and sorcery, make way in the disintegrating body politic.[1] The rise of Christianity is simply the success of a system which assimilates the main attractions of these while availing itself of exoteric and democratic as well as esoteric methods, and so necessarily winning the multitude, rich as well as poor;[2] and its ultimate acceptance by the autocrat was due to the very exclusiveness which at first made it intolerable. Once diffused widely enough to set up the largest religious organisation in the empire, it became a possible instrument of centralisation and control, and as such it was accepted and employed.

And now again we see how inevitably the force of attraction correlates with the force of repulsion. The new channels of the spirit of union, being dug not by reason but by ignorance, become new channels for the reverse flow of the spirit of strife; and as sectarian zeal spreads, in the absence of openings, good or bad, for public spirit, there arise new forms of domestic hate and struggle. Crude religious fervours, excluding or arising in lack of the play of the saner and higher forms of thought and feeling, beget crude antipathies;[3] and Christianity leads back to bloody strifes and seditions such as had not been seen since the fall of the republic. There is not intellectuality enough to raise men above this new superinduced barbarism of ignorant instinct; half of the old Christendom, disintegrated like the old politics, is overrun by a more robust barbarism that adopts a simpler creed; and the new barbaric Christen-

[1] Cp. Salverte, *De la Civilisation*, p. 52.

[2] The subject is discussed in the author's paper on Mithraism in *Religious Systems of the World*.

[3] Compare recent episodes in the history of the Salvation Army in England (1890), where that body was seen prepared to practise continuous fighting. It had no thought of "Christian" conciliation.

dom exhibits in its turn all the modes of operation of the biological forces that had been seen in the old.

§ 4

No history, of course, can be altogether rounded in one formula; and it is easy to generalise Roman history on another line.[1] But on any line, a truthful generalisation will corroborate the foregoing conclusions. We may view Rome, to begin with, as a case of the unique aggrandisement of a State in virtue of fit conditions and institutions. Thus (1) the comparatively uncommercial situation of the early Latins, leaving them, beyond agriculture, no occupation save war for surplus energy and no readier way of acquiring wealth; (2) the physical collocation of a group of seven defensible hills, so close that they must needs be held by a federated group;[2] (3) the ethnic collocation of a set of tribe groups of nearly equal vigour and ardour, strengthening each other's sinews by constant struggling; (4) the creation (not prescient, but purely as a provision against kingship) of the peculiar institution of the annual consulate,[3] securing a perpetuity of motive to conquest and a continuous flow of administrative energy;[4] (5) the peculiar need, imposed by this very habit of all-round warfare, for accommodation between the ruling and ruled classes, and for the safeguarding

[1] See below, Part ii. ch. i.

[2] On this see Ihne, *Early Rome*, p. 6. Cp. Mommsen, ch. iv.

[3] This may have been set up in imitation of the Carthaginian institution of *Suffetae*, which would be well known to the Etruscans of the monarchic period, who had much traffic with Carthage. E. Meyer, *Geschichte des Alterthums*, ii. 701. But it may also be explained by the simple fact that the original army was divided into two legions (*id.* ii. 812).

[4] On this see Montesquieu, *Grandeur des Romains*, c. 1. No one has elucidated so much of Roman history in so little space as Montesquieu has done in this little book, which Buckle rightly set above the *Esprit des Lois*. (Cp. the eulogy of Taine, in his *Tite-Live*.) Its real insight may perhaps best be appreciated by comparing it with the modern work of M. Charles Gouraud, *Histoire des Causes de la Grandeur de l'Angleterre* (1856), in which it will be hard to find any specification of real causes.

of the interests of the latter by laws and franchises; (6) the central position of Rome in Italy, enabling her to subdue it piecemeal; and finally (7) the development by all these means of a specialist aristocracy, habitually trained to administration[1]—all these genetic conditions combined to build up the most remarkable military empire the world has ever seen. They obtrude, it is clear, half of the explanation of the fact that the Romans rose to empire where the much more early civilised Greek cities of Italy did not. Of the latter fact we still receive the old explanation that it came of "the habit, which had ever been the curse of Hellenism, of jealous separation and frequent war between town and town, as well as internal feuds in the several cities themselves."[2] But this is clearly no *vera causa*, as these symptoms are identical in the history of Rome itself. The determining forces must then be looked for in the special conditions. The Greeks indeed brought with them the tradition of the separate City-State; but just as the cities remained independent in Greece by reason of natural conditions,[3] so the Greek cities of Italy remained isolated and stationary at a certain strength, because their basis and way of life were commercial, so that while they restricted each other's growth or dominance they were in times of peace mutually nutritive. They wanted customers,

[1] The specification of this detail is one of the items of real explanation in Mr. Warde Fowler's scholarly and sympathetic account of the development of the Roman City State (work cited, c. viii.) He credits the Romans with an "innate genius" for combination and constitutionalism as compared with the Greeks, not noticing the fact that Roman unity was in the main a matter of conquest of non-Romans by Romans; that the conquest was furthered by the Roman institutions; that the institutions were first, so to speak, fortuitously shaped in favour of systematic war and conquest by the revolt against kingship; that war and conquest, again, were taken to almost inevitably as the main road to wealth; and that the accommodations of later times, again, were forced on the upper classes by the career of warfare, to which domestic peace was indispensable. (Cp. Hegel as to the element of coercion and patrician policy in the Roman social system. *Philos. der Gesch.*, Theil iii. Abschnitt i. Kap. i.) See below, § 6, as to the very different conditions of the Greek City-States.

[2] E. S. Shuckburgh, *History of Rome*, 1894, p. 16.

[3] See below, ch. iii. *end*; ch. iv. § 2 (*c*).

not plunder. For the Romans, plunder was the first social need, and as they began they continued.

Of course the functions that were originally determined by external conditions came in time to be initial causes—the teeth and claws, so to speak, fixing the way of life for the body politic. The upper-class Romans became, as it were, the experts, the specialists of war and empire and administration. Until they became demoralised by habitual plunder, they showed, despite their intense primeval superstition of citizenship,[1] a degree of sagacity in the conciliation of their defeated rivals which was a main cause of their being able to hold out against Hannibal, and which contrasts markedly with the oppressive and self-defeating policy of imperial Carthage, Athens, and Sparta. Pitted against any monarch, they were invincible, because an ever-growing class supplied their administrators, as the swarming provinces supplied their soldiers, and because for all alike war meant plunder and new lands, as well as glory. Pitted against a republic like Carthage, whose armies were led by a man of genius, they were still insuppressible, in that Carthage was a community of traders employing mercenaries, where Rome was a community in arms, producing generals as Carthage produced merchants. Carthage had in fact preceded Rome on the line of the evolution of class egoism. Herself an expression of the pressure of the social problem in the older Semitic world, she began as a colony, staved off domestic strife by colonies, by empire, and by doles,[2] and was already near the economic stage reached only centuries later by the Roman Empire. Save for Rome she might have endured on the imperialist basis for centuries; but, as it was, she was socially exhausted relatively to her task, depending as she did on hired foreign troops and coerced allies. It is idle to speak, as

[1] Cp. Livy, viii. 3-5.

[2] Cp. Aristotle, *Politics*, ii. 11; vi. 5.

men still do, of Hannibal's stay in Capua as a fatal mistake.[1] Had Hannibal taken Rome, the ultimate triumph of the Romans would have been just as certain. Their State was bound to outlast the other, so long as it maintained to any extent its old basis of a rural population of free cultivators, supplying a zealous soldiery, headed by a specialised class equally dependent on conquest for all advancement. For the trading Carthaginians, war was beyond a certain point a mere act of self-defence: they could not have held and administered Italy had they taken it. The supreme general could last only one lifetime: the nation of warriors yielded a succession of captains, always learning something more of war, and raising the standard of capacity as the progress of machinery widens the scope of all engineers.

The author of a recent and meritorious *History of Rome*, Mr. Shuckburgh, is satisfied to quote (p. 231) from Polybius, as explaining the fall of Carthage, the generalisation that "Italians as a nation are by nature superior to Phœnicians and Libyans both in strength of body and courage of soul," and to add: "That is the root of the matter, from which all else is a natural growth." This only leaves us asking, "What was the natural root of the alleged physiological superiority?" There must have been reasons. If they were "racial" or climatic, whence the later implied degeneration of the Romans in body or soul or both? We are driven to the explanation lying in polity and institutions, which it should have been Mr. Shuckburgh's special aim to give, undertaking as he does to deal with "the state of the countries conquered by the Romans." And such explanations are actually offered by Polybius (vi. 53).

§ 5

And yet the deterioration of the Roman State is visibly as sure a sequence as its progress. Nothing

[1] Already in Montesquieu's *Grandeur des Romains* it is pointed out that for Hannibal's soldiers, loaded with plunder, anywhere was Capua. Montesquieu rightly observes that the stock phrase on that head is one of the things everybody says because it has once been said. And it is repeated still.

that men might then have proposed could save it. To moralise on the scarcity of Catos is an ill way of spending time if it be not recognised that Catos had latterly become as impossible as eaters of acorns in the upper grades of the ever-plundering State. Cato himself is a product of the last vestiges of the stage before universal conquest; and he begins to show in his own later years all the symptoms of the period of plutocracy. We have only to ask ourselves, What was the administrative class to do? in order to see the fatality of its course. The State must needs go on seeking conquest, by reason alike of the lower-class and the upper-class problem. The administrators must administer, or rust. The monied men must have fresh plunder, fresh sources of profit. The proletaries must be either fed or set fighting, else they would clamour. And as the frontiers of resistance receded, and new war was more and more a matter of far-reaching campaigns, the large administering class at home, men of action devoid of progressive culture, ran to brutal vice and frantic sedition as inevitably as returned sailors take to debauch; while the distant leader, passing years of camp life at the head of professional troops, became more and more surely a power extraneous to the Republic. When a State comes to depend for its coherence on a standing army, the head of the army inevitably becomes the head of the State. The Republic passed into the Empire as a matter of course, the senatorial class having outlived the main conditions of its health and stability; and the empire ran through stage after stage of civic degeneration under good and bad emperors alike, even while maintaining its power by the spell of its great traditional organisation, simply because it had and could have no intellectual life commensurate with its physical scope. Its function involved moral atrophy. It needs the strenuous superficiality of a Mommsen to find

ground for satisfaction in the apparition of a Cæsar in a State that must needs worsen under Cæsars even more profoundly than it did before its malady gave Cæsar his opportunity.

Not that the Empire could of itself have died as an organism. There are no such deaths in politics; and the frequent use of the phrase testifies to a hallucination that must greatly hamper political science. The ancient generalisation[1] as to the youth, maturity, and decrepitude and death of States is true only in respect of their variations of relative military and economic strength, which follow no general rule.

The comparison of the life of political bodies to that of individuals was long ago rightly rejected as vicious by Volney (*Leçons d'Histoire*, 1794, 6ième Séance), who insisted that political destruction occurred only through vices of polity, inasmuch as all polities have been been framed with one of the three intentions of *increasing*, *maintaining*, or *overthrowing*. The explanation is obscure, but the negation of the old formula is just. The issue was taken up and pronounced upon to the same effect in the closing chapter of C. A. Walckenaer's *Essai sur l'histoire de l'espèce humaine*, 1798. (Professor Flint, in his *History of the Philosophy of History*, cites Walckenaer, but does not mention Volney's *Leçons*.) Le Play, in modern times, has put the truth clearly and strongly: "At no epoch of its history is a people fatally doomed either to progress or decline. It does not necessarily pass, like an individual, from youth to old age" (cited by H. Higgs, in *American Quarterly Journal of Economics*, July 1890, p. 428). It is to be regretted that Dr. Draper should have adhered to the fallacy of the necessary decay and death of nations in his valuable work on the *Intellectual Development of Europe* (ed. 1875, i. 13-20; ii. 393-98). He was doubtless influenced by the American tendency to regard Europe and Asia as groups of "old countries." The word "decay" may of course be used with the implication of mere "sickness," as by Lord Mahon in the opening sentence of his *Life of Belisarius*; but even in that use it gives a lead to fallacy.

Were there no swarming and aggressive barbarians, standing to later Rome as Rome had done to Carthage,

[1] Polybius, vi. 51. See below, ch. iv. § 1 (11).

the Western Roman Empire would have gone on just as the Eastern[1] so long did, just as China has so long done—would have subsisted with little or no progress, most factors of progress being eliminated from its sphere. It ought now to be unnecessary to point out that Christianity was no such factor, but rather the reverse, as the history of Byzantium so distinctly proves. The forces of intellectual progress that did arise and collapse in the Dark Ages were extra-Christian heretical forces, Iconoclastic in the East, Arian in the West. Arianism once deleted, Christianity was no more a progressive force among the new peoples than it was among the old; and the later European progress demonstrably came from wholly different causes—new empire, forcing partial peace; Saracen contact, bringing physics, chemistry, and mathematics; new discovery, making new commerce; recovery of pagan lore, making new speculation; printing, making books abundant; gunpowder, making arms a specialty; and the fresh disruption of States, setting up fruitful differences, albeit also preparing new wars. To try to trace these causes in detail would be to attempt a complete sociological sketch of European history, a task beyond the scope of the present work; though we shall later make certain special surveys that may suffice to illustrate the general law. In the meantime, the foregoing and other bird's-eye views of some ancient developments may illustrate those of modern times.

[1] I am aware that Mr. Bury protests against this division; but his own difficulty in calling the middle (Byzantine) Empire the "later Roman Empire," while implicitly accepting the "Holy" Empire as *another* "later Roman Empire," is the best proof that the established nomenclature is the most convenient. Nobody is misled by it.

CHAPTER III

GREEK POLITICAL EVOLUTION

§ 1

THE political history of ancient Greece, similarly summarised, will serve the same purpose, perhaps even better. That history has served historian after historian as a means of modern polemic. The first considerable English historians of Greece, Gillies and Mitford, pointed to the evil fate of Greek democracy as a conclusive argument against countenancing democracy now; not stopping to ask whether ancient monarchies had fared any better than the democracies. And it is perfectly true that present-day democracies will tend to bad fortune just as did the ancient, unless they bottom themselves more firmly and guide themselves by a deeper political science. It will not suffice that we have rejected the foundation of slavery, on which all the Greek polities rested. The strifes between the demos and the aristocracy in the Greek City-States would have arisen just as surely, though more slowly, if the demos, instead of being an upper-grade populace owning slaves, had included the whole mass of the artisan and serving class.[1] Where population increases

[1] Cp. Mr. Godkin, *Problems of Modern Democracy*, 1896, pp. 327-28, as to the recent rise of class hatred in the United States.

at anything like the natural animal rate, and infanticide is not overwhelming, poverty must either force emigration or breed strife between the "have-nots" and the "haves," barring such continuous stress of war as suffices at once to thin numbers and yield conquerors the lands of the slain losers. During some centuries the pressure was in large part relieved by colonisation, as had already happened among the Phœnicians;[1] the colonies themselves in turn, with their more rapid evolution, developing the inevitable strife of rich and poor more quickly and more violently than the mother cities.[2] Among these, it was when that relief seemed to be exhausted that strife became most dangerous, being obscurely perceived to be a means to advancement and prosperity for individuals, as well as for the State which could extort tribute from the others. War, however, limits agriculture, so that food supply is kept proportionately small; and with peace the principle of population soon overtakes lost ground; so that though the Greek States like others tended to gain in solidarity under the stimulus of foreign war, the pressure of poverty was always breeding fresh division.

If we take up Grecian history after the settling down of the prehistoric invasions which complicated the ordinary process of rupture and fission, that process is seen occurring so frequently, and in so many different States, that there can be no question as to the presence of a general sociological law, not to be counteracted in any community save by a radical change of conditions. Everywhere the phenomena are broadly the same. The upper class ("upper" in virtue either of primary

[1] Meyer, *Geschichte des Alterthums*, ii. 142.

[2] "Freedom flourishes in colonies. Ancient usages cannot be preserved . . . as at home. . . . Where every man lives by the labour of his hands, equality arises, even where it did not originally exist" (Heeren, *Pol. Hist. of Greece*, Eng. tr. p. 88). Note, in this connection, the whole development of Magna Graecia. Sybaris was "perhaps in 510 B.C. the greatest of all Grecian cities" (Grote, part ii. ch. 37). As to the early strifes in the colonies, cp. Meyer, ii. 681.

advantages or of special faculty for acquiring wealth) attains to providing for its future by holding multitudes of poorer citizens in debt—the ancient adumbration of the modern developments of landlordism, national debts, and large joint-stock enterprises, which yield inheritable incomes. In early times, probably, debt led as often to enslavement in Greece as in Rome ;[1] but in a world of small and warring City-States, shaken by domestic division, constantly making slaves by capture and purchase, and always exposed to the risk of their insurrection, this was too dangerous a course to be long persisted in,[2] and the creditor was led to press his debtor in other ways. The pressure increases till the mass of debtors are harassed into insurrection, or are used by an adventurer to establish himself as despot.[3] Sometimes the documents of debt are publicly destroyed ;[4] sometimes the land is divided afresh.[5] Landholders burdened with debt would vote for the former course and resist the latter.[6] Sometimes even a refunding of interest would be insisted on.[7] Naturally such means of rectification availed only for a moment ; the despot stood a fair chance of being assassinated ; the triumphant demos would be caballed against ; the exiled nobles, with the cold rage of Theognis in their hearts, would return ; and the last state of the people

[1] Such was the legal course of things before Solon (Ingram, *History of Slavery*, p. 16 ; cp. Schömann, *Griechische Alterthümer*, 2e Aufl. i. 341 ; Aristotle, *Constitution of Athens*, cc. 2, 4, 6 ; Wachsmuth, *Histor. Antiq. of the Greeks*, § 33, Eng. tr. 1837, i. 244).

[2] Cp. Schömann, *Griechische Alterthümer*, 2e Aufl. i. 114 ; Burckhardt, *Griechische Culturgeschichte*, 1. 159. In the historic period the majority of slaves were of non-Greek race (Schömann, i. 112 ; Burckhardt, i. 158).

[3] *E.g.* Telys at Sybaris, Theagenes at Megara, and Kypselus at Corinth, in the sixth century B.C. ; and Klearchus at Herakleia in the fourth (Grote, ii. 414, 418 ; iv. 95 ; x. 394). Compare the appeals made to Solon by both parties to make himself despot (Plutarch, *Solon*, c. 14).

[4] As at Sparta under Agis IV. (Plutarch, *Agis*, c. 13 ; Thirlwall, c. lxii. 1st ed. viii. 142). The claims were restored at Agis' death (*id.* p. 163).

[5] As by Cleomenes, soon after (*id.* p. 164).

[6] *E.g.* Agesilaus in the same crisis.

[7] As at Megara (Grote, ii. 418).

would be worse than the first; till again slackened vigilance on one side and intolerable hardship on the other renewed the cycle of violent change.

In the course of ages there was perforce some approach to equipoise;[1] but it was presumably at the normal cost of a definite abasement of the populace;[2] and where the so-called "people" or body of franchise-holding citizens obtained the upper hand, as in Athens, they too often had to use the methods of the tyrant to maintain it. The name of Solon is associated with an early crisis (B.C. 594) in which debt and destitution among the Athenian demos (then still for the most part small cultivators, for whom the city was a refuge fortress, but as a rule no longer owning the land they tilled), brought matters to the same point as was marked in Rome by the Secession of the Plebs. Solon's scheme was thoughtful and statesmanlike, and it seems to have arrested actual enslavement for debt; but no scheme of mere statesmanship, short of social reconstruction and the rise of a temper of peace all-round, could permanently avail.[3] It is incredible that the graduated income-tax which he imposed was levied for long; and the fact that, a generation later, Peisistratos was able to become tyrant in the teeth of the aged Solon's vehement opposition, is intelligible only as standing for the feeling of the common people that through a *tyrannos* alone could their interests be maintained against the perpetual conspiracy of the upper class to overreach them.[4] The credit given to Peisistratos afterwards for maintaining the Solonian laws, though it cannot lead us to suppose that he enforced

[1] See Grote, ii. 381, as to the general development.

[2] But cp. Grote, ii. 420, as to the case of Megara.

[3] Cp. Cunningham, *Western Civilisation*, pp. 100-102.

[4] Friends of Solon's in the upper classes took advantage of a disclosure of his plans to buy up land in advance, escaping full payment under his law cancelling debts (Plutarch, *Solon*, c. 15; Aristotle, *Constitution of Athens*, c. 6). See c. 16 as to the moderation and popularity of Peisistratos.

the Solonian taxation, points to this understanding between him and the people,[1] and their acceptance of him in Solon's despite suggests that they even identified the latter with the failure of his laws to secure them against further aristocratic oppression. In any case, we cannot doubt that his plans had soon failed to exclude the old phenomena of poverty. The very encouragement he gave to artisans to immigrate,[2] while it made for the democratic development and naval strength of Athens, was a means of quickening the approach of a new economic crisis. And yet he seems to have recognised the crux of population. The permission given by the sage to parents to expose infants, implicitly avows the insoluble problem—the "cursed fraction" in the equation, which will not disappear; and in the years of the approach of Peisistratos to power we find Athens sending to Salamis (about 570) its first *kleruchie*, or civic colony-settlement on subject territory—this by way of providing for landless and needy citizens.[3] It was the easiest compromise; and nothing beyond compromise was dreamt of.

The statement that Solon by law permitted the exposure of infants is made by Malthus, who gives no authority, but is followed by Lecky. The law in question is not mentioned by Plutarch, and I do not find it noticed by any of the historians. It is stated, however, by Sextus Empiricus (*Hypotyp.* iii. 24), that Solon made a law by which a parent could put his child to death. Nothing nearer to the purpose is cited by Meursius in his monograph on Solon; but this could very well stand as a permission of infanticide, especially seeing that the practice is presumptively pre-historic. Petit writes: "Quemadmodum liberos tollere in patris erat positum potestate, ita etiam necare et exponere, idque, meo judicio,

[1] As to his tactic in building up a party, see Busolt, *Griechische Geschichte*, 1885, i. 550-53.

[2] Grote, ii. 504. Hitherto Athens was far behind other cities, as Corinth, in trade. The industrial expansion seems to begin in Solon's time (Plutarch, *Solon*, c. 22; Busolt, *Griechische Geschichte*, i. 501).

[3] Busolt, as cited, i. 549-50. The details, many of them from lately recovered inscriptions, are full of interest. Cp. Grote, ii. 462.

non tam moribus quam Lege receptum fuit Athenis" (*Leges Atticæ*, fol. 219, ed. Wesseling, 1742). Mr. Mahaffy (*Social Life in Greece*, 3rd ed. p. 165) believes "the notion of exposing infants from *economical* motives not to have prevailed till later times" than the 7th century B.C., but he gives no reason for fixing any date. We may take it as certain that while the laws of Lycurgus, like the Roman Twelve Tables, enjoined or permitted the destruction of sickly or deformed infants, the general Greek usage allowed exposure. The express prohibition of it at Thebes (Ælian, *Var. Hist.* ii. 7), implies its previous normality there and elsewhere (cp. however, Aristotle, *Pol.* vii. 16); and the *sale* of children by their (free) parents was further permitted, except in Attica (Ingram, *History of Slavery*, p. 16); while even there a freeman's children by a slave concubine were slaves.

On the other hand, the laws even of Sparta, framed with a view to the military strength of the State considered as the small free population, were ultimately evaded in the interests of property-holding, till the number of "pure Spartans" dwindled to a handful.[1] Here, apart from the revolts of the helots, and the chronic massacres of these by their lords, which put such a stamp of atrocity on Spartan history, the stress of class strife seems to have been limited not only by systematic infanticide but by the survival of polyandry, several brothers often having one wife in common.[2] Whether owing to infanticide or vice, or to preventives, families of three and four were uncommon and considered large, and special privileges offered to the fathers.[3] All the while, of course, the *perioikoi* and the helots multiplied freely: hence the policy of specially thinning down by over-toil[4] as well as massacre. In other States, where the polity was more

[1] Plutarch, *Agis*, c. 5; Aristotle, *Politics*, ii. 9; Thirlwall, viii. 133.

[2] See the recovered passage of Polybius cited (from Mai, *Nov. Collect. Vet. Scriptor.* ii. 384) by Müller (*Dorians*, Eng. tr. ii. 205). Cp. M'Lennan, *Kinship in Ancient Greece*, § 2.

[3] Aristotle, *Politics*, ii. c. 9. On Aristotle's unhesitating assumption (ii. 10) as to the effects of pæderasty, cp. K. O. Müller, *Dorians*, Eng. tr. B. iv. c. 4, §§ 6-8.

[4] Plutarch, *Solon*, c. 22.

civilised, many observers perceived that the two essential conditions of stability were (*a*) absolute or approximate equality of property, and (*b*) restraint of population, the latter principle being a notable reaction of reason against the normal practice of encouraging or compelling marriage.[1] Aristotle said in so many words that to let procreation go unchecked "is to bring certain poverty on the citizens; and poverty is the cause of sedition and evil;"[2] and he cites previous publicists who sought to solve the problem. Socrates and Plato had partly contemplated it; and the idealist, as usual, had proposed the more brutal methods;[3] but Aristotle, seeing more clearly the population difficulty, perhaps on that account is the less disposed towards communism.

As medical knowledge advanced, it seems certain, the practice of abortion must have been generally added to that of infanticide in Greece, as later in Rome. See Aristotle, *Politics*, vii. 16, as to the normal resort to abortion. The Greeks must have communicated to the Romans the knowledge of the arts of abortion as they did those of medicine generally. But it does not appear that with all these checks population really fell off in Greece until after the time of Alexander. Before that time it may very well have fallen off in Athens when she lost her position as sovereign and tribute-drawing State. The tribute would tend to maintain a population in excess of the natural amount. Mr. Mahaffy (*Rambles and Studies in Greece*, 4th ed. p. 11—a passage not squared with the data in *Greek Life and Thought*, pp. 328, 558), accepts the old view of a general and inexplicable depopulation. The *locus classicus* on that head, in the treatise *On the Cessation of Oracles* (viii.) attributed to Plutarch but probably not by him, is searchingly examined by Hume at the close of his essay *Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations*. Cp. Cunningham, *Western Civilisation*, p. 109, *note*. There is reason to conclude, however, that Hume was unduly incredulous on some points. In any case, a relative depopulation took place after the conquests of Alexander, from the operation of

[1] See refs. in Fustel de Coulanges, *La Cité Antique*, l. iii. ch. xviii. p. 265.

[2] Aristotle, *Politics*, ii. c. 6.

[3] Cp. the *Republic*, v. and the *Laws* (bks. v. xi.; Jowett's tr. 3rd ed. v. 122, 313), with the *Politics*, vii. c. 16.

socio-economic causes, which are indicated by Finlay (*History of Greece*, Tozer's ed. i. 15; cp. Mahaffy, *Greek Life and Thought*, p. 328, and *The Greek World under Roman Sway*, 1890, p. 218). Further depopulation took place under the Romans, partly from direct violence and deportation, partly from fiscal pressure, partly from economic causes.

It lies on the face of Aristotle's *Politics*, however, that even if the population difficulty had been solved, the fatality of war in the then civilised world would have sufficed to bring about political dissolution. As he profoundly observes, the training of a people to war ends in their ruin, even when they acquire supremacy, because their legislators have not "taught them how to rest."[1] But while the spirit of strife is universal, peoples are inevitably trained to war; and even if the Greek States could have so far risen above their fratricidal jealousies as to form a stable union, it must needs have run the downward course of the post-Alexandrian Hellenistic empires, and of the Roman empire which in turn sank to dissolution before the assaults of newer militarisms.

§ 2

Nothing can save any democratic polity from the alternatives of insane strife and imperial subjection but a vital prosperous culture, going hand in hand with a sound economy of industry. The Greek democracies in their different way split on the same rock as wrecked the Roman Republic: there was (1) no general mental development commensurate with the political problems which arose for solution, and (2) there was no approach to a sound economics. The first proposition will doubtless be denied by those who, nourished on the literature of Greece, have come to see in its relative excellence, the more confidently because of the abiding difficulty of

[1] Bk. vii. c. 15.

mastering it, the highest reach of the faculties of thought and expression. But this judgment is fundamentally astray because of the still subsisting separation, in the literary mind, of the idea of literary merit from the idea of scientific sanity. Men themselves too often vowed to the defence and service of a mythology are slow to see that it was not for nothing that the Athenian people bottomed its culture to the last on myth and superstition. Yet a little reflection might make it clear that the community which forced Socrates to drink the hemlock for an alleged and unproved scepticism, and Anaxagoras to fly for a materialistic hypothesis concerning the sun, could have no political enlightenment adequate to the Athenian needs. We see the superstitious Athenian demos playing the part of the ignorant multitude of all ages, eager for a master, incapable of steadfast self-rule, begging that the magnificent Alcibiades, who led the sacred procession to Eleusis in despite of the Spartans near at hand, shall put down his opponents and reign at Athens as king.[1] A primitive people may stumble along in primitive conditions by dint of elementary political methods; but a civilised people with a complex political problem can solve it only by means of a correspondingly evolved science. And the Athenian people, with their purely literary and æsthetic culture, never as a body reached even a moderate height of ethical and scientific thought, or even any such general æsthetic well-being as we are apt to credit them with. Moderns think of them, as the great song of Euripides has it, "lightly lifting their feet in the lucid air,"[2] and are indulgently ready to take by the letter the fine panegyric of the Athenian polity by Pericles,[3] forgetting that statesmen in all ages have glorified their State, always making out

[1] Plutarch, *Alcibiades*, c. 34.
[2] Rev. A. S. Way's translation of Euripides, *Medea*, 829-30.
[3] Thucydides, ii. 40.

the best case, always shunning discouragement for their hearers, and making little account of evil. But Burckhardt, after his long survey, decides with Boeckh that "the Hellenes were more unhappy than most men think;"[1] and the saying holds good of their political and intellectual life above all things.

Our more idealising scholars forget that the philosophy of the philosophers was a specialism, and that the chance of hearing a tragedy of Sophocles or a comedy of Aristophanes was no training in political conduct for a people whose greatest philosopher never learned to see the fatality of slavery. On the economic side, Periclean Athens was nearly as ill founded as aristocratic Rome. Citizens often with neither professions nor studies, with no ballasting occupation for head or hand; average men paid from the unearned tribute of allied States to attend to affairs without any fundamental study of political conditions; citizens whose work was paid for in the same fashion; citizens of merely empirical education, for whom politics was but an endless web of international intrigue, and who had no higher ideal than that of the supremacy of their own State in Hellenedom or their own faction in the State—such men, it is now easy to see, were incapable of saving Athens, much less of unifying Greece. They were politically raised to a situation which only wise and deeply instructed men could fill, and they were neither wise nor deeply instructed, however superior their experience might make them relatively to still worse trained contemporaries, or to populations living under a systematic despotism.

On some of the main problems of life the majority had thought no further than their ancestors of the days of the kings. The spell of religion had kept them

[1] *Griechische Culturgeschichte*, i. 11; cp. ii. 386-88, 394, etc. And see Meyer, *Geschichte des Alterthums*, ii. 727-29, 734, etc.

ignorant and superstitious.[1] In applied ethics they had as a body made no progress : the extension of sympathy, which is moral advance, had gone no further than the extortion of civic status and power by some new classes, leaving a majority still enslaved. Hence the instinct of justice was feeble for all purposes, and the strife of factions was nearly as malignant and animalised as in Borgian Italy. Mother cities and their colonies fought more destructively with each other than with aliens; Athens and Syracuse, Corinth and Korkyra, strove more malignantly than did Greek with barbarian. Unearned income, private and public ; blindly tyrannous political aggression ; ferocious domestic calumny ; civic and racial disruption—these were the due phases and fruits of the handling of a great political problem by men who in the mass had no ideals of increasing knowledge, of growing tolerance, of widening justice, of fraternity. Stoic and Epicurean wisdom and righteousness came too late to save free Hellas. The very art and literature which glorified Athens were in large part the economic products of impolicy and injustice,[2] being fostered by the ill-gotten wealth accruing to the city from her tributary allies and subject States, somewhat as the art of the great period in Italy was fed by the wealth of the church and of the merchant princes who grew by the great river of trade. In the one case as in the other, there was no polity, no science, equal to the maintenance of the result when the originating conditions disappeared. Greek art and letters passed away because they were ill rooted.

Not that matters would have gone a whit better if,

[1] Cp. Fustel de Coulanges, *La Cité Antique*, ed. 1880, pp. 260-64 ; E. Meyer, *Geschichte des Alterthums*, ii. 728.

[2] For various views on this matter cp. Heeren, Eng. tr. of Researches on the *Political History of Ancient Greece*, pp. 129-34 ; Thirlwall, *History of Greece*, ch. xviii. (1st ed. iii. 62-70) ; Grote, iv. 490-504 ; Abbott, *History of Greece*, i. 405-409 ; Holm, *History of Greece*, Eng. tr. ii. 268, note 8 to ch. xvii. (a vindication).

as our Tory historians used retrospectively to prescribe, democracy had been permanently subverted by aristocracy. No other ideal then in vogue would have produced even so much "good life" as was actually attained. The aristocrats were simply weaker versions of the demagogues; and nothing can be more misleading than to take the account given of Kleon by Aristophanes for even a semblance of the truth. The great humorist saw nothing as it really was: his very genius was as it were a many-faceted mirror that could reflect no whole, and left his practical judgment worth less than that of any of the men he ridiculed. Kleon is to be conceived as a powerful figure of the type of a New York Tammany "Boss," without culture or philosophy, but shrewd, executive, and abounding in energy. The aristocrats were but slighter egoists with a varnish of education, as far as he from a worthy philosophy. And the philosophers *par excellence*, Plato and Aristotle, were equally incapable of practical statesmanship.

The new self-governing combination of cities which arose in Achaia after the disintegration of Alexander's empire might conceivably have reached a high civilisation in time; but the external conditions, as summed up in the existence of Rome, were now overwhelmingly unfavourable. The opportunity for successful federalism was past. As it was, the Achaian and Ætolian Leagues were but politic unions as much for aggression as for defence, even as the Spartan reformers, Agis and Cleomenes, could never rise above the ideal of Spartan self-assertion and domination. Thus we have on one hand the Spartan kings concerned for the well-being of the mass of the people (always excepting the helots) as a means to restore Spartan pre-eminence; and on the other hand the Achaian federation of oligarchies, hating the doctrine of sympathy for the demos as much as they hated Sparta—the forces of union and strife always re-

pelling the regimen of peace, to say nothing of fraternity. The spectacle of Cleomenes and Philopœmen at deadly odds is the dramatic summary of the situation: the ablest men of the later Greek age could not transcend their barbarian heredity.

The statement of Freeman (*History of Federal Government in Greece and Italy*, ed. 1893, p. 184) that a federal system in Greece was "utterly impossible," is true in the bare scientific sense that that was impossible which did not happen; but such a proposition would hold equally true of anything else that did not happen at a given time; and it merely creates confusion to affirm it of one item in particular. M. Fustel de Coulanges well points out how the primary religious conception of the ancient City-State expelled and negated that of a composite State (*La Cité Antique*, liv. iii. ch. xiv. p. 239); that is a process of rational explanation. But unless we conceive the "failures" of the past as lessons to be profited by, there can be neither a social nor a moral science. Freeman, however, actually proceeds to say that Greek federation was utterly undesirable—an extraordinary doctrine in a treatise devoted to studying and advocating federalism. On the principles thus laid down, Dr. Freeman's denunciation of Austria and France in modern times is irrational, since that which has happened in these countries is that which alone was possible; and the problem as to the desirable is hopelessly obscured.

To say that "Greece united in a federal bond could never have become the Greece" we admire (*id.* p. 184) is only to vary the verbalism. Granted that Hellenic greatness *as we know it* was "inseparably limited to the system of independent city commonwealths," it remains a rational proposition that had the Greek cities federated they could have developed their general culture further than they actually did, though the special splendour of Periclean Athens could not in that case have been so quickly attained. And as the *fall* of Greece is no less "inseparably linked" with the separateness of the States, Dr. Freeman's proposition suggests or implies an assertion of the desirableness of that fall.

The lesson for modern democracies from the story of the ancient is thus clear enough. To flourish they must have peace; they must sooner or later practise a scientific and humane restraint of population—the sooner the better, as destruction of surplus population is always

going on, even with emigration; they must check inequality, which is the fountain of domestic dispeace; and they must maintain a progressive and scientific culture. And the lesson is one that may now be acted on as it never could have been before. There is no longer a reserve of fecund barbarism ready to overwhelm a civilisation that ceases to be pugnacious; and the civilised States have it in their own power to submit their quarrels to bloodless arbitrament. The inveterate strifes of the Greeks belong to a past stage of civilisation, and were in any case the product of peculiar geographical conditions, Greece being physically divided, externally among islands, and internally into a multitude of glens, which in the days of City-State life and primitive means of communication preserved a state of cantonal separateness and feud, just as did the physical conditions of the Scottish Highlands in the days before effective monarchic rule.

This permanent dissociation of the City-States was only a more intractable form of the primary divisions of the districts. Thus in Attica itself the divisions of party largely followed the localities: "there were as many parties among them as there were different tracts of land in their country"—the mountain-dwellers being democratic, while the plain-dwellers were for an oligarchy, and the coast-dwellers sought a mixed government. (Plutarch, *Solon*, cc. 13, 29; Aristotle, *Constitution of Athens*, c. 13. See the question further discussed below, ch. iv. § 2 (*c*.))

Indeed, the fulness of the autonomous life attained by the separate cities was a psychological hindrance to their political union, given the primary geographical sunderance. Thus we have in the old Amphictyonic councils the evidence of a measure of peaceful political attraction among the tribes before the cities were developed;[1] yet on those ancient beginnings there was

[1] Grote, part ii. ch. ii. (ed. 1888, ii. 173-78); Freeman, *History of Federal Government*, ed. 1893, p. 103.

no political advance till the rise of formal federalism in the Ætolian and Achaian Leagues after the death of Alexander. And that federalism was not ethically higher than the spirit of the ancient Amphictyonic oath preserved by Æschines. The balance of the forces of separateness and political wisdom is to be conceived in terms of a given degree of culture relatively to a given set of physical conditions. Happily the deadlock in question no longer subsists for civilised States.

Again, there is now possible a scientific control of population, without infanticide, without vice, without abortion. There has been attained a degree of democratic stability and enlightenment which, given peace, permits of a secure gradual extension of the principle of equality by sound machinery. And there is now accumulated a treasury of seminal knowledge which makes possible an endless intellectual progress, the great antiseptic of political decay, provided only that the foregoing conditions are secured. This is, in brief, the programme of progressive democracy.

CHAPTER IV

THE LAWS OF SOCIO-POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

§ 1

THE word "progressive," however, raises one of the most complex issues in sociology. It would be needless to point out, were it not well to anticipate objection, that the foregoing summaries are not offered as a complete theory of progress even as commonly conceived, much less as sufficing to dismiss the dispute[1] as to what progress is, or what basis there is for the modern conceptions bound up with the word. Our generalisations proceed on the assumption—not of course that human affairs must constantly improve in virtue of some cosmic law, but—that by most men of any education a certain advance in range of knowledge, of skill, of civic amenity, of general comfort, is held to be attainable and desirable; that such advances have clearly taken place in former periods; and that the due study of these periods and of present conditions may lead to a further and indefinitely prolonged advance. Conceiving progress broadly as occurring by way of rise in the quantity and the quality of pleasurable and intelligent

[1] On this may be consulted a suggestive paper by Mr. Lowes Dickinson in the *Free Review*, April 1894, and an instructive study by Mr. T. Whittaker, *A Critical Essay on the Philosophy of History*, in his *Essays and Notices*, 1895.

life, we beg the question, for the purposes of this inquiry, as against those who may regard such a tendency with aversion, and those who may deny that such increase ever takes place.

All of us, roughly speaking, understand by progress the moving of things in the way we want them to go; and the ideals underlying the present treatise are easily seen, though it does not aim at an exhaustive survey of the conditions and causes of what it assumes to be progressive forms or phases of civilisation. To reach even a working theory, however, we have to make, as it were, cross sections in our anatomy, and to view the movement of civilisation in terms of the conditions which increase men's stock of knowledge and extend their imaginative art. To lay a foundation, we have to subsume Buckle's all-important generalisation as to the effect of food and life conditions in differentiating what we may broadly term the primary from the secondary civilisation.

Buckle drew his capital distinction, so constantly ignored by his critics, between "European" and "non-European" civilisations. This broadly holds good, but is a historical rather than a sociological proposition. The process of causation is one of life conditions; and the first great steps in the higher Greek civilisation were made in Asia Minor, in contact with Asiatic life. The distinction here made between "primary" and "secondary" civilisations is of course merely relative, applying as it does only to the historic period. We can but mark off the known civilisations as standing in certain relations one to another. Thus the Roman civilisation was in reality complex before the conquest of Greece, inasmuch as it had undergone Etruscan influences representing a then ancient culture. But the Roman militarist system left the Roman civilisation in itself unprogressive, and prevented it from being durably fertilised by the Greek.

Proceeding from general laws to particular cases, we may roughly say that:—

(1) Primary civilisations arise in regions specially favourable to the regular production of abundant food.

(2) Such food conditions tend to maintain an abundant population, readily lending itself to exploitation by rulers, and so involving despotism and subordination. They also imply, as a rule, level territories, which facilitate conquest and administration, and thus also involve military autocracy.

The general law that facile food conditions, supporting large populations in a primary civilisation, generate despotisms, was explicitly put last century by Walckenaer (*Essai sur l'histoire de l'espèce humaine*, 1798, l. v. ch. iv. p. 198). Montesquieu, whose reasonings on climate and soil tend to be fanciful and non-economic (cp. Volney, *Leçons d'Histoire*, 6ième séance; and Buckle, 3 vol. ed. ii. 318), noted the fact that sterile Attica was relatively democratic, and fertile Lakedaimon aristocratic; and further (following Plutarch) decides that mountaineers tend to be democratic, plain-dwellers subject to rulers, and coast-dwellers something midway between (*Esprit des Lois*, liv. xviii. ch. i.). He is right in his facts, but misses the economic explanation. The fact that mountaineers as such are not easy to conquer, doubtless counts for a good deal. See it touched on in Gray's unfinished poem on the *Alliance between Government and Education*, written before the appearance of the *Esprit des Lois*, and stopped by Gray on the ground that "the Baron had forestalled some of his best thoughts" (Gray's *Works*, ed. 1821, p. 274). The point is discussed more fully in Dr. Dunbar's *Essays on the History of Mankind*, 1780, Essay vi.

(3) If the nation with such conditions is well aloof from other nations, in virtue of being much more civilised than its near neighbours, and of being self-sufficing as regards its produce, its civilisation (as in the cases of China and Incarian Peru and ancient Egypt) is likely to be extremely conservative. Above all, lack of racial interbreeding involves lack of due variation. No "pure" race ever evolved rapidly or highly. Even the conservative primary civilisations (as the Egyptian and Akkadian) rested on much race mixture.

As Dr. Draper has well pointed out (*Intellect. Develop. of Europe*, ed. 1875, i. 84-88), the peculiar regularity of Egyptian agriculture, depending as it did on the Nile overflow, which made known in

advance the quantity of the crops, lent itself especially to a stable system of life and administration. The long-lasting exclusion or foreigners there, as in China and in Sparta, would further secure sameness of culture; and only by such causes can special unprogressiveness anywhere arise. Sir Henry Maine's formula, marking off progressive and unprogressive civilisations as different species, is merely verbal, and is not adhered to by himself. (The point is discussed at length by the present writer in *Buckle and his Critics*, pp. 402-408.) Maine's distinction was drawn long ago by Eusèbe Salverte (*De la Civilisation depuis les premiers temps*, 1813, p. 22, *seq.*), who philosophically goes on to indicate the conditions which set up the differentiation; though in later references (*Essai sur les noms d'hommes*, 1824, préf. p. ii.; *Des Sciences Occultes*, 1829, préf. p. vi.), he recurs to the empirical form of his proposition, which is that adhered to by Maine.

(4) When an old civilisation comes in steady contact with that of a race of not greatly inferior but less ancient culture, physically so situated as to be much less amenable to despotism (that is, in a hilly or otherwise easily defensible region), it is likely so to fecundate the fresher civilisation that the latter, if not vitiated by a bad political system, will soon surpass it,[1] provided that the latter community in turn is duly crossed as regards its stock, and that the former has due resources.

(5) In other words, a primitive but not barbarous people placed in a region not highly fruitful but not really unpropitious to human life, is the less likely to fall tamely under a despotism because its population is not so easily multiplied and maintained;[2] and such a people, when physiologically variated by a mixture of stocks, and when mentally fecundated by contact with older civilisations, tends to develop what we term a secondary civilisation, higher in all respects than those which have stimulated it.[3]

[1] This also is posited by Dunbar, *Essays* cited, pp. 230, 233.

[2] This again, as well as the general importance of culture-contacts, is noted by Walckenaer, *Essai* cited, pp. 202-203.

[3] This was seen in antiquity. Julian, at least, pointed to the fashion in which the Greeks had perfected studies the rudiments of which they had received from other peoples (*apud* Cyrill. v. 8).

(6) A very great disparity in the culture stages of meeting races, however, is as unfavourable to the issue of a higher civilisation from their union as to a useful blending of their stocks. Thus it fares ill with the contact of higher and lower races even in a climate equally favourable to both; and where it is favourable to the latter only, there is likely to be no immediate progress in the lower race, while in the terms of the case the higher will deteriorate or disappear.[1]

(7) Where a vigorous but barbarian race overruns one much more civilised, there is similarly little prospect of immediate gain to progress, though after a period of independent growth the newer civilisation may be greatly fecundated by intelligent resort to the remains of the older.

The cases of China and the Roman Empire may serve as illustrations. They were, however, different in that the northern invasion of Rome was by relatively considerable masses, while the Tartar conquerors of China were easily absorbed in the vast native population.

(8) Where, again, independent States at nearly the same stage of civilisation, whether speaking the same or different languages, stand in a position of commerce and rivalry, but without desperate warfare, the friction and cross-fertilisation of ideas, together with the mixture of stocks, will develop a greater and higher intellectual and artistic life than can conceivably arise in one great State without great or close rivals, since there one set of ideals or standards is likely to overbear all others, with the result of partly stereotyping taste and opinion.

This point is well put by Hume as to Greece, in his essay on *The Rise of the Arts and Sciences* (1752); and after him by Gibbon, ch. liii., Bohn ed. vi. 233. Cp. Heeren, *Pol. Hist. of Ancient*

[1] Cp. Dunbar as cited, p. 211. In such cases as those of British India and French Algiers, the exception is only apparent, the European control being kept up by annual drafts of new men.

Greece, Eng. tr. p. 42; Walckenaer, *Essai* cited, p. 338; Ferguson, *Essay on the History of Civil Society*, 1767, pp. 182, 183; Dunbar, *Essays on the History of Mankind*, 1780, pp. 257, 271; Goguet, *De l'origine des Lois, des Arts, et des Sciences*, 1758, iii. Epoque, L. ii. ch. 2; Salverte, *De la Civilisation*, 1813, pp. 83-88; Grote, *History of Greece*, part ii. ch. i. ed. 1888, ii. 156; Cunningham, *Western Civilisation*, p. 75. Grote brings out very clearly the "mutuality of action and reaction" in the case of the maritime Greeks as compared with the others, and with other nations. See also Hegel, *Philos. der Geschichte*, Th. ii. Absch. i. (ed. 1840, p. 275). Hegel, besides noting the abstract element of geographical variety, points to the highly mixed character of the Greek stocks, specially in Attica. So Salverte, as cited. The same principle is rightly put by Guizot (*Hist. de la Civilisation en France*, i. leçon 2) and accepted by J. S. Mill (*On Liberty*, ch. iii. end), as a main explanation of the intellectual progress of modern Europe. It is therefore worth weighing as regards given peoples, by those who, like Mr. Bryce, see nothing but harm in the subdivision of Germany after the Thirty Years' War (*Holy Roman Empire*, 8th ed. p. 346). Against the undoubted evils connected with the partition system ought to be set the intellectual gains which latterly arose from it when the intellectual life of Germany had, as it were, recovered breath.

(9) Thus, while an empire with a developed civilisation may communicate it to uncivilised conquered peoples not too far below its own anthropological level, the secondary civilisation thus acquired is in its nature less "viable," less capable of independent evolution, than one set up by the free commerce of trading peoples. The most rapid growths of civilisation appear always to have occurred by way of the multiplying of free contacts among trading communities, and among the free colonies of such.[1] The "money economy" they introduced was a great instrument of social and industrial evolution;[2] and on such city civilisations

[1] *E.g.* the colonies of the Phœnicians; those of the Greeks in Asia Minor, Italy, and Sicily; the medieval Italian Republics; the Hansa towns; those of the Netherlands; and the United States.

[2] See Dr. Cunningham, *Western Civilisation*, pp. 73, 74, 83-86, 94-97, etc., for an interesting development of this principle. Cp. Prof. Ashley, *Introduction to Economic History*, 1888-93, i. 43, and Hildebrand, as there cited. The originality of Hildebrand's ideas on this point has perhaps been overrated by Ochenkowski and

the ancient empires themselves seem always to have proceeded.[1]

(10) Every phase of civilisation has its special drawbacks, so that great retrogression may follow on great development, especially when adventitious sources of wealth are the foundation of a luxurious culture. In some cases, a great development may be dependent on an exhaustible source of wealth, as in the case of Britain's coal supply, the empire of ancient Rome, the primacy of the Pope before the Reformation, or even the Periclean empire of Athens, and the trade monopolies of Venice, the Hansa Towns, and the Dutch Republic.

(11) The expression "decay" as applied to a people, however, has only a relative significance: used absolutely, it stands for a delusion. Economic conditions may worsen, and military power decline; but such processes imply no physiological degeneration. All the "dead" civilisations of the past were *overthrown or absorbed by military violence;* and there is no known case of a nation physically well placed dying out.

Professor W. D. Whitney, who is usually so well worth listening to, fails to recognise this fact in his interesting essay on "China and the Chinese" (*Oriental and Linguistic Studies*, 2nd series). He declares that "according to the ordinary march of events in human history, the Chinese empire should have perished from decay, and its culture either have become extinct or have passed into the keeping of another race, more than two thousand years ago. It had already reached the limit to its capacity of development" (p. 88). Similarly Ratzel pronounces (*History of Mankind*, Eng. tr. 1896, i. 26) that "Voltaire hits the point when he says Nature has given the Chinese the organ for discovering all that is *useful* to them, but not for going *any further*." Voltaire never penned such a "bull." He wrote (*Essai sur les Mœurs*, Avant-Propos, ch. i.), "Il *semble* que la Nature ait donné," and "*nécessaire*" not "useful." Even that has a touch of paralogism; but the great essayist goes on to

others. Smith recognised the main facts (*Wealth of Nations*, bk. i. c. iv.). See also the passage from Torrens cited by M'Culloch in his essay on "Money," *Treatises*, ed. 1859, pp. 9, 10.

[1] *E.g.* Babylonia, Egypt, Alexander's empire, and Rome.

suggest two causes for Chinese conservatism—their ancestral pie and the nature of their method of writing. The first is a pseu explanation; the second is a *vera causa*, though only one of thos involved. The German specialist of to-day is really further from the scientific point of view than the French wit of the middle of last century, going on as he does to decide that "defect in their endowments" causes the mediocrity of the Chinese, and "also is the sole cause of the rigidity in their social system." This is a vain saying; and it is no less vain to go on to ask, as Professor Whitney does, what has become of Egypt, of the Phœnicians and Hebrews, of the Persians, of Greece and Rome, and of Spain. The answer is easy. Egypt was conquered, and the old race still reproduces itself, in vassalage. The Phœnicians and Hebrews were destroyed or absorbed. The Persians are at present retrograde, but may rise again. Rome and Greece were successively overrun by barbarism. Spain, like Italy, retrograded, but, like Italy, is on the path of regeneration. In all these cases the process of causation is obvious. No nation dies or disappears save by violence; and, given the proper conditions, all races are capable of progress indefinitely. China, though unprogressive in comparison with a European State, has changed in many respects within two thousand years—nay, within twenty. Professor Whitney adopts an empirical convention, and accordingly misses any real elucidation of the problem of Chinese sociology, which he assumes to solve (p. 87) by saying we must look for our explanations "deep in the foundations of the national character itself." That is to say, the national character is determined by the national character. It is surely time that this palæo-theological fashion of explaining human affairs were superseded by the more fruitful method of positive science, even as regards China, which is perhaps the worst explained of all sociological cases. Like others, it had been intelligently taken up by sociologists of last century before the conservative reaction (see the *Esprit des Lois*, vii. 6; viii. 21; x. 15; xiv. 8; xviii. 6; xix. 13-20; Dunbar's *Essays*, as cited, pp. 257, 258, 262, 263, 321; and Walckenaer, *Essai* cited, pp. 175, 176); but that impetus seems to have been thus far almost entirely lost. Voltaire's fallacy is remembered and his truth ignored; and the methods of theology continue to be applied to many questions of moral science after they have been wholly cast out of physics and biology. The old "falsisms" of empirical politics are repeated even by professed biologists when they enter on the field of social science. Thus we have seen them accepted by Dr. Draper, and we find Professor Huxley (*Evolution and Ethics*, Romanes Lecture for 1893, p. 4) rhetorically putting "that successive rise, apogee, and fall of dynasties and states which is the most prominent topic of civil

story," as scientifically analogous to the process of growth and decay and death in the human organism. Any comparative study of history shows the analogy to be spurious. Professor Whitney was doubtless influenced like Dr. Draper by the American habit of regarding European and ancient civilisations as necessarily decrepit because "slow" and "old." Cp. Draper as cited, ii. 393-98.

In the cases above dealt with, however, and in many others, there is seen to have been *intellectual* decay, in the sense of, first, a cessation of forward movement, and, next, a loss of the power to appreciate ideas once current. A common cause of such paralysis of the higher life is the malignant action of dogmatic religious systems, as in the cases of Persia, Jewry, Byzantium, Islam, Spain under Catholicism, and Scotland for two centuries under Protestantism. Such paralysis by religion may arise alike in a highly-organised but isolated State like Byzantium, and in a semi-civilised country like Anglo-Saxon England.[1] The special malignity of dogma in these cases is itself of course a matter for analysis and explanation. Other cases are partly to be explained by (*a*) the substitution of systematic militarism, always fatal to progressive culture, for a life of only occasional warfare, favourable to study among the leisured class. But (*b*) there is reason to surmise a further and profoundly important cause of intellectual retrogression in the usage which develops the culture of a people for the most part in one sex only. The thesis may be ventured that whereas vigorous and creative brains may arise in abundance in a young civilisation, where the sexes are physiologically not far removed from the approximate equality of the semi-barbarous stage, the psychological divergence set up by mentally and physically training the males and not the females is likely to be unfavourable to the breeding of mentally energetic types.

[1] Cp. Pearson's *History of England during the Early and Middle Ages*, i. 312.

(12) Whether or not the last hypothesis be valid it is clear that the co-efficient or constituent of intellectual progress in a people, given the necessary conditions of peace and sufficient food, is multiplication of ideas; and this primarily results from international contact, or the contact of wholly or partly independent communities of one people. Multiplication of arts and crafts is of course included under the head of ideas. But unless the stock of ideas is not merely in constant process of being added-to among the studious or leisured class, but disseminated among the other classes, stagnation will take place among these, and will inevitably infect the educated class.

De Tocqueville, balancing somewhat inconclusively, because always *in vacuo*, the forces affecting literature in aristocratic and democratic societies, says decisively enough (*Démocratie en Amérique*, ed. 1850, ii. 62-63) that "Toute aristocratie qui se met entièrement à part du peuple devient impuissante. Cela est vrai dans les lettres aussi bien qu'en politique." This holds clearly enough of Italian literature in the despotic period. Mr. Godkin's criticism (*Problems of Modern Democracy*, p. 56) that "M. de Tocqueville and all his followers take it for granted that the great incentive to excellence in all countries in which excellence is found, is the patronage and encouragement of an aristocracy," is hardly accurate. De Tocqueville puts the case judicially enough, so far as he goes; and Mr. Godkin falls into strange extravagance in his counter statement that there is "hardly a single historical work composed prior to the end of the last century, except perhaps Gibbon's, which, judged by the standard that the criticism of our day has set up, would not, though written for the "few," be pronounced careless, slipshod, or superficial." As regards present-day literary productions, De Tocqueville and Mr. Godkin alike omit the necessary economic analysis.

(13) In the intellectual infectiousness of all class degradation, properly speaking, lies the final sociological (as apart from the primary ethical) condemnation of slavery. The familiar argument that slavery first secured the leisure necessary for culture, even were it wholly instead of being merely partially true,

would not rebut the censure that falls to be passed on slavery in later stages of civilisation. All the ancient States, before Greece, stood on slavery: then it was not slavery that yielded her special culture. What she gained from older civilisations was the knowledge and the arts developed by *specialisation* of pursuits; and such specialisation was not necessarily dependent on slavery, which could abound without it. It was in the special employment, finally, of the exceptionally large *free* population of Athens that the greatest artistic output was reached.[1] In later periods, the slave population was the great nucleus of superstition and anti-culture.

Inasmuch, then, as education is in only a small degree compatible with toilsome poverty, the betterment of the material conditions of the toiling class is essential to progress in ideas. That is to say, continual progress implies gradual elimination of class inequality, and cannot subsist otherwise. At the same time, a culture-class must be maintained by new machinery when leisured wealth is got rid of.[2]

(14) Again: it follows from the foregoing (4-10) that the highest civilisation will be that in which the greatest number of varying culture influences meet,[3] in the most happily-crossed stock, under climatic conditions favourable to energy, on a basis of a civilisation sufficiently matured.[4] But in order to the effectual action of such various culture influences through all classes of the nation in which they meet, there is needed a constant application of social or political regimen. In the lack of that, a great conflux of culture

[1] Cp. Cunningham's *Western Civilisation*, p. 109.

[2] The point is argued at greater length by the author in an article on *The Economics of Genius*, in the *Forum*, April 1898.

[3] Cp. Tiele, *Outlines of the History of Religion*, Eng. tr. pp. 205, 207.

[4] The civilisations of North America and the English colonies, while showing much diffusion of average culture, produce thus far relatively few of the highest fruits because of social immaturity and the smallness of their culture class.

forces may miss fruition. A mere fortuitous depression of the rich class, and elevation of the poor, will not suffice to place a society on a sound or even on an improved footing. Such a change occurred in ancient Athens after Salamis, when the poorer sort, who had constituted the navy, flourished[1] as against the richer, who had been the land soldiery, and whose lands had been ravaged. But the forces of disintegration played afresh. Yet again, transient financial conditions, such as those of Italy before the Reformation, of Holland until the decline of its fishing and trade, and of Venice until its final commercial decay, may sustain a great artistic life, art having always depended on private or public demand. Thus with a change in the geographical course of trade, a great phase of culture-life may dwindle. So many and so complex are the forces and conditions of progress in civilisation.

§ 2

It will readily be seen that most of the foregoing propositions have direct reference to well-known facts of history. Thus (*a*) ancient Egypt represents a primary civilisation, marked indeed by some fluctuations, connected with dynastic changes which involved mixture of stocks, but on the whole singularly fixed ; while ancient Greek civilisation was emphatically a secondary one, the fruit of much race-mixture and many interacting culture-forces, all facilitated by the commercial position and coast-conformation of Hellas.

This view is partly rejected by Grote in two passages (part i. cc. xvi. xvii., ed. 1888, i. 326, 413) in which he gives to the "inherent and expansive force" of "the Greek mind" the main credit of Greek civilisation. But his words, to begin with, are confused and contradictory: "the transition of the Greek mind from its poetical to its comparatively positive stage was self-operated,

[1] Aristotle, *Politics*, ii. 12 ; v. 4.

accomplished by its own inherent and exhaustive force—*aided indeed, but by no means either impressed or provoked* from without. In the second place, there is no basis for the denial of "impression or provocation" from without. And finally, what is decisive, the historian himself has in other passages acknowledged that the Greeks received from Asia and Egypt just such "provocation" as is seen to take place in varying degrees in the culture contacts of all nations (cc. xv. xvi. pp. 307, 329). Of the contact with Egypt he expressly says that it "enlarged the range of their thoughts and observations." His whole treatment of the rise of culture, however, is meagre and imperfect relatively to his ample study of the culture itself. The case is conclusively put by Eduard Meyer (*Geschichte des Alterthums*, ii. 155) in the observation that while the west coast of Greece had as many natural advantages as the eastern, it remained backward in civilisation when the other had progressed far. "*Here there lacked the foreign stimulus*: the west of Greece is away from the source of culture. Here, accordingly, primitive conditions continued to rule, while in the east a higher culture evolved itself. . . . Corinth in the older period played no part whatever, whether in story or in remains." The same proposition was put a generation ago by A. Bertrand, who pointed out that the coasts of Elis and Messenia are "incomparably more fertile" than those of Argolis and Attica (*Études de mythologie et d'archéologie grecques*, 1858, pp. 40-41). The question as to the originality of Greek culture, it is interesting to note, was already discussed at the beginning of the eighteenth century. See Shaftesbury's *Characteristics*, Misc. iii. ch. i.

(*b*) The Greek land, besides, was only moderately fertile, and therefore not so cheaply and redundantly populated as Egypt.

The bracing effect of their relative poverty was fully recognised by the Greeks themselves. Cp. Herodotus, vii. 102, and Thucydides, i. 123. See on the same point Heeren, *Political History of Ancient Greece*, Eng. tr. pp. 24-33; Thirlwall, *History of Greece*, small ed. i. 12; Duncker, *Gesch. des Alterthums*, iii. ch. i. § 1; Wachsmuth, *Hist. Antiq. of the Greeks*, § 8; Duruy, *Hist. Grecque*, 1851, p. 7; Grote, part ii. ch. i. (ed. 1888, ii. 160); Boeckh, *Public Economy of Athens*, B. i. c. 8; Niebuhr, *Lectures*, li. (Eng. tr. 3rd ed. p. 265); Mahaffy, *Rambles and Studies in Greece*, 4th ed. pp. 137, 164-67.

(*c*) Hellas was further so decisively cut up into separate cantons by its mountain ranges that the Greek

districts were largely foreign to each other, and their cultures had thus the advantage of reacting and interacting, as against the disadvantage of their incurable political separateness—that disadvantage in turn being correlative with the advantage of insusceptibility to a despotism.

The effect of geographical conditions on Greek history is discussed at length in Conrad Bursian's essay, *Ueber den Einfluss des griechischen Landes auf den Charakter seiner Bewohner*, which I have been unable to procure or see; but I gather from his *Geographie von Griechenlands* that he takes the view here set forth. Cp. Senior's *Journal kept in Turkey and Greece*, 1859, p. 255, for a modern Greek's view of the state of his nation, "divided into small districts by mountain ranges intersecting each other in all directions without a road or canal"; and the impression retained from his travels by M. Bertrand, *Études de mythologie et d'archéologie grecques*, 1858, p. 199.

The profound importance of the geographical fact has been recognised more or less clearly and fully by many writers—*e.g.* Gillies, *History of Greece*, 1-vol. ed. p. 5; Heeren, as cited, pp. 35, 75; Duncker, as last cited; Duruy, ch. i.; Cox, *General History of Greece*, bk. i. ch. i.; Thirlwall, ch. x.; Wachsmuth, Eng. tr. i. 87; Comte, *Cours de Philosophie Positive*, Leçon 53ième; Grote, part ii. ch. i. (ii. 155); Finlay, *History of Greece*, Tozer's ed. i. 28; K. O. Müller, *Introd. to Scientific Mythology*, Eng. tr. p. 179; Hegel, as last cited; Hertzberg, *Geschichte von Hellas und Rom*, 1879 (in Oncken's series), i. 9; Fyffe (very explicitly), *Primer of Greek History*, p. 8—but it is strangely overlooked by writers to whom one turns for a careful study of causes. Even Grote, after having clearly set forth the predetermining influence of geography, attributes Greek divisions to the "character of the race," which even in this connection, however, he describes as "splitting *by natural fracture* into a multitude of self-administering, indivisible cities" (part ii. ch. 28, beginning); and Sir George Cox, after specifying the geographical factor, speaks of it as merely "fostering" a love of isolation *resulting* from "political creed." Mr. Freeman (*History of Federal Government*) does not seem to apply the geographical fact to the explanation of any phase of Greek history, though he sees in Greece (ed. 1893, pp. 92, 554) "each valley and peninsula and island marked out by the hand of nature for an independent being," and quotes (p. 559) Cantù as to the effect of geography on history in Italy. In so many words he pro-

nounces (p. 101) that the love of town-autonomy was "inherent in the Greek mind." Mr. Warde Fowler (*City-State of the Greeks and Romans*) does not once give heed to the geographical conditions of causation, always speaking of the Greeks as lacking the "faculty" of union as compared with the Latins, though the Eastern Empire finally showed greater cohesive power than the Western. Even Mr. Fyffe (*Primer* cited, p. 127), despite his preliminary recognition of the facts, finally speaks of the Greeks as relatively lacking in the "gift for government."

A notable expression of the same fallacy is found in Mr. Morley's *Compromise* (ed. 1888, p. 108) in the allusion to "peoples so devoid of the sovereign faculty of political coherency as were the Greeks and the Jews." Mr. Morley's proposition is that such peoples may still evolve great civilising ideas; but though that is true the implied thesis as to "faculty" vitiates even the truth. The case of the Jews is to be explained in exactly the same way as that of the Greeks, the face of Palestine being disjunct and segregate in a peculiar degree. Other "Semites," living in great plains, were united in great monarchies. The sound view of the case as to Rome is put by Hertzberg:—"Soll man im Gegensatze zu der hellenischen Geschichte es in kürzester Fassung bezeichnen, so kann man etwa sagen, die italische Landesnatur stellte der Ausbildung eines grossen *einheitlich* geordneten Staates durchaus nicht die gewaltigen Hindernisse entgegen, wie das in Griechenland der Fall war" (*Gesch. von Hellas und Rom*, ii. 7). Cp. Shuckburgh, *History of Rome*, 1894, p. 9, as to "the vast heights which effectually separate tribes." Dr. Cunningham puts it (*Western Civilisation*, pp. 152, 160) that Roman expansion in Italy came of the need to reach a true frontier of defence, in the lack of physical barriers to the early States. It seems more plausible to say that all of the States concerned were positively disposed to conquest, and that the physical conditions of Italy made possible a process of overrunning which in early Greece was impossible.

The theory of "faculty," consistently applied on Mr. Fowler's and Mr. Morley's lines, would credit the French with an innate gift of union much superior to that of the Germans—at least in the modern period—and the Chinese with the greatest "faculty" of all. But the long maintenance of one rule over all China is clearly due in large part to the "great facility of internal intercourse" (Davis, *The Chinese*, Introd.) so long established. The Roman roads were half the secret of the cohesion of the empire. Dr. Draper suggests, ingeniously but inaccurately, that Rome had strength and permanence because of lying east and west, and thus possessing greater racial homogeneity than it would have had if it lay north and south (*Intel. Devel. of Europe*, i. 11). On the other

hand mountainous Switzerland remains still cantonally separate, though the pressure of surrounding States, beginning with that of Austria, forced a political union. Compare the case of the clans of the Scottish Highlands down to the road-making period after the last Jacobite rising. See the principle discussed in Mr. Spencer's *Principles of Sociology*, i. § 17.

It may be well, before leaving the subject, to meet the important criticism of the geographical principle by Fustel de Coulanges (*La Cité Antique*, liv. iii. ch. xiv. p. 238, édit. 1880). Noting that the incurable division of the Greeks has been attributed to the nature of their land, and that it has been said that the intersecting mountains established lines of natural demarcation among men, he goes on to argue: "But there are no mountains between Thebes and Platæa, between Argos and Sparta, between Sybaris and Crotona. There were none between the towns of Latium, or between the twelve cities of Etruria. Physical nature has doubtless some influence on the history of peoples, but the beliefs of men have a much greater. Between two neighbouring cities there was something more impassable than a mountain, to wit, the series of sacred limits, the difference of cults, the barrier which each city set up between the stranger and its Gods."

All this so far as it goes is substantially true, but it does not at all conflict with the principle as above set forth. Certainly all cities, like all tribes, were primarily separatist; though even in religious matters there was some measure of early peaceful interinfluence, and a certain tendency to syncresis as well as to separateness. (Cp. K. O. Müller, *Dorians*, Eng. tr. i. 228.) But the principle is not special to the cities of Greece. Cities and tribes were primarily separatist in Babylonia and in Egypt. How then were these regions nevertheless monarchised at an early period? Clearly by reason of the greater invitingness and feasibility of conquest in such territories —for their unification was forcible. The conditions had thus both an objective and a subjective, a suggestive and a permissive force, both lacking in Greece. Again, the twelve cities of Etruria *formed a league*. If they did so more readily and effectually than the Greeks, is not the level character of their territory one of the obviously probable causes? No doubt the close presence of hostile and alien races was a further unifying force which did not arise in Greece. Etruria finally, like Latium, was unified by conquest; the question is, Why was not Greece? There is no answer save one, that in the pre-Alexandrian period no Greek State had acquired the military and administrative skill and resources needed to conquer and hold such a divided territory. Certainly the conditions conserved the ideal of separateness and non-aggression or non-assimilation, so that cities which had easy access to each other respected

each other's ideal. But here again it was known that an attempt at conquest would probably lead to alliances between the attacked State and others; and the physical conditions prevented any State save Macedonia from becoming overwhelmingly strong. To these conditions, then, we always return, not as to sole causes, but as to determinants.

(*d*) In Egypt, again, culture was never deeply disseminated, and was hardly at all fecundated by outside contact. In Greece, there was always the great uncultured slave substratum; and the arrest of freedom, to say nothing of social ignorance, female subjection, and sexual perversion, ultimately kept vital culture stationary. In Rome, militarism and the multiplication of the slave class, along with the deletion of the independent and industrious middle class, made progressive culture impossible, as surely as it broke down self-government. In all cases alike, over-population, not being met by science, either bred poverty or was obviated by crime and vice.

The so-called regeneration of Europe by the barbarian conquest, finally, was simply the beginning of a long period of corrupted and internecine barbarism, the old culture remaining latent: and not till after many centuries did the maturing barbaric civilisation in times of compulsory peace reach the capacity of being fecundated by the intelligent assimilation of the old. But after the Renaissance, as before, the diseases of militarism and class privilege and the political subjection caused a backthrow and intellectual stagnation, which was assisted by the commercial decline brought upon Italy; so that in the feudal period, in one State after another, we have the symptoms of, as it were, senile "decay" and retrogression.[1] In all cases this is to be set down proximately to the deficit of new ideas, and in some to excess of strife, which exhausted spare energy

[1] See Stubbs, *Constitutional Hist. of England*, 4th ed. iii. 632-33, as to England in the 15th century.

among the leisured class, deepened the misery of the toilers, and normally prevented the intelligent intercourse of peoples. It is become a commonplace of historical philosophy that the Crusades wrought for good inasmuch as they meant fresh communication between East and West. Yet it may be doubted whether much more was not done through the quiet contacts of peace between Saracen and Christian in Western Europe than by the forced intercourse following on religious war. In any case the transition from quasi-decay to progress in Christendom is clearly due to the entrance of new ideas of many species from many directions into the common stock; Greek letters, Saracen physics, and new geographical discovery all combining to generate thought.

The case of Japan, again, compares with both that of ancient Greece and that of modern Europe. Its separate civilisation, advantageously placed in an archipelago, drew stimulus early in the historic period from that of China; and while long showing the Chinese unprogressiveness in other respects, partly in virtue of the peculiar burdensomeness of the Chino-Japanese system of ideograms, it made remarkable progress on the side of art. The recent rapid industrial development (injurious to the artistic life) is plainly a result of the European and American contact; and if only the mechanism of reading and writing be made manageable on the European lines, the Japanese civilisation may develop mentally as much as it is doing industrially and in military organisation.

It suffices the practical political student, then, to note that progress is thus always a matter of intelligible causation; and, without concerning himself about predicting the future or estimating the sum of possibilities, to take up the tasks of contemporary politics as all other tasks are taken up by practical men, as a matter

of adaptation of means to ends. The architect and engineer have nothing to do with calculating as to when the energy of the solar system will be wholly transmuted. As little has the politician to do with absolute estimates of the nature of progress. All alike have to do with the study of laws, forces, and economics.

§ 3

We may now, then, set forth the all-pervading biological forces or tendencies of attraction and repulsion in human affairs as the main primary factors in politics or corporate life, which it is the problem of human science to control by counteracting or guiding ; and we may without further illustration set down the principal modes in which these instincts appear. They are, broadly speaking :

(*a*) Animal pugnacities and antipathies of States or peoples, sanctified from the first by religion, and surviving as racial aspirations in subject peoples.

(*b*) Class combinations and hostilities within a State, and in particular, popular desire for betterment.

(*c*) The tendency to despotism as a cure for anarchy ; and the spirit of conquest.

(*d*) Commercial jealousies of States.

(*e*) Designs of rulers, giving rise to factions—complicated by questions of succession and loyalism.

(*f*) Religious combinations, antipathies, and ambitions, international or sectarian. In more educated communities, ideals of government and conduct.

In every one of these modes, be it observed, the instinct of repulsion correlates with the instinct of attraction. The strifes are the strifes of combinations, of groups or masses united in themselves by sympathy, in antipathy to other groups or masses. The "*esprit de corps*" arises alike in the species, the horde, the tribe, the community, the class, the faction, the nation, the trade or profession, the Church, the sect, the party. Always men unite to oppose : always they must love to hate, fraternise to struggle.

The analogies in physics are obvious, but need not here be dwelt upon. There is a risk of losing concrete impressions, which are here in view, in a highly generalised statement of cosmic analogiés. But it may be well to point out that a general view will perfectly reconcile the superficially conflicting doctrines of recent biologists, as to "progress by struggle" and "progress by co-operation." Both statements hold good, the two phases being correlatives.

I have said that it is extremely difficult to imagine a state of society in which there shall be no public operation of any one of these forces. I am disposed to say it is impossible, but for scientific purposes prefer to put simply the difficulties of the conception. A cessation of war is not only easily conceivable but likely ; but a cessation of strife of aspiration would mean a state of biological equilibrium throughout the civilised world. Now, equilibrium is by general consent a state only momentarily possible ; and the state of dissolution of unions, were that to follow, would involve strife of opinion at least up to a certain point. But just as evolution is now visibly towards an abandonment of brute strife among societies, so may it be reasonably expected that the strife of ideals and doctrines within societies, though now perhaps emotionally intense in proportion to the limitation of brute warfare, will gradually be freed of malevolent passion as organisms refine further. Passion, in any case, has hitherto been

at once motive power and hindrance—the omnipresent force, since all ideas have their correlative emotion. A perception of this has led to some needless dispute over what is called the "economic theory" of history; critics insisting that men are ruled by non-economic as well as economic motives.[1] The solution is perfectly simple. Men are proximately ruled by their passions or emotions; and the supremacy of the economic factor consists in its being the most permanent director or stimulant of feeling for the majority. Therefore the great social rectification, if it ever come, must needs be economic.

Certainly, on the principle laid down, there is a likelihood that strife of ideals and doctrines may be for a time intensified by the very process of social reform, should that go to lessen the stress of the industrial struggle for existence. It is easy to see that England has in the past hundred years escaped the stress of domestic strife which in France wrought successive revolutions, not so much by any virtue in its partially democratic constitution as by the fact that on the one hand a war was begun with France by the English ruling classes at an early stage of the first revolution, and that on the other hand the animal energies of the middle and lower classes were on the whole freer than those of the French to run in the channels of industrial competition. People peacefully fighting each other daily in trade, not to speak of sports, were thereby partly safeguarded from carrying the instincts of attraction and repulsion in politics to the length of insurrection and civil war. When the strife of trade became congested, the spirit of political strife, fed by hunger, broke out afresh; to be again eased off when the country had an exciting foreign war on hand. So obvious is this that it may be the last card

[1] This discussion also goes back for at least two centuries. See Shaftesbury's *Characteristics*, Misc. iii. ch. i. (vol. iii. pp. 137, 152).

of Conservatism to play off the war spirit against the reform spirit, as was done with some temporary success in England by Beaconsfield, and as is latterly being done by his successors. The climaxing movement of political rationalism is evidently dependent on the limitation of the field of industrial growth and the absence of brute warfare. And if, as seems conceivable, political rationalism attains to a scientific provision for the wellbeing of the mass of the people, we shall have attained a condition in which the forces of attraction and repulsion, no longer flowing freely in the old social channels, may be expected to dig new ones or deepen those lately formed. The future channels, generally speaking, would tend to lie in the regions of political, ethical, and religious opinion; and the partial disuse of any one of these will tend to bring about the deepening of the others.

But this is going far ahead; and it is our business rather to make clear, with the help of an analysis of analogous types of civilisation, what has happened in the modern past of our country. The simple general laws under notice are universal, and will be found to apply in all stages of history, though the interpretation of many phases of life by their means may be a somewhat complex matter.

For instance, the life of China (above discussed) and that of India may at first sight seem to give little colour to the assumption of a constant play of social attraction and repulsion. The "unprogressiveness of Asia" is dwelt on alike by many who know Asia and many who do not. But this relative unprogressiveness is to be explained, like European progress, in terms of the conditions. China is simply a case of comparative culture-stability and culture-isolation. The capital condition of progress in civilisation has always been, as aforesaid, the contact of divergent races whose independent culture elements, though different, are not greatly different in grade and prestige. Now, the contacts of China, down till last century, have been either with races which had few elements of civilisation to give her, like the Mongols, or with a civilisation little different from or less vigorous than her own, like that of India. Even these con-

tacts counted for much, and Chinese history has been full of political convulsions, despite—or in keeping with—the comparative stagnation of Chinese culture. (On this see Peschel, *Races of Men*, Eng. tr. pp. 361-374. Cp. Huc, *Chinese Empire*, Eng. tr. ed. 1859, p. xvii.; Walckenaer, *Essai sur l'histoire de l'espèce humaine*, 1798, pp. 175, 176; and Maine, *Early History of Institutions*, pp. 226, 227.) The very pigtail which for Europe is the symbol of Chinese civilisation is only two hundred years old, having come in with the Mantchoo dynasty; and the policy of systematically excluding foreigners dates from the same period (Huc, p. 236). "No one," writes Professor Flint, "who has felt interest enough in that singular nation to study the researches and translations of Remusat, Pauthier, Julien, Legge, Plath, Faber, Eitel, and others, will hesitate to dismiss as erroneous the commonplace that it has been an unprogressive nation" (*History of the Philosophy of History*, vol. i. 1893, p. 88). But on the other hand, the fecundity of the soil has always maintained a redundant and therefore a poor and ignorant population—a condition which we have described as fatal to progress in culture if not counteracted; and which further favours the utter subjection of women and the consequent arrest of half the sources of variation. We cannot, therefore, accede to Professor Flint's further remark that "The development and filiation of thought is scarcely less traceable in the history and literature of China than of Greece"—that is, if it be meant that Chinese history down till our own day may be so compared with the history of pagan Greece. The forces of fixation in China have been too strong to admit of this. The same factors have been at work in India, where, further, successive conquests, down till our own, had results very similar to those of the barbarian conquest of the Roman Empire. Yet at length, next door to China, in Japan, there has rapidly taken place a national transformation that is not to be paralleled in the world's history; and in India the Congress movement has developed in a way that twenty years ago was thought impossible. And while these things are actually happening before the world's eyes, certain Englishmen vociferate more loudly than ever the formula of the "unchangeableness of Asia." A saner, though still a speculative view, is put forth by Mr. C. H. Pearson's work on *National Character*. It was anticipated by—among others—M. Philarète Chasles. See his *L'Angleterre Politique*, édit. 1878, pp. 250, 251. And Walckenaer a hundred years ago (*Essai* cited, p. 368), predicted the future civilisation of the vast plains of Tartary.

PART II

ECONOMIC FORCES IN ANCIENT HISTORY

CHAPTER I

ROME

By singling out one set of the forces of aggregation and disintegration touched on in the foregoing general view, it is possible to get a more concrete idea of what actually went on in the Roman body politic. It is always useful in economic science, despite protests to the contrary, to consider bare processes irrespectively of ethical feeling; and the advantage accrues similarly in the "economic interpretation of history."[1] We have sufficiently for our purpose considered Roman history under the aspects of militarism and class egoism: it remains to consider it as a series of economic phenomena.

This has been facilitated by a number of special studies. Gibbon covers most of the ground in chapters 6, 14, 17, 18, 29, 35, 36 and 41. Cp. Alison on "The Fall of Rome," in *Essays*, 1850, vol. iii. (a useful conspectus, though flawed by some economic errors); Spalding's *Italy and the Italian Islands*, 3rd ed. 1845, i. 371-400; Dureau de la Malle, *Economie Politique des Romains*, 1840, t. ii.; Robiou et Delaunay, *Les Institutions de l'Ancienne Rome*, 1888, vol. iii. ch. i.; Fustel de Coulanges, *Le Colonat Romain*, etc.; Finlay, *History of Greece from its Conquest by the Romans*, ed. 1877, ch. i. §§ 5-8; Long, *Decline of the Roman Republic*, vol. i. 1864, ch. xi. xii. xx. (a work full of sound

[1] The phrase of Professor Thorold Rogers, whose application of the principle, however, does not carry us far.

criticism of testimonies); W. T. Arnold, *Roman Provincial Administration*, 1879; Brooks Adams, *The Law of Civilisation and Decay*, 1897, ch. i.; and last but not least, Dr. Cunningham's *Western Civilisation*, 1899.

As we first trace them, the Romans are a cluster of agricultural tribes, chronically at war with their neighbours, and centring round certain refuge-fortresses on one or two of the "Seven Hills"[1]—the site of an older and overthrown civilisation, great in public works.[2] Whether before or after conquest by monarchic Etruscans, these tribes tended normally to fall into social grades in which wealth and power tended to go together. The source of subsistence for all was agriculture, and that of the richer was primarily slave labour, a secondary source being usury. The slaves, again, were primarily procured by war, which would also yield plunder in the form of cattle, in the ages before the precious metals stood for the command of all forms of wealth. Thus the rich tended to grow richer even in that primitive community, their riches enabling them specially to qualify themselves for war, so getting more slaves and cattle, and to acquire fresh slave labour in time of peace, while in time of war the poor cultivator ran a special risk of being himself reduced to slavery at home, in that his farm was untilled, while that of the slave-owner went on as usual.[3] Long before the ages described as decadent, the lapse of the poor into slavery was a normal event. "The law of debt, framed by creditors,

[1] According to Mommsen (ch. iv.), the Palatine and the Quirinal.

[2] This was already inferred last century by Ferguson (*History of the Roman Republic*, 1783, ch. i. *note*) from the nature of the remains of the great *cloacae*, which he held could not have been built by any of the early Roman kings. That view is now confirmed: see Middleton's *Remains of Ancient Rome*, 1892, i. 104-107; and Robiou et Delaunay, *Les Institutions de l'Ancienne Rome*, 1884, vol. ii. ch. i. § 1. We may now decide with Mr. Mahaffy that "as civilisation of some kind was vastly older on the Hill of Troy than any of us had imagined, so the site of every historic city is likely to have been the habitation of countless generations" (*A Survey of Greek Civilisation*, 1897, p. 28).

[3] Cp. Bury, *History of the Later Roman Empire*, i. 26, following Von Ihering.

and for the protection of creditors, was the most horrible that has ever been known among men."[1] When the poorer cultivator borrowed stock or seed from the richer, he had first to pay a heavy interest; and when in bad years he failed to meet that liability he could be at once sold up and finally enslaved with his family, so making competition all the harder for the other small cultivators. As against the rapidly disintegrating action of such a system, however, wars of conquest and plunder became to some extent a means of popular salvation, the poorer having ultimately their necessary share in the booty, and, as the State strengthened, in the conquered lands. Military expansion was thus an economic need.

In such an inland community, commerce could grow but slowly, the products being little adapted for distant exchange. The traders, as apart from the agriculturists and vine- and olive-growers, would as a rule be foreigners, "non-citizens," having no political rights; and their calling was from the first held in low esteem by the richer natives, were it only because in comparison it yielded low gains and was always apt to involve some lying,[2] which as between man and man could be seen to be a bad thing by moralists who had no scruples about usury and enslavement for debt. And as the scope of the State increased from age to age, the patrician class found ready to its hand means of enrichment which yielded more return with much less trouble than was involved in commerce.

The first practical problem of all communities, taxation, was intelligently faced by the Roman aristocracy from the outset. The payment of the *tributum* or special tax for military purposes was a condition of the citizen franchise, and so far the patricians were all

[1] Macaulay, *Lays of Ancient Rome*, pref. to *Virginia*.
[2] Cp. Cicero, *De Officiis*, i. 42.

burdened where the unenfranchised plebeians were not. But the use of the public pastures (which seem at one time to have been the sole source of the State's revenue[1]), and the cultivation of public land, were operations which could be so conducted as to pay the individual without paying the State. It is clear that frauds in this connection were at all times common: the tithes and rents due on the *ager publicus* were evaded, and the land itself appropriated wherever possible by the more powerful, though still called public property.[2] "The poorer plebeian, therefore, always strove to have conquered lands divided, and not kept as *ager publicus*; while the landless men, who got allotments at a distance, were inclined to regard their migration as an almost equal grievance. If the rich men, they argued, had not monopolised the public pastures with their herds, and treated the lands which they leased at a nominal rental as their own, there would have been enough land at home to divide among those who had been ruined while serving their country in arms."[3]

But as the sphere of conquest widened, another economic phase supervened. Where newly conquered territory was too distant to tempt any save the poorest citizens, or to be directly utilised by the rich, it could be made *ager publicus* and rented to its own inhabitants; and the collection of this and other exactions from subject provinces gradually grew to be a main source of Roman wealth. For the mere cattle-looting[4] of the early days there was substituted the systematic

[1] Pliny, *Hist. Nat.* xviii. 3.

[2] E. Meyer (*Geschichte des Alterthums*, ii. 518), alleges a common misconception as to the *ager publicus* being made a subject of class strife; but does not make the matter at all clearer.

[3] Shuckburgh, *History of Rome*, pp. 93, 94. Cp. Long, *Decline of the Roman Republic*, ch. xii., as to the frauds of the rich in the matter of the public lands.

[4] Dr. Cunningham overlooks this form of gain-getting by war, when he says the early Romans had no direct profit from it (*Western Civilisation*, p. 154), but mentions it later (p. 157).

extortion of tribute. "In antiquity, conquest meant essentially the power to impose a tribute upon the conquered;"[1] and "until the time of Augustus, the Romans had maintained their armies by seizing and squandering the accumulated capital hoarded by all the nations of the world."[2] Meanwhile, the upper classes were directly or indirectly supported by the annual tribute which from the time of the conquest of Greece was drawn solely from the provinces. Paulus Emilius brought from the sack of Hellas so enormous a treasure in bullion, as well as in objects of art, that the exaction of the *tributum* from Roman citizens, however rich, was felt to have become irrational; and henceforth, until Augustus re-imposed taxation to pay his troops, Italy sponged undisguisedly on the rest of the empire.[3] On the one hand the exacted revenue supported the military and the bureaucracy: on the other hand, the business of collecting taxes and tribute was farmed out in the hands of companies of *publicani*, mainly formed of the so-called knights, the *equites* of the early days; in whose hands rich senators, in defiance of a legal prohibition, placed capital sums for investment. Roman administration was thus a matter of financially exploiting the empire in the interest of the Roman monied classes;[4] and the skill with which the possibilities of the situation were developed is perhaps even now not fully realised. The Roman financier could secure a

[1] W. T. Arnold, *Roman Provincial Administration*, 1879, p. 26.

[2] Finlay, *History of Greece*, Tozer's ed. i. 39.

[3] When Julius Cæsar abolished the public revenue from the lands of Campania by dividing them among 20,000 colonists, the only Italian revenue left was the small duty on the sale of slaves (Cicero, *Ep. ad Atticum*, ii. 16).

[4] Dr. Cunningham, preserving the conception of Rome as an entity with choice and volition, inclines to see a necessary self-protection in most Roman wars; yet his pages show clearly enough that the monied classes were the active power. He distinguishes (p. 161), "public neglect" (of conquered peoples) from "public oppression." But the public neglect was simply a matter of the control of the exploiting class, who were the effective "public" for foreign affairs. Compare his admissions as to their forcing of wars and their control of justice, pp. 163, 164.

tribute upon tribute by lending to a subject city the money demanded of it by the government, and charge as much interest on the loan as the borrowers could well pay. We know that the notoriously conscientious Brutus, of sacred memory, thus lent, or backed a friend who lent, money to tribute-payers at 48 per cent, or at least demanded 48 per cent on his loans, and sought to use the power of the executive to extort the usury.[1]

All this, we are to remember, went on without any promotion whatever of real domestic wealth-production; so that in sheer factitiousness the revenue of Rome is without parallel in history. Modern England, which has grown rich by burning up its coal in manufacture or selling it outright, but in the process has acquired a share in the national debts of all other countries—England is almost stable in comparison. While it lasts, the coal at least educes manufactures, which in turn support a good deal of agriculture even against the competition of better soils. But the history of Rome was a progressive paralysis of Italian production; and the one way in which the administration could be said to counteract the process was by forcing more-or-less unprofitable mining for gold and silver wherever any could be got, thus giving what little stimulus can be given to demand by the mere placing of fresh bullion on the market. Roman civilisation was thus irrevocably directed to an illusory end, with inevitably fatal results. Bullion had come to stand for public wealth, and wars were made for mines as well as for tribute, Spain in particular being prized for her mining resources. As a necessary sequence, therefore, copper money was ousted by silver, and silver finally by gold; which in turn was repeatedly debased when

[1] The fullest English account of the matter is given by Long, *Decline of the Roman Republic*, iv. 423-27, following Savigny. Cp. Plutarch's account of the doings of the *publicani* in Asia (*Lucullus*, cc. 7, 20). Lucullus gave deadly offence at Rome by his check on their extortions.

the treasury was in difficulties.[1] Between revenue and tax-farming profits and the yield of the mines, the Roman monied class must indeed have spent a good deal, so long as the tributaries were not exhausted. But their economic demand was mainly for—(*a*) foods, spices, wines, cloths, gems, marbles, and wares produced by the more prosperous provinces; and (*b*) *services* from artists, architects, master craftsmen, mimes, parasites, and meretrices, whose economic demand in turn would as far as possible go in the same direction.

As for the mass of the people, slave or free, which ought on common-sense principles to have been employed either in industry or on the land, it was by a series of hand-to-mouth measures on the part of the government, and by the operation of ordinary self-interest on the part of the rich class, made age by age more unproductive industrially and more worthless politically. Despite such a reform as the Licinian law of 367 B.C.,[2] which for a time seems to have restored a yeoman class to the State and greatly developed its fighting power, the forces of capitalism gradually ousted the yeomen cultivators all over Italy, leaving the land in the hands of the patricians and financiers of the city, who cultivated it either by slave labour or by grinding down the former cultivators as tenants. Even on this footing, a certain amount of industry would be forced on the towns. But not only was that also largely in the hands of slave-masters, with the result that demotic life everywhere was kept on the lowest possible plane: the emperors gradually adopted on humane grounds a policy which demoralised nearly all that was left of sound citizenship.

[1] Cp. M'Culloch, *Essays and Treatises*, 2nd ed. pp. 58-64, and refs.

[2] As to the probable nature of this much-discussed law, see Long, *Decline of the Roman Republic*, i. ch. xi. and xii.

As of old, monarchy in the hands of rational and conscientious men tended to seek for the mass of the people some protection as against the upper class; and the taxes and customs laid on by Augustus, to the disgust of the Senate, were an effort in this direction. But this was rather negative than positive protection, and the effort inevitably went further. In the last age of what may be termed conscientious aristocratic republicanism, such as it was, we find Caius Gracchus, as tribune, helping the plebs by causing grain to be sold at a half or a fourth of its market value—an expedient pathetically expressive of the hopeless distance that then lay between public spirit and social science. The one way, if there were any, in which the people could be saved, was by a raising of their social status; and that was impossible without an arrest of slavery. But no Roman thinker save the Gracchi seems ever to have dreamt of that; least of all were the Roman ruling class likely to think of it; and though Tiberius Gracchus did avowedly seek to substitute free for slave labour,[1] and wrought to that end; and though Caius Gracchus did in his time of power employ a large amount of free labour on public works, one such effort counted for nothing against the normal attitude of the patriciate. There is no record that in the contracts between the treasury and the companies of *publicani*, any stipulation was ever made as to their employing free labour, or in any way considering the special needs of the populations among whom they acted.[2] Thus a mere cheapening of bread could do nothing to aid free labour as against capitalism using slaves. On the contrary, such aids would tend irresistibly to multiply the host of idlers and broken men

[1] As Long remarks (i. 171) it does not appear what T. Gracchus proposed to do with the slaves when he had put freemen in their place. Cp. Cunningham, p. 150.

[2] Robiou et Delaunay, *Les Institutions de l'Ancienne Rome*, 1888, iii. 18.

who flocked to Rome from all its provinces, on the trail of the plunder. The method of free or subsidised distribution of grain,[1] however, was so easy a way of keeping Rome quiet, in the period of rapidly spreading conquest and mounting tribute, that in spite of the resistance of the monied classes[2] it was adhered to. Sulla naturally checked the practice, but still it was revived; and Cæsar, after his triumph in Africa, found the incredible number of 320,000 citizens in receipt of regular doles of cheapened or gratis corn. He in turn, though he had been concerned in extending it,[3] took strong measures to check the corrosion, reducing the roll to 150,000[4]; but even that was in effect a confession that the problem was past solution by the policy, so energetically followed by him, of re-colonising in Italy, Corinth, Carthage, Spain, and Gaul. And if Cæsar sought to limit the gifts of bread, he seems to have outgone his predecessors in his provision of the other element in the popular ideal—the circus; his shows being bloodier as well as vaster than those of earlier days.[5] A public thus treated to sport must needs have cheap food as well.

Of this policy, the economic result was to carry still further the depression of Italian agriculture. The corn supplied at low rates or given away by the administration was of course bought in the cheapest markets, those of Sardinia and Sicily, Africa and Gaul, and importation once begun would be carried to the

[1] For the history of the practice, see the article "Frumentariae Leges," in Smith's *Dictionary of Antiquities*.

[2] The first step by Gracchus does not seem to have been much resisted (Merivale, *Fall of the Roman Republic*, p. 22; but cp. Long, *Decline of the Roman Republic*, i. 262), such measures having been for various reasons often resorted to in the past (Pliny, *Hist. Nat.* xviii. 1; Livy, ii. 34); but in the reaction which followed, the process was for a time restricted (Merivale, p. 34).

[3] It seems to have been he who, as consul, first caused the distribution to be made gratuitous. See Cicero, *ad Attic.* ii. 19, and *De Domo Sua*, cc. 10, 15. The Clodian law, making the distribution gratuitous, was passed next year.

[4] Suetonius, *Julius*, c. 41.

[5] Dio Cassius, xliii. 24.

utmost lengths of commercialism. Italian farms, especially those at a distance from the capital,[1] could not compete with the provinces save by still further substituting large slave-tilled farms for small holdings, and grinding still harder the face of the slave. When finally Augustus,[2] definitely establishing the system of lowered prices and doles, subsidised the trade in the produce of conquered Egypt to feed his populace, and thus still further promoted the importation of the cheapest foreign grain, the agriculture of Italy, and even of some of the provinces, was practically destroyed.

It has been argued by M'Culloch (*Treatises and Essays: History of Commerce*, 2nd ed. p. 287, *note*) that it is impossible that the mere importation of the corn required to feed the populace—say a million quarters or more—could have ruined the agriculture of Italy. This expresses a misconception of what took place. The doles were not universal, and the emperors naturally preferred to limit themselves as far as possible to paying premiums for the importation and cheap sale of corn. (Cp. Suetonius, *Claudius*, c. 19, and the Digest, iii. 4, 1 ; xiv. i. 1, 20 ; xlvii. ix. 3, 8 ; l. v. 3, etc.) Egyptian corn could thus easily undersell Italian for ordinary consumption. For the rest, its sale would be a means of special revenue to the emperor. Cp. M'Culloch's own statement, p. 291.

It was not that, as Pliny put it in the perpetually quoted phrase,[3] the *latifundia*, the great estates, had ruined Italy and began to ruin the provinces ; it was that, first, the provinces undersold Italy, whereafter the economically advantaged competition of Egypt, as imperially exploited, undersold the produce of most of the other regions, and would have done so equally had their agriculture remained in the hands of small farmers. The theory that "those large pastoral estates, and that slave-cultivation, which had so powerful and so deleterious an influence over Italian

[1] It must have been the relative dearness of land transport that kept the price of corn so low in Cisalpine Gaul in the time of Polybius, who describes a remarkable abundance (ii. 15).

[2] Suetonius, *Aug.* cc. 40, 41.

[3] *Hist. Nat.* xviii. 7 (6).

husbandry and population, may be principally ascribed to the confiscations and the military colonies of Sulla and his successors,"[1] is clearly wide of the mark. Large capitalistic estates were beginning to arise in Attica in the time of Solon, and were normal in the time of Xenophon. In Carthage, where they likewise arose in due economic course, they do not seem to have hurt agriculture, though worked by slave labour; and on the other hand the Roman military colonies were an attempt, albeit vain, to restore a free farming population. The true account of the matter is this: that if Italy had not conquered Egypt and the other fertile provinces, their competition could not have come to pass as it did, for the imports in that case would have had to be paid for by exports, and Italy had nothing adequate to export. It was the power to exact tribute that upset the economic balance. To support the policy of cheap or free food—which was extended to other large Italian cities—the tribute came in large measure in the form of foods; and in so far as it came in bullion the coin had to be speedily re-exported to pay for the manufactures turned out by the provinces, and bought by the Italian rich. Save in so far as rich amateurs of agriculture went on farming at small profit or at a loss,[2] Italy produced little beyond olives and wine and cattle.[3] Industrially considered, the society of the whole peninsula was thus finally a mere shell, doing its exchanges solely in virtue of the annual income it extorted from provincial labour, and growing more and more worthless in point of character as its vital basis grew more and more strictly factitious.

[1] M'Culloch, *Treatises and Essays: Colonial System of the Ancients*, p. 426. No doubt agriculture went rapidly from bad to worse in the convulsions of Sulla's rule. See Professor Pelham's article "Rome" in *Ency. Brit.* xx. 761, 762.

[2] Cp. Pliny, as last cited.

[3] The Italians consumed large quantities of pork, mainly raised in the north. Polybius, ii. 15; xii. fr. 1.

It would be accurate to say of the empire, as represented by Italy and the capital, that it was a vast economic simulacrum. The paternal policy of the emperors,[1] good and bad, wrought to pretty much the same kind of result as the egoism of the upper classes had done; and though their popular measures must have exasperated the Senate, that body had in general to tolerate their well-meaning deeds as it did their crimes.[2]

We may perhaps better understand the case by supposing a certain economic development to take place in England from henceforth. At present, we remain economically advantaged or beneficed for manufacture by our coalfields, which are unequalled in Europe. In return for our manufactures we import foods and goods that otherwise we could not pay for; and the additional revenue from British investments in foreign debts and enterprises further swells the import, thus depressing to a considerable extent *our* agriculture. When in the course of one or two centuries the coalfields are exhausted (unless it should be found that the tides can be made to yield electric power cheaply enough) our manufacturing population must needs dwindle, as the United States must supersede us with their enormous stores of coal. A "return to the land" might in that case be assumed to be inevitable; but should American wheat-production continue (as it may or may not) to have the same relative advantages of soil and finance, the remaining city populations would continue to buy foreign corn; and the land would be still further turned to pasture—if indeed foreign competition were not too strong there also. That remaining city popula-

[1] Cp. Spalding, *Italy and the Italian Islands*, i. 372-75, 392, 398; Merivale, *History*, c. 32; ed. 1873, iv. 42; M'Culloch, as cited, pp. 286-92; Finlay, *History of Greece*, i. 43; and Blanqui, *Histoire de l'Economie Politique*, 2e éd. i. 123, as to the progression of the policy of feeding the populace. Cp. also Suetonius, *in Aug.* c. 42.

[2] There is, however, reason to surmise that the murder of Pertinax was planned, not by the prætorians who did the deed, but by the official and monied class who detested his reforms. See them specified by Gibbon, ch. iv. *end.*

tion, roughly speaking, would in the terms of the case consist of (*a*) those persons drawing incomes from foreign investments; (*b*) those tradesmen and professional people whom they employed to do their necessary home work, as the Romans perforce employed to the last some workmen and doctors and scribes, slave or free; (*c*) those who might earn incomes by seafaring; and (*d*) the official class—necessarily much reduced, like every other. Until the incomes from foreign investments disappeared, the country could not gravitate down to an economically stable recommencement in agriculture.

We need not consider curiously whether things would or will happen in exactly this way; suffice it that such a development would be in a measure economically analogous to what took place in ancient Rome. If the upper-class population of England, instead of receiving only dividends from foreign stocks, and pensions from the revenue of India, were able to extort an absolute tribute from India and the colonies, the parallel would be so much the closer. What held together the Roman Empire so long was, on the one hand, the developed military and juridical organisation with its maintaining revenue, and on the other hand the absence of any competent antagonist. Could a Mithridates or an Alexander have arisen during the reign of one of the worse emperors, he might more easily have overrun the Roman world than Rome did Carthage. As it was, all the civilised parts of the empire shared its political anæmia; and indeed the comfort of the Roman peace was in many of the provinces a sufficient ground for not returning to the old life of chronic warfare, at least for men who had lost the spirit of reasoned political self-assertion.

Under good emperors, the system worked imposingly enough; and Mommsen, echoing Gibbon, not unwarrantably bids us ask ourselves whether the

south of Europe has ever since been better governed than it was under the Antonines.[1] But, to say nothing of the state of character and intellect, the economic evisceration was proceeding steadily alike under good emperors and bad, and the Stoic jurists did but frame good laws for a worm-eaten society. So long as the seat of empire remained at Rome drawing the tribute thither, the imperial system would give an air of solidity to Italian life; but when the Roman population itself grew cosmopolitanised in all its classes, taking in all the races of the empire, the provinces were in the terms of the case as Roman as the capital, and there was no special reason, save the principle of concentration, why the later emperors should reside there. Once the palace was set up elsewhere, the accessories of administration inevitably followed; and we shall perhaps not be wrong in saying that the growth of medieval Italy, the new and better-rooted life which was to make possible the Renaissance, obscurely began when Italy was deprived of a large part of its unearned income, and the populace had in part to turn for fresh life to agriculture and industry. Where of old the provincial governors had extorted from their subjects fortunes for themselves, to be spent in Rome like the public tribute, they would now tend to act as permanent dwellers in their districts. Thus, while Italy fell upon a wholesomer poverty, the provinces would be less impoverished.

There remains the question, What is the precise economic statement of the final collapse? It is easy to figure that in terms of (*a*) increasing barbarian enterprise, stimulated by the personal experience of

[1] Mommsen, *History of Rome*, Eng. tr. large ed: v. 5 (*Provinces*, vol. i.); Gibbon, ch. iii. near end (Bohn ed. i. 104); cp. Mahaffy, *The Greek World under Roman Sway*, p. 397; Milman, *History of Christianity*, bk. i. ch. vi.; Renan, *Les Apôtres*, ed. 1866, p. 312; and Hegewisch, as cited by Finlay (i. 80, *note*) who protests that the favourable view cannot be taken of the state of Greece and Egypt.

the many barbarians who served the empire, and of (*b*) increasing moral weakness on the part of the whole administrative system. And doubtless this change in the balance of military energy counted for much. But the long subsistence of the Eastern Empire as contrasted with the Western suggests that not only had the barbarians an easier task against Italy in terms of its easiness of invasion, but the defence was there relatively weaker in terms of lack of resources. This lack has been wholly or partly explained by quite a number of writers as a result of a failure in the whole supply of the precious metals—a proposition which may be understood of either a falling-off in the yield of the mines or a general withdrawal of bullion from the empire. It is difficult to see how either explanation can stand. There was already an immense amount of bullion in the empire, and a general withdrawal could take place only by way of export to the barbarian east in return for commodities.[1] But the eastern provinces of the empire were still in themselves abundantly productive, and after the fall of Rome they continued to exhibit industrial solvency.

As for the falling-off in the yield of the Spanish mines, to which some writers seem to attribute the whole collapse, it could only mean that the Roman Government at length realised what had been as true before and has been as true since, that *all* gold-mining, save in the case of the richest and easiest mines, is carried on at a loss as against the standing competition of the great mass of precious metal above-ground at any moment, the output of unknown barbarian toil and infinite slave labour, begun long before the age of written history.[2] When it was reluctantly realised that

[1] Cp. Pliny, *Hist. Nat.* xii. 18 (41).

[2] Cp. Del Mar, *History of the Precious Metals*, 1880, pref. p. vi.; *Money and Civilisation*, 1886, introd. p. ix.

the cost of working the Spanish or any other mines was greater to the State than their product, they would be abandoned; though under a free government private speculators would have been found ready to risk more money in reopening them immediately. As a matter of fact, the Spanish mines were actually worked by the Saracens in the Middle Ages, and have been since. The Romans had made the natural blunder of greed in taking all gold mines into the hands of the State,[1] where speculative private enterprise would have gone on working them at a loss, and so adding—vainly enough—to the total bullion in circulation, on which the State could levy its taxes. Even as it was, when they were losing nothing, but rather checking loss, by abandoning the mines, a falling-off in revenue from one source could have been made good by taxation if the fiscal system remained unimpaired, and if the former income of Italy were not affected by other causes than a stoppage of mining output. If the mere cessation of public gold-mining were the cause of a general weakening of the imperial power, and by consequence the cause of the collapse in Italy, it ought equally to have affected the Eastern Empire, which we know to have possessed a normal sufficiency of bullion all through the Dark and Middle Ages.

Dr. Cunningham, in his very instructive study of the economic conditions of the declining empire, appears to lay undue stress on the factor of scarcity of bullion, and does not duly recognise the difference of progression between the case of Italy and that of the East. "The Roman Empire," he writes (p. 187, *note*), lacked both treasure and capital, "and *it perished*." When? The Eastern seat of the empire survived the Western by a thousand years. "It seems highly improbable," he argues again (p. 185) "that the drain of silver to the East, which continued during the Middle Ages, was suspended at any period of the history of the empire." But such a drain (which means a depletion) cannot go

[1] Cp. Dureau de la Malle, *Ec. Pol. des Romains*, ii. 441; Merivale, *History*, iv. 44.

on for twelve hundred years; and it was certainly not a drain of silver to the East that ruined the Byzantine Empire. Finlay's dictum (i. 52) that the debasement of the currency between Caracalla and Gallienus "annihilated a great part of the trading capital in the Roman Empire and rendered it impossible to carry on commercial transactions, not only with foreign countries but even with distant provinces," is another erroneous theorem.

It seems clear that the Italian collapse occurred as it did because, after the transfer of the capital status to Constantinople, there was an increasing tendency in the nature of things to let each province shift for itself save in so far as it was a direct source of imperial revenue. Now, Italy, in the transition period, can have yielded very little revenue, though Rome had for the barbarians plenty of hoarded plunder; and the country had long ceased to yield good troops. The greater the depression in the sources of income the harder becomes the pressure of the fiscal system, till the burdens laid on the upper citizens who formed the *curia*[1] put them out of all heart for patriotic action. Towards the end, indeed, there was set up a rapid process of economic change which substituted for slaves a class of serfs, *coloni*, *adscriptitii*, and so on, who though tied to the land paid a rent for it and could keep any surplus; but under this system agriculture was thus far no more a source of revenue than before. Latterly the very wine of Italy grew worthless, and its olives decayed[2]; so that in once fruitful Campania, "the orchard of the south," Honorius in the year 395 had to strike from the fiscal registers, as worthless, more than three hundred thousand acres of land.[3] In the east, again, the fiscal power of the Emperor was inelastic; his revenues needed careful husbanding; his own world needed all his

[1] On this form of oppression cp. Guizot, *Essais sur l'histoire de France*, i.; and Cunningham, *Western Civilisation*, pp. 188, 189.

[2] Spalding, *Italy*, i. 398, following Symmachus.

[3] *Cod. Theodos.* xi. 28, 2.

attention ; and the Eastern upper class of clerics and officials were not the people to strain themselves for the mere military retention of Britain or Gaul or Italy, as Rome would have done in the republican period, or as the emperors would have done before the period of decentralisation. Armies could still be enrolled and generalled if there was pay for them ; but the pay failed, not because bullion was lacking, but because the will to supply and apply it in the old fashion was lacking. The new age looked at these matters in a different light—the light of commercial self-interest and cosmopolitan disregard for Roman tradition and prestige. The new religion, Christianity, was a direct solvent of imperial patriotism in the old sense, transferring as it did the concern of serious men from this world to the next, and from political theory to theological. In Italy, besides, the priesthood could count on making rather more docile Christians of the invaders than it had done of the previous inhabitants ; so that Christian Rome, once overrun, must needs remain so.

Guizot (*Histoire de la Civilisation en France*, 13e éd. i. 75, 76) notes the fundamental difference in the attitude of the Church under the old and eastern emperors and under the Teutonic rule. Mr. Symonds (*Renaissance in Italy*, 2nd ed. i. 43) thinks this was a result of Theodoric's not having made Rome his headquarters, and his having treated it with special respect. But the clergy of Gaul at once gained an ascendency over the Frankish kings, and the popes would probably have done as well with resident emperors as with absentees. Their great resource was that of playing one Christian monarch against another—a plan not open to the patriarch of Constantinople.

That the empire could still at a push raise armies and find for them generals who could beat back the barbarians, was sufficiently shown in the careers of Stilicho and Belisarius ; but the extreme parsimony with which Justinian supported his great commander in

Italy is some proof of the economic difficulty of keeping up, even in a period of prudent administration, a paid force along the vast frontiers of what had been Hadrian's realm. Only as ruled by one central system, inspired by an ideal of European empire, and using the finance and force of the whole for the defence of any part, could that realm have been preserved; but when Diocletian, while holding mechanically by the ideal of empire, began the disintegration of its executive, he began the ending of the ideal.[1] We should thus not be finally wrong in saying that "the Roman idea" died out before the western empire could fall; provided only that we recognise the economic and other sociological causation of the process.

It remains only to note, finally, that the process cannot possibly be explained by the theory[2] that the Eastern Empire was successfully unified by Christianity, and that the Western remained divided by reason of the obstinate adherence of the Roman aristocracy to Paganism. The framer of this theory confutes it by affirming that in Greece "the popular element . . . by its alliance with Christianity, infused into society the energy which saved the Eastern Empire," while admitting that in Italy also the "great body of the [city] population" had embraced Christianity. Surely the popular Christian element ought to have saved Italy also if it were the saving force. Italy was essentially Christian in the age of Belisarius: if there was any special element of disunion it was the mutual hatred of Arians and Athanasians, and other sects, which had abundantly existed also in the East, where it finally contributed to the Saracen conquest of the Asiatic

[1] He also went far to break down local patriotism by drawing for imperial purposes on the revenues of municipalities. Gibbon, ch. xiii. Bohn ed. i. 459. Cp. Arnold, *Roman Provincial Administration*, p. 200.

[2] Put forth by Finlay, *History of Greece from its Conquest by the Romans*, ed. 1877, i. 138.

provinces and Egypt,[1] but as regarded the central part of the empire was periodically got rid of by the simple suppression of all heresy.[2] Eastern unification, such as it was, had thus been the work, not of "Christianity," or of any sudden spirit of unity among the Greeks, but of the Imperial Government, which in the East had sufficient command of, and needed for its own sake to use, the resources that we have seen lost to Italy.[3] As for the established religion, it was the insoluble conflict of doctrine as to images that finally, in the reign of Leo the Iconoclast, arrayed the Papacy against the Christian Emperor, and began the sunderance of Greek and Latin Christendom; while in the East the patriarch of Jerusalem became the minister of the Moslem conquerors in the seventh century, as did the patriarch of Constantinople in the fifteenth.

[1] "Here [in Egypt], as in Palestine, as in Syria, as in the country about the Euphrates, the efforts of the Persians could never have been attended with such immediate and easy success but for the disaffection of large masses of the population. This disaffection rested chiefly on the religious differences" (Bury, *History of the Later Roman Empire*, ii. 214).

[2] *E.g.*, the *tome* of St. Leo, the laws of Marcian, the *Henoticon* of Zeno, and the laws of Justinian—all retailed by Gibbon, ch. xlvii.

[3] Finlay immediately afterwards (p. 139) declares of the choice of Byzantium by Constantine as his capital that "its first effect was to preserve the unity of the Eastern Empire." The admission is repeated on p. 140, where the whole credit of the stand made by the East is given to the administration. Cp. also the explanations as to Italy on p. 235, and as to Byzantium on p. 184. The theory of p. 138 is utterly unsupported, and on p. 289 it is practically repudiated once for all. Cp. finally, pp. 217, 298, 347, 348, and p. 361.

CHAPTER II

LATER GREECE AND THE BYZANTINE EMPIRE

THE socio-economic history of Greece has been less cleared up than that of Rome, by reason not only of the greater complexity of the problem but of the predominance of literary specialism in Greek studies.

The modern Greek historian, Paparrigopoulo, has published in French an *Histoire de la Civilisation Hellénique* (Paris, 1878), which condenses his learned Greek work in five volumes; but the general view, though sometimes suggestive, is both scanty and superficial as regards ancient Greek history, and runs to an unprofitable effort at showing the "unity" of all Hellenic history, Pagan and Christian, in terms of an assumed conception of Hellenic character.

The posthumous *Griechische Culturgeschichte* of Jakob Burckhardt (1898), turned to with eagerness by the writer on its appearance, after the present work had been prepared for the press, turns out to throw little light on social evolution. Trustworthy, weighty, and lucid, like all Burckhardt's work, it is rather a survey of Greek moral conditions than a study of social development, thus adding something of synthesis to the previous scholarly literature on the subject without reducing the phenomena to any theory of causation.

The chapters on Greece in Dr. Cunningham's *Western Civilisation* (also 1898), though they contain not a few explanations of Greek culture phenomena on the old lines, in terms of themselves, are much more helpful for the purposes of the present inquiry, since they really study causation, as do Meyer's *Wirthschaftliche Entwickelung des Alterthums* and some other recent German treatises, of which Dr. Cunningham makes use.

Much use, however, remains to be made of these and previous

expert studies. Boeckh's great work on the *Public Economy of the Athenians*, which, though containing economic absurdities, hardly deserves even in that regard the strictures passed on it by the first English translator (Sir G. C. Lewis, 1828 ; 2nd ed. 1842 ; superior American ed. tr. from 2nd German ed. by A. Lamb, 1857), has not very fruitfully affected the later historians proper. The third German edition by Fränkel, 1886, typifies the course of scholarship. It corrects details and adds a mass of *apparatus criticus* equal in bulk to the whole original work, but supplies no new ideas. Heeren's section on Greece in his *Reflections*, translated as a *Sketch of the Political History of Ancient Greece* (1829), is too full of early misconceptions to be well worth returning to, save for its general view. On the other hand, Grote's great *History of Greece*, though unmatched in its own species, and though a far more philosophical performance than that of Mitford (which Professor Mahaffy and the King of Greece agree in preferring for its doctrine), is substantially a narrative and critical history on the established lines, and does not aim at being more than incidentally sociological ; and that of Bishop Thirlwall, though in parts superior in this regard, is substantially in similar case. Of the German general histories, that of Holm (Eng. tr. 4 vols. 1894-98) is a trustworthy and judicious embodiment of the latest research, but has no special intellectual weight, and is somewhat needlessly prolix. The History of Dr. Evelyn Abbott, so far as it has gone, has fully equal value in most respects ; but both leave the need for a sociological history unsatisfied. Mr. Warde Fowler's *City State of the Greeks and Romans* (1893) points in the right direction, but needs following up.

Apart from Burckhardt and Cunningham, the nearest approach yet made to a sociological study of Greek civilisation is the series of works on Greek social history by Professor Mahaffy (*Social Life in Greece ; Greek Life and Thought from the Age of Alexander to the Roman Conquest ; The Greek World under Roman Sway ; Problems of Greek History ;* and *Survey of Greek Civilisation*). These learned and brilliant volumes have great value as giving more vivid ideas of Greek life than are conveyed by any of the regular histories, and as constantly stimulating reflection ; but they lack method, omit much, and abound regrettably in capricious and inconsistent dicta. The *Survey* is disappointing as emphasising rather than making good the defects of the previous treatises. G. F. Hertzberg's *Geschichte Griechenlands unter der Herrschaft der Römer* (1866), and indeed all his works on Greek history, are always worth consulting.

Some help may be had from the volume on Greece in the *Industrial History of the Free Nations* by W. T. M'Cullagh (1846) ; but that fails to throw any light on what should have been its primary problem, the rise of Greek industry, and is rather senti-

mental than scientific in spirit. For later Greece, Finlay (*History of Greece from its Conquest by the Romans*, revised ed. 7 vols., 1877) becomes illuminating by his interest in economic law, though he holds uncritically enough by some now exploded principles, and exhibits some religious prejudice. His somewhat entangled opening sections express his difficulties as a pioneer in sociological history—difficulties only too abundantly apparent in the following pages. Mr. J. B. Bury's *History of the Later Roman Empire* (2 vols. 1889) is an admirable work, open only to the objection that it at times recurs to a conventional view of the religious factors; but it does not attempt, save incidentally, to supersede Finlay in matters economic.

§ 1

In republican Greece, as in republican Rome, we have already seen the tendency to the accumulation of wealth in few hands, as proved by the strifes between rich and poor in most of the States. A world in which aristocrats were finally wont to take an oath to hate and injure the demos,[1] was on no very hopeful economic footing, whatever its glory in literature and art. Nor did the most comprehensive mind of all the ancient world see in slavery anything but an institution to be defended against ethical attack as a naturally right arrangement.[2] In view of all this, we may reasonably hold that even if there had been no Macedonian dominance and no Roman conquest, Greek civilisation would not have gone on progressing indefinitely after the period which we now mark as its zenith—that the evil lot of the lower strata must needs in time have infected the upper. What we have here briefly to consider, however, is the actual economic course of affairs.

For the purposes of such a generalisation, we may rank the Greek communities under two classes: (1) those whose incomes, down through the historic period, continued to come from land-owning, whether with

[1] Aristotle, *Politics*, v. 9. [2] *Id.* i. 2.

slave or free labour, as Sparta; and (2) those which latterly flourished chiefly by commerce, whether with or without military domination, as Athens and Corinth. In both species alike, in all ages, though in different degrees as regards both time and place, there were steep divisions of lot between rich and poor, even among the free. Nowhere, not even in early "Lycurgean" Sparta, was there any system aiming at the methodical prevention of large estates, or the prevention of poverty, though the primitive basis was one of military communism, and though certain sumptuary laws and a common discipline were long maintained.

Grote's examination (part ii. ch. vi. ed. cited, ii. 308-30), of Thirlwall's hypothesis (ch. viii. 1st ed. i. 301, 326) as to an equal division of lands by Lycurgus, seems to prove that, as regards rich and poor, the legendary legislator "took no pains either to restrain the enrichment of the former, or to prevent the impoverishment of the latter,"—this even as regards born Spartans. As to the early military communism of Sparta and Crete, see Meyer, *Geschichte des Alterthums*, ii. § 210; and as to the economic process see Fustel de Coulanges, *Nouvelles Recherches sur quelques problèmes d'histoire*, 1891, pp. 99-118.

As between Sparta and Athens, the main difference was that Athenian life was for a long period more or less expansive, while that of Sparta, even in the period of special vigour, was steadily contractive, as regarded quantity and quality of "good life." At Sparta, as above noted, the normal play of self-interest in the governing class brought about a continuous shrinkage in the number of enfranchised citizens and of those holding land, till there were only 700 of the former and 100 of the latter—this when there were still 4500 adult Spartans of pure descent, and 15,000 Laconians capable of military service. Even of the hundred landowners, many were women, the estates having thus evidently aggregated by descent through heiresses.[1] It mattered

[1] Aristotle, *Politics*, ii. 9; Plutarch, *Agis*, c. 7.

little that this inner ring of rich became, after the triumph over Athens and in the post-Alexandrian period, as luxurious as the rest of Greece : [1] the evil lay not in the mode of their expenditure but in the mode of their revenue. Agis IV. and his successor Cleomenes thought to put the community on a sound footing by abolition of debts and forcible division of the land; but even had Agis triumphed at home or Cleomenes maintained himself abroad, the expedient could have availed only for a time. Accumulation would instantly recommence in the absence of a scientific and permanent system.

Schemes for promoting equality had been mooted in Greece from an early period (see Aristotle, *Politics*, ii. 6, 7, 8). Thus, "Pheidon the Corinthian, one of the oldest of legislators, thought that the families and number of citizens ought to continue the same." Phaleas of Chalcedon proposed to keep fortunes and culture equal; and Hippodamus, the Milesian, had a system of equality for a State of 10,000 persons. Some States, too, put restraints on the accumulation of land. But, save for transient successes, such as that of Solon at Athens, and of the compromise at Tarentum (see Aristotle, v. 5; and Müller, *Dorians*, Eng. tr. ii. 184-86), there was no adequate adjustment of means to ends, as indeed there could not be. Aristotle's own practical suggestions show the hopelessness of the problem.

In the commercial cities, where industry was encouraged and wealth tended to take the form of invested capital, it could not readily get into so few hands; and as commerce developed and the investments were more and more in that direction, there would arise an idle rich class which could be best got at by way of taxation. In such communities, though the division and hostility of rich and poor was as unalterable as in Sparta, there was more elasticity of adjustment; so that we see maritime and trading communities like Heracleia and Rhodes maintaining their oligarchic government, with vicissitudes, down into the Roman

[1] Athenæus, citing Phylarchus, iv. 20.

period,[1] somewhat as Venice in a later age outlasted the other chief republics of Italy. The ruin of Corinth, though indirectly promoted by class strifes,[2] need not have occurred but for the Roman overthrow.[3]

As regards Athens, it is necessary to guard against some misconceptions concerning the life conditions even in the Periclean period. Public buildings apart, it was not a rich or rich-looking city; on the contrary, partly by reason of the force of democratic sentiment, its houses were mostly mean, the well-to-do people presumably having their better houses in the country, where the land was now mostly owned by them. After the destruction of the city by Xerxes (B.C. 480), the first need was felt to be its refortification on a larger scale, even sepulchres as well as the remains of private houses being made to yield materials for the walls.[4] At the same time the Piræus and Munychia were walled on a still greater scale—the whole constituting a public work of extraordinary scope, rapidly carried through by the co-operation of the whole of the citizens. The further gradual rebuilding of the city, as well as the fresh flocking of the foreign trading population to the now safe Piræus, would help, with the public works of Pericles, to set up the conditions of general prosperity which prevailed before the Peloponnesian war.[5] According to Demosthenes, the public men of the generation of Salamis had houses indistinguishable from those of ordinary people, whereas in the orator's own day the statesmen had houses actually finer than the public buildings.[6] This would be the natural result of the control of the confederate treasure resulting from the Athenian supremacy. But Dicæarchus belongs to the

[1] Grote, x. 402; Mahaffy, *Greek Life and Thought*, p. 457; *Greek World under Roman Sway*, p. 237; McCulloch, *Treatises and Essays*, ed. 1859, pp. 276-78.
[2] Mahaffy, *Greek Life and Thought*, p. 452.
[3] McCulloch, as cited, p. 275.
[4] Thucydides, i. 93.
[5] Grote, iv. 341, 342.
[6] Citations in Boeckh, bk. i. ch. xii.

same period, and his account represents the mass of the city as poor in appearance, the houses small and with projecting stairways, and the streets crooked.[1] We know further from Xenophon that there were many empty spaces, some of them doubtless made by the customary destruction of the houses of those ostracised. There was thus a considerable approach to a rather straitened equality among the mass of the town-dwelling free citizens, who, despite the meanness of their houses, had luxuries in the form of the public baths and gymnasia.

Before Salamis, again, the revenue drawn from the leases of the silver mines of Laurium had been equally divided among the enfranchised citizens—an arrangement which had yielded only a small sum to each, but which represented a notable adumbration of a communal system. The devotion of this fund to the building of a navy was the making of the Athenian maritime power; whence in turn came the ability of Athens to extort tribute from the allied States, and therewith, under Pericles, to achieve the greatest and most effective expenditure on public works[2] ever attempted by any government. It was this specially created demand for and endowment of the arts and the drama that raised Athens to the artistic and literary supremacy of the ancient world, and, by so creating a special intellectual soil, prepared the ensuing supremacy of Athenian philosophy.[3] But the Periclean policy of endowment

[1] Boeckh, bk. i. ch. xii. Cp. De Pauw, *Recherches Philosophiques sur les Grecs*, 1787, i. 55-60.

[2] As to the enormous cost in labour and money of such buildings as the Propylæa and the Parthenon, cp. Mahaffy, *Survey of Greek Civilisation*, p. 143, and M'Cullagh, *Industrial History of the Free Nations*, 1846, i. 166, 167.

[3] "Before the Persian war Athens had contributed less than many other cities, her inferiors in magnitude and in political importance, to the intellectual progress of Greece. She had produced no artists to be compared with those of Argos, Corinth, Sicyon, Ægina, Laconia, and of many cities both in the eastern and western colonies. She could boast of no poets so celebrated as those of the Ionian and Æolian Schools, But . . . . in the period between the Persian and the Peloponnesian wars, both

went far beyond even the employment of labour by the State on the largest scale: it set up the principle of supplying something like an income to multitudes of poorer free citizens—an experiment unique in history. The main features of the system were: (1) Payments for service to the members of the Council of Five Hundred; (2) payments to all jurors, an order numbering some six thousand; (3) the *theorikon* or allowance of theatre money to all the poorer citizens; (4) regular payments to the soldiers and sailors; (5) largesses of corn, or sales at reduced prices; (6) sacrificial banquets, shared in by the common people; (7) the sending out of "kleruchies," or bodies of quasi-colonists, who were billeted on the confederate cities, to the number of five or six thousand in ten years. Without taking the *a priori* hostile view of the aristocratic faction, who bitterly opposed all this—a view endorsed later by Plato and Socrates—the common-sense politician must note the utter insecurity of the whole development, depending as it did absolutely on military predominance.[1] The mere cessation of the expenditure on public works at the fall of Athens in the Peloponnesian war was bound to affect class relations seriously; and parties, already bitter, were henceforth more decisively so divided.[2]

In the second period of Athenian ascendency, after the fall of the Thirty Tyrants and of Sparta, when the virtual pensioning of citizens begun by Pericles had been carried to still further lengths,[3] we find Xenophon, the typical Greek of culture and military experience,

literature and the fine arts began to tend towards Athens as their most favoured seat" (Thirlwall, ch. xviii. vol. iii. pp. 70, 71). "Never before or since has life developed so richly" (Abbott, ii. 415). Cp. Holm, Eng. tr. ii. 156, 157.

[1] This view appears to be substantially at one with the reasoning of Dr. Cunningham (*Western Civilisation*, pp. 112-23). I must dissent, however, from his apparent position (pp. 119-21) that it was the *mode* of the expenditure that was wrong, and that Athens might have employed her ill-gotten capital "productively" in the modern economic sense. The cases of Miletus and Tyre, cited by him, seem to be beside the argument.

[2] Plutarch, *Pericles*, xi.

[3] Cp. Thirlwall, small ed. iii. 67.

proposing a financial plan[1] whereby Athens, instead of keeping up the renewed practice of oppressing the confederate cities in order to pay pensions to its own poorer citizens, should derive a sufficient revenue from other sources. In particular he proposed (1) the encouraging of foreigners to settle in the city in larger numbers, by exempting them from military service and from all forms of public stigma, and by giving them the waste grounds to build on. The taxes they would have to pay as aliens would serve as revenue to maintain the citizens proper. (2) A fund should be established for the encouragement of trade which in some unexplained way should yield a high interest, paid by the State, to all investors. (3) The State should build inns, shops, warehouses, and exchanges, chiefly for the use of the foreigners, and so further increase its revenue. (4) It should build ships for the merchant trade, and charter them out upon good security. (5) Above all, it should develop by slave labour the silver mines of Laurium, to the yield of which there was no limit. The public in fact might there employ thrice as many slaves as the number of citizens; and it should further set about finding new mines.

We have here the measure of the Athenian faculty to solve the democratic problem as then recognised. The polity of Pericles was bound to perish because it negated international ethics, and had no true economic basis. The comparatively well-meaning plan of Xenophon could not even be set in motion, so purely fanciful is its structure. The income of the poorer citizens is to come from the taxes and rents paid by foreigners, and from mines worked by slave labour; the necessary army of slaves has to be bought as a State investment. It is as if the Boers of the Transvaal proposed to live idly in perpetuity on the dues paid by the immigrants, all the

[1] *On the Revenues.*

while owning all the mines and drawing all the profits. It is hardly necessary to say, with Boeckh, that the thesis as to the yield of the mines was a pure delusion;[1] and that the idea of living on the taxation of foreigners was suicidal.[2] The old method, supplemented perforce by some regular taxation of the taxable citizens, and by the special exaction of "liturgies" or payments for the religious festival drama from the rich, was maintained as long as might be; industry tending gradually to decay, though the carrying trade and the resumed concourse of foreigners for a time kept Athens a leading city. Never rich agriculturally, the middle and upper classes had for the rest only their manufactures and their commerce as sources of income; and as the manufactures were mostly carried on by slave labour, and were largely dependent on the State's control of the confederate treasure, the case of the poorer free citizens must needs worsen when that control ceased. About 400 B.C. the Athenians had still a virtual monopoly of the corn trade of Bosporus, on which basis they could develop an extensive shipping, which was a source of many incomes; but even these would necessarily be affected by the new regimen which began with the Macedonian conquest.

The attempt of Boeckh (bk. i. ch. viii.) to confute the ordinary view as to the poverty of the Attic soil, cannot be maintained. Niebuhr (*Lectures on Roman History*, Eng. tr. 3rd ed. p. 264) doubtless goes to the other extreme in calling the Greeks bad husbandmen. Compare the contrary view of Cox, *General History*, 2nd ed. p. 4. But even good husbandry on a poor soil could not compete with the output of Bosporus and Egypt. And in the Peloponnesian war, Attic agriculture sank to a low level (Curtius' *History*, Eng. tr. iv. 71; bk. v. ch. ii.).

As to the incomes made in the Bosporus corn-trade, cp. Grote,

[1] As cited, bk. iv. ch. xxi.

[2] Boeckh's arguments, denounced by Lewis, need not be adhered to; but the whole theorem is so fantastic that Lewis's general vindication of it is puzzling (Trans. pref. xv. *note*).

x. 410, 412, 413. When it became possible thus to draw a revenue from investment, the Athenian publicists rapidly developed the capitalist view that the lending of money capital is the support of trade. See Demosthenes, as cited by Boeckh, bk. i. ch. ix.

§ 2

In the economic readjustments, finally, which followed on the rise and subdivision of the empire of Alexander, Greece as a whole took a secondary place in the Hellenistic world, though Macedonia kept much of its newly acquired wealth. While commerce passed with industry and population to the new eastern cities, the remaining wealth of Greece proper would tend to pass into fewer hands,[1] thus *pro tanto* narrowing more than ever the free and cultured class, and relatively enlarging that of the slaves.

Boeckh (bk. i. ch. viii.) dwells on the variety of manufactures, and here gives a juster view than does Mr. Mahaffy, who (*Social Life in Greece*, 3rd ed. p. 406) oddly speaks of the lack of machinery as making "any large employment of hands in manufacture impossible." But the main manufacture, that of arms, was peculiarly dependent on the Athenian command of the confederate treasure; and it does not appear that the other manufactures were a source of much revenue till just before the period of political decline, when other causes combined to check Athenian trade. By that time, the aristocratic class had weakened in their old prejudice against all forms of commerce (Mahaffy, as cited; Boeckh, as cited) which had hitherto kept it largely in the hands of aliens, this long after the time when, at Corinth and other ports, the ruling class had been constituted of the rich traders; and after the special efforts of Solon to encourage and enforce industry. Apart from this prejudice, which in many States put a political disability on traders, commerce had always been hampered by war and bad policy. Mr. Mahaffy (*Social Life*, p. 405) somewhat over-confidently follows Heeren and Boeckh in deciding that none of the Greek trade laws were in the interests of particular trades or traders; bu even if they were not, they none the less hampered all commerce

[1] See Hertzberg, *Geschichte Griechenlands unter der Herrschaft der Römer*, Theil II Kap. 2, p. 200, as to the vast estates now acquired by a few.

Cp. Boeckh, bk. i. ch. ix. As Hume observed, the high rates of profit and interest prevailing in Greece show an early stage of commerce. Cp. Boeckh, bk. i. ch. ix. xxii.

Those who had not shared in the plunder of Asia, to begin with, would find themselves badly impoverished, for the new influx of bullion would raise all prices. It is notable on the other hand that philosophy, formerly the study of men with, for the most part, good incomes, and thence always associated more or less with the spirit of aristocracy,[1] was now often cultivated by men of humble status.[2] The new rich then appear to have already fallen away somewhat from the old Athenian standards; while the attraction of poorer men was presumably caused in part by the process of endowment of the philosophic schools begun by Plato in his will, an example soon followed by others.[3] It is probable that as much weight is due to this economic cause as to that of political restraint[4] in the explanation of the prosperity of philosophy at Athens at a time when literature was relatively decaying.

The Roman conquest, again, further depressed Greek fortunes by absolute violence, hurling whole armies of the conquered into slavery,[5] and later setting up a new foreign attraction to the Greeks of ready wit and small means. They presumably began to flock to Rome as the conditions in Greece worsened; and that process in turn would be promoted by the gradual worsening of the Roman financial pressure. It is notable that a rebellion of Attic slaves occurred B.C. 133, synchronously with the first slave-rising in Sicily—a proof of fresh oppression all round.[6] The Romans had retained the

[1] In Magna Graecia, in particular, the whole Pythagorean movement had such associations in a high degree.
[2] Mahaffy, *Greek Life and Thought*, p. 136.
[3] *Idem*, pp. 145-49.
[4] See below, pp. 128-29.
[5] *E.g.*, the whole population of Corinth; and 150,000 inhabitants of Epirus.
[6] Cp. Finlay, i. 23.

Greek systems of municipal government, and had begun by putting light taxes.[1] But these surely increased ;[2] and the Mithridatic war, in which Athens had taken the anti-Roman side, changed all for the worse. Sulla took the city after a difficult siege, massacred most of the citizens, and entirely destroyed the Piræus ; whereafter Athens practically ceased to be a commercial centre. Corinth, which had been razed to the ground by Mummius, was ultimately reconstructed by Cæsar as a Roman colony, and secured most of what commerce Greece retained. Twenty years before, Pompey had put down the Cilician pirates, a powerful community of organised freebooters that had arisen out of the disbanding of the hired forces of Mithridates and other Eastern monarchs on the triumph of the Romans, and was further swelled by the accessions of poverty-stricken Greeks. While it lasted, it greatly multiplied the number of slaves for the Roman market by simple kidnapping.

The great mart for such sales was Delos, which was practically a Roman emporium. Mahaffy (*Greek World under Roman Sway*, p. 154) regards the pirates as largely anti-Roman, especially in respect of their sacking of Delos. But previously they sold their captives there (Finlay, i. 32); and Mr. Mahaffy (p. 7) recognises the connection. The pirates, in short, became anti-Roman when the Romans, who had so long tolerated them as slave-traders, were driven to keep them in check as pirates.

Thus all the conditions deteriorated together ; and the suppression of the pirate state found Greece substantially demoralised, the prey of greedy proconsuls, poor in men, rich only in ancient art and in wistful memories. In the civil wars before and after Cæsar's

[1] They exacted from Macedonia only half the tribute it had paid to its kings ; but there is a strong presumption that it was too impoverished after the war to pay more.

[2] "The extraordinary payments levied on the provinces soon equalled, and sometimes exceeded, the regular taxes" (Finlay, i. 39). Cp. Mahaffy, *Greek World under Roman Sway*, pp. 145, 156, 159, 161, 162.

fall Greece was harried by both sides in turn; and down to the time of Augustus, depopulation and impoverishment seem to have steadily proceeded under Roman rule.[1] Every special contribution laid on the provinces by the rulers was made an engine of confiscation; citizens unable to pay their taxes were sold as slaves; property-owners were forced to borrow at usurious rates in the old Roman fashion; and the parasitic class of so-called Roman citizens, as such free of taxation, tended to absorb the remaining wealth.[2] This wealth in turn tended to take the shape of luxuries bought from the really productive provinces; and the fatality of the unproductive communities, lack of the bullion which they in a double degree required, for the time overtook Greece very much as it overtook Italy. Both must have presented a spectacle of exterior splendour as regarded their monuments and public buildings, and as regarded the luxury that was always tending to concentrate in fewer hands, usurers plundering citizens and proconsuls plundering usurers; but the lot of the mass of the people must have been depressed to the verge of endurance if depopulation had not spontaneously yielded relief. As it was, the Greek populations would tend to consist more and more of the capitalistic, official, and parasitic classes on the one hand, and of slaves and poor on the other.[3]

The general depopulation of subject Greece is thus perfectly intelligible. The "race" had not lost reproductive power; and even its newer artificial methods of checking numbers were not immeasurably more active than simple infanticide or exposure had been in the palmy days. In the ages of expansion the whole Hellenic world in nearly all its cities and all its islands swarmed

[1] Cp. Hertzberg, *Gesch. Griechenlands unter der Herrsch. der Römer*, Th. i. Kap. 5, pp. 486-491.

[2] Finlay, i. 45, 46, 74.

[3] "We stand [1st c. A.C.] before a decayed society of very rich men and slaves" (Mahaffy, *Greek World*, p. 268).

with a relatively energetic population, who won from conditions often in large part unpropitious, a sufficiency of subsistence on which to build by the hands of slaves a wonderful world of art. To these conditions they were limited by racial hostilities : everywhere there was substantial though convulsive equipoise among their own warring forces, and between those of their frontier communities and the surrounding "barbarians." The conquest of Alexander (heralded and invited by the campaign of the Ten Thousand) at one blow broke up this equipoise ; organised Greek capacity, once forcibly unified, triumphed over the now lower civilisations of Egypt and the East, and Greek population at once began to find its economic level in the easier conditions of some of the conquered lands. Nothing could now restore the old conditions ; but the Roman conquest and tyranny forced on the disintegration till Greece proper was but the glorious shell of the life of the past, inhabited by handfuls of a semi-alien population, grown in a sense psychically degenerate under evil psychic conditions. In the lower strata of this population began the spread of Christianity, passing sporadically from Syria to the Greek cities, as at the same time to Egypt and Rome. A new conception of life was generated on the plane that typified it.

§ 3

It is a great testimony to the value of sheer peace that, in the Roman empire of the second century, with an incurable economic malady, as it were, eating into its nerve centres, and with no better provision for the higher life than the endowments of the Greek philosophic schools, there was yet evolved a system of law and administration which, even under the frightful chances of imperial succession, sustained for centuries a

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vast empire, and imposed itself as a model on the very barbarism that overthrew it. And it is this system which connects for us the life conditions of Greece as the Romans held it, with its artistic shell almost intact despite all the Roman plunder,[1] and those of the strangely un-Hellenic Greek-speaking world which we know as Byzantium, with its capital at Constantinople. The economic changes in this period can be traced only with difficulty and uncertainty; but they must have been important. The multiplication of slaves, which was a feature of the ages of the post-Alexandrian empires, the Roman conquest, and the Cilician pirate state, would necessarily be checked at a certain stage, both in town and country, by the continued shrinkage of the rich class. Agriculture in Greece, as in Italy, could not compete with that of Egypt; and slave-farming, save in special cultures, would not be worth carrying on. In the towns, again, the manufactures carried on by means of slaves had also dwindled greatly; and the small wealthy class could not and would not maintain more than a certain number of slaves for household purposes. The records of the religious associations, too, as we shall see, seem to prove that men who were slaves in status had practical freedom of life, and the power of disposing of part of their earnings; whence it may be inferred that many owners virtually liberated their slaves, though retaining a legal claim over them. In this state of things, population would gradually recover ground, albeit on a low plane. The type of poor semi-Greek now produced would live at a lower standard of comfort than had latterly been set for themselves by the more educated, who would largely drift elsewhere; and a home-staying population living mainly on olives and fish could relatively flourish, both in town and country. On that basis, in turn, commerce could

[1] Finlay, i. 73.

to some extent revive, especially when Nero granted to the Greeks immunity from taxation.[1] We are prepared then, in the second century, under propitious rulers like Hadrian and the Antonines, to find Greek life materially improved.[2] The expenditure of Hadrian on public works, and the new endowments of the philosophic schools at Athens by the Antonines, would stimulate such a revival ; and the Greek cities would further regain ground as Italy lost it, with the growth of cosmopolitanism throughout the empire. While domestic slavery would still abound, the industries in Athens under the imperial rule would tend to be carried on by freedmen.

A further stimulus would come from the overthrow of the Parthian empire of the Arsacidæ by Artaxerxes, A.C. 226. The Arsacidæ, though often at war with the Romans, still represented the Hellenistic civilisation, whereas the Sassanidæ zealously returned to the ancient Persian religion, the exclusiveness of which would serve as a barrier to Western commerce,[3] even while the cult of Mithra, Hellenised to the extent of being specially associated with image-worship, was spreading widely in the West. Commerce would now tend afresh to concentrate in Greece, the Indian and Chinese trade passing north and south of Persia.[4] The removal of the seat of government from Rome by Diocletian, greatly lessening the Italian drain on the provinces,

[1] This was soon withdrawn by Vespasian, but apparently with circumspection. In the first century A.C. the administration seems to have been unoppressive (Mahaffy, *Greek World*, pp. 233, 237).

[2] Hertzberg (*Gesch. Griechenlands unter der Herrschaft der Römer*, Th. ii. Kap. 2, p. 189) rejects the statement of Finlay that Greece reached the lowest degree of misery and depopulation under the Flavian emperors ("about the time of Vespasian" is the first expression in the revised ed. i. 80). But Finlay contradicts himself, cp. p. 66. Hertzberg again (iii. 116) speaks of a "furchtbar zunehmende sociale Noth des dritten Jahrhunderts" at Athens, without making the fact clear. See below.

[3] This is noted by Finlay (i. 143) in regard to the later surrender of a large Mesopotamian territory by Jovian to Shapur II., when the whole Greek population of the ceded districts was forced to emigrate.

[4] Cp. Finlay, i. 264, 267-269.

would still further assist the Greek revival after the Gothic invasion had come and gone. Thus we find the Greek world in the time of Constantine grown once more so important that in the struggle between him and Licinus his great naval armament, composed chiefly of European Greeks, was massed in the restored Piræus. The fleet of Licinus, made up chiefly by Asiatic and Egyptian Greeks, already showed a relative decline on that side of the empire's resources.[1] When, finally, Constantine established the new seat of empire at Byzantium, he tended to draw thither all the streams of Greek commerce, and to establish there, as the centre of the revenues of the Eastern empire, some such population as had once flourished in Rome; with, however, a definite tendency to commerce and industry in the lower class population as well as in the middle class. To the government of this population was brought the highly developed organisation of the later Pagan empire, joined with an ecclesiastical system from which heresy was periodically eliminated by the imperial policy, aided by the positive intellectual inferiority of the new Greek-speaking species. There was prosperity enough for material life; and the political and religious system was such as to prevent the normal result of prosperity, culture, from developing independently. The much-divided Greek world had at last, after countless convulsions, been brought to a possibility of quasi-inert equilibrium, an equilibrium which enabled it to sustain and repel repeated and destructive irruptions of Northern barbarism,[2] and on the whole to hold at bay, with a shrunken territory, its neighbouring enemies for a thousand years.

[1] Finlay, i. 141. See p. 142 as to the recognition of the military importance of Greece by Julian.

[2] Cp. Finlay, i. 161, as to the ruin wrought at the end of the fourth century by Alaric; and pp. 253, 297, 303, 316, as to that wrought in the sixth century by Huns, Sclavonians, and Avars.

§ 4

We have passed, then, through a twilight age, to find a new civilised empire ruled on the lines of the old, but with a single religion, and that the Christian, all others having been extirpated not by persuasion but by governmental force, after the new creed, adapting itself to its economic conditions, had secured for itself and its poor adherents, mainly from superstitious rich women, an amount of endowment such as no cult or priesthood possessed in the days of democracy. This process of endowment itself originated, however, in Pagan practice; for in the days of substitution of emotional Eastern cults for the simpler worships of early Hellas, there had grown up a multitude of voluntary societies for special semi-religious, semi-festival purposes—*thiasoi*, *eranoi*, and *orgeones*, all cultivating certain alien sacrifices and mysteries, as those of Dionysos, Adonis, Sabazios, Sarapis, Cotytto, or any other God called "Saviour."[1] These societies, unlike the older Hellenic associations of the same names[2] for the promotion of native worships, were freely open to women, to foreigners, and even to slaves;[3] they were absolutely self-governing; the members subscribed according to their means; and we find them flourishing in large numbers in the age of the Antonines,[4] when the old state cults were already deserted, though still endowed. They represent, as has been said, the reappearance of the democratic spirit and the gregarious instinct in new fields and in lower strata when general and practical democracy has been suppressed. In some such fashion did the Christian Church begin, employing the attrac-

[1] Σωτηριαστα is one of the group-names preserved.
[2] They are already seen established in the laws of Solon.
[3] Foucart, *Des associations religieuses chez les Grecs*, 1873, pp. 5-10.
[4] They may have begun as early as the Peloponnesian war (Foucart, p. 66).

tions and the machinery of many rival cults. Its final selection and establishment by the empire represented in things religious a process analogous to that which had forcibly unified the competing republics of Greece in one inflexible and unprogressive organisation. Nothing but governmental force could have imposed doctrinal unity on the chaos of sects into which Christianity was naturally subdividing; but the power of conferring on the State Church special revenues was an effective means of keeping it practically subordinate.

The historian who has laid down the proposition that religious unity was the cause of the survival of the Eastern empire when the Western fell,[1] has made the countervailing admission that between Justinian and Heraclius there was an almost universal centrifugal tendency in the Byzantine state, which was finally overcome only by "the inexorable principle of Roman centralisation,"[2] at a time when it was nearly destroyed by its enemies and its own dissentient forces.[3] Province after province had been taken by the Persians in the East; Slavs and Avars were driving back the population from the northern frontiers, even harrying the Peloponnesus; discontent enabled Phocas to dethrone and execute Maurice (A.C. 602); and Phocas in turn was utterly defeated by the Persian foe; when Heraclius appeared, to check the continuity of disaster, and to place the now circumscribed empire on a footing of possible permanence. But it is important to realise how far the economic and external conditions conduced to his success, such as it was. Hitherto the populace of Constantinople had been supported like that of imperial Rome by regular allowances of bread to every householder, provided from the tributary grain supplies of Egypt. The Persian conquest of Egypt in the year

[1] Finlay, as cited above, pp. 85-86, *notes*.

[2] *Id.* i. 289.

[3] *Id.* p. 309; cp. pp. 328, 329.

616 stopped that revenue; and the emperor's inability to feed the huge semi-idle population became a cause of regeneration, inasmuch as the State was forcibly relieved of the burden, and many of the idlers became available for the army about to be led by the emperor against the menacing Persians. He was reduced, however, to the expedient of offering to continue the supply on a payment of three pieces of gold from each claimant, and finally to breaking that contract; whereafter, on his proposing to transfer his capital to Carthage to escape the discontent, the populace and the clergy implored him to remain, and thus enabled him to exact a large loan from the latter,[1] and to dominate the nobility who had hitherto hampered his action. The victories of Heraclius over the Persians only left the Eastern and Egyptian provinces to fall under the Arabs; the first financial result of his successes having been to tax to exasperation the recovered lands in order to repay the ecclesiastical loan with usury; and the circumscribed empire under his successors could not, even if the emperors wished, resume the feeding of the mass of the citizens. Constantinople, though still drawing some tribute from the remaining provinces in Italy, was thus perforce reduced to a safe economic basis, even as the people in general had been coerced into united effort by the imminent danger from Persia.

From this time forward, with many vicissitudes of military fortune, the contracted Byzantine state endured in virtue of its industrial and commercial basis and its consequent maritime and military strength, managed

[1] A fair idea of the facts may be had by combining the narratives of Gibbon, Finlay, and Mr. Oman (*The Byzantine Empire*, ch. x.). Gibbon and Mr. Oman ignore the threat to make Carthage the capital; Gibbon ignores the point as to the stoppage of the grain supply; Finlay ignores the Church loan; Mr. Oman (p. 133) represents it as voluntary, whereas Gibbon shows it to have been compulsory (ch. xlvi., Bohn ed. v. 179, *note*). Mr. Bury alone (*History of the Later Roman Empire*, 1889, ii. 217-221) gives a fairly complete view of the situation. He specifies a famine and a pestilence as following on the stoppage of the grain supply.

with ancient military science against enemies less skilled. The new invention of "Greek fire," like all advances in the use of missiles in warfare, counted for much; but the decisive condition of success was the possession of continuous resources. Justinian, among many measures of mere oppression and restriction, had contrived to introduce from the far East the silk manufacture, which for the ancient and medieval European world was of enormous mercantile importance. Such a staple, and the virtual control of the whole commerce between northern and western Europe and the East, kept Byzantium the greatest trading power in Christendom until the triumph of the Italian republics. Even the Saracen conquests in Asia and Africa did not seriously affect this source of strength; for the Saracen administration, though often wise and energetic, was in Egypt too often convulsed by civil wars to permit of trade flourishing there in any superlative degree. The Byzantines continued to trade with India by the Black Sea and Central Asian route; and their monopolies and imposts, however grievous, were relatively bearable compared with the afflictions of commerce under other powers. As of old, the Greeks or Greek-speaking folk were the traders of the Mediterranean, the Saracen navy never reaching sufficient power to check them; and when finally its remnants took to piracy, they rather served to cut off all weaker competition than to affect the preponderating naval power of the empire.

In this period of prevailing commercial vigour, from the sixth to the eleventh century, the life of the Greek empire was substantially civic, the rural districts remaining desolate, and agriculture extremely feeble,[1] though the Sclavonian immigrants who now inhabited the Peloponnesus[2] must have lived by that means. Under such circumstances the towns would be fed by imported

[1] Finlay, i. 425.

[2] *Id.* ii. 37.

grain, presumably that of the Crimea; but as they did not grow in size, at least in the case of the capital, their industrial prosperity must have largely depended on the restriction of population, whether by vice, preventive checks, misery, or the sheer unhealthiness of city life, which at the present day prevents so many Eastern cities from maintaining themselves save by influx from the country.[1] It is misleading to point to the legal veto on infanticide as a great Christian reform without taking these things into account. The presumption is that misery, vice, child-exposure, and abortion, rather than prudence, kept the poor population within the limits of subsistence.

Mr. Oman (*Byzantine Empire*, p. 145) takes the popular view as to the reformative effect of Christianity. Mr. Oman goes on to describe Constantine as providing for the children of the destitute to prevent their exposure, but does not mention that the same thing had been done under the Antonines, and that Constantine permitted the finder of an exposed child to enslave it. The punishment of all exposure as infanticide, under Valentinian, was only an adoption of the Pagan practice at Thebes (Ælian, *Var. Hist.* ii. 7). But in spite of all enactments, under Christian as under Pagan rule, exposure and positive infanticide continued, though Christian sentiment never gave it the toleration exhibited in the drama of Menander. As to the historic facts, cp. Lecky, *Hist. of European Morals*, 6th ed. ii. 24-33.

Broadly speaking, it was inevitable that in such a population as is pictured for us by Chrysostom—a multitude profoundly ignorant, superstitious, excitable, sensuous—all the vices of the Græco-Roman period should habitually flourish, while poverty must have been normally acute after the stoppage of regular free bread. On the general moral environment, cp. the author's *Short History of Freethought*, pp. 167, 168.

It is necessary, in the same way, to substitute an accurate for a conventional view as to the treatment of slaves under the Christian empire. We are still told[2]

[1] Robertson Smith, *Religion of the Semites*, p. 12.
[2] Oman, as cited, pp. 147, 148.

that the Christian doctrine or implication of religious equality had the effect first of greatly modifying the evils of slavery and finally of abolishing it. Research proves that the facts were otherwise. We have already seen how economic causes greatly limited slavery before Christianity was heard of; and in so far as the limitation was maintained,[1] the efficient causes remain demonstrably economic.[2] Indeed, no other causes can be shown to have existed. Not only is slavery endorsed in the Gospels,[3] and treated by Paul as not merely compatible with but favourable to Christian freedom on the part of the slave,[4] but the early Christians, commonly supposed to have been the most incorrupt, held slaves as a matter of course.[5] In the laws of Justinian not a word is said as to slavery being opposed to either the spirit or the letter of Christianity; and the only expressions that in any degree deprecate it are in terms of the Stoic doctrine of the "law of nature,"[6] which we know to have been already current in the time of Aristotle,[7] and to have become widespread in the age of the Antonines, under Stoic auspices. It cannot even be said of the Byzantines, any more than of the Protestants of the southern United States of forty years ago, that they were more humane to their slaves than the earlier Pagans had been; for we find

[1] Finlay (i. 81) writes that "at this favourable conjuncture Christianity stepped in to prevent avarice from ever recovering the ground which humanity had gained." This clearly did not happen, and his later chapters supply the true explanation.

[2] Finlay later says so in so many words (ii. 23, 220), explicitly rejecting the Christian theory (see also p. 321). This historian's views seem to have modified as his studies proceeded, but without leading him to recast his earlier text.

[3] Luke xvii. 7-10, Gr. The translation "servant" is of course an entire perversion.

[4] 1 Cor. vii. 21-24. The phrase unintelligibly garbled as "use it rather," clearly means "rather remain a slave," "even" being understood in the previous clause. This was the interpretation of Chrysostom and most of the Fathers. See the Variorum Teacher's Bible, *ad loc.* Cp. the whole first chapter of Larroque, *De l'esclavage chez les nations chrétiennes*, 2nd edit. 1864.

[5] Athenagoras, *Apology for Christianity*, c. 35; Chrysostom, *passim*.

[6] *Instit. Justin.* I. iii. § 2, 4; v.

[7] *Politics*, i. 3.

Christian Byzantine matrons causing their slave-girls to be tied up and brutally flogged[1]; and we have the testimony of Salvian as to the atrocities committed by Christian slave-owners in Gaul.[2] The admission that the Church, even when encouraging laymen to free their slaves, insisted on retaining its own, is the proof that the urging force was not even then doctrinal, but the perception that the Church's secular interests were served by the growth of an independent population outside its own lands.[3] The spirit of the Justinian code, despite its allusion to the law of nature, and the spirit of the enactments of the early Councils of the Church, are alike opposed to any idea of spiritual equality between bond and free.

On the other hand, the simple restriction of conquest limited the possibilities of slavery for Byzantium. Captives were enslaved to the last,[4] but of these there was no steady supply. In the rural districts, again, the fiscal conditions made for at least nominal freedom, as is shown by the historian who has most closely analysed the conditions :—

"The Roman financial administration, by depressing the higher classes and impoverishing the rich, at last burdened the small proprietors and cultivators of the soil with the whole weight of the land-tax. The labourer of the soil then became an object of great interest to the treasury, and . . . obtained almost as important a position in the eyes of the fisc as the landed proprietor himself. The first laws which conferred any rights on the slave are those which the Roman government enacted to prevent the landed proprietors from transferring their slaves, engaged in the cultivation of lands assessed for the land-tax, to other employments which, though more profitable to the proprietor of the slave, would have yielded a smaller or less permanent return to the imperial treasury.[5] The avarice of the imperial treasury, by reducing the mass of the

[1] Chrysostom, 15th Hom. in Eph. (iv. 31); cp. 11th Hom. in 1 Thess. (v. 28).
[2] "Cum occidunt servos suos, jus putant esse, non crimen. Non solum hoc, sed eodem privilegio etiam in execrando impudicitiae caeno abutuntur" (*De gubernatione Dei*, iv.).
[3] Compare the whole of Larroque's second chapter.
[4] So Mr. Oman admits, p. 148.
[5] *Cod. Theod.* xi. 3. 1, 2; *Cod. Justin.* xi. 47.

free population to the same degree of poverty as the slaves, had removed one cause of the separation of the two classes. The position of the slave had lost most of its moral degradation, and [he] occupied precisely the same political position in society as the poor labourer from the moment that the Roman fiscal laws compelled any freeman who had cultivated lands for the space of thirty years to remain for ever attached, with his descendants, to the same estate.[1] The lower orders were from that period blended into one class; the slave rose to be a member of this body; the freeman descended, but his descent was necessary for the improvement of the great bulk of the human race, and for the extinction of slavery. *Such was the progress of civilisation in the Eastern Empire.* The measures of Justinian which, by their fiscal rapacity, tended to sink the free population to the same state of poverty as the slaves, really prepared the way for the rise of the slaves *as soon as any general improvement took place in the condition of the human race.*"[2]

For the rest, it cannot be supposed that the "freedom" thus constituted had much actuality. Sons of soldiers and artisans were held bound to follow their father's profession, as in the hereditary castes of the East,[3] and none of the fruits of freedom are to be traced in Byzantine life. Still, the fact remains that the commercial and industrial life sustained the political, and that the political began definitely to fail when the commercial did. Constantinople could hardly have collapsed as it did before the crusaders if its commerce had not already begun to dwindle through interception by Venice and the Italian trading cities. As soon as these were able to trade directly with the East they did so, thus withdrawing a large part of the stream of commerce from Byzantium; and when, finally, they acquired the secret of her silk manufacture, her industrial revenue was in turn undermined. On the economic weakening, the political followed; and the Eastern empire finally fell before the Turks, very much as the Western had fallen before the Goths.

[1] *Cod. Justin.* xi. 47. 13 and 23. [A clear retrogression to quasi-slavery for the freemen.]

[2] Finlay, i. 200, 201. Cp. p. 153.

[3] *Id.* ii. 27, and *note.*

PART III

THE CONDITIONS OF CULTURE-PROGRESS IN ANTIQUITY

CHAPTER I

GREECE

§ 1

It is still common, among men who professedly accept the theory of evolution, to speak of special culture developments, such as those of sculpture and literature in Greece, art in mediæval Italy, and theocratic religion in Judea, as mysteries beyond solution.[1] It may be well, then, to consider some of these developments as processes of political causation, in terms of the general principles above outlined.

And first as to Greece. As against the common conception of the Hellenic people as "innately" artistic,

[1] A rational view was reached by the sociologists of last century, by whom the question of culture beginnings was much discussed, *e.g.* Goguet's *De l'origine des lois, des arts, et des sciences*, 1758; Ferguson, *Essay on the History of Civil Society*, 1767, and Hume's essay on the *Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences*. At the end of the century we find the solution scientifically put by Walckenaer:—"Ainsi le germe de génie et des talens existe dans tous les tems, mais tous les tems ne sont pas propres à le faire éclore" (*Essai sur l'histoire de l'espèce humaine*, 1798, l. vi. ch. xx., *Des siècles les plus favorables aux productions de génie*, pp. 348, 349). In England forty years later we find Hallam thus exemplifying the obscurantist reaction:—"There is only one cause for the want of great men in any period; nature does not think fit to produce them. They are no creatures of education and circumstances" (*Literature of Europe*, part i. ch. iii. § 35). A kindred though much less crude view underlies Mr. Douglas Galton's argument in *Hereditary Genius*. Cp. the writer's paper on "The Economics of Genius," in *The Forum*, April 1898, and the able essay of Mr. Cooley, there cited. My esteemed friend, Mr. Lester Ward (*Dynamic Sociology*, ii. 600, 601), seems to me, as does Mill (*System of Logic*, bk. vi. ch. iv. § 4; cp. Bain, *J. S. Mill*, p. 146), to err somewhat on the opposite side to that of Hallam and Galton, in assuming that faculty is nearly equal in all, given only opportunity.

it may be well to cite the judgment of an artist who, if not more scientific in his method of reaching his opinion, has on the whole a better right to it than has the average man to his. It is a man of genius who writes :—[1]

"A favourite faith, dear to those who teach, is that certain periods were especially artistic, and that nations, readily named, were notably lovers of art. So we are told that the Greeks were, as a people, worshippers of the beautiful, and that in the fifteenth century art was ingrained in the multitude . . . Listen! There never was an artistic period. There never was an Art-loving nation."

This, which was sometime a paradox, is when interpreted one of the primary truths of sociology.

Our theorist goes on to describe the doings of the first artist, and the slow contagion of his example among men similarly gifted, till the artistic species had filled the land with beautiful things, which were uncritically used by the non-artistic; "and the Amateur was unknown—and the Dilettante undreamed of." Such is the artist's fairy tale of explanation. The probable fact is that the "first artists" in actual Greece were moved to imitative construction by samples of the work of foreigners. Having first had fetish Gods of unshapen stone, they made Gods in crudely human shape, at first probably of wood, later of stone. So with vases, goblets, tables, furniture, and ware of all sorts, all gradually developing in felicity of form up to a certain point, whereafter art worsened. What we require to know is the why of both processes.

Pace the artist, it is clear that artistic objects were multiplied mainly because they were in steady economic demand. The shaping impulse is doubtless special, and in its highest grades rare; but there must also have been special conditions to develop it in one country in

[1] Whistler, *The Gentle Art of Making Enemies*, 1890, pp. 138, 139.

the special degree. That is to say, the faculty for shaping, for design, was oftener appealed to in Greece than elsewhere, and was allowed more freedom in the response, thus reaching new excellence. The early Greeks can have had no very delicate taste, satisfied as they were with statues as primitive as the conventional Assyrian types they copied.

A rational view of the growth of Greek art is put by Mr. Mahaffy, despite his endorsement of Mr. Freeman's extravagant estimate of Athenian intelligence: — "However national and diffused it [art] became, this was due to careful study, and training, and legislation, and not to a sort of natural compulsion. . . . As natural beauty was always the exception among Greek men, so artistic talent was also rare and special" (*Social Life in Greece*, 3rd ed. p. 430). All the remains, as well as every principle of sociological science, go to support this view of the case. When Reber asserts (*Hist. of Ancient Art*, Eng. tr. 1883, p. 264), that "the very first carvings of Greece had a power of development which was wanting in all the other nations of that period," he is setting up an occult principle and obscuring the problem. The other nations of *that period* were not in progressive stages; but some of them had progressed in art in their time. And the "very first" Greek works are enormously inferior to some very ancient Egyptian work.

The development of taste was itself the outcome of a thousand steps of comparison and specialisation, art growing "artistic" as children grow in reasonableness and in nervous co-ordination. And the special conditions of Greece were roughly these:—

(1) The great primary stimulus to Greek art, science, and thought, through the contact of the early settlers in Asia Minor with the remains of the older Semitic civilisation,[1] and the further stimuli from Egypt.

(2) Multitude of autonomous communities, of which the members had intercourse as kindred yet critical strangers, emulous of each other, but mixing their

[1] E. Meyer, *Geschichte des Alterthums*, ii. 533-36; cp. the author's *Short History of Freethought*, pp. 90-99.

stocks, and so developing the potentialities of the species.

(3) Multitude of religious cults, each having its local temples, its local statues, and its local ritual practices.

(4) The concourse in Athens, and some other cities, of alert and capable men from all parts of the Greek-speaking world,[1] and of men of other speech who came thither to learn.

(5) The special growth of civic and peaceful population in Attica by the free incorporation of the smaller towns in the franchise of Athens. Athens had thus the largest number of free citizens of all the Greek cities to start with,[2] and the maximum of domestic peace.

(6) The maintenance of an ideal of cultured life as the outcome of these conditions, which were not speedily overridden either by (*a*) systematic militarism, or (*b*) industrialism, or (*c*) by great accumulation of wealth.

(7) The special public expenditure of the age of Pericles on art, architecture, and the drama, and in stipends to the poorer of the free citizens.

Thus the culture history of Greece, like the political, connects vitally from the first with the physical conditions. The disrupted character of the mainland, the diffusion of the people through the Ægean Isles, the spreading of colonies on east and west, set up a multitude of separate City-States, no one of which could decisively or long dominate the rest. These democratic and equal communities reacted on each other,

[1] Cp. Galton, *Hereditary Genius*, ed. 1892, p. 329. The contrast between the policy of Athens, from Solon onwards, and that of Megara, which boasted of never having given the citizenship to any stranger save Hercules (Wachsmuth, Eng. tr. i. 248) goes far to explain the inferiority of Megarean culture.

[2] "No other Greek city possessed so large an immediate territory" [as distinct from subject territory, like Laconia,] "or so great a number of free and equal citizens" (Freeman, *History of Federal Government*, ed. 1893, p. 22, *note*).

especially those so placed as to be sea-faring. Their separateness developed a multitudinous mythology; even the Gods generally recognised being worshipped with endless local particularities, while most districts had their special deities. For each and all of these were required temples, altars, statues, sacred vessels, which would be paid for by the public or the temple revenues, or by rich devotees; and the countless myths, multiplied on all hands because of the absence of anything like a general priestly organisation, were an endless appeal to the imitative arts. Nature, too, had freely supplied the ideal medium for sculpture and for the finest architecture—pure marble. And as the political dividedness of Hellenedom prevented even an approach to organisation among the scattered and independent priests, so the priesthood had no power and no thought of imposing artistic limitations on the shapers of the art objects given to their temples. In addition to all this, the local patriotism of the countless communities was constantly expressed in statues to their local heroes, statesmen, and athletes. And in such a world of sculpture, formative art must needs flourish wherever it could ornament life.

We have only to compare the conditions in Judea, Persia, Egypt, and early Rome to see the enormous differentiation herein implied. In Mazdean Persia and Yahwistic Judea there was a tabu on all divine images, and by consequence on all sculpture that could lend itself to idolatry.[1] (This tabu, like the monotheistic idea, was itself the outcome of political and social causation, which is in large part traceable and readily intelligible.) In Italy, in the early historic period, outside of Etruria, there had been no process of culture-

[1] The result is a marked poverty of power in such sculpture as the Persians had. It is in every respect inferior to the Assyrian which it copies. See Reber, *History of Ancient Art*, Eng. tr. 1883, pp. 121-28.

contact sufficient to develop any of the arts in a high degree; and the relation of the Romans to the other Italian communities in terms of situation and institutions[1] was fatally one of progressive conquest. Their specialisation was thus military or predaceous; and the formal acceptance of the deities of the conquered communities could not prevent the partial uniformation of worship. Thus Rome had nearly everything to learn from Greece in art as in literature. In Egypt, again, where sculpture had at more than one time, in more than one locality, reached an astonishing excellence,[2] the easily maintained political centralisation[3] and the commercial isolation made fatally for uniformity of ideal; and the secure dominion of the organised priesthood, cultured only sacerdotally, always strove to impose one stolid conventional form on all sacred and ritual sculpture,[4] which was copied in the secular, in order that kings should as much as possible resemble Gods. Where Greece was "servile to all the skyey influences," physically as well as mentally, open on all sides to all cultures, all pressures, all stimuli, Egypt and Judea and Persia were relatively iron-bound, and early Rome relatively inaccessible.

Finally, as militarism never spread systematically over pre-Alexandrian Greece, and her natural limitations prevented any such popular exploitation of labour as took place in Egypt, the prevailing ideal in times of peace was that of the cultured man, καλοκἀγαθός, supported by slave labour but not enormously rich, who stimulated art as he was stimulated by it. Assuredly he was in many cases a dilettante, if not an amateur, else were art in a worse case.

[1] See above, p. 19.

[2] See Maspero, *Manual of Egyptian Archæology*, Eng. tr. 1895, pp. 215, 226, 235, 236, 240, etc.

[3] See above, p. 43.

[4] See Maspero, as cited, pp. 212, 214, 231, etc., as to the religious influence. M. Maspero recognises several movements of renaissance and reaction through the ages.

It is to be remembered that in later Greece, from about the time of Apelles, all free children were taught to draw (Pliny, *Hist. Nat.* xxxv. 36, 15); and long before, the same authority tells us, art was taken up by men of rank. Aristotle, too (*Politics*, v. (viii.) 3), commends the teaching of drawing to children, noting that it enables men to judge of the arts and avoid blunders in picture-buying—though he puts this as an inferior and incidental gain. Thus the educated Greeks were in a sense all dilettanti and amateurs.

§ 2

In literature Greek development is as clearly consequent as in art. The Homeric poems are the outcome of a social state in which a class of bards could find a living by chanting heroic tales to aristocratic households. The drama, tragic and comic alike, was unquestionably the outcome of the public worship of the Gods, first provided for by the community, later often exacted by it from rich aspirants to political power. For all such developments special genius is as a matter of course required, but potential genius occurs in all communities in given forms at a given culture stage; and what happened in Athens was that the special genius for drama was specially appealed to, evoked, and maintained. Æschylus in Egypt and Aristophanes in Persia must have died with all their drama in them.

History, science, and philosophy, again, were similarly fostered by the special conditions. Abstract and physical science began for Greece in the comparison and friction of ideas among leisured men, themselves often travelled, living in inquisitive communities often visited by strangers. What Egypt and Syria and Phœnicia had to give in medical lore, in geometry, and in astronomy, was assimilated and built upon, in an atmosphere of free thought and free discussion, whence came all manner of abstract philosophy, analytical and ethical. Plato and Aristotle are the peaks of immense accumulations of more primitive thought

beginning on the soil laid by Semitic culture in Asia Minor; Socrates was stimulated and drawn out by the Athenian life on which he didactically reacted; Hippocrates garnered the experience of many medical priests. History was cultivated under similar conditions of manifold intercourse and intelligent inquisitiveness. Herodotus put down the outcome of much questioning during many travels, and he had an appreciative public with similar tastes.[1] The manifold life of Hellas and her neighbours, Egypt, Persia, Syria, was an endless ground for inquiry and anecdote. The art of writing, acquired long before from Phœnicia, was thus put to unparalleled uses; and at length the theme of the Peloponnesian war, in which all the political passions of Hellas were embroiled for a generation, found in Thucydides a historian produced by and representative of all the critical judgment of the critical Athenian age. Plutarch, in a later period, condenses a library of lesser writers.

Thus in respect of every characteristic and every special attainment of Greek life we can trace external causation from the geographical conditions upwards, without being once tempted to resort to the verbalist explanation of "race qualities" or "national genius." If Hellas developed otherwise than Phœnicia from any given date onwards, the causes lay either in the environment or in the set previously given to Phœnician life by its antecedents, which in turn were determined by environment. To suppose that "the Greeks" started primordially with a unique connatural bent to a relatively "ideal" method of life, preferring culture to riches and art to luxury, is to entail the further assumption of a separate

[1] See Holm's suggestion, cited by Mahaffy, *Problems of Greek History*, p. 92 *note*, as to the value of Herodotus to the *traders* of his day. Holm also suggests, however, that the political service rendered by Herodotus to the Athenians was felt by them to be important, as giving them new light on Egypt and the East (Eng. tr. ii. 290, 291). The reward paid to Herodotus would greatly stimulate further historical research.

biological evolution. And the futility of the whole thesis becomes evident the moment we reflect how unequal Greek culture was; how restricted in Hellas, how special to Athens was it on the intellectual side when once Athens had reached her stature; how blank of thought and science was all Hellenic life before the contact of Semitic survivals in Ionia; and how backward were many sections of the Hellenic stock to the last.

The concept of racial genius appears incidentally, but definitely, in Dr. Cunningham's contrast of Phœnicians and Greeks as relatively wealth-seekers and culture-seekers, ingrained barbarians and ingrained humanists (*Western Civilisation*, pp. 72, 73, 98, 99, etc.), and in his phrase as to the persistent "principles which the Greek and the Phœnician respectively represented." The antithesis, it is here maintained, is spurious. Many Greeks were in full sympathy with the Phœnician norm; many Phœnicians must have been capable of delighting in the Greek norm had they been reared to it. At a given period the Phœnicians had a higher life than the Greeks; and had the Phœnicians evolved for ages in the Greek environment, with an equivalent blending of stocks and cross-fertilisation of cultures, they could have become all that the Greeks ever were. The assertion that when we see "the destruction and degradation of human life in the march of material progress, we see what is alien to the Greek spirit" (*id.* p. 99) will not bear examination. Greek slavery was just such a degradation of human life. And to speak of a "consciousness of her mission" on the part of "Athens" (*id.* pp. 72, 73) is to set up a pseud-entity and a moral illusion.

Should the general line of causation here set forth be challenged, it will suffice, by way of test, to turn to the special case of Sparta. If it were "Greek character" that brought forth Greek art, letters, and science, they ought to have flourished in Greek Sparta as elsewhere. It is however the notorious historic fact that during all the centuries of her existence Sparta contributed to the general deed of man virtually nothing either in art or letters, in science or philosophy.

The grounds for holding that choral poetry flourished pre-eminently at Sparta (see K. O. Müller, *History of the Dorians*, Eng.

tr. ii. 383) are not very strong. See Busolt, *Griechische Geschichte*, 1885, i. 158, 159, for what can be finally said on this head. Ernst Curtius (*Griechische Geschichte*, 1858, i. 240) writes on this subject as a romantic enthusiast. Burckhardt (*Griechische Culturgeschichte*, i. 116-119) examines the subject with his usual care, but decides only that the Spartans employed music with a special eye to military education. And Müller acknowledges that though many Spartan lyrists are named, "there has not been preserved a single fragment of Spartan lyric poetry, with the exception of Alcman's, the probable reason being "a certain uniformity and monotony in their productions, such as is perceived in the early works of art."

In the story of Hellas Sparta stands almost alone among the peoples as yielding no foothold to the life of the mind, bare of nearly all memory of beauty,[1] indigent in all that belongs to the spirit, morally sterile as steel. Before such a phenomenon the dogma of race-character instantly collapses, whereas in terms of the reaction of conditions the explanation is entirely adequate. As thus :—

1. Sparta was by situation one of the most secluded of the Greek States. In the words of Euripides it was "hollow, surrounded by mountains, rugged, and difficult of access to an enemy."[2] Compared in particular with Athens, it was not only landward and mountain-walled, but out of the way of all traffic.[3]

2. Being thus so little open to commercial influence, Sparta was susceptible of a rigidity of military constitution that was impossible elsewhere in the Hellene world, save to some extent in the similarly aristocratic and undeveloped communities of Thessaly and Crete, each similarly noted for unintellectuality. Whatever be the political origins of these societies, it is clear that that of Sparta could not have been built up or maintained save under conditions of comparative isolation.

[1] The Spartan women were indeed reputed the most beautiful, doubtless a result of their healthier life. [2] Cited in Strabo, bk. viii. ch. v. § 6.

[3] Müller notes that the Corinthians were "nearly singular among the Doric States" in esteeming trade, their experience of its productiveness "having taught them to set a higher value upon it" (work cited, ii. 24).

Grote, always somewhat inclined to racial explanations, argues (ed. 1888, ii. 262) as against K. O. Müller, who had still stronger leanings of the kind, that the Spartans were not the "true Doric type," in that their institutions were peculiar to themselves, distinguishing them "not less from Argos, Corinth, Megara, Epidaurus, Sikyôn, Korkyra, or Knidus, than from Athens or Thebes." This is doubtless true as against Müller (cp. Kopstadt, cited by Grote; Cox, *General History of Greece*, 1877, p. 28; and Ménard, *Histoire des Grecs*, 1884, pp. 218, 221), but the suggestion that the Spartans varied in respect of being *less* "Doric" is equally astray. Grote goes on to note that "Krête was the only other portion of Greece in which there prevailed institutions in many respects analogous, yet still dissimilar in those two attributes which form the real mark and pinch of Spartan legislation, viz. the military discipline and rigorous private training. There were doubtless Dorians in Krête, but we have no proof that these peculiar institutions belonged to them more than to the other inhabitants of the island." The argument cuts both ways. If it was not definitely "Dorian" to have such institutions, neither was it un-Dorian. As Cox observes (p. 30), the Spartan constitution in its earlier stages "much resembled the constitution of the Achaians as described in the Iliad." Equally arbitrary seems Grote's argument (i. 451) that "the low level of taste and intelligence among the Thessalians, as well as certain points of their costume, assimilates them more to Macedonians or Epirots than to Hellenes." He notes the equally low level of taste and intelligence among the Spartans, who as a rule could not read or write (ii. 307), and to whom he might as well have assimilated the Thessalians as to the Macedonians. In all cases alike culture conditions supply the true explanation. All through Greece, stocks were endlessly mixed. M. Ménard well points out in reply to Müller that it is impossible to associate types of government with any of the special "races"—that as against Sparta there were "Ionian aristocracies at Marseilles and at Chalkis, and Dorian democracies at Tarentum and Syracuse," while most of the Greek cities had by turns aristocratic and democratic constitutions.

3. As regards Sparta, the specialisation of all life on the military side developed a spirit of peculiar separateness and arrogance,[1] which clinched the geographical influence. Where Greeks of all States were admitted

[1] The native Spartans were positively forbidden to go abroad without special leave, nor were strangers permitted to settle there (Grote, ii. 306; Wachsmuth, i. 248).

to the Eleusinian festivals, Sparta kept hers for her own people.[1] This would limit her mythology, and by consequence her art.

Among the names of Greek sculptors only three belong to Sparta, and these are all of the sixth century B.C., the beginning of the historic period. After that, nothing. See Radford's *Ancient Sculpture*, Chron. List at end. Thus Sparta positively retrogressed into militarism. "There is evidence in the character of Alkman's poetry that he did not sing to a Sparta at all resembling the so-called Sparta of Lycurgus" (Mahaffy, *Problems in Greek History*, p. 77; cp. Burckhardt, *Griechische Culturgeschichte*, i. 117).

4. Not only does military specialism preclude, so far as it goes, more intellectual forms of activity: it develops in the highest degree the conservative spirit[2] when thoroughly rooted in law and custom. Nor is it any more favourable to moral feeling in general.[3]

As offset to all this it may be urged that the middle unenfranchised class (the *Perioikoi*) in Sparta, the *Penestai* in Thessaly, and the ordinary citizens in Crete, were in some ways superior types to part of the similar classes of Attica; while the slaves, as having some military life, were, despite the flavour of the name "Helot," above the average.[4] But even if that were so, it would not affect the problem as to culture development, and its solution in terms of the primary and secondary conditions of life for the given communities.

It is to be noted that in Crete, less isolated by nature and way of life than either Sparta or Thessaly, less rigidly militarised than

[1] Grote, iii. 294, and *note*.

[2] Compare Mr. Mahaffy's remark on post-Alexandrian Sparta, "where five ignorant old men were appointed to watch the close adherence of the State to the system of a fabulous legislator" (*Greek Life and Thought from the Age of Alexander to the Roman Conquest*, 1887, p. 3).

[3] Macaulay, in his youthful review of Mitford (*Miscellaneous Writings*, ed. 1868, p. 74), draws up a long indictment against the Spartans in the matter of bad faith and meanness. It is only fair to remember that some similar charges can be laid against others of the Greek States.

[4] Grote, ii. 204. But cp. Plutarch (*Lycurgus*, c. 27), who agrees with the saying that in Sparta a free man was most a freeman, and a slave most a slave. And see Schömann, *Alterthümer*, i. 362.

they and more democratic in constitution, there were more stirrings of mind. Epimenides, the author of the famous saying that the Cretans were always "liars, evil beasts, idle gluttons," was himself a distinguished Cretan.

§ 3

Such being, in brief, the process of the building up of culture for Greece, it remains to note the causes of the process of retrogression, which also connects broadly with the course of politics. Indeed the mere expansion of Hellenistic life set up by the empire-making of Alexander might alone account for a complete change in the conditions and phases of Greek civilisation. In the new Hellenistic world, wealth and power were to be won with ease and with amenity [1] where of old there was only an alien barbarism, or at least a society which to the cultured Greek was barbaric. When such cities as Alexandria and Antioch beckoned the Greek scholar of small means, impoverished Athens could hardly retain him. Her extorted revenue in her most powerful period,[2] as we saw, was the source of her highest flight of artistic splendour ; and even after the Peloponnesian war, with greatly lessened power, Athens was the most desirable dwelling-place in Hellas. After Alexander, all this was insensibly changed : Athens, though for a time filled with Greeks enriched by the plunder of Persia, must needs gradually dwindle to the point at which the slight natural advantages of her soil, industry, and situation would maintain her ; and the life of ideas, such as it finally was, passed inevitably to Alexandria, where it was systematically encouraged and protected, in the fashion in which well-meaning autocrats do such things. But while these new developments were not inconsiderable, and include some rare felicities, they

[1] Cp. Finlay, *History of Greece*, Tozer's ed. i. 15 ; Mahaffy, *Greek Life and Thought*, pp. 4, 105.

[2] Fifth century B.C.

were on the whole fatally inferior to the old, and this for reasons which would equally affect what intellectual life was left in Greece proper.

The forces of hindrance were political and psychological ;[1] and they operated still more powerfully under the Romans than under the successors of Alexander. The dominance of the Greeks over the other races in the eastern provinces did not make them more than a class of privileged tools of Rome ; and they deteriorated none the less.[2] When for the stimulating though feverish life of factious self-government there was substituted the iron hand of a conqueror, governing by military force, there was need of a new and intelligent discipline if the mental atmosphere were not to worsen. All civilisation, in so far as it proceeds from and involves a "leisured class," sets up a perpetual risk of new morbid phases. Men must have some normal occupation if their life is to be sound ; and where that occupation is not handicraft it can be kept sound and educative only by the perpetual free effort of the intelligence towards new truth, new conception, and new presentment.[3] Nor can this effort conceivably take place on any wide scale, and with any continuity, save in a community kept more or less generally alert by the agitation of vital issues. For a generation or two after Alexander, it is true, there is no arrest in the production of good minds among the Greeks ; indeed, the sudden forcing back of all the best remaining minds on philosophy, as the one mental employment left to self-

[1] Holm (Eng. tr. iv. 595-98) misses half the problem when he argues that the Greek cities under the Romans were nearly as free and self-governing as are to-day those of Switzerland, the United States, or the German Empire. The last named may perhaps approximate at some points ; but in the other cases the moral difference is inexpressible.

[2] Cp. Finlay, i. 76.

[3] In artistic handicraft, of course, such daily renewal of creative intelligent effort is of great importance to mental health ; and the complete lack of it, as in the conventional sculpture of Egypt, tells of utter intellectual stagnation. In the least artistic crafts, however, it is not so essential a condition of sound work.

respecting men of leisure,[1] raised the standards of the study, and led to the ethical systems of Epicurus and Zeno, certainly fit in their way to stand beside those of Plato and Aristotle. So, too, the thrusting back of the drama (which in the hands of Aristophanes had meddled audaciously with every public question) on the study of private life, developed in the highest degree the domestic and psychological bent of the later comedy,[2] very much as the autocracy has developed the novel in contemporary Russia. But the schools of Epicurus and Zeno, both of which outlasted in moral credit and in moral efficacy that of Plato,[3] and the new comedy of Menander, alike represent the as yet unexhausted storage of the mental energy generated by the old political life; and the development is not prolonged in either case. Evidently something vital was lost: only a renewal of the freer life could make possible a continuous advance in intellectual power. On this it is important to insist, as there are plausible grounds for contrary inferences, which are often drawn. All supposed exceptions to the law, however, will be found on analysis to be apparent only. A tyranny may indeed give economic encouragement to art and culture, and a republic may fail to do so; but the work of the tyranny is inevitably undone or kept within a fixed limit by its own character; while if the free community be but fairly well guided, its potentialities are unlimited. This is the solution of much modern dispute between the schools of *laissez-faire* and protection. A Velasquez, who might otherwise have been condemned to seek his market with

[1] Cp. Mahaffy, *Greek Life and Thought*, pp. 4, 10, 15, 131-38, 144.

[2] The change was not so immediately dependent on the Alexandrian régime as Droysen implies (*Geschichte Alexanders des Grossen*, 3te Aufl. p. 367): the New Comedy had been led up to by the Middle Comedy, which already tended to withdraw from burning questions (cp. K. O. Müller, *Lit. of Ancient Greece*, Eng. tr. ed. 1847, pp. 436-41); but the movement was clearly hastened.

[3] Cp. Mackintosh, *On the Progress of Ethical Philosophy*, 4th ed. p. 29; Lecky, *History of European Morals*, 6th ed. i. 128.

coarser wares, may develop to perfection at the court of an autocrat of fine taste; but even he partly depends for his progress on intelligent communion, which the autocrat in this case chances to yield him. And from Velasquez onward there is no progress. So, in autocratic Assyria, sculpture reaches a certain point and becomes for ever conventionalised. In Egypt, it conforms more or less exactly to the general stereotyping of life. We may grant that "with the tyrant *began* the building of large temples, . . . the patronage of clever handicrafts, the promoting of all the arts,"[1] and that he may have patronised men of letters; but it is quite certain that the tyrant never evolved a single generation of important writers, thinkers, and artists, any more than of intelligent, self-respecting, and self-governing citizens. The latter constituted, in fact, the necessary nutritive soil for the former in the communities of antiquity.[2] It has been said[3] that "at the end of the third century of Rome, when its inhabitants had hardly escaped from the hands of Porsena, Syracuse contained more men of high genius than any other city in the world. These were collected at the court of the first Hiero, during his short reign of ten years, and among them were the greatest poets of the age: Pindar . . . Simonides . . . Æschylus." This is true; but Hiero had not been the means of evolving the powers of any one of the three. Pindar is manifestly the product of the diversified life of the free States; Simonides,

[1] Mahaffy, *Problems of Greek History*, p. 85; *Survey of Greek Civilisation*, pp. 87, 99, 117; *Social Life in Greece*, 3rd ed. pp. 83, 137, 440. Cp. the remark of Thirlwall, ch. xii. (1st ed. ii. 125), that the tyrants "were the natural patrons of the lyrical poets, who cheered their banquets, extolled their success," etc.

[2] Holm on this head makes an admission (iii. 168) which countervails the remark last above cited from him. Noting the prosperity of art in Asiatic Greece, he writes: "Art as a rule flourishes—we do not say, reaches its highest point, *for that is impossible without freedom*—where wealth is to be found combined with good taste. And good taste is a gift which even tyrants may possess, and semi-barbarians acquire."

[3] Professor Spalding, *Italy and the Italian Islands*, i. 117, 118.

though much patronised by aristocrats, began to "find himself" as a chorus teacher at Carthea in Ceos, won countless prizes at the Greek festivals,[1] and spent only the latter part of his life with Hiero; Æschylus is the product of the Attic theatre. Not the tyranny, but democracy, had been the *alma mater*. It is true that Athens after Æschylus played the "despot city" in finance, but she so far preserved at home the democratic atmosphere, in which, according to Demosthenes, slaves had more freedom of speech than citizens in many other places.[2]

And where in modern times certain of the less democratic nations may be said to develop certain forms of culture more widely and energetically than do certain of the more democratic States—as Germany her learned class, in comparison with France and England and the United States; or Russia in comparison with England in the matter of the higher fiction—it can easily be shown (1) that these developments arise not in virtue of but in reaction against autocracy, and (2) that they were possible only in virtue of the evocative influence of communities living more freely. Modern communities differ vitally from the ancient in that printing has created a species of intercourse which overleaps all political and geographical restrictions, so that a politically tyrannised community can yet receive and respond to the stimulus of another. But the stimulus is still indispensable. Thus the intellectual expansion of France after the death of Louis XIV.[3] drew germinally from the culture of the England of the day; and that of Germany later in the century was equally a sequence from that and from the ferment in France. Given the

[1] K. O. Müller, *History of Greek Literature*, 1847, pp. 208, 210.

[2] Schömann, *Griechische Alterthümer*, ii. 362.

[3] The questions of the previous expansion under Richelieu and Mazarin, and of the decay in the latter part of Louis's reign, are discussed, àpropos of the *laissez-faire* argument of Buckle, in the author's *Buckle and his Critics*, pp. 324-339.

cluster of independent States, each with its court and its university, which made up the Germany of the period, the revived spirit of free thought bore the more and the better fruit because of the multitude of the reactions involved in the circumstances. For the time, the slackened and lightened petty autocracies counted for intellectual democracy, though even Kant was made to feel the pressure of censorship. It was not regal or ducal rule that made Lessing or Herder or Schiller or Goethe; and it was not mere kingly encouragement that bred scholars like Hermann and Wachsmuth and Buttmann and Bekker and Boeckh and Heeren and Ottfried Müller. The school of Tübingen was the outcome of a movement that proximately began in English Deism; and even the personal bias of Frederick counted for much less in the evolution than the general contagion of European debate. In the University of Berlin, organised after Jena, the inspiring principle was that of intellectual freedom; and the moving spirits took express pains to guard against the tyranny of convention which they saw ruling in the universities of England. For the rest, the production of a very large class of scholarly specialists in Germany was made possible primarily by the number of universities set up in the days of separatism, and secondarily by the absence of such economic conditions (all resting on possession of coal and maritime situation) as drew English energy predominantly to industry and commerce. It is true that if a democratic society to-day does not make express economic provision for a scholarly and cultured class, it is likely to lack such, because the leisured or idle class in all countries grows less capable of, and less inclined to, such intellectual production as it has hitherto contributed to the serious literature of England during this century. But such economic provision has been still more necessary in monarchic communities. Finally, at

every stage Germany has been reacted upon by France and England; and it is notable that while, under a strengthening militarism and imperialism, the number of trained German specialists is maintained, the number of Germans who stir and lead European thought falls off.[1]

In the same way the phenomenon of a group of great novelists in the autocratic Russia of this century is no fruit of autocracy, save in the sense that autocratic government checks all other forms of criticism of life, all liberal discussion, and so drives men back on artistic forms of writing which offer no disturbing social doctrine. And the artistic development itself is made possible only by the culture previously or contemporaneously accumulated in other and freer communities, from whose mental life the cultivated Russian draws his. It was to some extent a similar restrictive pressure that specially developed the drama in France under the Third Empire. Apart from the peculiar case of the Italian cities of the Renaissance, discussed hereinafter, the most that can be said for the "tyrant" in modern Europe is that Richelieu and Colbert promoted science in France; that the German principalities of last century fostered music at their courts; that George III. did much for Handel in England; and that the King of Bavaria did still more for Wagner. On the other hand,

[1] An interesting corroboration of the above general view presents itself in an article on the state of German art, in the *Century* Magazine for July 1898. The writer thus writes of the position of German art under the Kaiser's patronage:—"Moved by the best of intentions, the Emperor is not very successful in his efforts to encourage art. They smack too much of personal tastes and one-man power. Menzel is perhaps a favourite, not because of his great Meissonier-like skill in illustrations, but because he is the draftsman and painter of the period of Frederick the Great. The Emperor is really honouring his own line rather than the artist when he covers him with rewards. . . . It is not by making sketches for the Knackfusses to carry out that the Emperor will raise art in Prussia from its present stagnation, but by allowing the dangerous breath of liberty to blow through the art world. The fine arts are under the drill-sergeant, and produce recruits who have everything except art in them. It is too much to say that this is the Emperor's fault; but it is true that so long as he insists upon running things artistic, no one else can, or will—and the artists themselves least of all."

the system of national and municipal theatres on the Continent was an essential adjunct even in this regard; and the mere comparative freedom accorded to the drama in Elizabethan England, at a time when surplus intellectual energy lacked other stimuli, sufficed to develop that art in one generation to a degree never so speedily reached elsewhere, save in republican Athens. Where the "tyrant" is most useful is in such a civilisation as that of the Saracens, for which autocracy is the only alternative to anarchy, and where, on a basis of derived culture, he can rapidly further the useful arts and all manner of special studies. But even he cannot command a great intellectual art, or an inwardly great literature. "This is no plant that grows on tyrant's soil."[1]

It is clear, then, that first the rule of Alexander and his successors, and later the rule of Rome, over Greece and the Græcised East, put a check on the intellectual forces there, against which there was no counteractive in existence. There remained no other free communities whose culture could fecundate that of the Greek and other cities held in tutelage;[2] and for a whole community, once self-governing, to acquiesce in an all-embracing foreign despotism, meant the settling of lethargy on half of its mental life.[3] What the thinkers left in Greece *could* do was to lend philosophic ideas and method to the jurists at work on the problem of adapting Roman law to the needs of a world-empire,

[1] Cp. Mill, *Liberty*, ch. iii., People's ed. p. 38.

[2] The city of Rhodes, which recovered its independence at the death of Alexander, and maintained its self-government down till the Roman period, was, in point of fact, latterly distinguished for its art (Mahaffy, *Greek Life and Thought*, pp. 334-38), thus illustrating afresh the value of free life as an art stimulus; but its pre-eminently commercial activity, as in the case of Corinth, and as later in the case of Venice, kept it relatively undistinguished in literature. Rich merchants commissioned pictures and statues, but not philosophies or books. Holm (Eng. tr. iv. 492) calls Rhodes a *seat* of philosophy, etc., naming Theophrastus and Eudemus. But they both studied and settled at Athens.

[3] Cp. J. S. Mill's analysis of "benevolent despotism" in ch. iii. of his *Representative Government*.

and this was done to good purpose; but it was the last genuine task that the circumstances permitted of. To discuss vitally the problems of politics would have meant challenging the despotism. There remained, it is true, philosophy and the arts; and these were still cultivated; but they finally subsisted at the level of the spirit of a community which felt itself degenerate from its past, and so grew soon hopelessly imitative. No important work, broadly speaking, can ever be done save by men who, like the Greeks of the palmy days (innovating in drama and improving on the science of the foreigner), feel themselves capable of transcending or equalling the past;[1] and that feeling seems to have become impossible alike for the students and the sculptors of Greece soon after the Macedonian conquest, or at least after the Roman. Plato and Pheidias, Aristotle and Praxiteles, Æschylus and Epicurus, figured as heights of irrecoverable achievement; and the pupillary generations brooded dreamily over Plato or drew serenity from Epicurus as their bent lay, and produced statues of alien rulers, or of the deities of alien temples, where their ancestors had portrayed heroes for the cities and Gods for the shrines of Greece. Beneath the decadence of spirit there doubtless lay, not physiological decay, as is sometimes loosely assumed, but a certain arrest of psychological development, an arrest which, as above suggested, may be held to have set in when the life and culture of the "family women" in the Greek cities began decisively to conform to the Asiatic standard, the men cultivating the mind, while the women were concerned only with the passive life of the body. In this one matter of the equal treatment of the sexes, Sparta

[1] Professor Mahaffy (*Greek Life and Thought*, p. 112) attributes the same sense of superiority to the men of the period of the earlier successors of Alexander. This could well be, and such a feeling would serve to inspire the great art works of the period in question. Cp. Thirlwall (vii. 120) as to the sense of new growth set up by the commercial developments of the Alexandrian world.

transcended the practice of Athens, her narrow intellectual life being at least the same for both; and to this element of equilibrium was probably due her long maintenance of vigour at the level of her ideal.

As, however, the women, whatever their training, could not finally live the martial life of the men, the results of their chiefly animal training were not exemplary. See the question vivaciously discussed by De Pauw, *Recherches philosophiques sur les Grecs*, 1787, ptie. iv. sect. x. § 1—a work which contains many acute observations, as well as a good many absurdities. The Spartan women, it appears, were in a special degree carried away by the Bacchic frenzy. Aelian, *Var. Hist.* iii. 42. Cp. Aristotle, *Politics*, ii. 9 (and other testimonies cited by Hermann, *Manual of the Political Antiquities of Greece*, § 27, 12), as to their general licence.

The arrested psychological development, it need hardly be added, would tend to mean not merely unoriginal thinking among those who did think, but finally a lessening of the number of those who cared greatly for thinking. In the independent period, the mental life of Greece drew perforce from a small class —chiefly the leisured middle class and the exceptional artificers or slaves who, in a democratic community, could win culture by proving their fitness for it. Under the Roman rule the endowed scholars (sophists) and artists alike would tend to minister to Roman taste, and as *that* deteriorated its ministers would. Rome, it is easy to see, went the downward intellectual way in the imperial age with fatal certainty; and her subject States necessarily did likewise at their relative distance. Finally, when Christianity became the religion of the Empire, all the sciences and all the fine arts save architecture and metal-work were rapidly stupefied, the Emperor vetoing free discussion in the fifth century, and the Church laying the dead hand of convention on all such art as it tolerated, even as the priesthood of Egypt had done in their day.

See Finlay, *History of Greece*, as cited, i. 284-85, as to the veto on discussion by Theodosius. In the next century Justinian suppressed the philosophic schools at Athens. Finlay, in one passage (i. 221), speaks of them as nearly extinct before suppression; but elsewhere (pp. 277-81) he gives an entirely contrary account. There are too many such contradictions in his pages. Cp. Hertzberg, *Geschichte Griechenlands seit dem Absterben des antiken Lebens*, 1876, i. 78-84.

Soon even the coinage came to look like that of a semi-barbarian State; and thought, of course, had already stagnated when Christianity conquered the "educated" classes. But these classes themselves were speedily narrowed nearly to those of the priests and the bureaucracy, save in so far as commerce maintained some semi-leisure. Barbarian invasion and imperial taxation combined in many districts to exterminate the former leisured and property-owning class: "The labourer and the artisan alone could find bread . . . and, with the extinction of the wealthy and educated classes, the local prejudices of the lower orders became the law of society."[1] In this society the priest, with his purely pietistic tastes and knowledge, became the type and source of culture.

A cultured modern Greek apologist of the Byzantine Empire[2] has anxiously sought to combine with the thesis that Christianity is a civilising force, the unavoidable admission that Byzantine civilisation was intellectually stationary for a thousand years. It is right that every possible plea for that ill-famed civilisation should be carefully attended to, even when it takes the form of reminding us[3] that after all the sixth century produced Procopius and Agathias; the seventh, George of Pisidia; the eighth, John of Damascus; the ninth, Photius; and so on—one man or two per century who contrived to

[1] Finlay, *History of Greece*, i. 186. Cp. p. 185.

[2] D. Bikélas, *Seven Essays on Christian Greece*, translated by the Marquess of Bute, 1890.

[3] Work cited, p. 103.

be remembered without being annalised as emperor. Of rather more importance is the item that Christian Constantinople at one point, following Egyptian and Roman precedent, improved on the practice of heathen Athens, in that the women of the imperial court and of the upper classes seem to have received a fair share of what culture there was.[1] It is further a matter of bare justice to note that Byzantium had all along to maintain itself against the assaults of Persia, of Islam, of barbarism, heathen and Christian, and of Latin Christendom. But there must all the same be made the grieving admission that "We certainly do not find in the Byzantine authors the same depth and originality which mark the ancient writers whom they copied";[2] and that this imitation "was unhappily the essential weakness of Byzantine literature." That is to say, the intelligence of the Christian Empire, like that of the Greece of the post-Macedonian and the Roman domination, looked back to pagan Athens as to an irrecoverable greatness. In that case, if we are to assume comparative equality of culture between the sexes, there is no escape from the conclusion that Christianity was in itself a force of fixation or paralysis, the subsequent counteraction of which in Europe was a result of many causes—of any cause but the creed and lore itself. The creed, in fact, was a specific cause of isolation, and so of intellectual impoverishment. As was well said by Gibbon, the mental paralysis of the Byzantines was "the natural effect of their solitary and insulated state."[3] The one civilisation from which Byzantium might latterly have profited—the Saracen—was made tabu by creed, which was further

[1] Work cited, pp. 97-98; Finlay, *History of Greece*, iv. 351-52. That this was no Christian innovation, becomes clear when we compare the status of women in Egypt and imperial Rome. Cp. Mahaffy, *Greek Life and Thought*, pp. 173-74. And see his *Greek World under Roman Sway*, p. 328, as to pre-Christian developments.

[2] Bikélas, p. 104.

[3] Ch. liii., Bohn ed. vi. 233. Cp. Finlay, ii. 4, 217, as to the internal forces of routine.

the efficient cause of the sunderance of Byzantine and Italian life.

Had the external conditions, indeed, permitted of the maintenance of the earlier manifold Empire of Constantine, the mere conditions of social diversity which prepared the countless strifes of speculative sects in Egypt and Syria might have led to intellectual progress, were it only by arousing in the more rational minds that aversion to the madness of all the wrangling sects which we detect in Procopius.[1] The disputes of the Christians were indeed the most absurd that had ever been carried on in the Greek tongue; and in comparing the competing insanities it is hard to imagine how from among themselves they could have evoked any form of rational thought. But as in Northern Europe in a later age, so in the Byzantine Empire, the insensate strifes of fanatics, after exhausting and decimating themselves, might have bred in a saner minority a conviction of the futility of all wars of creed—this if only external peace could have been secured. But the attacks, first of Persia and later of Islam, both determined religious enemies, with whom, on Christian principles, there could be no fruitful intercourse, shore away all the outlying and diversified provinces, leaving to Byzantium finally only its central and most homogeneous section, where the power of the organised Church, backed by a monarchy bent on spiritual as on political unity, could easily overcome the slight forces of intellectual variation that remained. The very misfortunes of the Empire, connected as they were with so many destructive earthquakes and pestilences,[2] would, on the familiar principle of Buckle, deepen the hold of superstition on the general mind. On the other hand, the final Christianising of the Bulgarian and Slav populations on the north, while

[1] *De bello Gothico*, i. 3. Cp. Gibbon, ch. xlvii., note, Bohn ed. v. 243.
[2] Finlay, *History of Greece*, i. 224-25.

safeguarding the Empire there, yielded it only the inferior and retarding culture-contact of a new pietistic barbarism, more childish in thought than itself. We can see the fatality of the case when we contemplate the great effort of Leo the Isaurian in the eighth century to put down image-worship by the arm of the executive. No such effort could avail against the mindless superstition of the ignorant mass, rich[1] and poor, on whom the clerical majority relied for their existence. A Moslem conqueror, with outside force to fall back upon, might have succeeded; but Leo was only shaking the bough on which he sat.[2] Thus did it come about that Christian Byzantium found the rigid, intellectual equilibrium in which it outlasted, at a lower level of mental life, the Caliphate which sought its destruction, but only to fall finally before the more vigorous barbarism of the Turks.

[1] "The degrading feature of the end of the seventh century . . . was the ignorant credulity of the richer classes" (Bury, *History of the Later Empire*, ii. 387). Cp. Gibbon, ch. liv., Bohn ed. vi. 235.

[2] Cp. Bury, as cited, ii. 521.

CHAPTER II

THE SARACENS

WHILE Byzantine civilisation thus stagnated, the Saracen civilisation for a time actually gained by contact with it, inasmuch as Byzantium possessed, if it could not employ, the treasures of old Hellenic science and philosophy. The fact that such a fructification of an alien civilisation could take place while the transmitting community showed no similar gain, is tolerably decisive as to (*a*) the constrictive force of religious systems under certain conditions, and (*b*) the nullity of the theory of race genius. Yet these very circumstances have been made the ground of a preposterous impeachment of the "Semitic" character in general, and of the Arab in particular.

Concerning no "race" save the Celtic has there been more unprofitable theorising than over the Semitic. One continental specialist after another[1] has explained Semitic "faculty" in terms of Semitic experience, always to the effect that a nation has a genius for becoming what it becomes, but only when it has become so, since what it does not do it has, by implication, no genius for doing. The learned Spiegel, for instance, in his work on the antiquities of Iran, inexpensively accounts for the Jewish opposition to sculpture as a matter of race

[1] Cp. the author's criticism of Dr. Pulszky, in *Buckle and His Critics*, p. 509.

taste,[1] without even asking how a practice to which the race was averse had to be forbidden under heavy penalties, or why the same course was held in Aryan Persia. Connecting sculpture with architecture, he rules them averse to that also; and as regards the undeniable building tendencies of the Babylonians, he argues that we know not "how far entirely alien models were imitated by the Semites."[2] Only for music does he admit them to have any independent inclination; and their lack of epos and drama as such is explained, not by the virtual inclusion of their epopees and early dramatic writings in their Sacred Books, and the later tabu on secular literature, but by primordial lack of faculty for epos and drama. The vast development of imaginative fiction in the *Arabian Nights* is credited bodily to the "Indo-Germanic" account, because it has Hindu affinities, and took place in Persia; and, of course, the Semites are denied a mythology, as by M. Renan, no question being raised as to what is redacted myth in the Sacred Books. For the rest, "the Semite" is not fitted to shine in science, being in all his branches "almost totally devoid of intellectual curiosity," so that what philosophy and science he has are not "his own"; and he is equally ill-fitted for politics, wherein, having no political idea save that of the family, he oscillates between "unlimited despotism and complete anarchy."[3] Apart from music, his one special faculty is for religion.

Contemporary anti-Semitism may fairly be surmised to underlie in part such performances in pseudo-sociology, which, taken by themselves, set up a depressing suspicion that numbers of deeply learned specialists contrive to spend a lifetime over studies in departments of the history of civilisation without learning wherein the process of civilisation consists. On Spiegel's method —which is that of Mommsen in dealing with the early

[1] *Erânische Alterthumskunde*, 1871, i. 387. [2] *Id.* p. 388. [3] *Id.* p. 389.

culture-history of Rome—the Germanic nations must be adjudged to be naturally devoid of faculty for art, architecture, drama, philosophy, science, law, and order, since they had none of those things till they got them in the Middle Ages through the reviving civilisation of the Mediterranean and France. And as the Greeks certainly received their first impulse to philosophy and science through contact with the survivals of the old Semitic civilisations in Ionia, they in turn must be pronounced to have "neither a philosophy nor a science of their own"; while the Spartans were no less clearly devoid of all faculty for the epic and the drama. It is the method of Molière's doctors, with their *virtus dormitivus* of opium, applied to sociology.

The method, nevertheless, is steadily popular, and is no less freely applied to the phenomena of Arab retrogression than to those of imperfect development in the Semitic life of antiquity, with some edifying results as regards consistency. Says a French medical writer :—

"There is no such thing as an original Arab medical science. Arab medical science was a slavish imitation from the Greek. And the same remark is true of all the sciences. The Arabs have never been inventors. They are enthusiasts, possessed with a passion for anything new, which renders their enthusiasm itself evanescent. And in consequence of this incapacity for perseverance, they soon forgot the lessons in medical science which they had once acquired from the Greeks, and have fallen back into a state of the most absolute ignorance." [1]

The method by which Arab defects are here demonstrated from the arrest of Arab civilisation, is a simple extension of that by which Spiegel demonstrates the original deficiencies of the ancient Semites, and Mommsen the incapacity of the Latins to do what they did not do. A certain race or nation, having at one time

[1] Dr. Daremberg, writing on Cairo, "Impressions médicales," in the *Journal des Débats*, December 13, 1882, cited by the K. Bikélas, tr. p. 100.

attained a considerable degree of civilisation, and afterwards lost it, is held to have thus shown a collective incapacity for remembering what "it" or "they" learned. The "they" here is the correlative of M. Taine's "we" —a pseud-entity, entirely self-determining and strictly homogeneous. The racial misfortune is set down to a fault pervading the whole national character or intellect, and peculiar to it in comparison with other national characters. Conditions count for nothing: totality of inherited character, acting *in vacuo*, is at once the summary and the judgment. Any one who has followed the present argument with any assent thus far will at once grant the futility of such doctrine. "The Arabs" had neither more nor less collective faculty of appreciation and oblivion than any other equally homogeneous people at the same culture-stage. It is quite true that they had not an "original medical science." But neither has any other historical "they" ever had such. The Greeks certainly had not. The beginnings of medical knowledge for all mankind lay of necessity in the primeval lore of the savage; and the nations which carried it furthest in antiquity were just those who learned what others had to give, and improved upon it. The Greeks must have learned from Asia, from Egypt,[1] from Phœnicia; and the Romans learned from the Greeks. The Arabs, coming late into the sphere of the higher civilisation, and crossing their stock in the East with those of Persia, in the West with the already much mixed stocks of Spain, passed almost as rapidly as the

[1] This has been disputed: see Berdoe, *Origin of the Healing Art*, 1893, p. 72. But the Greeks could not have resorted to the Egyptians so much as they admittedly did for mathematical and astronomical teaching in the early period without learning something of their medicine. Cp. Berdoe, bk. ii. ch. i., and Kenrick, *Ancient Egypt*, 1850, i. 345-48, as to Egyptian medicine. The passage in the *Odyssey*, iv. 227-32, is decisive as to its repute in early Greece. Whether the Indian and Egyptian medicine found "neue Bedeutung" in Greek hands, after the fresh contacts made under Alexander, as is claimed by Droysen (*Geschichte Alexanders des Grossen*, 3te Aufl. pp. 367-68), is another question.

Greeks had done from the stage of primitive thought in all things to one of comparative rationality as regards medicine and the exact sciences; and this not in virtue of any special "enthusiasm" for new ideas, but by the normal way of gradual collection of observations and reflection upon them, in communities kept alert by variety of intercourse, and sufficiently free on the side of the intellectual life. Such was the state of the Saracens in Persia and Spain in the ninth, tenth, and eleventh centuries, and their social evolution before and after is all a matter of natural sequence, not proceeding upon any peculiarity of collective character, but representing the normal reactions of character at a given culture-stage in special political circumstances.

What is peculiar to the Saracen civilisation is its sudden origin (taking Islam as a history by itself)[1] under conditions reached elsewhere only as climax in a long evolution. The rise of Islam has the twofold aspect of a barbarian campaign of plunder and a crusade of fanaticism; and though the prospect and the fruition of plunder were needed to ripen the fanaticism to full bloom,[2] the latter was a part of the cementing force that turned a horde into a community. The great facilitating conditions for both were the feeble centralised system maintained by the Christianised empire, and the disintegrating force of Christianity as a sectarian ferment. In Egypt, for instance, the hatred between rival schools of Christian metaphysic secured for the Arabs an unresisted entrance into Alexandria.[3] It needed only a

[1] As to the inferred development of pre-Islamic civilisation in Arabia, see Deutsch, *Literary Remains*, pp. 91, 123, 124, 313, 314; and Nöldeke, *Sketches from Eastern History*, Eng. tr. pp. 18, 19.

[2] The first Islamites, apart from the inner circle, were the least religious. See Renan, *Études d'histoire religieuse*, 1862, pp. 257-265. Nöldeke (p. 15), speaks in the conventional way of the "wonderful intellectual outburst," which made possible the early triumphs of Islam. The case is really on all fours with that of the French Revolution—"*la carrière ouverte aux talens.*"

[3] Sharp, *History of Egypt*, 6th ed. ii. 371. Cp. Bury, as cited above, p. 86.

few generations of contact with higher culture in a richer environment to put the Saracens, as regards art and science, very much on a level with the stagnating Byzantines; and where the latter, possessed of their scientific and philosophical classics, but imprisoned by their religion, made no intellectual progress whatever, the former, on the same stimulus, progressed to a remarkable degree. There has been much dispute as to the exact measure of their achievements; but three things are clear: (1) that they carried the mathematics of astronomy beyond the point at which it had been left by the Greeks; (2) that they laid the foundations of chemistry; and (3) that they intelligently carried on surgery and medicine when the Byzantines, having early in the Christian period destroyed the Asklepions, which were the schools of the medicine of antiquity, had sunk to the level of using prayers and incantations and relics as their regular means of cure. Curiously enough, too, the Saracens had the merit, claimed for the Byzantines, of letting their women share rather freely in their culture of all kinds.[1] What is more, the later Saracens of Spain, whatever the measure of their own scientific progress, were without question a great seminal force in the civilisation of Western Christendom, which drew from them its beginnings in mathematics, philosophy, chemistry, astronomy, and medicine, and to some extent even in literature[2] and architecture,[3] to say nothing of the effect on the useful arts of the contact of the Crusaders with the Saracens of the East.

As to Arab medicine, see Sprengel, *History of Medicine*, French tr. vol. ii. (1815) pp. 262-264—a passage which contradicts his previous disparagements. Compare p. 343. The *histoire par-*

[1] Prescott, *History of Ferdinand and Isabella*, Kirk's ed. 1889, pp. 187, 188.

[2] Cp. Bouterwek, *History of Spanish and Portuguese Literature*, Eng. tr. 1823, i. 4, and Sismondi, *Literature of the South of Europe*, Eng. tr. i. 61, 64, 68, 80-90. As to Arabic study of linguistics, cp. Nöldeke, p. 17.

[3] Cp. Testa, *History of the War of Frederick I. upon the Communes of Lombardy*, Eng. tr. p. 100.

ticulière in this chapter (v. of Sect. 6) generally countervails the hostile summaries. Sprengel proceeded on the prejudice (i. 215) that there was no "rational science" anywhere before the Greeks; as if there were not many irrational elements in the science not only of the Greeks but of the moderns. A much better qualified historian of Arab medicine, Dr. Lucien Leclerc, writes (*Histoire de la Médecine Arabe*, 1876, i. 462) that in the eleventh century "the medical productions [of the Arabs] continue to develop an independent aspect, and have already a certain stamp of originality. Already the Arabs feel themselves rich on their own footing. We see appearing certain writings not less remarkable for the novelty of the form than for the value of the substance." Again, Dr. Ernst von Meyer, the historian of chemistry, sums up (*Hist. of Chemistry*, M'Gowan's tr. 2nd ed. p. 28), that "the germs of chemical knowledge attained to a marvellous growth among the Arabians." It may be noted that there is record of a hospital in Bagdad at the beginning of the ninth century, and that there were many there in the tenth (Leclerc, i. 559).

A rational argument is brought against Semitic "faculty" by Dr. Cunningham, it should be admitted, in the contention that the Phœnicians figured poorly as copyists of Greek art (*Western Civilisation*, p. 69, following Renan). But this argument entirely ignores the element of time that is needed to develop any art in any civilisation. The Phœnician civilisation was overthrown before it had time to assimilate Greek art developments, which themselves were the work of centuries even in a highly favourable set of conditions. Nöldeke, though less grossly unscientific than Spiegel, partly follows him in insisting that Phœnician architecture copied Egyptian, and that the later Semites copied the Greek, as if the Greeks in turn had not had predecessors and guides. Starting with the fixed fallacy that the Semites were "one-sided," he reasons in a circle to the effect that their one-sidedness was "highly prejudicial to the development of science," while compelled to admit the importance of the work of the Babylonians in astronomy. (*Sketches from Eastern History*, Eng. tr. pp. 15-18.)

It is now current doctrine that "for nearly eight centuries, under her Mohammedan rulers, Spain set to all Europe a shining example of a civilised and enlightened State. Her fertile provinces, rendered doubly prolific by the industry and engineering skill of her conquerors, bore fruit an hundred-fold. Cities innumerable sprang up in the rich valleys of the

Guadalquivir and the Guadiana. . . . Art, literature, and science prospered as they prospered nowhere else in Europe. Students flocked from France and Germany and England to drink from the fountain of learning which flowed only in the cities of the Moors. The surgeons and doctors of Andalusia were in the van of science ; women were encouraged to devote themselves to serious study ; and the lady doctor was not unknown among the people of Cordova. Mathematics, astronomy and botany, history [?], philosophy and jurisprudence [?] were to be mastered in Spain, and Spain alone. The practical work of the field, the scientific methods of irrigation, the arts of fortification and shipbuilding, the highest and most elaborate products of the loom, the graver and the hammer, the potter's wheel and the mason's trowel, were brought to perfection by the Spanish Moors."

See Stanley Lane-Poole, *The Moors in Spain*, pref. It could be wished that Mr. Lane-Poole had given English readers, as he so well could, a study of Saracen civilisation, instead of a "Story of the Nation" on the old lines. For corroboration of the passage, see Dozy, *Histoire des Musulmans d'Espagne*, 1861, iii. 109, 110 ; Prescott, *History of Ferdinand and Isabella*, Kirk's ed. 1889, pp. 186-188, 192, 195-199 ; Draper, *Intellectual Development of Europe*, ed. 1875, ii. 30-53 ; Sismondi, *Historical View of the Literature of the South of Europe*, Eng. tr. i. 50-54, 64-68, 76-84, 89. Cp. Seignobos, *Histoire de la Civilisation au Moyen Age*, 3e éd. pp. 48-62 ; Gebhart, *Origines de la Renaissance en Italie*, 1879, pp. 185-189 ; Bosworth Smith, *Mohammed and Mohammedanism*, 2nd ed. pp. 217, 286 ; Nöldeke, as cited, p. 105 ; Bouterwek, as cited, i. 3 ; Baden-Powell, *History of Natural Philosophy*, 1834, pp. 94-104.

All this being so, the course of deciding that the Arabs retrogressed because "they" were impatient and discontinuous is on a level with the thesis that nature has a horror of a vacuum.

The Arab civilisation was arrested and anchylosed by forces which in other civilisations operated in exactly

the same modes. The first great trouble was the element of perpetual domestic strife, which was uncured by the monarchic system, since every succession was liable to dispute. This, indeed, wrought hardly more strife among the Saracens than has taken place among Greeks and Romans, and Christians of all nations, down to modern times; even the ecclesiastical and feudal doctrine of legitimacy, developed by the Latin and Greek churches, having failed to prevent dynastic wars in Christendom. But the Saracens, neighboured everywhere by Christians who bore them a twofold hostility, had peculiar need of union, and ran special risks from dissension; and in Spain their disunion was their ruin. At the same time their civilisation was strangled intellectually by a force which, though actually in operation in Christendom also, was there sufficiently countered by a saving condition which the Saracens finally lacked. The force of constriction was the cult of the Sacred Book; the counteracting force in Christendom was diversity and friction of governments and cultures—a condition which passed out of the Saracen equation.

How fatally restrictive the cult of the completed Sacred Book can be is obvious in the history of Byzantium. It was in terms of the claims of the Christian creed that the Eastern Emperors proscribed pagan philosophy and science, reducing the life of the whole Eastern world as far as possible to one rigid and unreasoned code. That the mental life of Italy and France was relatively progressive even in the Middle Ages was substantially due—(1) to Saracen stimulus; and (2) to the friction and ferment set up by the diversity of life in the Italian republics, and the Italian and French and German universities. Byzantium was in comparison a China or an Egypt. The saving elements of political diversity, culture competition, and culture contact, have in later Europe

completed the frustration of the tendency of church, creed and Bible to destroy alike science and philosophy. In Islam, on the other hand, the arresting force finally triumphed over the progressive because of the social and political conditions. (1) The political field, though stormy, finally lacked diversity in terms of the universality of the monarchic principle, which was imposed by the military basis and bound up with the creed: uniformity of ideal was thus furthered. (2) There was practically no fresh culture-contact possible after the assimilation of the remains of Greek science and the stimulus of Jewish philosophy; for medieval Christendom had no culture to give; and the more thoroughly the Papacy and the Christian monarchy in Spain were organised, the more hostile they grew to the Moors. (3) The economic stimulus among the latter tended to be restricted more and more to the religious class, till that class was able to suppress all independent mental activity.

The last is the salient circumstance. In any society, the special cultivation of serious literature and the arts and sciences depends on one or more of three conditions—(*a*) the existence of a cultured class living on unearned incomes, as in ancient Athens, middle Rome, and modern England and France; (*b*) public expenditure on art and culture, as in ancient Athens, renaissance Italy and modern France, and in the German university system *par excellence*; or (*c*) the personal concern of princes and other patrons to encourage ability. In the nature of the case it was mainly on this last and most precarious stimulus that Saracen culture depended. Taking it at its zenith, under such rulers as Haroun Alraschid and El-Mamoun at Bagdad, and Abderrahmān III. and Hakam II. of Cordova, we find its advance always directly dependent on the bounty of the caliph; and even if, like Abderrahmān and his son Hakam, he founded all manner of public

and free schools, it depended on the bias of his successors rather than on public opinion or municipal custom whether the movement should continue. Abderrahmān's achievement, seen even through Christian eyes, was so manifold as to constitute him one of the great rulers of all history; but the task of making Moorish civilisation permanent was one which no series of such statesmen could have compassed. The natural course of progress would have been through stable monarchy to constitutionalism. But Christian barbarism, with its perpetual assault, kept the Saracens forever at the stage of active militarism, which is the negation of constitutionalism; and their very refinement was a political danger, no less than their dynastic strifes.

On the other hand the stress of militarism was in ordinary course much more favourable to fanaticism than to free thought; and to fanaticism the Koran, like the Bible, was and is a perpetual stimulant. It was as a militant faith that Islam maintained itself; and in such a civilisation the Sacred Book, which claimed to be the highest of all lore, and was all the while so easy a one, giving to ignorance and conceit the consciousness of supreme knowledge without any mental discipline whatever, was sure of abundant devotees.[1] In an uninstructed community—and of course the mass of the Saracen population was uninstructed[2]—the cult of the Sacred Book needs no special endowment; it can always be depended on to secure revenues for itself, even as may the medicine-man in an African tribe. To this day the propagation of the Koran is subscribed for in Turkey as the Bible Society is subscribed to

[1] As to the religious zeal of the Berbers in the way of Moslem dissent, on all fours with the phenomena of Protestantism, see Lane-Poole, as cited, p. 53.

[2] Dozy (*Histoire des Musulmans d'Espagne*, 1861, iii. 109) decides that "in Andalusia nearly every one could read and write"; but even if this were true, which is very doubtful (seeing that on the same page the historian tells how Hakam founded twenty-three free schools for the children of the poor in Cordova), the reading would be almost solely confined to the Koran.

among ourselves, ignorance earning thus the felicity of prescribing for human welfare in the mass, and at the same time propitiating Omnipotence, at the lowest possible outlay of study and reflection. Enthusiasms which can thus flourish in the nineteenth century were of course abundant in the ninth, tenth, and eleventh ;[1] and thus we find that when a caliph was suspected by the pietists of caring too little for their lore, he ran the risk of being rebelled against with a speed and zeal in the ratio of their conviction of divine knowledge. Islam, unlike the churches of Greece, Rome, and England, has democratic rootage in the practice of setting ordinary laymen to recite the prayers and preach the sermons in the mosques : it in fact resembles Methodism more than any of the established Christian churches in respect of its blending of clerisy and laity. Such a system, when thoroughly fanaticised, has enormous powers of turbulence ; and in Moorish Spain we find them early exercised. Abderrahmān I., whose policy of tolerance towards Jews and Christians transcended all previous Christian practice, and thus won for his realm a great stimulus in the way of variety of culture-elements and of industry, had kept the religious class in due control ; but his well-meaning son Hishām was priest-ridden to the last degree ; and when his successor Hakam showed an indisposition to patronise them to the same extent they raised revolt after revolt (806-815), all put down by massacre.

Mr. Lane-Poole notes (p. 73) the interesting fact that the theologers were largely of Spanish stock, the natives having in general embraced Islam. Thus the fanaticism of the Berbers was reinforced by that of the older population, which, as Buckle showed, was made abnormally devout, not by inheritance of character, but by the constant effect of terrorising environment, in the form of earthquakes.

[1] The mere preaching and miracle-working of the Marabouts among the Berbers set up successively the movements of the Fatimites, the Almoravides, and the Almohades (Lane-Poole, p. 54).

The elements of the situation remained fundamentally unchanged; and when the Moorish military power began to feel more and more the pressure of the strengthening Christian foe, it lay in the nature of the case that the fanatical species should predominate. The rationalistic and indifferent types would figure as the enemies of their race, very much as such types would have done in Covenanting Scotland. At length, in the eleventh century, the weakened Moorish princes had to call in the aid of the fanatical Almoravides from Barbary; and these, with the full support of the priesthood and the pious, established themselves at the head of affairs, reducing everything as far as possible to the standards of the eighth century.[1] And when the new barbarism in time grew corrupt, as that of the Goths and Vandals had done in earlier ages, the "Unitarian" Almohades in turn (twelfth century) overthrew the Almoravides in Spain as they had already done in Africa, only to be themselves overthrown a hundred years later by the Christians.

A civilisation driven back on superstition and fanaticism [2] thus gave way to a revived barbarism, which itself, after a few centuries of power, was arrested in its progress by the same order of forces, and has ever since remained in the rear of European development.

In Persia the same forces wrought closely similar results. The Greek stimulus, after working wonders in science and rational thought, failed to sustain a society that could not evolve beyond despotism; and economic evil and intellectual decay together undermined the empire of the Khalifs,[3] till the Turks could overrun it

[1] Concerning the intolerance of this reaction, see Dozy, iii. 248-254. Cp. iii. 16-21, as to the normal fanaticism of the Moorish populace.

[2] See Dozy, iii. 286, as to the general lapse from rationalism to faith.

[3] Cp. Dugat, *Histoire des philosophes et des théologiens Mussulmans*, 1878, pp. 337-348; Freeman, *History and Conquests of the Saracens*, p. 124; and the author's *Short History of Freethought*, p. 184.

as the Christians did Moorish Spain ; they themselves, however, adding no new culture developments, because under them no new culture contacts were possible.

Of the Moslem civilisation as a whole, it must be said that on the material side, in Spain and the East, it was such a success as had not been attained under the Romans previously (though it was exceeded in Egypt by the Lagids), and has not been reached in Christian Spain since the fall of Boabdil. Economically, the Moorish regimen was sound and stable in comparison with that of imperial Spain, which, like Rome, merely set up a factitious civilisation on the basis of imported bullion and provincial tribute, and decayed industrially while nominally growing in empire and power. When the history of Spain from the seventeenth century onward is compared with that of the Saracens up to their overthrow, the nullity of explanations in terms of race qualities becomes sufficiently plain—unless, indeed, it is argued that Moorish blood is the secret of Spanish decadence. But that surmise too is folly. Spanish decadence is a perfectly simple sociological sequence ; and a Spanish renascence is not only conceivable but likely, under conditions of free science and free thought. Nor is it on the whole less likely that the Arab stock will in time to come contribute afresh and largely to civilisation. The one element which can finally distinguish one race from another—acquired physiological adaptation to a given climate—marks the Arab races as best fitted for the recovery of great southern and eastern regions which, once enormously productive, have since the fall of the Roman and Byzantine empires been reduced to sterility and poverty. The Greeks in their recovered fatherland, and the French in Algeria, have not thus far been much more successful than the Turks in developing material prosperity. If North Africa, Syria, and Mesopotamia are again to be rich and

fruitful lands, it must be in the hands of an acclimatised race ; and the Arab stocks are in this regard among the most eligible.

But there is no reason why the Turks should not share in such a renascence. Their incivilisation is no more a matter of race character than the decline of the Moors or the backwardness of the Spaniards : it is the enforced result of the attitude of special enmity taken up towards the Turkish intruders from the first by all their Christian neighbours. By sheer force of outside pressure, co-operating with the sinister sway of the Sacred Book, Turkey has been kept fanatical, barbarous, uncultured, utterly militarist, and therefore financially misgoverned. The moral inferiority of the long-oppressed Christian peoples of the Levant, whose dishonesty was till lately proverbial, was such as to strengthen the Moslem in the conceit of superiority ; while the need to maintain a relatively great military force as against dangerous neighbours is for him a check upon all endowment of culture. To change all this, it needs that either force or prudence should so modify the system of government as to give freer course to industry and ideas ; that the military system should be restricted ; and that European knowledge should be brought to bear on education, till the fettering force of religion is frustrated, as in the progressive countries of Christendom. For Turkey and Spain, for Moslems and for Christians, the laws of progress and decadence are the same ; and if only the more fortunate peoples can learn to help instead of hindering the backward, realising that every civilisation is industrially and intellectually an aid to every other, the future course of things may be blessedly different from that of the past. But the closest students of the past will doubtless be as a rule among the slowest to predict such a transformation.[1]

[1] Deutsch, however (*Literary Remains*, p. 172), predicted it with confidence.

CHAPTER III

ROME

THE culture conditions of Rome seem to cause no perplexity even to those who find Greek civilisation a mystery. They are certainly obvious enough. By reason of the primary natural direction of Roman life to plunder and conquest, with a minimum of commerce and peaceful contacts, Roman culture was as backward as that of Greece was forward. The early Etruscan culture being relegated to the status of archæology, however respectfully treated,[1] and the popular language having become that of all classes, the republican period had to begin again at the beginning. Latin literature practically commenced in the third century B.C., when that of Greece was past its meridian; and the fact that Lucius Andronicus and Nævius, the early playwrights, were men of Greek culture, and that Ennius translated the Greek rationalist Evêmeros, point to the Hellenic origins of Rome's intellectual life. Her first art, on the other hand, was substantially derived from the Etruscans, who also laid the simple beginnings of the Roman drama, later built upon under Greek influence.

[1] See E. Meyer, *Geschichte des Alterthums*, ii. 703, as to the clear survivals. The reversion of the remaining Etruscan aristocracy to the language of the common people, under stress of strife with Etruria, is a phenomenon on all fours with the abandonment of French by the upper-class English in the fourteenth century, as a result of hostility with France.

But even with the Etruscan stimulus, the art went no great way before the conquest of Greece; and even under Greek stimulus the literature was progressive for only two centuries, beginning to decline as soon as the empire was firmly established.

Of the relative poverty of early Roman art, the cause is seen even by Mommsen to lie in the religious environment; but the nature of the religious environment he implicitly sets down as usual to the character of the race,[1] as contrasted with the character of the Greeks. Obviously it is necessary to seek a reason for the religious conditions to begin with; and this is to be found in the absence from early Rome of exactly those natural and political conditions which made Greece so manifold in its culture. We have seen how, where Greece was divided into a score of physically "self-contained" states, no one of which could readily overrun the others, Rome was placed on a natural career of conquest; and this at a culture stage much lower than that of Greece of the same period. Manifold and important culture contacts there must have been for Hellenes before the Homeric poems were possible; but Rome at the beginning of the republican period was in contact only with the other Italic tribes, the Grecian cities, and the Etruscans; and with these her relations were hostile. In early Ionia, again, Greek poetry flourished as a species of luxury under a feudal system constituted by a caste of rich nobles who had acquired wealth by conquest of an old and rich civilisation. Roman militarism began in agricultural poverty; and the absorption of the whole energies of the group in warfare involved the relegation of the arts of song and

[1] Even Eduard Meyer decides in this fashion (*Geschichte des Alterthums*, ii. 530) that to Italy "was denied the capacity to shape a culture for itself, to energise independently and creatively in the sphere of art, poetry, religion, and science"—this after expressly noting (ii. 155) how Greece itself developed only under the stimulus of alien culture. Compare §§ 339, 340 (ii. 533-536).

poetry to the care of the women and boys, as something beneath adult male notice.[1] Roman religion in the same way was left as a species of archæology to a small group of priests, charged to observe the ancient usages. It would thus inevitably remain primitive, that is, it would remain at a stage which the Greeks had mostly passed at the Homeric period; and when wealth and leisure came, Greek culture was there to overshadow it. To say that the Latins racially lacked the mythopœic faculty is to fall back on the old plan of explaining phenomena in terms of themselves. As a matter of fact the mere number of deities, of personified forces, in the Roman mythology is very large,[2] only there is lacking the embroidery of concrete fiction which gives vividness to the mythology of the Greeks. The Romans relatively failed to develop the mythopœic faculty because their conditions caused them to energise more in other ways.[3]

There is, however, obvious reason to believe that among the Italian peoples there was at one time a great deal more of myth than has survived. What is preserved is mainly the mythology of one set of tribes, and that in only a slightly developed form. All the other Italic peoples had been subdued by the Romans before any of them had come into the general use of letters;[4] and instead of being put in a position to develop their

[1] Mommsen, *History of Rome*, Eng. tr. 1894, i. 285-300 (bk. i. ch. xv.).

[2] "No people has ever possessed a vaster pantheon," observes M. Boissier, while noting the slightness of the characterisation (*La religion romaine d'Auguste aux Antonins*, 4e édition, i. 8). The lack of characterisation would seem to have encouraged multiplication.

[3] The fact that the Etruscans, like the other Italian peoples, remained at the stage of unintellectual formalism (Meyer, *Geschichte des Alterthums*, ii. 528-529) suffices to show that not in race genius but in stage and conditions of culture lies the explanation. All early religion in official hands is formalist—witness the Pentateuch. The preoccupied Italians left their cults, as did the Phœnicians, to archæological officials, while the leisured Greeks carried them into poetry and art under conditions which fostered these activities.

[4] Whether or not we accept Mommsen's view (B. i. c. xiv.) that the use of the alphabet in Italy dates from about 1000 B.C.

own myths and cults, or to co-ordinate the former in the Greek fashion, they were absorbed in the Roman system, which took their Gods to its pantheon, and at the same time imposed on them those of Rome. Much of their mythic lore would thus perish, for the Romans had not been concerned to cultivate even their own. Early Roman life being divided between war and agriculture, and there being no free literary class to concern itself with the embellishment of the myths, there subsisted only the simple myths and rituals of agriculture, the numerous list of personified functions connected with all the phases of life, and the customary ceremonial of augury and invocation in war. The augurs and pontifices were the public men and statesmen, and they made religion a State function. What occult lore there was they made a class monopoly—an effectual preventive in itself of a Hellenic development of myth. Apart from the special sets or colleges of priests there were specially appointed colleges of religio-archæological specialists—first, the six augurs and the five *pontifices*, then the *duoviri sacris faciundis*, afterwards increased to ten and to fifteen, who collected Greek oracles and saw to the Sibylline books; later the twenty *fetiales* or heralds, and so on. "These colleges have been often, but erroneously, confounded with the priesthoods. The priesthoods were charged with the worship of a specific divinity; the skilled colleges, on the other hand, were charged with the preservation of traditional rules regarding the more general religious observances. . . . These close corporations supplying their own vacancies, of course from the ranks of the burgesses, became in this way the depositaries of skilled arts and sciences." [1]

Religion being thus for centuries so peculiarly a matter of settled tradition, no unauthorised myth-maker

[1] Mommsen, *History of Rome*, bk. i. ch. xii. Eng. tr. ed. 1868, i. 189. Cp. Boissier, as cited, i. 354, as to the respective functions of priests and pontiffs.

could get a hearing. Even what was known would be kept as far as possible a corporation secret,[1] as indeed were some of the mystery practices in Egypt and Greece. But whereas in Greece the art of sculpture, once introduced, was stimulated by and reacted on mythology in every temple in every town, the rigid limitation of early Roman public life to the business of war would on that side have closed the door on sculpture,[2] even if it could otherwise have found entrance. The check laid on the efflorescence of the religious instinct was a double check on the efflorescence of art. The net result is well described by an eminent mythologist, in a passage which reduces to unity of idea the tissues of contradiction spun by Mommsen :—

"For the Latins their Gods, although their name was legion, remained mysterious beings without forms, feelings, or passions; and they influenced human affairs without sharing or having any sympathy with human hopes, fears, or joys. Neither had they, like the Greek deities, any society among themselves. There was for them no Olympos where they might gather and take counsel with the father of Gods and men. They had no parentage, no marriage, no offspring. They thus became a mere multitude of oppressive beings, living beyond the circle of human interests, yet constantly interfering with it; and their worship was thus as terrible a bondage as any under which the world has yet suffered. Not being associated with any definite bodily shapes, they could not, like the beautiful creations of the Greek mind, promote the growth of the highest art of the sculptor, the painter, and the poet." [3]

It is necessary here to make one correction and one expansion. The proposition as to "terrible bondage" cannot stand historically; for, to say nothing of the

[1] It is only through fragmentary vestiges (Servius on Virgil, *Georg.* i. 21; cp. Varro in Augustine, *De civitate Dei*, vi. 7-10) that we know the contents of the book of *Indigitamenta* kept by the pontifices. It seems to have been a list, not of the *Dii Indigetes* commonly so-called, but of all the multitudinous powers presiding over the various operations of life. See Boissier, *La religion romaine d'Auguste aux Antonins*, i. 4 and *note*.

[2] According to Varro (cited by Augustine, *De civ. Dei*, iv. 31), the early Romans for 170 years worshipped the Gods without images.

[3] Rev. Sir G. W. Cox, *Mythology of the Aryan Nations*, ed. 1882, p. 169.

religions of Mexico and Palestine, and some of those of India, the Roman life was certainly much less darkened by creed than has been that of many Christian countries, for instance Protestant Scotland.

M. Boissier (*La religion romaine*, i. 2) decided that the Romans were religiously ruled more by fear than hope, and that their worship consisted chiefly of "timid supplications and rigorous expiations." Mommsen, on the other hand (ch. xii. p. 191), pronounces that "the Latin religion was grounded mainly on man's enjoyment of earthly pleasures." Both statements are astray, and the truth lies between. Compare M. Boissier's later remarks, pp. 21-25, 26, 28.

As regards, again, the incapacity of the Latin pantheon to stimulate sculpture and poetry, it has to be noticed that sculpture and poetry tended to make as well as to be made by mythology in Greece. The cults of Hellas did not start with a mythology full-blown, thereby creating the arts; the mythology grew step by step with and in the arts, in a continuous mutual reaction. Thus the primitive bareness of the Latin mythology expresses not a natural saplessness which could give no increase to art, but a lack of the artistic and other conditions which stimulate mythologic growth. The outcome is relative sterility in both species.

Thus limited in their native culture, the Roman upper class were inevitably much affected by higher foreign cultures when they met these under conditions of wealth and leisure. Long before that stage, indeed, they consulted Greek oracles and collected responses; and they had informally assimilated before the conquest a whole series of Greek Gods without giving them public worship.[1] The very Goddess of the early Latin League, the Aventine Diana, was imaged by a copy of Artemis of Ephesus, the Goddess of the Ionian League.[2] As time went on the more psychologically developed cults of the East were bound to attract the Romans of all

[1] Meyer, ii. 531.

[2] Mommsen, ch. xii.

classes. What of religious emotion there was in the early days must have played in large part around the worship which the State left free to the citizens as individuals—the worship of the *Lares* and *Penates*, the cults of the hearth and the family; and in this connection the primitive mythopœic instinct must have evolved a great deal of private mythology which never found its way into literature. But as the very possession of *Lares* and *Penates*, ancestral and domestic spirits, was originally a class privilege, not shared by the landless and the homeless, these had step by step to be made free of public institutions of a similar species—the *Lares Praestites* of the whole city, festally worshipped on the first day of May, and other *Lares Publici*, *Rurales*, *Compitales*, *Viales*, and so on—just as they were helped to bread. Even these concessions, however, failed to make the old system suffice for the transforming State; and individual foreign worships with a specific attraction were one by one inevitably introduced—that of Æsculapius in the year 291 B.C., in a panic about pestilence; that of Cybele, the Mother of the Gods, in 205: both by formal decision of the Senate. The manner of the latter importation is instructive. Beginning the Hannibalic war in a spirit of religious patriotism, the Senate decreed the destruction of the temples of the alien Isis and Serapis.[1] But as the war went on, and the devotion shown to the native Gods was seen to be unrewarded, the Senate themselves, yielding to the general perturbation which showed itself in constant resort to foreign rites by the women,[2] prescribed resort to the Greek sacrificial rites of Apollo.[3] Later they called in the cult of Cybele from Phrygia;[4] and other cults informally, but none the less irresistibly, followed.

In all such steps two forces were at work—the

[1] Valerius Maximus, i. 3. [2] Livy, xxv. 1. [3] *Id.* xxv. 12. [4] *Id.* xxix. 10, 14.

readiness of the plebeians to welcome a foreign religion in which the patricians had, as it were, no vested rights; and the tendency of the more plastic patricians themselves, especially the women, to turn to a worship with emotional attractions. When the plebeians sought admission for their class to the higher offices of State, they were told with unaffected seriousness that their men had not the religious qualifications—they lacked the hereditary gift of reading auspices, the lore of things sacred.[1] So, when they did force entrance, their alleged blunders in these matters were exclaimed against as going far to ruin the republic. This was not a way to make the populace revere the national religion; and as the population of foreign race steadily increased by conquest and enslavement, alien cults found more and more hold. "It was always in the popular quarters of the city that these movements began."[2]

The first great unofficial importation seems to have been the orgiastic worship of Dionysos, who specially bore for the Romans his epithet of Bacchus, and was identified with their probably aboriginal *Liber*. This worship, carried on in secret assemblies, was held by the conservatives to be a hotbed of vice and crime, and was, according to Livy, bloodily punished (B.C. 186). So essentially absurd, however, is Livy's childish narrative, that it is impossible to take anything in it for certain save the bare fact that the worship was put under restrictions, as tending to promote secret conspiracies.[3] But from this time forward, roughly speaking, Rome may be said to have entered into the mythological heritage of Greece, even as she did into her positive treasure of art work and of oriental gold. Every cult of the conquered Mediterranean world found a footing

[1] Boissier, as cited, i. 39. [2] Boissier, i. 346.

[3] Livy, xxxix. 18. The farrago of charges of crime we have no more reason to credit than holds in regard to the similar charges made later against the Christians.

in the capital, the mere craving for new sensations among the upper class being sufficient to overcome their political bias to the old system. It is clear that when Augustus found scores of Roman temples in disrepair after the long storms of the civil wars, it was not that "religion" was out of vogue, but that it was superseded by what the Romans called "superstition" —something extraneous, something over and above the public system of rites and ceremonies. The emperor's restorations could but give a subsidised continuity to the official services: what vitally flourished were the cults which ministered to the new psychological needs of a population more and more divorced from great public interests, and increasingly alien in its heredity—the stimulant and hysterical worships of Adonis, of Attis, of the Lover Goddess coupled with the first, or the Mourning Mother Goddess with the second, of Isis and Osiris and their child—rituals of alternate lamentation and rejoicing, of initiations, austerities, confessions, penances, self-abasement, and the promise of immortality. On the general soil of devotion thus formed, there finally grew up side by side Mithraism and Christianity, the rival religions of the decadence, of which the second triumphed in virtue of having the larger number of adaptations to its environment.

But while Rome was thus at length fully possessed by the spirit of religious imagination which had so fruitfully stirred the art of Greece, there ensued no new birth of faculty. It was with the arts as with literature: the stimulus from Greece was received by a society rapidly on the way to that social state which in Greece had choked the springs of progress. In the last generations of the republic the literary development was markedly rapid. In the century which saw Rome, after a terrific struggle, victorious over Carthage and

prepared for the grapple with Macedon, the first practitioners of literature were playwrights, or slaves or clients of great men, or teachers like Ennius, who could find in the now leisured and in part intelligent or at least inquisitive upper class a sufficient encouragement to a literary career. Drama, always the form of literature which can best support itself, is the form most cultivated down till the period of popular abasement and civil convulsion, though of a dozen dramatists we have only Plautus and Terence left in anything like completeness; and while the tragedy of Pacuvius and Attius was unquestionably an imitation of the Greeks, it may have had in its kind as much merit as the comedies that have been preserved. Even more rapid than the development, however, is the social gangrene that kills the popular taste; for when we reach the time of Augustus there is no longer a literary drama, save perhaps for the small audiences of the wooden theatres, and the private performances of amateurs;[1] parades and pantomimes alone can attract the mindless multitude; and the era of autocrats begins on well-laid foundations of ignorance and artificial incivilisation.

As with the literature of the people, so with that of the lettered class. In the last generation of freedom, we have in Lucretius and Catullus two of the great poets of all antiquity, compared with whose forceful inspiration Virgil and Horace already begin to seem sicklied o'er with the pale cast of decline. Thenceforth the glory begins to die away; and though the red blade of Juvenal is brandished with a hand of power, and Lucan clangs forth a stern memorial note, and Petronius sparkles with a sinister brilliancy, there is no mistaking the downward course of things under Cæsarism. It is

[1] Cp. Merivale, *History*, small ed. iv. 67-70, and Gibbon, ch. xxxi. (Bohn ed. iii. 420).

true we find Juvenal complaining that only the emperor does anything for literature :—

> Et spes et ratio studiorum in Caesare tantum.
> Solus enim tristes hac tempestate Camoenas
> Respexit.[1]

It is the one word of praise he ever gives to the autocrat, be it Domitian or another ; and the commentators decide that only at the beginning of Domitian's reign would it apply. In effect, the satire is a description of the Roman upper class as grown indifferent to poetry, or to any but their own. But it is not on the economic side that the autocracy and the aristocracy of the empire are to be specially indicted. The economic difficulty was very much the same under the republic, when only by play-writing could literary men as such make a living. As Juvenal goes on to say, Horace when he cried Evohe was well fed, and if Virgil had lacked slave and lodging the serpents would have been lacking to the fury's hair, and the tongueless trumpet have sounded nothing great. Lucretius, Catullus, and Virgil, were all inheritors of a patrimony ; and Horace needed first an official post and later a patron's munificence to enable him to live as a poet. The mere sale of their books could not possibly have supported any one of them, so low were prices kept by the small demand.[2] What was true of the poets was still truer of the historians. Thus in the republic as in the empire, the men of letters, apart from the playwrights, tended to be drawn solely from the small class with inherited incomes. The curse of the empire was that even when the sanest emperors, as the Antonines, sought to endow studies,[3] they could not

[1] Sat. vii. 1.

[2] Martial, i. 67, 118 ; xiii. 3. But cp. Becker, *Gallus*, Sc. iii. Excur. 3.

[3] Vespasian began the endowment of professorships of rhetoric (Suetonius, *Vespasian*, 18). As to the Antonines, see Gibbon, ch. ii. *note*, near end. Ves-

buy moral or intellectual energy. The senate of poltroons who crouched before the Neros and Caligulas were the upper-class version of the population which lived by bread and the circus; and in that air neither great art nor great thought could breathe. Roman sculpture is but enslaved Greek sculpture taken into pay; Latin literature ceases to be Roman with Tacitus. The noble apparition of Marcus Aurelius shines out of the darkening ages like some unearthly incarnation, collecting in one life and in one book all the light and healing left in the waning civilisations; beside the babble of Fronto his speech is as that of one of the wise Gods of the ancient fantasy. Henceforth we have but ancillary history, and, in imaginative literature, be it of Claudian or of Apuleius, the portents of another age. *Roma fuit.*

The last stages of the transition from the pagan to the Middle Ages can best be traced in the history of the northern province of Gaul. Subjected to regular imperial administration within a generation of its conquest by Cæsar, Gaul for some centuries actually gained in civilisation, the imperial regimen being relatively more favourable to nearly every species of progress than that of the old chiefs.[1] The emperors even in the fourth century are found maintaining there professorships of rhetoric, language, law, philosophy and medicine[2]; and until finance began to fail and the barbarians to invade, the material conditions were not retrograde. But the general intellectual life was merely imitative and retrospective; and the middle and upper classes, for which the higher schools existed, were already decaying in Gaul as elsewhere. The old

pasian's endowments, it should be noted, were given only to the professors of rhetoric. The philosophers (presumably the Stoics, but also the astrologers) he banished, as did Domitian. On this cp. Merivale, *History*, vol. vii. c. 60.

[1] Cp. Guizot, *Histoire de la civilisation en France*, 13e éd. i. 48, 49.

[2] *Id.* pp. 113-115.

trouble, besides, the official veto on all vital political discussion—if indeed any appetite for such discussion survived—drove literature either into mere erudition or into triviality. On the other hand the growing Church offered a field of ostensibly free intellectual activity, and so was for a time highly productive, in point of sheer quantity of writing; a circumstance naturally placed by later inquirers to the credit of its creed. The phenomenon was of course simply one of the passage of energy by the line of least resistance. Within the Church, to which they turned as did thoughtful Greeks to philosophy after the rise of Alexander's empire, men of mental tastes and moderate culture found both shelter and support; and the first Gaulish monasteries, unlike those of Egypt and the East, were, as M. Guizot has noted, places for conference rather than for solitary life.[1] There, for men who believed the creed, which was as credible as the older doctrines, there was a constant exercise for the mind on interests that were relatively real, albeit profoundly divided from the interests of the community. Thus, at a time when the community needed all its mental energy to meet its political need, that mental energy was spent in the discussion of insoluble and insane problems, of predestination and freewill, of faith and works, of fasts, celibacy, the trinity, immortality, and the worship of saints. Men such as Ambrose, Paulinus, Cassian, Hilary, and Salvian in Gaul, Jerome in the East, and Augustine in the South, represent as it were the last vibrations of the civilised intelligence; their energy, vainly spent on what they felt to be great issues, hints of the amount of force that was still running to waste throughout the Empire.

Soon, however, and even before the barbarian tide had overflowed the intellectual world, the fatal principle

[1] Cp. Guizot, *Histoire de la civilisation en France*, i. 121, 122.

at the core of the new creed began to paralyse even the life that centred around that. In a world of political tyranny, an established church claiming to stand for the whole of supernatural truth must needs resort to tyranny as soon as it could wield the weapons. The civil strifes which broke out alike in the Eastern and the Western Empire in the third and fourth centuries, and the multitude of sects which rapidly honeycombed the Church, were so many more forces of social disintegration; and churchmen, reasoning that difference of dogma was the ground of civil warfare as well as of war in the Church, must needs take the course that had before been taken in politics.

After the original Arian battle had raged itself out in Egypt, Gregory of Nazianzen at Constantinople, Ambrose at Milan, and Martin at Tours,[1] fought it over again. One point secured, others were settled in turn; and as soon as the influence of Augustine set up a prevailing system of thought, theology was as much a matter of rule and precedent as government. As we read Augustine's *City of God*, with its strenuous demonstration that the calamities which men ascribe to the new religion are the fruit of their own misdeeds, we realise to the full the dissolution of antiquity. All that is valid in his polemic is the exposure of the absurdity of the old faiths, long before detected by the reason of the few, but maintained by believers and unbelievers alike for reasons of State. The due Nemesis came in the rise of a faith which first flourished on and promoted an utter disregard of State concerns, then helped directly to rob the State of the mental energy it most needed, and finally wrought for the paralysis of what mental energy itself contained. Of constructive truth, of the

[1] Guizot (as cited, i. 135) makes much of the fact that Hilary, Ambrose, and Martin opposed the *capital* punishment of heretics. He ignores the circumstance that Martin led an attack on all the pagan idols and temples of his neighbourhood, in which the peasants who resisted were slain.

thought whereby a State could live, the polemist had much less than was once possessed by the men who framed or credited the fables he derided. He could destroy, but could not build up. And so it was with the Church, as regarded the commonweal.

But one thing the Church could construct and conserve—the fabric of her own wealth and power. Hence it came about that the Church, in itself a community within the community, was one of the three or four concrete survivals of antiquity round which modern civilisation nucleated. Of the four, the Church, often treated as the most valuable, was really the least so, inasmuch as it wrought always more for the hindrance of progress and the sundering of communities than for advance and unification. The truly civilising forces were the other three : the first being the body of Roman law, the product of Roman experience and Greek thought in combination ; and the second, the literature of antiquity, in large part lost till the time we call the New Birth, when its recovery impregnated and inspired, though it perhaps also overburdened and lamed, the unformed intelligence of modern Europe. The third was the heritage of the arts of life and of beauty, preserved in part by the populations of the western towns which survived and propagated their species through the ages of dominant barbarism ; in part by the cohering society of Byzantium. From these ancient germs placed in new soil is modern civilisation derived.

PART IV

THE CASE OF THE ITALIAN REPUBLICS



THE CASE OF THE ITALIAN REPUBLICS

No quite satisfactory history of Italy has appeared in English. The standard modern Italian history, that of Cesare Cantù, has been translated into French; but in English there has been no general history of any length since Procter and Spalding. Col. Procter's *History of Italy* (published as by G. Perceval, 1825), 2nd ed. 1844, has merit, but is not abreast of modern studies. Spalding's *Italy and the Italian Islands* (3 vols. 3rd ed. 1845) is an excellent work of its kind, covering Italian history from the earliest times, but is also in need of revision. Of special histories there are several. Captain H. E. Napier, in the preface to his *Florentine History* (1846, 6 vols.) rightly contended that "no people can be known by riding post through their country against time"; but his six learned volumes are not only unreasonably long, they are ill-written and ill-assimilated. Mr. T. A. Trollope's *History of the Commonwealth of Florence* (1865, 4 vols.) is less indigestible, but is gratuitously diffuse, and is written in large part in unfortunate imitation of the pseudo-dramatic manner of Carlyle. It is further blemished by an absurd index. Neither this nor Mr. W. Carew Hazlitt's *History of the Venetian Republic* (1860, 4 vols.) has much sociological value, though the latter is painstaking, albeit also diffuse. A good short manual is the *Italy* of Mr. Hunt (Macmillan's Historical Course); but it is still profitable to return to the condensed *History of the Italian Republics* by Sismondi (written for the English "Cabinet Cyclopædia" in 1832), though it needs revision in detail. Sismondi's larger and earlier *Histoire des Républiques Italiennes* has never ceased to be well worth study, though the *Geschichte von Italien* of H. Leo (1829) improves upon it in several respects. Among modern monographs that of Alfred von Reumont on *Lorenzo de' Medici* (Eng. tr. 1876, 2 vols.) in nearly every way supersedes the old work of Roscoe, whose *Leo X.*, again, is practically superseded by later works on the Renaissance, in particular those of Burckhardt (Eng.

tr. of Geiger's ed. in 1 vol. 1892) and the late Mr. Addington Symonds. No one of these works, however, constitutes a satisfying sociological history of Italy even for the Renaissance period, their accomplished authors naturally leaning to the æsthetic and humanistic sides of the study. Miss Duffy has a good chapter (xix.) on Florentine trade and finance in her *Story of the Tuscan Republics*, 1892. Ranke's *History of the Latin and Teutonic Nations* (Eng. tr. 1887), which deals with the Italy of 1494-1514, is little more than a sand-heap of incident. The best complete history of Florence, the typical Italian republic, is perhaps the long *Histoire ae Florence*, by F. T. Perrens, Paris, 6 tom. 1877-1884. Of still more general value is the elaborate work of Gregorovius, *Geschichte der Stadt Rom im Mittelalter* (4te Aufl. 8 Bde. 1886-96), which, however, suffers from the disparity of its purposes, combining as it does, at great length, a topographical history of the city of Rome with a full history of its politics. It remains a valuable mass of materials rather than a history proper. The same criticism applies to the very meritorious *Geschichte der Stadt Rom* of A. von Reumont (3 Bde. 1867-70), which begins with the very origin of the city, and comes down to our own time. Sociological light is lacking, again, to the copious work of T. Hodgkin, *Italy and her Invaders* (2nd ed. 1892-99, 8 vols.), which comes down to the death of Charlemagne. But there is rising in contemporary Italy a school of historical students who are rewriting the history of the great period in the light of the voluminous archives which have been preserved by municipalities. One outcome of this line of investigation is Professor Villari's *The Two First Centuries of Florentine History* (Eng. tr. of first 2 vols. 1894), a work regrettably diffuse in composition. Meantime, new light has been thrown on the commercial history of Italy in the Dark Ages and early Middle Ages by the admirable work of Professor W. von Heyd, of which the French translation by Furcy Raynaud, *Histoire du commerce du Levant au moyen age*, 1886, 2 tom., is recast and considerably enlarged by the author.

CHAPTER I

THE BEGINNINGS

To understand aright the phenomenon of medieval Italian civilisation, we need first to realise that it was at bottom a fresh growth on the culture roots of the cities of Romanised Italy. When the imperial centre was shifted to the East, as already remarked, the people of Italy began a fresh self-adaptation to their conditions; those of Rome, instead of leading, standing most zealously to the old way of things. All the barbarian irruptions did but harass and hinder the new development; they finally counted for very little in its course. There is a prevalent hallucination, akin to others concerning the "Teutonic race," in the shape of a belief that Italy was somehow "regenerated" by the "free nations of the North." No accepted formula could well be further away from the facts. If the political qualities of the "Teutonic race," whatever that may mean, are to be generalised on the facts of the invasions of Italy by the Germanic tribes, from Theodoric to Frederick Barbarossa, they must be summed up as consisting in an extreme incapacity for progressive civilisation. They were, in fact, too disparate in their stage of evolution from that of the southern civilisation to be capable of assimilating it and carrying it on. Living a

life of strife and plunder like the early Romans, they found in the disarmed Italians, and in their rapidly degenerate predecessors of their own stock, an easier prey than the Romans had ever known till they went to the East; but in the qualities either of military or of civil organisation they were immeasurably inferior to the Romans of the early republic. Men of the highest executive ability appeared from time to time among their leaders: a circumstance of great interest and importance, as suggesting that a percentage of genius occurs in all stages of human culture; but the mass of the invaders was always signally devoid of the very characteristics so romantically attributed to them by German, English, and even French Teutophiles—to wit, the gifts of union, discipline, order, and self-government. These elements of civilisation belong to the functioning of the nerve centres, and are not to be evolved by mere multiplication of animated flesh, which was the main constructive process carried on in ancient Germania. Precisely because they were, as Tacitus noted, the most homogeneous of the European races of that era, they were incapable of any rapid and durable social development. It is only mixed races that can evolve or sustain a complex civilisation.

"The Germans," as we historically trace them at the beginning of our era, were barbarians (*i.e.* men between savagery and civilisation) in the most rudimentary stage, making scanty beginnings in agriculture; devoid of the useful arts, save those normally practised by savages; given to drunkenness; chronically at war; and alternating at other times between utter sloth and energetic hunting—the pursuit which best fitted them for war. Because the peoples thus situated were in comparison with the Romans "chaste" and monogamous—a common enough virtue in savage life[1]—they

[1] For a good view of the many points in common between Teutonic barbarism

are supposed by their admirers to have been excellent material for a work of racial regeneration. Only in an indirect sense does this hold good. As a new "cross" to the Italian stocks they may indeed have made for beneficial variation; but in themselves they were mere raw material, morally and psychologically. As a matter of fact, the solitary virtue of chastity disappeared as soon as the barbarians passed from a northern to a southern climate, their vices so speedily exceeding the measure of paganism that even a degree of physiological degeneration soon set in. Even in their own land, met by a fiercer barbarism than their own, they collapsed miserably before the Huns. As regards the arts and sciences, moral and physical, it is impossible to trace to the invaders any share in the progress of Italy,[1] save in so far as they were doubtless a serviceable cross with the older native stocks. To their own stock, which had been relatively too homogeneous, the gain of crossing was mixed. Aurelian had put the case with rude truth when he told a bragging embassy of Goths that they knew neither the arts of war nor those of peace;[2] and so long as the empire in any section had resources enough to levy and maintain trained armies, it was able to destroy any combination of the Teutons. There was always generalship enough for that, down till the days of Teutonic civilisation. Claudius the Second routed their swarms as utterly as ever did Marius or Cæsar; Stilicho annihilated Rodogast, and always outgeneralled Alaric; Ætius, after routing Franks, Burgundians, and Visigoths, overwhelmed the vast host of Attila's Huns; and in a later age the single unsleeping

and normal savagery, see the synopsis of Guizot, *Histoire de la civilisation en France*, i. 7ième leçon.

[1] Ranke's statement (*Latin and Teutonic Nations*, Eng. tr. p. 1), that the "collective German nations at last brought about" a Latino-Teutonic unity is a merely empirical proposition, true in no organic sense.

[2] Gibbon, chap. xi., Bohn ed. i. 365.

brain of Belisarius, scantily weaponed with men and money by a jealous sovereign, could drive back from Rome in shame and ruin all the barbarian levy of Wittich.[1]

What happened in Italy after Odoaker was that, for sheer lack of unitary government on the part of the invaders, the cities, which preserved the seeds and norms of the old civilisation, gradually grew into new organic life. Under the early empire they had been disarmed and unwalled, to make them incapable of revolt. Aurelian, stemming the barbarian tide, began to wall them afresh; but, as we have seen, the withdrawal of the seat of empire left Italy economically incapable of action on an imperial scale; and the personal imbecility of such emperors as Honorius filled up the cup of the humiliation of what once was Rome. But the invaders on the whole did no better; and the material they brought was more hopeless than what they found. The passage from full barbarism to order and civilisation cannot conceivably be made in one generation or one age. Athaulf, the able successor of Alaric, passed his competent judgment on the matter in words which outweigh all the rhetoric of modern romanticism :—"He was wont to say that his warmest wish had at first been to obliterate the Roman name, and to make one sole Gothic empire, so that all that which had been Romania should be called Gothia, and that he, Athaulf, should play the same part as did Cæsar Augustus. But when by much experience he was convinced that the Goths were incapable of obedience to laws, because of their unbridled barbarism, and that the State without laws would cease to be a State, he had chosen to seek glory in rebuilding its integrity and

[1] It is true that none of the generals mentioned was an Italian. Stilicho was indeed a Vandal; Ætius was a Scythian; Belisarius was a Thracian; and Narses probably a Persian. But they handled armies made up of all races; and their common qualification was a military science to be learned only from Roman tradition. Cp. Finlay, *History of Greece from its Conquest by the Romans*, ed. 1877, i. 211.

increasing the Roman power by Gothic forces, so that posterity should at least regard him as the restorer of the empire which he was unable to replace. Therefore he strove to avoid war and to establish peace." [1]

It needed only command of the machinery of systematic government—if indeed the same qualities had not been in full play long before—to develop in the Teutons every species of evil that could be charged against the Southerns. The fallacy of attributing the crimes of Byzantium to the physiological degeneration of an "old" race is exposed the moment we compare the record with the history of the Franks, as told by Gregory of Tours.

Christian writers continue to hold up Nero as a typical product of decadent paganism, saying nothing of the Christian Chilperic, "the Nero of France," or of his father, less ill-famed, Clothaire, the slayer of children, the polygamist, the strictly orthodox churchman, "certain that Jesus Christ will remunerate us for all the good we do" to his priests.[2] Odious women were as powerful in Frankish courts as in Byzantine; and the tale of the end of Brunehild is not to be matched in pagan annals. Savage treachery, perjury, parricide, fratricide, filicide, assassination, massacre, debauchery, are if possible more constant notes in the tale of the young barbarism, as told by the admiring saint, than in that of the long-descended civilisation of Constantinople; and the rank and file seem to have been worthy of the heads.

One note of Gibbon's, on "barbaric virtue," àpropos of the character of Totila, has given one of his editors (Bohn ed. iv. 505) the opportunity to assert that the "natural superiority" of the

[1] Paulus Orosius, vii. 43. The record has every appearance of trustworthiness, the historian premising that at Bethlehem he heard the blessed Jerome tell how he had known a wise old inhabitant of Narbonne, who was highly placed under Theodosius, and had known Athaulf intimately; and who often told Jerome how that great and wise king thus delivered himself.

[2] Sismondi, citing the *Diplomata*, tom. iv. p. 616.

invaders was manifest wherever they came in contact with their civilised antagonists. As if Aurelian and Belisarius were not the moral equals of Totila. Yet in a previous note (ch. xxxviii. ed. cited, iv. 181) on the Frankish history of Gregory of Tours, Gibbon had truly remarked that "it would not be easy, within the same historical space, to find more vice and less virtue." On that head Sismondi declares (*Histoire des Français*, ed. 1821, i. 403-404; *Fall of the Roman Empire*, i. 263) that "there was not a Merovingian king that was not a father before the age of fifteen and decrepit at thirty." Dunham (*History of the Germanic Empire*, 1834, i. 10) improves on this to the extent of asserting that "those abominable princes generally—such were their premature vices—died of old age before thirty." It is a fair surmise that, Clovis being a barbarian of great executive genius (cp. Guizot, *Essais sur l'histoire de France*, p. 43), his stock was specially liable to degeneration through indulgence. But Mr. Motley, whose Teutophile and Celtophobe declamation at times reaches nearly the lowest depth touched by his school, will have it (*Rise of the Dutch Republic*, ed. 1863, p. 12) that later "the Carlovingian *race* had been exhausted by *producing a race* of heroes." Any formula avails to support the dogma that "the German was loyal as the Celt was dissolute" (*id.* p. 6).

It is perhaps arguable that the early Teuton has a moral code peculiar to himself. Sismondi (*Fall*, i. 246) remarks, concerning Clothaire's son Gontran, called by Gregory "the good king Gontran," as compared with his brothers: "His morality indeed passed for good; he is only known to have had two wives and one mistress, and he repudiated the first before he married the second; his temper was, moreover, reputed to be a kindly one, for, with the exception of his wife's physician, who was hewn in pieces because he was unable to cure her; of his two brothers-in-law, whom he caused to be assassinated; and of his bastard brother, Gondebald, who was slain by treachery, no other act of cruelty is recorded of him than that he razed the town of Cominges to the ground and massacred all the inhabitants, men, women, and children." Sismondi has also appreciated (p. 205) what Gibbon has missed, the point of the letter of St. Avitus to Gondebald of Burgundy, who had killed his three brothers, exhorting him "to weep no longer with such ineffable piety the death of his brothers, since it was the good fortune of the kingdom which diminished the number of persons invested with royal authority, and preserved to the world such only as were necessary to rule it."

A great name, such as Theodoric's, tends to dazzle the eye that looks on the history of the time; but the

great name, on scrutiny, is seen to stand for all the progress made in a generation. Theodoric had a civilised education, and what was masterly in his rule may at least as well be attributed to that as to his barbaric stock.[1] It is important to note that in his reign, by reason of being forced to live on her own products, Italy actually attains the capacity to export grain after feeding herself[2]—a result to which the king's rule may conceivably have contributed.[3] In any case, the able ruler represents but a moment of order in an epic of anarchy.[4] After Theodoric, four kings in turn are assassinated, each by his successor; and the new monarchy begins to go the way of the old. What Belisarius began Narses finished, turning to his ends the hatreds between the Teutonic tribes. Narses gone, a fresh wave of barbarism flows in under Alboin the Lombard, who in due course is assassinated by his outraged wife; and his successor is assassinated in turn. Yet again, the new barbarism began to wear all the features of disorderly decay; and the Lombard kingdom subsisted for over two hundred years, under twenty-one kings, without decisively conquering Venetia, or the Romagna, or Rome, or the Greek municipalities of the south.[5] Then came the Frankish conquest, completed under Charlemagne, on the invitation of the Pope, given because the Franks were good Athanasians and the Lombards Arians. The great emperor did what a

[1] See Gregorovius, *Geschichte der Stadt Rom*, B. ii. Kap. ii., as to his constant concern for culture and established usage.

[2] Alison, *Essays*, iii. 473-74, citing Cassiodorus, l. iii. epist. 44.

[3] Cp. Gibbon, ch. xxxix. (Bohn ed. iv. 270-71), as to the general care of the administration.

[4] "Gross war Ruhm und Glanz seines [Theodoric's] Reiches: die inneren Schäden und Gefahren desselben blieben damals noch verhüllt, kaum etwa dem Kaiser und den Merovingen erkennbar" (F. Dahn, "Urgeschichte der germanischen und romanischen Völker," in Oncken's *Allg. Gesch.*, 1881, i. 246).

[5] Machiavelli points out (*Istorie Fiorentine*, l. i.) that this was the result of their having, at the death of their tyrant Clef, suspended the election of kings and set up the system of thirty dukes or marquises—an arrangement unfavourable to further conquest.

great man could to civilise his barbarian empire; but instead of fitting it to subsist without him he destroyed what self-governing power it had.[1] Soon after his death, accordingly, the stone rolled downhill once more; and when Otto of Saxony entered Rome in 961, Italy had undergone five hundred years of Teutonic domination without owing to Teuton activity, save indirectly, one step in civil progress.

It thus appears that, while barbaric imperialism has different aspects from that of "civilisation," having a possible alterative virtue where the conditions are in themselves stagnant, even then its work is at best negative, and never truly constructive. Charlemagne's work, being one of personal ambition, was in large part destructive even where it ostensibly made for civilisation; and at his death the Germanic world was as literally degenerate, in the sense of being enfeebled for self-defence, as was the Roman world in the period of its imperial decay.[2] It is true that despite the political chaos which followed on the disintegration of his system, there is henceforth no such apparent continuity of decadence as had followed on the Merovingian conquest,[3] and his period shows a new intellectual activity.[4] But it is a fallacy to suppose that he created this activity, which is traceable to many sources. At most, Charlemagne furthered general civilisation by forcing new culture contacts in Central Europe, and bringing capable men from other countries, Alcuin in particular.[5]

[1] See Guizot, *Essais sur l'histoire de France*, 7e édit. pp. 185, 189, 195. But cp. pp. 198-201, as to the rise of hereditary feudality. Cp. the *Histoire de la civilisation*, iii. 103; iv. 77-79.

[2] Cp. Sismondi, *Républiques Italiennes*, ed. cited, i. 85.

[3] Guizot, *Histoire de la civilisation en France*, 13ième édit. ii. 134, 162.

[4] See Guizot's table, pp. 130-32.

[5] For a favourable view of the case see Schröder's *Geschichte Karl's des Grossen*, 1869, Kapp. 15, 16; and Gregorovius, *Geschichte der Stadt Rom*, B. v. Kap. i., § 2. Gregorovius (p. 20) calls Charlemagne "the Moses of the Middle Ages, who had happily led mankind through the wilderness of barbarism"—a proposition grounded on race-pride rather than on evidence.

But these favourable conditions were not permanent; there was no steady evolution; and we are left asking whether progress might not have occurred in a higher degree had the emperor's work been left unattempted.[1] In any case, it is long after his time that civilisation is seen to make a steady recovery; and there is probably justice in the verdict of Sismondi, that Otto, an administrator of no less capacity than Charlemagne, did more for it than he.[2] Guizot, while refusing to admit that the work of Charlemagne passed away, admits Sismondi's proposition that in the tenth century civilised society in Europe was dissolving in all directions.[3] The subsequent new life came not of imperialism but of the loosening of empire, and not from the Teuton world but from the Latin.

Mommsen, in one of those primitively biassed anti-Celtic passages which destroy his pretensions to rank as a philosophic historian, declares of the elusive Celtæ of antiquity, in dogged disregard of the question (so often put by German scholars and so often answered against him [4]) whether they were not Germans, that "always occupied with combats and heroic actions, they were scattered far and wide from Ireland to Spain and Asia Minor; but all their enterprises melted like snow in spring; they created nowhere a great State, and developed no specific civilisation."[5] The passage would be exactly as true if written of the Teutons. Every

[1] There is reason to surmise that the very movement of theological thought which marks the ninth century was due to Moslem contacts. These might have been more fruitful under peace conditions than under those of Charlemagne's campaigns.

[2] *Républiques*, i. 91. Gregorovius, instead of giving Otto some such praise as he bestows on Karl, pronounces this time that "the Roman Empire was now regenerated by the German *nation*" (B. vi. Kap. iii. § 1).

[3] Guizot, *Civilisation*, iii. 103; Sismondi, *Républiques*, i. 87. In his *Essais*, however (p. 238, etc.), Guizot speaks of the "belle mais stérile tentative de Charlemagne."

[4] *E.g.* Wieseler, *Die deutsche Nationalität der kleinasiatischen Galater*, 1877; Holtzmann, *Kelten und Germanen*, 1855.

[5] *History of Rome*, bk. ii. ch. iv.

tendency and quality which Mommsen in this context[1] specifies as Celtic is strictly applicable to the race supposed to be so different from them. "Attachment to the natal soil, so characteristic of the Italians and *Germans*, was foreign to them. . . . Their political constitution was imperfect ; not only was their national unity feebly recognised,[2] as happens with all nations at their outset, but the separate communities were lacking in unity of aim, in solid control, in serious political sentiment, and in persistence. The sole organisation of which they were capable was the military,[3] in which the ties of discipline dispensed the individual from personal efforts." "They preferred the pastoral life to agriculture." "Always we find them ready to roam, or, in other words, to begin the march . . . following the profession of arms as a system of organised pillage;" and so on. Such were in strict truth the peculiarities of the Germani, from Tacitus to the Middle Ages.

In the early stage they actually shifted their ground every year;[4] and for every migration or crusade recorded of Celtæ, three are recorded of Teutons. The successive swarms who conquered Italy showed an almost invincible repugnance to the practice of agriculture ; in the mass they knew no law and no ideal save the military ; they were constantly at tribal war with each other, Frank with Lombard and Goth with Burgundian ; Ostrogoths and Gepidæ fought on the side of Attila at Chalons against Visigoths, Franks, Burgundians, and Saxons ; they had no idea of racial unity ; and not one of their kingdoms ever went well

[1] The author has examined a later deliverance of Mommsen's on the subject in *The Saxon and the Celt*, sect. iii. § 1.

[2] In a later passage (bk. v. ch. vii.) Mommsen credits the Celts with "unsurpassed fervour of national feeling." His History abounds in such contradictions.

[3] In the passage cited in the last note, the historian asserts that the Celts were unable "to attain, or barely to tolerate . . . any sort of fixed military discipline." Such is the consistency of malice.

[4] Tacitus, *Germania*, c. 26 ; Cæsar, *Bell. Gall.* vi. 21.

for two successive generations. The story of the Merovingians is one nightmare of ferocious discord; that of the Suevi in Spain, and of the Visigoths in Aquitaine, is mainly a memory of fratricide. As regards organisation, the only Teutonic kings who ever made any headway were those who, like Theodoric, had a civilised education, or, like the great Charles and Louis the Second, eagerly learned all that Roman tradition could teach them; the main stock were so incapable of political combination that after the deposition of the last incapable Carlovingian (888) they could not arrest their anarchy even to resist the Huns and Saracens. Their later conquests of Italy came to nothing; and in the end, by the admission of Teutonic men of science,[1] there is nothing to show, in all the southern lands they once conquered, that they had ever been there. The supposed type has disappeared; the language never imposed itself; the Vandal kingdom in Africa went down like a house of cards before Belisarius;[2] the Teutondom of Spain was swept away by the Moors, and it was finally the mixed population that there effected the reconquest. In Spain, France, and Italy alike, the language remained Romance; even in England, where also the Teutonic peoples for six hundred years failed to attain either progressive civilisation or political order, the Norman conquerors, speaking a Romance language, vitally modified by it the vocabulary of the conquered.

If, instead of seeking simply for the scientific truth, we sought to meet Teutomania with Celtomania, we might argue that it was only where there was a Celtic basis that civilisation prospered in the tracks of the Roman Empire.[3] Mommsen, in the passage first above

[1] See Virchow, as cited in Penka's *Die Herkunft der Arier*, 1886, p. 98.

[2] "Never was there a more rapid conquest than that of the vast kingdom of the Vandals" (Sismondi, *Fall of the Roman Empire*, Eng. tr. i. 221).

[3] Guizot (*Hist. de la Civ. en France*, i. 2e leçon) has an extraordinary passage to the effect that while German and English civilisation was German *in origin*, that

cited, declares that the Celts, meaning the Cisalpine Galli, "loved to assemble in towns and villages, which consequently grew and gained in importance among the Celts sooner than in the rest of Italy"—this just after alleging that they preferred pastoral life to agriculture, and just before saying that they were always on the march. If the first statement be true, it would seem to follow that the Celts laid the ground-work of medieval Italian civilisation; for it was in the towns of what had been Cisalpine Gaul that that civilisation flourished. It is certain that "Celtic" Gaul—whence Charlemagne (semi-civilised by the old environment) wrought hard, but almost in vain, to impose civilisation on Germany—reached unity and civilisation in the Middle Ages, while Germany remained divided and semi-barbaric; that England was civilised only after the Norman Conquest; and that Germany, utterly disrupted by the Reformation where France regained unity, was so thrown back in development by her desperate intestine strifes that only last century did she begin to produce a modern literature. But if anything has been proved by the foregoing analyses, it is that race theories are, for the most part, survivals of barbaric pseudo-science; that culture stage and not race (save as regards the need for mixture), conditions and not hereditary character, are the clues to the development of all nations, "race" being a calculable factor only where many thousands of years of given environments have made a conspicuous similarity of

of France is *romaine dès ses premiers pas*. As if there had not been a primary Gallic society as well as a Germanic. If Mommsen be right, the Galli before their conquest were much more advanced in civilisation than the Germani. In point of fact, the Celtæ of Southern France had commercial contact with the Greeks before they had any with the Romans. And in the very passage under notice, Guizot goes on to say that the life and institutions of *northern* France had been essentially *Germanic*. The theorem is hopelessly confused. The plain facts are that German "civilisation" came from Italy and Romanised Gaul, albeit later, as fully as did that of Gaul from Italy.

type, setting up a disadvantageous homogeneity. It was simply their prior and fuller contact with Greece and Rome, and further their greater mixture of stocks, that civilised the Galli so much earlier than the Germani. On the other hand, the failure in Italy of the Teutonic stocks, as such, proves only that idle northern barbarians, imposing themselves as a warrior caste on an industrious southern population, were (1) not good material for industrial development, and (2) were probably at a physiological disadvantage in the new climate. Southerners would doubtless have failed similarly in Scandinavia.

I know of no thorough investigation of the amalgamation of the stocks, or the absorption or disappearance of the northern. There is, however, reason to suppose that early in Rome's career of conquest there began in the capital a substitution of more southerly physiological types—eastern and Spanish—for those of the early Latins. But the Italians at all times seem to have undergone a climatic selection which adapted them to Italy, where the northerners, whether Celt or Teuton, were not so adapted. The supposed divergence of character between northern and southern Italians, insisted on by the former in our own time, certainly cannot be explained by any Teutonic intermixture ; for the Teutons were settled in all parts of Italy, and nowhere does the traditional blond type remain. Exactly such differences, it should be remembered, are locally alleged as between Norwegians and Danes, northern and southern Germans, and northern and southern English. If there be any real generic difference of temperament (there is none in variety of moral bias and mental capacity) or of nervous energy, it is presumably to be traced to climate. Some aspects of the problem are discussed at length in *The Saxon and the Celt*, sect. i. §§ 4, 5.

The salvation of Italy, so to speak, came of the ultimate impotence of the northern invaders for imperialism. Again and again, from the time of Odoaker, we find signs of a growth of new life in the cities, now partly thrown on their own resources ; and it is only the too great stress of the subsequent invasions that

postpones their fuller growth for so many centuries. It is to be remembered that these invasions wrought absolute devastation where, even under Roman rule, there had been well-being. Thus the province of Illyria, between the Alps and the Danube, whose outlying and exposed character made it unattractive to the senatorial monopolists, was under the empire well-populated by a free peasantry, who abundantly recruited the army.[1] In the successive invasions, this population was almost obliterated; and when Odoaker conquered the Rugians, who then held the territory, he brought multitudes of them into stricken Italy, to people and cultivate its waste lands.[2] Theodoric, in turn, is supposed to have revived prosperity after overthrowing Odoaker; but early in his reign (496) we find Pope Gelasius declaring that in the provinces of Aemilia and Tuscany, human life was almost extinct; while Ambrose writes that Bologna, Modena, Reggio, Piacenza, and the adjacent country remained ruined and desolate.[3] After Theodoric, Belisarius, in a struggle that exhausted central Italy, almost annihilated the Goths; and under Narses, who finished the conquest, there was again some recovery, the scattered remnants of the population congregating in the towns, so that Milan and others made fresh headway,[4] though the country remained deserted. This would seem to have been the turning-point in the long welter of Italian history. The Lombard conquest under Alboin forced on the process of driving the older inhabitants into the cities. The Ostrogothic kings, while they unwalled the towns they captured, had fortified Pavia, which was

[1] Sismondi, *Fall of the Roman Empire*, as cited, i. 35, 172, 238.

[2] Gibbon, ch. xxxvi. *end.*

[3] Citations in Gibbon, ch. xxxvi.; Bohn ed. iv. 105. For a somewhat fuller sketch than Gibbon's, see Manso, *Geschichte des ost-gothischen Reiches in Italien*, 1824, §§ 73-79. Cp. Spalding, *Italy*, i. 398-400.

[4] Sismondi, *Fall*, i. 236.

able to resist Alboin for four years, thus giving the other towns their lesson; and as he advanced the natives fled before him to Venice, to Genoa, to the cities of the Pentapolis, to Pisa, to Rome, to Gaeta, to Naples, and to Amalfi.[1] Above all, the cities of the coast, still adhering to the Greek empire, and impregnable from land, were now allowed to retain for their own defence the revenue they had formerly paid to Constantinople. Thus once more there began to grow up, in tendency if not in form and name, republics of civilised and industrious men, in the teeth of barbarism and under the shadow of the name of empire.[2] The Lombards had not, as has been so often written, revived the spirit of liberty; but they had driven other men into the conditions where liberty could revive; and in so far as Lombard civilisation in the next two hundred years distanced that of the Franks,[3] it was owing to the reactions of the other Italian cities, no less than to the renewed growth of rural population and agriculture.

Sismondi (*Républiques*, i. 55, 402-405; *Fall*, i. 242) uses the conventional phrase as to the Lombards reviving the spirit of freedom, while actually showing its fallacy. In his *Short History of the Italian Republics* (p. 13), he tells in the same breath that the invaders "introduced" several of their sentiments, "particularly the habit of independence, and resistance to authority," and that in their conquests they considered the inhabitants "their property equally with the land." Dunham (*Europe in the Middle Ages*, 1835, i. 8) similarly speaks of the Lombards as "infusing a new spirit" into the "slavish minds of the Italians," and then proceeds (p. 9) to show that what happened was a flight of the Italians from Lombard tyranny. He admits further (p. 17) that the Lombard

[1] Sismondi, *Fall*, i. 240.

[2] *Id.*, p. 241. The movement, as Sismondi notes, extended to Spain, to Africa, to Illyria, and to Gaul.

[3] Sismondi, *Fall*, i. 259. The historian decides that "the race of the conquerors took root and throve in the soil, without *entirely* superseding that of the conquered natives, *whose language still prevailed*," but gives no proofs for the first proposition. The uncritical handling of these questions in the histories leaves essential problems still unsolved. Cp. Hodgkin, *Italy and her Invaders*, 2nd ed. vi. (B. vii.), 579-93; vii. (B. viii.), 384, 385.

code of laws was "less favourable to social happiness than almost any other, the Visigothic, perhaps, alone excepted;" and (p. 19) that the Lombards, wherever they could, "destroyed the [free] municipal institutions, by subjecting the cities to the jurisdiction of the great military feudatories, the true and only tyrants of the country." Sismondi again (*Fall*, i. 259) declares that their laws, for a barbarian people, were "wise and equal." The midway truth seems to be that the dukes or provincial rulers came to feel some identity of interest with their subjects. Later jurists called their laws *asininum jus, quoddam jus quod faciebant reges per se* (Symonds, *Renaissance in Italy*, 2nd ed. i. 45).

On the whole, it may be psychologically accurate to say that the invaders, by setting up a new caste of freemen where before all classes were alike subordinate to the imperial tyranny, created a variation in the direction of a new self-government, the spectacle of privilege stimulating the unprivileged to desire it. But any conquest whatever might do this; and it is a paralogism to conclude that where the subjugated people does *not* react the fault is its own, while where it does the credit is to go to the conquerors. It does not seem to have occurred to any one to reason that the Norman Conquest of England was the bringer of the liberty later achieved there. Yet, as regards the Teutonic invasions of Italy, the principle passes current on all sides; and Guizot endorses it in one lecture (*Hist. de la civ. en France*, i. 7ième leçon, *end*), though in the next he gives an objective account which practically discredits it.

It took centuries, however, to develop the new tendency to a decisive degree. The Frankish conquest, like others, disarmed and unwalled the population as far as possible; and it seems to have been only in the tenth century, when the Hungarians repeatedly raided northern Italy (900–24), and the Saracens the southern coasts and the isles, that a general permission was given to the towns to defend themselves.[1] This time the balance of power lay with the defence; and to the mere disorderliness of the barbarian rule on one hand may in

[1] This is again Sismondi's generalisation (*Histoire des républiques Italiennes*, ed. 1826, i. 21; Eng. summary, p. 14). He has been followed by Procter (Perceval's *History of Italy*, 1825, 2nd ed. 1844, p. 9); by Dunham (*Europe in the Middle Ages*, i. 23); and by Symonds (*Renaissance in Italy*, 2nd ed. i. 48). It is noteworthy that at the same period Henry the Fowler encouraged free cities in Germany for the same reason.

part be attributed the relative success of the cities of the later empire as compared with those of the earlier. Latin Rome had not only disarmed its cities but accustomed them for centuries to ease and idleness; and before a numerous foe, bent on conquest, they made no resistance. Goths, Lombards and Franks in turn sought to keep all but their own strong places disarmed; but their system could not wholly prevent the growth of a militant spirit in the industrial towns. On the other hand, the Hungarians and Saracens were bent not on conquest but on mere plunder, and were thus manageable foes. Had the Normans, say, come at this time into Italy, they could have overrun the quasi-Teutonic communities as easily as the Teutons had done the Romans or each other. But the conditions being as they were, the swing was towards the independence of the cities; and when Otto came in 951 the foundations of the republics were laid.

Hallam (*State of Europe in the Middle Ages*, ch. iii. part 1) describes Sismondi as stating that Otto "erected" the Lombard cities into municipal communities, and dissents from that view. But Sismondi (*Républiques Italiennes*, ed. 1826, i. 95) expressly says that there are no charters, and that the municipal independence of the cities is to be inferred from their subsequent claims of prescription. As there is nothing to show for any regular government from the outside in the preceding period of turmoil, the inference that *some* self-government existed before and under Otto is really forced upon us. Ranke (*History of the Latin and Teutonic Nations*, Eng. tr. p. 11) pronounces that the first *consuls* of the Italian cities, chosen by themselves, appear at the date of the first Crusade, 1100. "Beyond all question, we meet with them first in Genoa on the occasion of an expedition to the Holy Land." But this clearly does not exclude prior forms of self-government for domestic needs. Hallam himself points out that in the years 1002-1006 the annalists, in recording the wars of the cities, speak "of the people and not of their leaders, which is the true republican tone of history;" and notes that a contemporary chronicle shows the people of Pavia and Milan acting as independent states in 1047. This state of things would naturally arise when the emperor and the nobles lived in a

state of mutual jealousy. Compare Bryce, *Holy Roman Empire*, 7th ed. pp. 127-29, 139-40, 150, 176. Unfortunately Mr. Bryce does not attempt to clear up the dispute, but he recognises that the liberties of the cities would naturally "shoot up in the absence of the emperors and the feuds of the princes." And this is the view finally of Heinrich Leo—"Seit Otto bemerken wir eine auffallende Aenderung in der Politik der ganzen nördlichen Italiens" (*Geschichte von Italien*, 1829, i. 325; B. iv. Kap. i. § 1). Leo points out that the granting of exemptions to the north Italian cities came from the Ottos. "It was not, however," he goes on, "as it has been supposed we must assume, the blending of Roman *citizenship* (which in the Lombard cities had never existed[1] in the form of commune or municipality [*Gemeinde*]) with the Lombard and German, but the blending of the survivors and the labourers, mostly of Roman descent, with the almost entirely German-derived free *Gemeinde*, through which the exemptions were obtained, and which gave a new aspect to the Italian cities" (§§ 326, 327).

Almost concurrently with the new growth of political life in the cities, rural life readjusted itself under a system concerning the merits of which there has been as much dispute as concerning its origins—the system of feudalism. Broadly speaking, that began in the relation between the leaders of the Germanic invasion and their chief followers, who, receiving lands as their share, or at another time as a reward, were expected as a matter of course to back the king in time of war, and in their turn ruled their lands and retainers on that principle. When the principle of heredity was established as regarded the crown, it was necessarily affirmed as regards land tenures; and soon it was applied as a matter of course to nearly all the higher royal offices and "benefices" in the Frankish empire,[2] which after Charlemagne became the model for the Germanic and the French and English kingdoms. Thus "the aristocratic system was in possession of society;" and the conflict which inevitably arose

[1] *Note by Leo.*—"Except in the cities acquired latest, and by capitulation from the Romans"—*i.e.* the Greek Empire.

[2] Guizot, *Essais*, pp. 199-201; Stubbs, i. 277.

between the feudal baronage and the monarchic power, served in time to aggrandise the cities, whose support was so important to both sides.

See Stubbs, *Constitutional History of England*, 4th ed. i. 273-74, *note*, for a sketch of the discussion as to the rise of feudalism. It has been obscured, especially among the later writers, by lack of faculty for exact and consistent statement. Thus Bishop Stubbs endorses Waitz's dictum that "the gift of an estate by the king involved no *defined* obligation of service"; going on to say (p. 275), that a king's beneficium was received "with a *special undertaking* to be faithful"; and again adding the footnote: "Not a *promise* of *definite* service, but a *pledge* to *continue faithful in the conduct in consideration of which the reward is given.*" Again, the bishop admits that by this condition the giver had a hold on the land, "through which he was able to enforce fidelity" (p. 275, *note*); yet goes on to say (p. 277) that homage and fealty "depended on conscience only for their fulfilment." Bishop Stubbs further remarks (i. 278) that there was a "*great difference in social results* between French (= Frankish) and German feudalism," by reason of the prostrate state of the old Gallic population; going on however to add: "But the *result was the same*, feudal government, a graduated system of jurisdiction based on land tenure, in which every lord judged, taxed, and commanded the class next below him; in which abject slavery formed the lowest, and irresponsible tyranny the highest grade; in which private war, private coinage, private prisons, took the place of the imperial institutions of government." Of course the bishop has previously (p. 274, *note*) endorsed Waitz's view, that "*all* the people were bound to be faithful to the king"; but the passage above cited seems to be his final generalisation.

Whatever its social value, the feudal system is essentially a blend of Roman and barbarian points of polity; and in France, the place of its development, Gallic usage played a modifying part. It is dubiously described as growing up "from two great sources—the *beneficium* and the practice of commendation"—the first consisting (*a*) in gifts of land by the kings out of their own estates, and (*b*) in surrenders of land to churches or powerful men, on condition that the surrenderer holds it as tenant for rent or service; while commendation consisting in becoming a vassal without any surrender of

title. "The union of the beneficiary tie with that of commendation completed the idea of feudal obligation." The beneficium, again, "is partly of Roman, partly of German origin," and "the reduction of a large Roman population," nominally freemen under the Roman system, "to dependence," placed it on a common footing with the German semi-free cultivator, "and conduced to the wide extension of the institution. Commendation, on the other hand, may have had a Gallic or Celtic origin. . . ." In one or other of these developments, the German *comitatus* or chief's war-band, originally so different, "ultimately merged its existence." On the whole, then, the Teutons followed Gallo-Roman leads.

See Stubbs, i. 275, 276; cp. p. 4; and Bryce, *Holy Roman Empire*, 7th ed. pp. 123-24. Under Otto, observes Mr. Bryce (p. 125) "the institutions of primitive Germany were almost all gone." Elsewhere Bishop Stubbs decides (p. 10) that "the essence of feudal law is custom," and again (p. 71), that "no creative genius can be expected among the rude leaders of the tribes of North Germany. The new life started at the point at which the old had been broken off." Then in the matter of the feudal system, "the old" must have been mainly the Gallo-Roman, for feudalism arose in Frankish-Gaul, not in Germany. In an early passage (p. 3) Dr. Stubbs confuses matters by describing the government of France as "originally little more than a simple adaptation of the old German polity to the government of a conquered race," but proceeds to admit that "the Franks, gradually uniting in religion, blood, and language with the [Romanised] Gauls, retained and developed the idea of feudal subordination. . . ." The rest of the sentence again introduces error.

To pass a moral judgment on this system, either for or against, is to invert the problem. It was simply the most stable, or rather the most elastic arrangement possible in the species of society in which it arose; and we are now concerned with it merely as a conditioning influence in European civilisation. Hallam, severe towards all other men's generalisations, lightly pro-

nounces that "in the reciprocal services of lord and vassal, there was ample scope for every magnanimous and disinterested energy," and that "the heart of man, when placed in circumstances which have a tendency to excite them, will seldom be deficient in such sentiments." On the other hand he concedes that "the bulk of the people, it is true, were degraded by servitude," though he affirms that "this had no connection with the feudal tenures"; and he is forced to decide that "the peace and good order of society were not promoted by this system. Though private wars did not originate in the feudal customs, it is impossible to doubt that they were perpetuated by so convenient an institution, which indeed owed its universal establishment to no other cause."[1] The latter judgment sufficiently countervails the others; and the claim that feudalism was a school of moral discipline, which gradually substituted good faith for bad, will be endorsed by few students of the history of feudal times. A more plausible plea is that of Sismondi, that the feudal nobles of Italy, finding themselves resisted in the cities, which they had been wont to regard as their property, and finding the need of retainers for the defence of their castles, enfranchised and protected their peasants as they had never done before. There resulted, he believes, an extension of agriculture which greatly increased the population in the tenth and eleventh centuries.[2] This is partially provable; and it gives us the standpoint most favourable to feudalism; which on the other hand is seen in the main to have soon reached its constructive limits, and to have promoted division no less than union.[3]

[1] *Europe in the Middle Ages*, ch. ii. part ii. *end.*

[2] *Short History*, i. 15. It probably needed such an expansion, we may note, to make possible the Crusades.

[3] Sismondi finally decides that in the tenth century, feudalism had induced in the main rather a dissolution than an organisation of society (*Républiques*, i. 85-91). Cp. Guizot, *Hist. de la civ. en France*, as cited, iii. 103, 272-75, iv. 77-79; and *Essais*, v.

As regards Italy, the value of the imperial feudal system was that it freed the energies of the cities, where alone the higher civilisation could germinate; but on the other hand it developed in them a spirit of localism and separatism[1] that was ultimately fatal. In the ever-changing conflict of nobles, emperor, Pope, cities, and bishops, all parties alike developed the spirit of self-assertion, and wrought for their own special incorporation. At times prelates and cities combined against nobles, as under Conrad the Salic (1035-39), who was forced to revise the feudal law and freed the remaining serfs; later, members of each species sided with pope or emperor in the strifes of Hildebrand and Henry IV. and their successors, over the question of investitures, till the general interest compelled a peace. During these ages of inconclusive conflict the cities developed their militia; their *caroccio* or banner-bearing fighting-car; and their institution of public election of consuls. Here the very name tells of the power of the great Roman tradition, as against the supposed capacity of the Teutonic races for spontaneous free organisation and self-government—tells too of the survival of a majority of Roman-speaking people even in the upper and middle classes of the cities. We may readily grant, as against Savigny and his disciples, that the Roman institution of the *curia* had not been preserved in the cities of Lombardy. There was no reason why it should have been, even if the Lombard kings had been inclined to use it as a means of extorting taxation; for in the last ages of the empire it had become detestable to the upper citizens themselves.

Savigny's proposition seems to be sufficiently confuted in a page or two by Leo, *Geschichte von Italien*, 1829, i. 82, 83. Karl Hegel later wrote a whole treatise to the same effect, *Geschichte der Stadtverfassung von Italien*, Leipzig, 1847. As to the general revolt

[1] Cp. Sismondi, *Républiques*, i. 105-14.

against the *curia*, cp. Leo, i. 47, and Guizot, *Civilisation en France*, i. 52-63. As to the theory of a Roman basis for the early civic organisation of Saxon Britain, cp. Pearson, *History of England during the Early and Middle Ages*, 1867, i. 264; Scarth, *Roman Britain*, App. i.; Stubbs, *Constitutional History of England*, 4th ed. i. 99; and Karl Hegel, *Städte und Gilden der germanischen Völker im Mittelalter*, 1891, Einleit. pp. 10, 33, 34.

But other Roman institutions remained even in the Lombard cities in respect of the organisation of trades and commerce[1]; and apart from the Roman survivals at Ravenna,[2] the free cities of the coast, which had remained nominally attached to Byzantium, had *their* elective institutions, not specially democratic, but sufficiently "free" to incite the Lombard towns to similar procedure.[3] At all events it was in the train of these earlier developments, and perhaps in some degree on stimulus from papal Rome, that the new organic life of the Lombard and Tuscan cities began to develop itself in the tenth and eleventh centuries. Once begun, it was extraordinarily energetic on the industrial and constructive side, the independence and rivalry of so many communities securing for the time the maximum of effort. It was in these cities that architecture may be said to have had its first general revival in western Europe since the beginning of the decay of Rome. Walls, towers, ports, quays, canals, municipal palaces, prisons, churches, cathedrals—such were the first outward and visible signs of the new era

[1] "Die Abtheilung in Zünfte und die daran sich anknüpfende Markt-polizei mögen die einzigen Institute aus römischer Zeit sein, die sich auch unter den Longobarden erhielten" (Leo, i. 85; cp. p. 335).

[2] Leo decides (i. 335) that in Ravenna between 1031 and 1115 there appear "gar keine Stadtconsuln in Urkunden, aber wohl Leute, die sich *ex genere consulum* nennen."

[3] As the general governor elected by the Venetians to stay their dissensions (697) bore the title of doge or duke, which was that borne by the Greek governors of Italian provinces, the influence of imperial example must be admitted, especially as Venice continued to profess allegiance to the Greek empire. The cities of Naples, Gaëta, and Amalfi, again, while connected only nominally and commercially with Byzantium, gave the title of doge to their first magistrate likewise (Sismondi, *Short History*, pp. 25, 26).

in Italian civilisation.[1] On these foundations were to follow the literature and the art and science which began the civilisation of modern Europe, the whole presided over and in part ordered and inspired by the recovered use of the great system of ancient Roman law, which too began to be redelivered to Europe early in the twelfth century from Italian Bologna.

The public buildings of the eleventh century are to this day among the greatest in Italy. Cp. Sismondi with Testa, *History of the War of Frederick I. against the Commons of Lombardy*, Eng. tr. p. 101. Before the tenth century the houses were mostly of wood, and thatched with straw or shingles (Testa, p. 11). It seems highly probable that the great development of building in the eleventh century was due to the sense of a new lease of life which came upon Christendom when it was found that the world did not come to an end, as had been expected, with the year 1000. That expectation must have gone far to paralyse all activity towards the end of the tenth century.

[1] "The citizens (900-1200) allowed themselves no other use of their riches than that of defending or embellishing their country" (Sismondi, *Short History*, p. 23.)

CHAPTER II

THE INTELLECTUAL EVOLUTION

In the twelfth century, then, we find in the full flush of life a number of prosperous Italian republics or "communes," closely resembling in many respects the City-States of ancient Greece. The salient differences were (1) the Christian Church, with its wealth and its elaborate organisation; (2) the pretensions of the empire; and (3) the presence of feudal nobles, who, after their exodus and their life as castle-holders, had in nearly every case compromised with the cities, spending some months of every year in their town palaces by stipulation of the citizens themselves. All of these differentia counted for the worse to Italy, in comparison with Hellas, as aggravations of the uncured evil of internal strife. The source of their strength—separateness and the need to struggle—was at the same time the source of their bane, for at no time do we find the Italian republics contemplating durable peace even as an ideal, or regarding political union as aught save a temporary expedient of the state of war. On the familiar assumption of "race character" we should accordingly proceed to decide that the Italians by getting mixed with the Teutons had lost the "instinct of union" which built up Rome. The rational explanation is, of course, that

there was now neither a sufficient preponderance of strength in any one State to admit of its unifying Italy by conquest, nor such a concurrence of conditions as could enable any State to become thus preponderant; while on the other hand the Church, fighting for its own hand, was a perpetual fountain of discord.

All alike were at once industrial and military, with the exception of the peculiarly composite case of Rome; and for all alike a career of mere plunder was out of the question, though every city sought to enlarge its territory. Forcible unification could conceivably be wrought only by the emperor or the papacy; and in the nature of things these powers became enemies, carrying feud into the heart of every city in Italy, as well as setting each on one or the other side according as the majority swayed for the time. At times, as after the destruction of Milan by Frederick Barbarossa, hatred of the foreigner and despot could unite a number of cities in a powerful league; but though the emperor was worsted there was no excising the trouble of the separate interests of the bishops and the nobles, or that of the old jealousies and hatreds of many of the cities for each other. The Christian religion not only did not avail to make Italians less madly quarrelsome than pagan Greeks: it embittered and complicated every difference; and if the cities could have agreed to keep out the Germans the papacy would not let them.[1] As a civilising lore or social science the religion of professed love and fraternity, itself a theatre of divisions and discords,[2] counted literally for less than

[1] Some writers, even non-Catholics, have spoken of the papacy as a unifying factor in Italian life. Machiavelli, who was pretty well placed for knowing where the shoe pinched, repeatedly (*Istorie Fiorentine*, l. i.; *Discorsi sopra Tito Livio*, i. 12) speaks of it bitterly as being at all times the source of invasion and of disunion in Italy. This is substantially the view of Gregorovius (*Geschichte der Stadt Rom*, B. iv. cap. iii. § 3) as to the process in the city of Rome to begin with.

[2] As to the relations of successive popes in the Dark Ages—each cancelling the acts of his predecessor—see Sismondi, *Républiques*, i. 142; Gregorovius, as last cited, and *passim*.

nothing against the passions of ignorance, egoism, and patriotism, for ignorant all orders of the people still were—ignorant as the Greeks of Athens—in the main matters of political knowledge and self-knowledge. Yet such is the creative power of free intelligence even in a state of strife—given but the conditions of economic furtherance and variety of life and of culture-contact—that in this warring Italy of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries there grew up a civilisation almost as manifold as that of Hellas itself. The elements of variety, of culture, and of competition were present in nearly as potent a degree. In the north, in particular, the Lombard and other cities differed widely in their industries.[1] Florence, besides being one of the great centres of European banking, was eminently the city of various occupations, manufacturing and trading in woollens and silks and gold brocades, working in gold and jewelry, the metals, and leather. In 1266 the reformed constitution specified twelve *arti* or crafts, seven major and five minor, the latter list being later increased to fourteen.[2] Milan, besides silks and woollens, manufactured in particular weapons and armour. Genoa had factories of wool, cotton, silk, maroquin, leather, embroidery, and silver and gold thread.[3] Bologna was in a special degree a culture city, with its school of law, and as such would have its special minor industries. But indeed every one of the countless Italian republics, with its specialty of dialect and of outward aspect, must have had something of its own to contribute to the complex whole.

In the south the Norman kingdom set up in the eleventh century meant yet another norm of life, for there Frederick the Second established the University of

[1] Their industry grew up rapidly after the tenth century, the progress in the eleventh being already great (Sismondi, *Républiques*, i. 384, 385).

[2] Machiavelli, *Istorie Fiorentine*, l. ii.

[3] H. Scherer, *Allgemeine Geschichte des Welthandels*, 1852, i. 337, 338.

Naples; and Saracen contact told alike on thought and imagination. All through these regions there now reigned something like a common speech, the skeleton of old Latin newly suppled and newly clothed upon; and for all educated men the Latin itself was the instrument of thought and intercourse. For them, too, the Church and the twofold law constituted a common ground of culture and discipline. On this composite soil, under heats of passion and stresses of warring energies, there gradually grew the many-seeded flower of a new literature.

Gradual indeed was the process. Italy was still relatively backward at a time when Germany and France, and even England, under progressive conditions quickened with studious life[1]; and there was a great intellectual movement in France, in particular, in the twelfth century, when Italy had nothing of the kind to show, save as regarded the important part played by the law school of Bologna in educating jurists for the whole of western Europe. For other developments there still lacked the needed conditions, both political and social. The first economic furtherance given to mental life by the cities seems to have been the endowment of law schools and chronicle-writers; the schools of Ravenna and Bologna, and the first chronicles, dating from the eleventh century. Salerno had even earlier had a medical school, long famous, which first drew its lore from the Saracens, and may or may not have been municipally endowed. To the Church, as against her constant influence for discord and her early encouragement of illiteracy,[2] must be credited a share in these

[1] Hallam, *Introd. to Literature of Europe*, ed. 1872, i. 8, 16, 19, 71, 77, 78. But see p. 74 as to the stimulus from Italy in the eleventh century. Cp. Gregorovius, *Geschichte der Stadt Rom*, B. viii. Kap. vii. § 1 (Bd. iv. 604-605), as to the primitive state of mental life in Rome in the twelfth century, and the resort of young nobles to Paris for education.

[2] As to the attitude and influence of Gregory the Great see Hallam, *Literature*

beginnings. After the law school of Bologna (whence in 1222 was founded that of Padua, by a secession of teachers and students at strife with the citizens) had added medicine and philology to its chairs, the papacy gave it a faculty of theology; and in Rome itself the Church had established a school of law. The first great literary fruit of this intellectual ferment is the *Summa Theologiae* of St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-74), a performance in which the revived study of Aristotle, set up by the stimulus of Saracen culture, is brought by a capacious and powerful mind to the insuperable task of philosophising at once the Christian creed and the problems of Christendom. Close upon this, the Latin expression of accepted medieval thought, comes the great achievement of Dante, wherein a new genius for the supreme art of rhythmic speech has preserved for ever the profound vibration of all the fierce and passionate Italian life of the Middle Ages. In his own spirit he carries it all, save its vice and levity. Its pitiless cruelty, its intellectuality, its curious observation, its ingrained intolerance, its piercing flashes of tenderness, its capacity for intense and mystic devotion, its absolute dogmatism in every field of thought, the whole pell-mell of its vehement experience, throbs through every canto of his welded strain.

With Dante we are already in the fourteenth century, close upon Petrarch and Boccaccio; and already the course of political things is curving back to tyranny for lack of faculty in the cities, placed as they were, to learn the lesson of politics. Their inhabitants could neither combine as groups to secure well-being for all of their own members, nor cease to combine as groups against

of Europe, as cited, i. 4, 21, 22; and Gregorovius, B. iii. cap. iii. § 2 (ii. 88). As to the reforms of Gregory VII. in the tenth century, see also Gregorovius, B. vii. cap. vii. § 5 (iv. 288). See the latter writer again, B. vii. cap. vi. (iv. 242-46), and Guizot, *Civilisation en Europe*, leçon vi. ed. 1844, pp. 159-60, as to the effect of Hildebrand's policy in dividing the Church.

each other. Always their one principle of union remained negative—animal hatred of city to city, of faction to faction. It is important then to seek for a clear notion of the forces which fostered mental life and popular prosperity alongside of influences which wrought for demoralisation and dissolution. Taking progress to consist on one hand in increase and diffusion of knowledge and art, and on the other in better distribution of wealth, we find that slavery, to begin with, was substantially extinguished in the time of conflict between cities, barons, and emperor.

Already in the fifth century the process had begun in Gaul. Guizot treats the change from slave to free labour as a mystery. "Quand et comment il s'opéra au sein du monde romain, je ne le sais pas; et personne, je crois, ne l'a découvert; mais . . . au commencement du V^e^ siècle, ce pas était fait; il y avait, dans toutes les grandes villes de la Gaule, une classe assez nombreuse d'artisans libres; déjà même ils étaient constitués en corporations. . . . La plupart des corporations, dont on a continué d'attribuer l'origine au moyen âge, remontent, dans le midi de la Gaule surtout et en Italie, au monde romain" (*Civilisation en France*, i. 57). But a few pages before (p. 51) we are told that at the *end* of the *fourth* century free men commenced in crowds to seek the protection of powerful persons. On this we have the testimony of Salvian (*De gubernatione Dei*, lib. v.) The solution seems to be that the "freed" class in the rural districts were the serfs of the glebe who, as we have seen, were rapidly substituted for slaves in Italy in the last age of the empire; and that in the towns in the same way the crumbling upper class slackened its hold on its slaves. Both in town and country such detached poor folk would in time of trouble naturally seek the protection of powerful persons, thus preparing the way for feudalism. Whatever were the case in the earlier ages of barbarian irruption, it seems clear that during the Dark Ages the general tendency was to reduce "small men" in general to a servile status, whether they were of the conquering or the conquered stock. Cp. Guizot, *Essais*, as cited, pp. 161-72; *Civilisation*, iii. 172, 190-203 (leçons 7, 8). The different grades of *coloni* and *servi* tended to approximate to the same subjection in Europe as in the England of the twelfth century. But in France and Italy betterment seems to have set in about the eleventh century; and the famous ordinance of Louis the Fat in 1118 (given by Guizot, iii. 204) tells of a general move-

ment, largely traceable to the Crusades, which in this connection wrought good for the tillers of the soil in the process of squandering the wealth of their masters.

The process of causation is still somewhat obscure, and is further obscured by *a priori* views and prepossessions as to the part played by religion in the change. The fact that the Catholic church everywhere, though the last to free her own slaves, encouraged penitents to free theirs, is taken as a phenomenon of religion, though we have seen slavery of the worst description[1] flourishing within the present century in a devoutly Protestant community. The rational inference is that the motives in the medieval abandonment of slavery, as in its disuse towards the end of the Roman empire, and as in its later re-establishments in Christian States, were economic —that (1) nobles on the one hand and burghers on the other found it to their advantage to free their slaves for military purposes,[2] as by way of getting money; and (2) that the Church promoted the process, especially during the crusading period, because a free laity was to her more profitable than one of slaves—as apart from her own serfs. Freemen could be made to pay clerical dues: slaves could not, save on a very small scale. And the principle goes farther. In Adam Smith's not altogether coherent discussion of the general question,[3] the unprofitableness of slave labour in comparison with free is urged, probably rightly, as counting for much more than the bull of Alexander III. (twelfth century), while the interest of the sovereign as against the noble[4] is noted

[1] We know further from Salvian that the Christians of Gaul treated their slaves as badly as the pagans had ever done (*De gubernatione Dei*, l. iv.) As to the whole subject, see the valuable research of Larroque, *De l'esclavage chez les nations chrétiennes*, 2e éd., 1864.

[2] Cp. Sismondi, as before cited, and Testa, as cited, p. 92. Testa's book, like so many other modern Italian treatises, is written with the garrulity of the Middle Ages, but embodies a good deal of research. The pietistic passage on p. 93 is contradicted by that on p. 92.

[3] *Wealth of Nations*, bk. iii. ch. ii.

[4] Thus Louis VII. of France enfranchised many serfs of the crown in 1188.

as a further factor. As regards the "love of domination" to which Smith attributes the slowness of slave-owners to see the inferiority of slave labour, it is to be remembered that the Roman slave-owner was fixed in his bias by the perpetual influx of captives and cheap slaves from the East; that this resource was lacking to the medieval Italians, who had to take the costly course of breeding most of their slaves; and that in such circumstances the concurrent pressure of all the other causes mentioned could very well suffice to make emancipation general.

While the lowest stratum of the people was thus being raised, the state of war was for a time comparatively harmless by reason of the primitiveness of the fighting. The cities had periodical conflicts[1] which often came to nothing, and involved no heavy outlay; and even the struggle with Barbarossa was much less vitally costly to the cities than to Germany. Frederick's eight variously devastating campaigns, ending in frustration, were the beginning of the medieval demoralisation of Germany,[2] to which such a policy meant retrogression in industry and agriculture; while the Lombards, traders and cultivators first, and soldiers only secondarily, rapidly made good all their heavy losses. Again, up till the end of the thirteenth century, the growth of capital went on slowly,[3] and the division between rich and poor was not deep, the less so because thus far the middle and upper classes held by the sentiment of civic

Louis X., again, who made the famous declaration (1315) that slavery was contrary to nature, and that Franks ought to be free, really made his principle a measure of finance. See a good general view of the process of enfranchisement in Koch, *European History*, Eng. tr. 3rd ed. p. 47.

[1] As to these see Testa, p. 56. Compare the accounts of the later bloodless battles of the *condottieri*, which were thus not without Italian precedent.

[2] Cp. Heeren, *Essai sur l'influence des Croisades*, Villers' tr. 1808, p. 101.

[3] Wealth-accumulation first took the form of land-owning. At the beginning of the twelfth century, the Florentine territory was about six miles in diameter; at the end, it was about forty (Trollope, *History of the Commonwealth of Florence*, 1865, i. 85).

patriotism to the extent of being ready to spend freely for civic purposes, while they spent little on themselves as compared with the rich of a later period. So that, although the republics were from the first, in differing degrees, aristocratic rather than democratic—the *popolo* being the body of upper-class and middle-class citizens with the franchise, not the mass of the population—and though the workers had later to struggle for their political privileges very much as did the plebs of ancient Rome, the economic conditions were for a considerable period healthy enough. A rapid expansion of upper-class wealth seems to have begun in the thirteenth century, in connection apparently with the new usury and the new commerce connected with the crusades; and it is from this time that the economic conditions so markedly alter as to infect the political unity and independence of the republics without substituting any ideal of a wider union.

Much of the wealth of Florence must at all times have been drawn from the agriculture of the surrounding plains, which had a large population. Machiavelli (*Istorie Fiorentine*, l. ii.) states that when at the death of Frederick II. the city re-organised its military, there were formed twenty companies in the town and sixty-six in the country. Cp. Hallam, *Middle Ages*, iii. 365. Dante (*Paradiso*, xv. 97-129) pictures the Florentine upper class as living frugally in the reign of Conrad III. (d. 1152). Borghini and Giovanni Villani (who copies Malispini) decide that the same standards still prevailed till the middle of the thirteenth century. (Cited by Testa, *Wars of Frederick*, pp. 89-91; cp. Riccobaldi of Ferrara, there cited from Muratori; Trollope, *History of Florence*, i. 34; and Hallam, *Middle Ages*, 11th ed. iii. 342-44.) If these testimonies can be in any degree trusted, the growth of wealth and luxury may be inferred to have taken place in part through the money-lending system developed by the Florentines in the period of the later crusades, in part through the great commercial developments. The silk manufacture (carried north from Sicily in the reign of Frederick II., and introduced to Florence from Lucca about 1315), being much more profitable than any other by reason of the high prices, seems to have speedily ranked as more aristocratic than the wool-trade. The business of banking, again, must have been much

developed before the Bardi and the Peruzzi could lend 1,500,000 florins to Edward III. of England (G. Villani, xi. 88; Gibbins, *History of Commerce*, 1891, pp. 47, 48; Hallam, *Middle Ages*, iii. 340).

We can now generalise, then, the conditions of the rise of the arts and sciences in medieval Italy. First we have seen architecture flourish in the new free cities, as it did at the same time in Genoa, Pisa, and Venice. In the south, again, in the Two Sicilies, under the reign of Frederick II., prosperous industry and commerce, in contact and rivalry with those of the Saracens, supplied a similar basis, though without yielding such remarkable fruits. There, however, on the stimulus of Saracen literature, occur the decided beginnings of a new literature, in a speech at once vernacular and courtly, as being accepted by the emperor and the aristocracy. The same conditions, indeed, had existed before Frederick, under the later Norman kings; and it is in Sicily about 1190 that we must date the oldest known verses in an Italian dialect.[1] Some of them refer to Saladin: and the connection between Italian and Arab literature goes deeper than that detail, for there is reason to suppose that for Europe the very use of rhyme, arising as it thus did in the sphere of Saracen culture-contact, derives from Saracen models.[2] In any case, the Moorish poetry certainly influenced the beginnings of the Italian and Spanish. About the same time, however, there occurs the important literary influence of the troubadours, radiating from Provence, where again the special source of fertilisation was the culture of the Moors.[3] The Provençal speech, developed in a more stable life,[4] took

[1] Bartoli, *Storia della letteratura Italiana*, 1878, tom. ii. cap. vii.

[2] Sismondi, *Literature of the South of Europe*, Eng. tr. i. 61, 85, 86, 87, 89; Bouterwek, *History of Spanish and Portuguese Literature*, Eng. tr. 1823, i. 22, 23; Bartoli, i. 94.

[3] Sismondi, as last cited, i. 74, 76, 80, 242; Bartoli, tom. ii. cap. i. and p. 165.

[4] "The union of Provence, during two hundred and thirteen years, under a line of princes who . . . . never experienced any foreign invasion, but, by a fraternal

literary form before the Italian, and yielded a literature which was the most effective stimulus to that of Italy. And, broadly speaking, the troubadours stood socially for either the leisured upper class or a class which entertained and was supported by it.

Here, then, as regards imaginative and artistic literature, we find the beginnings made in the sphere of the beneficent prince or "tyrant." But, exactly as in Greece, it is only in the struggling and stimulating life of the free cities that there arises the great literature, the great art: and, furthermore, the pursuit of letters at the courts of the princes is itself a result of outside stimulus. It needed the ferment of Moorish culture—itself promoted by the special tolerance of the earlier Ommiades towards Jews and Christians—to produce the literary stir in Sicily and Provence. Again, while the Provençal life, like the Moorish, includes a remarkable development of free thought, the first great propagation of rational heresy in the south occurring in Provence, it is in the free Italian cities, where also many *cathari* and *paterini* were found for burning, that there arises the more general development of intelligence. That is to say, the intellectual climate, the mental atmosphere, in which great literature grows, is here as elsewhere found to be supplied by the "free" State, in which men's wills and ideas clash and compromise. In turbulent Florence of the thirteenth century was nourished the spirit of Dante. And it is with art as with literature. Modern painting begins in the thirteenth century in Florence with Cimabue, and at Siena with Duccio, who, trained like previous Italian painters of other towns in the Byzantine manner, transcended it and led the Renaissance.

government, augmented the population and riches of the State, and favoured commercial pursuits . . . . consolidated the laws, the language, and the manners of Provence" (Sismondi, as last cited, i. 75).

The great step once taken, the new speech once fixed, and the new art-ideal once adumbrated by masters, both literature and art could in differing sort flourish under the regimen of more or less propitious princes; but not so as to alter the truth just stated. What could best of all thrive was art. Architecture, indeed, save for one or two great undertakings, can hardly be said to have ever outgone the achievement of the republican period; and painting was first broadly developed by public patronage; but it lay in the nature of the case that painting could find ample economic furtherance under the princes and under the Church. For the rule of the princes was not, save in one or two places at a time, a tyranny of the kind that destroys all individuality; the invention of printing, and the general use of Latin, now maintained a constant interaction of thought throughout all Europe, checked only by the throttling hand of the Church; and the arts of form and colour, once well grown, are those which least closely depend on, though they also thrive by, a free all-round intellectual life. The efficient cause of the great florescence of Italian art from the thirteenth to the sixteenth century was economic—the unparalleled *demand* for art on the part alike of the cities, the Church, the princes, and the rich. From the tenth to the thirteenth century the outstanding economic phenomenon in Italy is the growth of wealth by industry and commerce. In the same period, Italian agriculture so flourished that by the fifteenth century Italy would on this ground alone have ranked as the richest of European countries.[1] From the thirteenth to the sixteenth century the outstanding economic fact is the addition to this still increasing wealth of the foreign revenues of the Church.[2]

[1] Sismondi, *Républiques*, xii. 38-41. The land was already cultivated on the *métayer* system, half the crop going to the tenant—a state of things advantageous all round.

[2] As to these, consult M'Crie, *History of the Reformation in Italy*, 1827, pp. 26, 27.

In the sixteenth century all three sources of wealth are almost simultaneously checked—that from agriculture through the miserable devastation wrought by the wars,[1] and by the Spanish and papal rule; and then it is that the great art period begins to draw to its close. While the revenue of the Church from the northern countries was sharply curtailed by the Reformation, which in rapid succession affected Germany, France, Switzerland, England, Scotland, and Scandinavia, the trade of Italy began to be affected through the development of the new sea route round the Cape of Good Hope by the Portuguese; and though that gradual change need not have brought depression speedily, the misrule of Leo X., raised to an unprecedented secular power, and the crowning blow of the Spanish Conquest, following upon the other and involving government by Spanish methods, were the beginning of the end of Italian greatness.

Professor Thorold Rogers repeatedly generalises (*Six Centuries of Work and Wages*, p. 157; *Holland*, p. 49; *Economic Interpretation of History*, p. 11) that the Turkish conquest of Egypt (1517) blocked the only remaining road to the East known to the Old World; and that thenceforth the trade of the Rhine and Danube was so impoverished as to ruin the German nobles, who speedily took to oppressing their tenants, and so brought about the Peasants' War, while "the Italian cities fell into rapid decay." Whatever be the truth as to Germany, the statement as to Italy is very doubtful. The Professor confessedly came to these conclusions from having observed a "sudden and enormous rise in the prices of all Eastern products" at the close of the first quarter of the sixteenth century, not from having ascertained first the decay of the Italian cities. Now, H. Scherer expressly notes (*Allgemeine Geschichte des Welthandels*, 1852, i. 336) that Selim I., after conquering Egypt, made terms with his old enemies the Venetians (who were then the main Eastern traders in Italy) and "bestowed on them all the privileges they had under the Mamelukes." Professor Rogers states that "the thriving manufactures of Alexandria were

[1] See Sismondi, *Républiques*, xii. 39, as to the utter ruin of the Pisan territory by Florence.

at once destroyed." Scherer states that Selim freed from imposts all the Indian wares brought into his States through Alexandria, while he burdened heavily all that came by way of Lisbon. Heyd sums up (*Histoire du commerce du Levant*, éd. fran. 1886, ii. 546) that "under the new régime as under the old, Egypt and Syria remained open to the Venetian merchants." It is hard to reconcile these data with the assertions of Professor Rogers; and his statement as to prices is further indecisive because the Portuguese trade by sea should have availed to counteract the effect of the closing of the Egyptian route, if that *were* closed. But the subject remains obscure: Professor Gibbins (*History of Commerce in Europe*, 1891, pp. 56, 57) follows Rogers without criticism. The difficulty is that, as Scherer complains (i. 272) we have very few records as to Italian trade. "They have illustrated nearly everything, but least of all their commerce and their commercial politics." The lack of information Scherer sets down to the internecine jealousy of the cities. But see the list of works of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries given by Heyd, i. p. xvii. ff., and his narrative, *passim*.

So superficially has history been written that it is difficult to gather the effect thus far of the change in the channels of trade; but there seems to be no obscurity as to the effect of papal and Spanish rule. What the arrest of trade began, and the rule of Leo X. promoted, the desperate wars of France and Spain for the possession of Italy completed, and the gross misgovernment of the Spanish crown from 1530 onwards perpetuated. Under sane rule peace might have brought recuperation; but Spanish rule was ruin prolonged. Destructive taxation, and still more destructive monopolies, paralysed commerce in the cities under Spanish sway; while the executive was so weak for good that brigandage abounded in the interior, and the coasts were raided periodically by the fleets of the Turks or the Algerine pirates. The decline of the art of painting in Italy (apart from Venice and Rome) being broadly coincident with this collapse, the induction is pretty clear that the economic demand had been the fundamental force in the artistic development. The Church and the despot remained, but the artistic growth ceased.

Always in need of money for his vast outlays, Leo administered his secular power solely with a view to his own immediate revenue, and set up trade monopolies in Florence and the papal estates wherever he could. As to the usual effects of the papal power on commerce, see Napier, *Florentine History*, 1845, ii. 413. "The Court of Rome, since it had ceased to respect the ancient municipal liberties, never extended its authority over a new province without ruining its population and resources" (Sismondi, *Short History*, p. 319). Roscoe (*Life of Leo X.*, ed. 1846, ii. 207) speaks of a revival of Florentine commerce under Leo's kinsman, the Cardinal, about 1520; but this is almost the only glance at the subject of trade and administration in Roscoe's work.

As to Spanish misrule, see Cantù, *Storia degli Italiani*, cap. 139, ed. pop. ix. 512; Sismondi, *Républiques*, xvi. 71-76, 158-59, 170, 217; Symonds, *Renaissance*, vol. vi. part i. (*Catholic Reaction*), pp. 52, 65; Procter, *History of Italy*, 1844, pp. 218, 219, following Muratori and Giannone; Spalding, *Italy*, ii. 264-72, citing many other sources. "The Spaniards, as a Milanese writer indignantly remarks, possessed Central Lombardy for 172 years. They found in its chief city 300,000 souls; they left in it scarcely a third of that number. They found in it seventy-five woollen manufactories; they left in it no more than five" (Spalding, ii. 272). Agriculture suffered equally. The decay of manufactures might be set down to outside causes, not so the rise in taxation. In Sicily, it is alleged, though the statement is hardly credible, the revenue which in 1558 was 1,770,000 ducats, was in 1620 5,000,000 (Leo, *Geschichte von Italien*, v. 506, 507).

We are in sight, then, of the solution of the dispute as to whether it was the republics or the "tyrants" that evoked the arts and literature in Italy. The true generalisation embraces both sides. It may be well, however, to meet in full the "protectionist" or "monarchist" view, as it has been very judiciously put by an accomplished specialist in Italian culture history, in criticism of the other theory :—

"The obliteration of the parties beneath despotism was needed, under actual conditions, for that development of arts and industry which raised Italy to a first place among civilised nations. We are not justified by the facts in assuming that had the free burghs continued independent, arts and literature would have risen to a greater height. Venice, in spite of an uninterrupted republican

career, produced no commanding men of letters, and owed much of her splendour in the art of painting to aliens from Cadore, Castelfranco, and Verona. Genoa remained silent and irresponsive to the artistic movement of Italy to the last days of the republic, when her independence was but a shadow. Pisa, though a burgh of Tuscany, displayed no literary talent, while her architecture dates from the first period of the Commune. Siena, whose republican existence lasted longer even than that of Florence, contributed nothing of importance to Italian literature. The art of Perugia was developed during the ascendency of despotic families. The painting of the Milanese school owes its origin to Lodovico Sforza, and survived the tragic catastrophes of his capital, which suffered more than any other from the brutalities of Spaniards and Frenchmen. Next to Florence, the most brilliant centres of literary activity during the bright days of the Renaissance were princely Ferrara and royal Naples. Lastly, we might insist upon the fact that the Italian language took its first flight in the court of imperial Palermo, while republican Rome remained dumb throughout the earlier stage of Italian literary evolution. Thus the facts of the case seem to show that culture and republican independence were not so closely united in Italy as some historians would seek to make us believe.

"On the other hand, it is impossible to prove that the despotisms of the fifteenth century were necessary to the perfecting of art and literature. All that can be safely advanced upon this subject is that the pacification of Italy was demanded as a preliminary condition, and that this pacification came to pass through the action of the princes, checked and equilibrated by the oligarchies of Venice and Florence. It might further be urged that the despots were in close sympathy with the masses of the people, shared their enthusiasms, and promoted their industry. . . . To be a prince and not to be the patron of scholarship, the pupil of the humanists, and the founder of libraries, was an impossibility. In like manner they employed their wealth upon the development of arts and industries. The great age of Florentine painting is indissolubly connected with the memories of Casa Medici. Rome owes her magnificence to the despotic popes. Even the pottery of Gubbio was the creation of the ducal house of Urbino."[1]

The criticism on this well-marshalled passage may best be put in a summary form, as thus :—

I. (*a*) The despot promoter of arts and letters is

[1] J. A. Symonds, *The Renaissance in Italy*, 2nd ed. i. 71-73.

here admittedly the pupil and product of a previous culture. That being so, he could avail for fresh culture in so far as he gave it economic furtherance. He might even give such furtherance on some sides in a fuller degree than ever did the republics. But he could *not* give (though after the invention of printing he could not wholly destroy) the mental atmosphere needed to produce great literature. None of the above-cited illustrations goes any way to prove that he could; and it is easy to prove that his influence was commonly belittling to those who depended on him.

(*b*) The point as to pacification is unduly pressed, or is perhaps accidentally misstated. The despots did not pacify Italy; they did to some extent set up local stability by checking faction feuds.

(*c*) The popes were in the earlier ages a main cause of the ill-development of republican Rome. Their splendid works were much later than many of those of the republics. St. Mark's at Venice, a result of Byzantine contact, was built in the eleventh century, as was the duomo of Pisa, whose baptistery and tower belong to the twelfth. The *Campo Santo* of Pisa, again, belongs to the thirteenth and fourteenth, and the Palazzo Vecchio of Florence to the end of the thirteenth. And the great architects and sculptors of the thirteenth century were mostly Pisans.[1]

II. The point as to the lack of the right intellectual atmosphere under the princes can be proved by a comparison of products. The literature that is intellectually great, in the days before printing equalised and distributed cultures, belongs from first to last to Florence. Dante and Machiavelli are its terms; both standing for the experience of affairs in a disturbed but self-governing community; and it was in Florence that Boccaccio formed his powers. What the popes and the princes

[1] Sismondi, *Républiques Italiennes*, iv. 174-77.

protected and developed was the literature of a scholarship; their donations constituting an endowment of research. If the revival of classic learning and the rapid growth of art after the middle of the fifteenth century be held, as by some historians, to be the essence of the Renaissance,[1] then the Renaissance is largely the work of the despots. But even the artists and scholars patronised by Cosmo de' Medici were formed before his time,[2] and there is no proportional increase in number or achievement afterwards. On the other hand, it was *mere* scholarship that the potentates fostered: Lorenzo Valla, welcomed for his *Elegantiae latinae linguae*, had barely escaped exile for his *De falsa donatione Constantini Magni*;[3] and it is impossible to show that they promoted thought save in such a case as the encouragement of the Platonic philosophy by Cosmo and Lorenzo. For the rest, the character of the humanists whom the potentates fostered is admittedly illaudable in nearly every case. Pomponius Lætus, who almost alone of his class bears scrutiny as a personality, expressly set his face against patronage, and sought to live as a free professor in the University of Rome.[4] And it is open to argument, finally, whether the princely patronage of the merely retrospective humanists did not check vital culture in Italy.[5]

III. (*a*) The case of Venice has to be explained in respect of its special conditions. Venice was from the first aloof from ordinary Italian life by reason of its situation and its long Byzantine connections. It was

[1] Cp. Zeller, *Histoire d'Italie*, 1853, p. 309.

[2] Roscoe (*Life of Leo X.*, ed. 1846, ii. 318) attributes to the rivalry of Lionardo and Michel Angelo at Florence (in 1500, while the Medici were in exile, and the city was self-governed) the kindling of the art life of the greatest period.

[3] Zeller, p. 310. The *De falsa donatione* was certainly an abusive document. See Hallam, *Literature of Europe*, part i. ch. iii. sect. i. § 7, *note*.

[4] Burckhardt, as cited, p. 279. Another estimable type was Fra Urbano. See Roscoe, *Leo X.*, ed. 1846, i. 351, 352.

[5] Cp. Burckhardt, pp. 203, 204, 291; Zeller, p. 330; and von Reumont, *Lorenzo de' Medici*, Eng. tr. ii. 18.

further an aristocratic republic of the old Roman type, its patrician class developing as a caste of commanders and administrators; and its foreign possessions, added to in every century, reinforced this tendency.[1] Contrasted with Florence, the Italian Athens, Venice has even been compared to Sparta by a modern Italian.[2] It has been more justly compared, however,[3] with Rhodes, which unlike Sparta was primarily a commercial and a maritime power; and where, as in Venice, the rich merchants patronised the arts rather than letters. From the first Venice drew its wealth from an energetically prosecuted trade, with no basis of landed property to set up a leisured class. In such a city the necessarily high standards of living,[4] as well as the prevailing habit and tradition, would keep men of the middle class away from literature;[5] and only men of the middle class like Dante, or leisured officials like Poggio and Boccaccio and Machiavelli, are found to do important literary work even in Florence. The same explanation holds good of art. Venice, however, at length gave the needed economic furtherance; and men of other communities could there find a market as did Greek sculptors in imperial Rome. Obviously a despot could not have evoked artists of Venetian birth any more than did the republic, save by driving men out of commerce. But it is in Venice, where wealth and the republican form lasted longest, that we find almost the last of the great artists, Titian, Tintoretto, Veronese. After these the Caracci, Guido, and many others gravitate to Rome, where

[1] See the estimate of Venetian ideals in Burckhardt, *Civilisation of the Renaissance in Italy*, part i. ch. vii.

[2] Prof. Giacomo Gay, *Dei Carattere degli Italiani nel medio evo e nell' età moderna*, Asti, 1876, p. 8.

[3] By Professor Mahaffy, *Greek Life and Thought*, p. 97.

[4] Compare these as described by Ranke (*Latin and Teutonic Nations*, Eng. tr. p. 248) with those of old Athens.

[5] Burckhardt (Eng. tr. ed. 1892, pp. 71, 72) gives some illustrative details. But cp. Geiger, *Renaissance und Humanismus in Italien und Deutschland*, Berlin, 1882, pp. 265-66, as to the *per contra*.

the reorganised Church regains some riches with power.

The fact that Venice *did* maintain great artists after the artistic arrest of Tuscany and Lombardy, is part of the proof that, as above contended (p. 212), it was papal and Spanish misrule rather than the change in the channels of trade that impoverished Italy in the sixteenth century. Venice could still prosper by her manufactures when her commerce was partly checked, because the volume of European trade went on increasing. As Hallam notes: "We are apt to fall into a vulgar error in supposing that Venice was crushed, or even materially affected [phrase slightly modified in footnote], as a commercial city, by the discoveries of the Portuguese. She was in fact *more opulent*, as her buildings themselves may prove, in the sixteenth century than in any preceding age. The French trade from Marseilles to the Levant, which began later to flourish, was what impoverished Venice rather than that of Portugal with the East Indies." As the treatise of Antonio Serra shows (1613), Venice was rich when Spanish Naples was poor (*Introduction to the Literature of Europe*, ed. 1872, iii. 165, 166).

(*b*) As regards Genoa, the explanation is similar. That republic resembled Venice in that it was from the beginning a city apart from the rest of Italy, devoted to foreign commerce and absorbed in the management of distant possessions or trade colonies. When we compare the intellectual history of two such States with that of Florence, which was not less but more republican in its government, it becomes clear that it was not republicanism that limited culture in the maritime cities. Rather we must recognise that their development is analogous with that of England in the eighteenth century, when the growth of commerce, foreign possessions, and naval power, seems to have turned the general energies, hitherto in large proportion intellectually employed, predominantly towards practical and administrative employment.[1] The case of Florence is the test for the whole problem. Its pre-eminence in art and

[1] Cp. *The Dynamics of Religion*, by "M. W. Wiseman" (J. M. R.), 1897, pp. 175, 176, 181.

letters alike is to be explained through (1) its being in constant touch with *all* the elements of Italian and other European culture; and (2) its having no direct maritime interests and no foreign possessions.[1]

IV. With the patronage of the princes of Ferrara, history associates the poetry of Ariosto and Tasso, though as a matter of fact the *Orlando Furioso* seems to have been written before Ariosto entered the ducal service. But even if that and the *Gerusalemme* be wholly credited to the principle of monarchism, it only needs to weigh the two works against those which were brought forth in the atmosphere of the free cities in order to see how little mere princely pay can avail for power and originality in literature where the princely rule thwarts the great instincts of personality. Ariosto and Tasso are charming melodists; and as such they have had an influence on European literature; but they have waned in distinction age by age, while earlier and later names have waxed. And all the while, what is delightful in them is clearly enough the outcome of the still manifold Italian culture in which they grew, though it may be that the influence of a court would do more to foster sheer melody than would the storm and stress of the life of a republic.

Sismondi (*Républiques Italiennes*, iv. pp. 416-18), admits the encouragement given to men of letters by despots like Can' Grande, and the frequent presence of poets at the courts. But he rightly insists that the faculty of imagination itself visibly dwindled when intellectual freedom was gone. It is interesting to note how Montaigne, writing within a century of the production of the *Orlando Furioso*, is struck by its want of sustained imaginative flight

[1] "Non partecipavi Firenze nelle faccende d' Europa così largamente, come Venezia e Genova, sì per essere continuamente straziata dalle fazioni e sì per non avere dominio di mare. Dal che nasceva, che niun cittadino potesse sorgere in lei di nome e di appichi esterni tanto possente che potesse stabilirvi da per se o la libertà o la tyrannide" (C. Botta, *Storia d' Italia*, 1837, i. 124). But Genoa also had countless faction fights, so that the *vera causa* of the greater inner development of Florence must be held to be her lack of external dominion and occupation.

in comparison with Virgil (*Essais*, B. ii. 10, éd. Firmin-Didot, vol. i. p. 432). Compare the estimate of Cantù, *Storia degli Italiani*, cap. 142, ed. pop. x., 180-86.

In fine, we can rightly say with Mr. Symonds himself that the history of the Renaissance is not the history of arts, or of sciences, or even of nations. It is the history of the attainment of self-conscious freedom by the human spirit manifested in the European races.[1] And *this* process, surely, was not accomplished at the courts of the despots. Nor can it well be disputed, finally, that the Spanish domination was the visible and final check to intellectual progress on the side of imaginative literature, at a time when there was every prospect of a great development of Italian drama. "It was the Inquisitors and Spaniards who cowed the Italian spirit."[2]

When all is said, however, there can be no gainsaying of the judgment that the strifes of the republic were the frustration of their culture; and it matters little whether or not we set down the inveteracy of the strifes to the final scantiness and ill-distribution of the culture. Neither republics nor princes seem ever to have aimed at its diffusion. The latter, in common with the richer ecclesiastics, did undoubtedly promote the recovery of the literature of antiquity; but where the republics had failed to see any need for systematic popular tuition[3] the princes naturally did not dream of it. It would be a fallacy, however, to suppose that, given the then state of knowledge and of political forces,

[1] Work cited, i. 3, 4. Cp. Burckhardt, *Civilisation of the Renaissance in Italy*, part iv. chap. iv. p. 309. Both writers adopt the language of Michelet.

[2] Burckhardt, p. 317. The Counter-Reformation, of course, must always be taken into account in estimates of the latter period of Italian history. The regeneration of the papacy after the Reformation is to be credited jointly to Spain and the Reformation itself.

[3] Study suffered in Florence particularly from the faction-troubles. The *Studio* or college, founded in 1348, was closed between 1378 and 1386; reopened then, shut in 1404, again opened in 1412, and so on. Cp. Napier, *Florentine History*, 1846, iv. 75, and von Reumont, *Lorenzo de' Medici*, Eng. tr. i. 428-30.

any system of public schooling could have saved Italian liberty. No class had the science that could solve the problem which pressed on all. The increase and culmination of social and political evil in medieval Italy was an outcome of more forces than could be checked by any expedient known to the thought of the time. It must never be forgotten that the very dividedness of the cities had been visibly a main cause of their growth in riches ;[1] and that anything like a federation which should secure to the satisfaction of each their conflicting commercial interests was an enormously difficult conception. The problem, in fact, was definitely beyond the grasp of the age. It only remains to realise this by a survey of the process of disintegration.

[1] Mr. Symonds notes (*Renaissance*, 2nd ed. i. 40), how Guicciardini argued this (*Op. Ined.* i. 28), as against Machiavelli's lament over the lack of Italian unity.

CHAPTER III

THE POLITICAL COLLAPSE

§ 1

GIVEN the monarchic and feudal environment, the chronic strife between the Italian cities can be seen to be sufficient in time to undo them ;[1] and some wonder naturally arises at their failure to frame some system of federal government that should restrain their feuds. It was their supreme necessity ; but though the idea was now and then broached[2] there is no sign that the average man ever came nearer planning for it than did the Ghibeline Dante, with his simple theory that Cæsar should ride the horse,[3] or than did the clear brain of Machiavelli, with its longing for a native ruler[4] like Cesare Borgia, capable of beating down the rival princes and the adventurers, and of holding his own against the papacy. The failure of Cesare, who of all Italians of his day came nearest combining the needed faculties for Italian unification, is the proof of the practical im-

[1] Burckhardt (as cited, p. 94), agrees with Ranke that if Italy had escaped subjugation by the Spaniards, she would have fallen into the hands of the Turks.

[2] Burckhardt, p. 82. Freeman, from whom one looks for details (*History of Federal Government in Greece and Italy*, ed. 1893, pp. 558, 615), gives none.

[3] *Purgatorio*, canto vi. 91-93.

[4] Machiavelli, however, had special schemes of constitutional compromise (see Burckhardt, p. 85, and Roscoe, *Life of Leo X.* ed. 1846, ii. 204, 205) ; and there were many framers of paper constitutions for Florence (Burckhardt, p. 83).

possibility of that solution. But a federation of States, it has been reasoned, was relatively feasible; why then was it never attempted? As usual, the question has been answered in the simple verbalist way, by the decision that the Italians did not strike out a political philosophy or science because they were not that way given. They lacked the "faculty" for whatever they did not happen to do; whereas the ancient Greeks, on the contrary, did theorise because that faculty was theirs, though not the faculty to work out the theories.

E.g. the reasoning of so intelligent a thinker as Heeren: "Among those countries in which [political speculation] might have been expected to give the earliest sign of life, Italy was undoubtedly the first: all the ordinary causes appear to have united here; a number of small states arose near each other; republican constitutions were established; political parties were everywhere at work and at variance; and with all this, the arts and sciences were in the full splendour of their revival. The appearance of Italy in the fifteenth century recalls most fully the picture of ancient Greece. And yet in Italy, political theories were as few as in Greece they had been many! a result both unexpected and difficult to explain. Still, however, I think that this phenomenon may be in great part accounted for, if we remember that there *never was* a philosophical system of character or influence which prospered *under the sky of Italy*. No nation of civilised Europe has given birth to so few theories as the Italian: none has had less genius for such pursuits. The history of the Roman philosophy, a mere echo of the Grecian, proves this of its earlier ages, nor was it otherwise in its later" (Essay "On the Rise and Progress of Political Theories," in *Historical Treatises*, Eng. tr. 1836, p. 118).

To say nothing of the looseness of the generalisation, which ignores alike Thomas Aquinas and Vico, Lionardo and Galileo, Machiavelli and Giordano Bruno, it may suffice to note once more that on this principle the Germans must be pronounced to have been devoid of theoretical faculty before Leibnitz. On that view it does not become any more intelligible how "they" acquired it.

Seeking a less vacuous species of explanation, we are soon led to recognise (1) that the case of medieval Italy was to the extent of at least two factors more complicated than that of ancient Greece; and that

these factors alone might suffice to explain their non-production of a "theory" which should avail for the need; (2) that the theories of the Greeks did not avail to solve their problem; and (3) that the Italians all the while had really two theories too many. At the very emergence of their republics they were already possessed or wrought upon by the embodied theories of the empire and the papacy, two elements never represented in the Greek problem, where empire was an alien and barbarian thing suddenly entering into the affairs of civilised Hellas, and where there was nothing in the nature of the papacy. These two forces in Italian life were all along represented by specific theories; and their clash was a large part of the trouble. Their pressure set up a chronic clash of parties; and the theorist of to-day may be challenged to frame a theory which could have worked well for Italy otherwise than by setting those forces aside—a thing quite impossible in the Middle Ages. If mere system-making on either side could have availed, Thomas Aquinas might have rendered the service.

Cp. Burckhardt, pp. 6, 7. It is true that the monk Arnold of Brescia, burned alive by the papacy in 1155, fought a long battle against the papal power; and that, as noted by M'Crie (*Reformation in Italy*, p. 1), "the supremacy claimed by the bishops of Rome was resisted in Italy after it had been submitted to by the most remote churches of the west;" but once papalised, Italy necessarily remained so in her own pecuniary interest. Cp. Rogers, *Economic Interpretation of History*, p. 79.

If we seek to localise the disease, we find that no one factor is specially responsible. The alien emperor, coming in from outside, and setting city against city, Pisa against Milan, and nobles against burghers, is clearly a force of strife. Again, whereas the cities might on the whole have combined successfully against the emperor, to the point of abolishing his rule, the

papacy, calling him in to suit its own purposes, and calling in yet other aliens at a pinch, is still more a force of discord. At times the emperors, in the worst days of Roman corruption, had to choose among the competitors nominated to the papacy by the intrigues of courtesans and nobles and the venal votes of the people, thus identifying the man they chose with their cause. Hildebrand, again, after securing that the popes should be elected by the cardinals, became the fiercest of autocrats. By his strife with Henry IV. he set up civil war through all Italy and Germany; and when in his despair he called in the Normans against Rome, they sold most of the people into slavery. Later, in the minority of Frederick II., Innocent III. so strengthened the Church that it was able by sheer slaughter to crush for a generation all Provençal heresy, and was able to prevail against Frederick in its long struggle with him; in so doing, however, deepening to the uttermost the passion of faction in all the cities, and so preparing the worst and bloodiest wars of the future.

Yet, on the other hand, if we make abstraction of pope and emperor, and consider only the nobles and the citizens, it is clear that they had among them the seeds of strife immeasurable. The nobles were by training and habit centres of violence.[1] Their mutual feuds, always tending to involve the citizens, were a perpetual peril to order; and their disregard of law kept them as ready to make war on citizens or cities as on each other. Again and again they were violently expelled from every Lombard city on the score of their gross and perpetual disorders; but they being the chief experts in military matters, they were always welcomed back again because the burghers had need of

[1] Trollope notes (*History of the Commonwealth of Florence*, i. 31) how Dante and Villani caught at the theory of an intermixture of alien blood as an explanation of the strifes which in Florence, as elsewhere, grew out of the primordial and universal passions of men in an expanding society.

them as leaders in the feuds of city with city, and of Guelphs with Ghibelines. So that yet again, if we put the nobles out of sight, the spirit of strife as between city and city was sufficient, as in ancient Greece, to make them all the prey of any invader with a free hand. They could not master the science of their problem, could not rise above the plane of primary tribal or local passion and jealousy; though within each city were faction hatreds as bitter as those between the cities as wholes. Already in the twelfth century we find Milan destroying Lodi and unwalling Como. Later, in the thirteenth century, Genoa ruins the naval power of Pisa[1] in a war of commercial hatred; in the fourteenth, Genoa and Venice again and again fight till both are exhausted, and Genoa accepts a lord to aid her in the struggle; in the fifteenth and sixteenth, Florence spares no cost or effort to keep Pisa in subjection. All along, inter-civic hates are in full flow through all the wars of Guelphs and Ghibelines; and the menace of neither French nor Spanish tyranny can finally unify the mutually repellent communities.

We may indeed make out a special case against the papacy, to the effect that but for that, Italian intelligence would have had a freer life; and that even if Italy, like Spain and France and England, underwent despotism in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, her intellectual activity would have sufficed to work her recovery at least as rapidly as the process took place elsewhere. It has been argued[2] that the liberating force elsewhere in the sixteenth century was the Reformation—a theory which leaves us asking what originated the Reformation in its turn. Taking that to be the spirit of (*a*) free thought, of developing reason, or (*b*) of economic revolt against the fiscal exactions of an alien power, or

[1] Which, however, was already being weakened by the silting up of the Pisan harbour.

[2] Heeren, as cited, pp. 69, 120, etc.

both, we are entitled to say broadly that the crushing of such revolt in Italy, as in Provence and in Spain, clearly came of the special development of the papal power thus near its centre—the explanation of "national character" being as nugatory in this as in any other sociological issue.

Heeren naturally rests on this solution. The "new religion," he says, "was suited to the north, but not to the south. The calm and investigating spirit of the German nations found in it the nourishment which it required and sought for. . . . The more vivid imagination and sensitive feelings of the people of the south . . . found little to please them in its tenets. . . . It was not, therefore, owing to the prohibitions of the government, but to the character of the nations themselves, that the Reformation found no support among them" (vol. cited, pp. 58, 59). The two explanations of climate and race can thus be employed alternatively at need. Ireland, though "northern," is to be got rid of as not being "German." For the rest, the Albigenses, the *paterini*, the reforming Franciscans, and the myriad victims of the Inquisition in Spain, are conveniently ignored. Heeren's phrase about the "almost total exclusion" of the southern countries from the "great ferment of ideas which in other countries of civilised Europe gave activity and life to the human intellect" can be described only as a piece of concentrated misinformation. And a similar judgment must be passed on the summing-up of Mr. Symonds that "Germany achieved the labour of the Reformation almost single-handed" (*Renaissance in Italy*, 2nd ed. i. 28). There is far more truth in the verdict of Guizot that "la principale lutte d'érudition et de doctrine contre l'Eglise catholique a été soutenue par la réforme française ; c'est en France et en Hollande, et toujours en français, qu'ont été écrits tants d'ouvrages philosophiques, historiques, polémiques, à l'appui de cette cause" (*Civilisation en France*, i. 18). Motley, though an uncritical Teutophile and Gallophobe, admits as to Holland that "the Reformation first entered the Provinces, not through the Augsburg but the Huguenot gate" (*Rise of the Dutch Republic*, ed. 1863, p. 162). As to the spirit of reformation in Italy and Spain, the student may consult the two careful and learned *Histories* of M'Crie, works which might have saved many vain generalisations by later writers, had they heeded them. The question of the supposed racial determination of the Reformation is discussed at some length in *The Saxon and the Celt*, pp. 92-97, 143-47, 203, 204. Compare *The Dynamics of Religion*, 1897, part i.; and *A Short History of Freethought*, chs. ix. x. xi.

The history of Italian religious life shows that the spirit of sheer reformation in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries was stronger there than even in France in the sixteenth, where again it was positively stronger than in Germany, though not stronger relatively to the resistance. And in Italy the resistance was personified in the papacy, which there had its seat and strength. When all is said, however, the facts remain that in England the Reformation meant sordid spoliation, retrogression in culture, and finally civil war; that in France it meant long years of furious strife; that in Germany, where it "prospered," it meant finally a whole generation of the most ruinous warfare the modern world had seen, throwing back German civilisation a full hundred years. Save for the original agony of conquest and the special sting of subjection to alien rule, Italy suffered in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries less evils than these.

The lesson of our retrospect then is, (1) generally, that as between medieval Italian development and that of other countries—say, our own—there has been difference, not of "race character" and "faculty," but of favouring and adverse conditions; and, (2) particularly, that certain social evils which went on worsening in Florence and are in some degree present in all societies to-day, call for scientific treatment lest they go on worsening with us. The modern problem is in many respects different from that of pre-Reformation Italy; but the forces concerned are kindred, and it may be worth while to note the broad facts of the past process with some particularity.

§ 2

The central fact of disunion in Italian life, complicated as we have seen it to be by extraneous factors,

analyses down to the eternal conflict of interests of the rich and the poor, the very rich and the less rich, or, as Italian humour figured it, the "fat" and the "lean." For Machiavelli, this is the salient trouble in the Florentine retrospect, since it survived the feuds of Guelph and Ghibeline; though he sets down to the papacy the foreign invasions and the disunion of the cities. The faction-feuds, of course, tell of the psychological conditions of the feud of rich and poor, and were to some extent an early form of the feud,[1] the imperialist Ghibelines being originally the more aristocratic faction, while the papalist Guelphs, by the admission of Machiavelli, were the more friendly to the popular liberties, that being the natural course for the papacy to take. The imperial cause, on the other hand, was badly compromised by the tyranny of the terrible Ezzelino, the emperor's representative in the Trevisan March, who ruled half-a-dozen cities in a fashion never exceeded for cruelty in the later ages of Italian tyranny. Whatever democratic feeling there was must needs be on the other side.

After Florence had recast its constitution at the death of Frederick II., establishing twelve *anziani* or magistrates, replaced every two months, and two foreign judges—one the upper-class *podestà* and the other the captain of the people[2]—to prevent grounds of quarrel, matters were in fair train, and the city approved its unity by the sinister steps of forcing Pistoia, Arèzzo, and Siena to join its confederation, capturing Volterra,

[1] Cp. Trollope, *History of Florence*, i. 105.

[2] The expedient of a foreign *podestà*, chosen from a city distant at least fifty miles from Florence, dates back to 1207. The idea was that only a foreigner would deal impartially between citizens. Cp. the comments of Trollope, i. 84, 94; and the mention by Plutarch, *De amore prolis*, § 1, as to the same development among the Greeks. The institution of the *priori delle arti*, mentioned below, is traced back as far as 1204 (Cantù, as cited, viii. 465, *note*). The *anziani*, during their term of office, slept at the public palace, and could not go out save together—somewhat like a modern English jury.

and destroying several villages, whose inhabitants were deported to Florence. But new plots on behalf of Manfred led to the expulsion of the Ghibelines, who in turn, getting the upper hand with no sense of permanence, reasoned that to make their party safe they must destroy the city; a purpose changed, as the familiar story goes, only by the protest of the Florentine Ghibeline chief, Farinata degli Uberti. They then tried, in obvious bad faith, the expedient of conciliating the people, whom they had always hitherto oppressed, by giving them a quasi-democratic constitution, in which the skilled workers were recognised as bodies, to which all citizens had to belong.[1] But this scheme being accompanied by fresh taxation, the Ghibelines were driven out by force; and once more the Guelphs, now backed by Charles of Anjou (1266), organised a government of 12 magistrates, adding a council of 24 upper-class citizens, called the *credenza*, and yet another body of 180 popular deputies, 30 for each of the six quarters of the city, making up with the others a Council General. To this, however, was strangely added yet another council of 120, charged with executive functions. The purpose was to identify the Guelph cause with that of the people, that is, the lower *bourgeoisie* and skilled artisans; and the property of the exiled Ghibelines was confiscated and divided among the public treasury, the heads of the ruling party, and the Guelphs in general. At this stage the effort of Gregory X., at his election, to effect a restoration of the Ghibelines and a general reconciliation, naturally failed. Yet when his successor, Nicolas III., persisted in the anti-French policy, he was able through his northern legate to persuade the city, suffering from the lawlessness of the Guelph as of old from that of the Ghibeline nobles, to recall the latter and set up a new constitution

[1] Thus Dante and Lorenzo de' Medici belonged to the craft of apothecaries.

of fourteen governors, seven of each party, all nominated by the Pope—a system which lasted ten years. Then came another French interregnum; whereafter, on the fall of the French rule in Sicily in 1282, there was set up yet another constitution of compromise. For the council of fourteen was set up one of three *priori delle arti*, heads of the crafts—a number immediately raised to six, so as to give one prior to each ward of the city, with a change in the title to *signoria*. These were to be elected every two months. The system, aristocratic in respect of its small governing body, yet by its elective method lent itself peculiarly to the new *bourgeois* tendencies; and thenceforward, says Machiavelli, we find the parties of Guelph and Ghibeline in Florence supplanted by the simpler enmity of rich and poor. Soon many of the nobles, albeit Guelph, were driven out of the city, or declared disqualified for priorship on the score of their past disorders; and outside they set up new feuds.

While Florence thus held out, other cities sought safety in one-man-power, choosing some noble as "captain of the people" and setting him above the magistrates. Thus Pagan della Torre, a Guelph, became war-lord of Milan, and his brothers succeeded him, till the office came to be looked on as hereditary, and other cities inclined to choose the same head. And so astutely egotistic was the action of all the forces concerned, that when the Guelph house of Della Torre thus became unmanageably powerful, the papacy did not scruple to appoint to the archbishopric of Milan an exiled Ghibeline, Visconti. "Henceforward," says Sismondi, "the rivalry between the families of Della Torre and Visconti made that between the people and the nobles almost forgotten." The Visconti finally defeated the other faction, made Milan Ghibeline, and became its virtual rulers.

On the other hand, the entrance of a French army under Charles of Anjou, called in by a French pope to conquer the Ghibeline realm of the Two Sicilies (1266), put a due share of wrong to the account of the Guelphs, the French power standing for something very like barbarism. Its first achievement was to exterminate the Saracen name and religion in Sicily. On its heels came a new irruption from Germany, in the person of Conradin, the claimant of the imperial succession, to whom joined themselves Pisa and Siena, in opposition to their big neighbour and enemy Florence, and the people of Rome itself, at quarrel with their Pope, who had left the city for Viterbo. By Conradin's defeat the French power became paramount; and then it was that the next pope, Gregory X., sought to restore the Ghibelines as counterpoise: a policy pursued by his successor, to the end, however, of substituting (1278) papal for imperial claims over Italy. Even Florence at his wish recalled her Ghibelines. But then came the forced election of another French pope, who acted wholly in the French interest, and re-exiled everywhere the Ghibelines: a process speedily followed in turn by the "Sicilian Vespers," involving the massacre and expulsion of the French, and introducing a Spanish king as representative of the imperial line. Again the papacy encouraged the other power, relieving Charles II., as King of Naples, from his treaty oath, and set him upon making a war with Sicily, which dragged for twenty-four years. Such were the main political features of the Italy of Dante. The papacy, becoming a prize of the leading Roman families, played a varying game as between the two monarchies of the south and their partisans in the north; and the minor cities, like the greater, underwent chronic revolutions. Still, so complete was the Italian monopoly of intellectual and inventive energy, so substantial was the general freedom

of the cities, and so soundly was the average regimen founded on energetic agriculture and commerce, that wealth abounded on all hands.

With the new French invasion (1302) under Charles of Valois, called in by Boniface VIII. to aid him against Sicily, a partially new stage begins. Charles was received at Florence as the typical Guelph; but, being counselled by the pope to pacify Tuscany to his own advantage, allied himself with the ultra-Guelphs, the *Neri*, gave up to plunder, the proceeds of which he pocketed, the houses of the other or pro-Ghibeline faction, the *Bianchi*, and enforced the execution or exile of its leading men, including Dante. Then came the election of a strictly French pope and his establishment at Avignon. A new lease being now given to faction, the cities rapidly lapsed into the over-lord system as the only means of preserving order; and when in 1316 a new emperor, Henry VII., presented himself for homage and claimed to place an imperial vicar in each city, most were well disposed to agree. When however Henry, like Charles, showed himself mainly bent on plunder, demanding 100,000 florins from Milan and 60,000 from Genoa, he destroyed his prestige. He had insisted on the recall of all exiles of either party; but all united against his demands, save the Pisans, who had sent him 60,000 florins in advance. His sudden death, on his way to fight the forces of Naples, left everything in a new suspense, save that Pisa, already shorn of maritime power, was soon eclipsed, after setting up a military tyranny as a last resort.

The *régime* of the local tyrant now rapidly developed. On the fall of the Pisan tyrant rose that of Lucca, Castruccio Castracani, the great type, after Ezzelino, of the Italian despot-adventurer of the Renaissance. Such a leader was too dangerous an antagonist to such a corporation as that of Florence—

once more (1323) reconstructed on an upper-class basis, with a scrutinised franchise, election by ballot, and a more complicated system of offices than ever.[1] To command them against Castruccio, they called in the Catalonian general Cardona, who took the course of so handling and placing his troops as to force those citizens in the army who could afford it to buy leave of absence, and who was finally defeated with his wilfully weakened army. Florence was driven to call in the King of Naples, at the price of conferring the *signoria* on his son. Meanwhile the new emperor Ludwig, called in by Castracani, plundered the Milanese and imprisoned their lords, the Visconti, who had been of his own party; extorted 150,000 florins from the Pisans; tortured, to extort treasure, a Ghibeline who had given up to him a fortress in the papal State; and generally showed the Italians, before he withdrew, that a German tyrant could beat even a native at once in treachery, cruelty, and avarice. Castruccio and the son of the King of Naples, who had proved a bad bargain, died about the same time as did the reigning Visconti at Milan, the reigning tyrant at Mantua, and Can' Grande of Verona, the successor of Ezzelino, who had conquered Padua. Again the encouraged middle-class of Florence recast their constitution (1328), annulling the old councils and electing two new: a Council of the "People," composed of 300 middle-class citizens, and a Council of the Commune, composed of 250 of both orders. Elsewhere the balance inclined to anarchy and despotism, as of old. A new emperor, John of Bohemia, offered (1330) a new chance of pacification, eagerly welcomed, to a harassed people, in large part shaken by military dangers in its devotion to republicanism, and weary of local tyrannies. But against the new imperial-

[1] See Trollope, ii. 179, as to the endless Florentine devices to check special power and to vary the balance of the constitution.

ism Florence stoutly held out, with the aid of Lombard Ghibelines; the new emperor, leaving Italy, sold his influence everywhere to local tyrants, and once more everything was in suspense.

At length, in 1336, there occurred the new phenomenon of a combination between Florence and Venice against a new tyrant of Padua and Lucca, who had betrayed Florence; but the Venetians in turn did the same thing, leaving the Florentines half a million of florins in debt; whereupon they were attacked by their old enemies the Pisans, who heavily defeated them and captured Lucca, for which Florence had been fighting. It was in this stage of demoralisation that the Florentines (1342) suddenly forced their *signoria* to give the war-lordship to the French Gaultier de Brienne, "Duke of Athens," formerly the right-hand man of the son of the King of Naples, who had now been sent to them as a new commander by that king, on the request of the Commission of Twenty charged with the war. The commission elected him to the sole command in order to save themselves[1] and pacify the people; and his natural associates, the old nobility, counselled him to seize the government, which he gradually did, beheading and exiling the discredited middle-class leaders, and so winning the support of the populace, who, on his putting himself for open election to the *signoria* for one year, acclaimed him to the function for life. To this pass had come the see-saw of middle class (*popolo*) and upper class, with a populace held in pupilage.

Sismondi, in his *Short History*, pp. 147, 148, seems to represent the episode as wholly one of wanton popular caprice and venality, even representing that Duke Gaultier was only by chance in the city. The narrative of Machiavelli explicitly sets forth how he came through the appeal of the Commission of Twenty; how the

[1] Two years before a feebler attempt had been made to set up a military tool, named Gabrielli.

nobility and some of the *bourgeoisie* conspired with him ; and how the populace were worked upon by the conspirators. The public acclamation, bad as it was, had been carefully subsidised. The middle class, whose war policy, however, had brought the city into such danger, were far more guilty than the mostly unenfranchised populace. Sismondi had latterly an undue faith in the principle of middle class rule. In his *Histoire des Républiques Italiennes* (v. 329-53) he sets forth the financial corruption of the middle-class rulers (p. 330), and recognises that they and the aristocrats were alike dangerous to liberty.

Within a year, partly on the sudden pressure of a scarcity, the tyrant was overthrown, after having wrung from Florence 400,000 florins and infuriated all classes against him and his race. Not the least of his offences was his conclusion of a peace with Pisa, by which she for a given period was to have rule over Lucca. The rising against him was universal. Three of his henchmen were literally torn to pieces with hands and teeth : a madness of fury which was only too profoundly in keeping with the self-abandonment that had placed the tyrant in power. The political organism was beginning to disintegrate. A new constitution was set up, with a leaning to aristocracy, which was soon upset by the middle class, who in turn established yet another. The nobles, believing the populace to be hostile to the *bourgeoisie*, attempted anew a revolution, and were utterly crushed. And now began, according to the greatest of the publicists of the Renaissance, the final enfeeblement of Florence, in that the ruin of the nobility, whose one merit had been their fighting power, led to the abandonment of all military exercise.[1] Yet Florence a generation later made vigorous war under a "committee," and in the meantime at least the city tasted domestic peace and grew in civilisation. And though we doubtless exaggerate when we conceive of a transition from what we are apt to figure as the fierce

[1] Machiavelli, *Istorie*, end of l. ii. and beginning of l. iii.

and laughterless Florence of Dante to the gay Florence of Boccaccio, it is hard to hold that life was worsened when men changed the ways which made them collectively capable of rending with their teeth the carcases of those they hated, and which left the Viscontis of Milan capable of torturing their political prisoners to death through forty days.

Still the process of disintegration and reintegration proceeded. The tyrants of the smaller cities usually established themselves by the aid of professional mercenaries, German and other, whom, when their funds failed, they turned loose to shift for themselves, having in the meantime disarmed the citizens. These companies, swelled by others disbanded after the English wars in France, ravaged and plundered Italy from Montferrat to Naples, and were everywhere bought off save by Florence. Only the Pope and the greater tyrants could keep them regularly in pay; and by their means the Viscontis became lords of sixteen cities of Lombardy, while the papacy began to build up a military power. Naples, on the other hand, continuously degenerated; while Genoa and Venice exhausted each other in deadly strife for the commercial monopoly of the East; and Pisa leaned to the Viscontis, who ultimately obtained its headship. Rome, popeless, and domineered over by warring nobles, had its brief vision of a republic under the dreamer Rienzi, who at last fell by the hand of the masses whom he had for a moment hypnotised (1354). A new emperor, Charles IV., charged Florence 100,000 florins (1355) for her immunities, leaving all men hopeless as ever of the empire as a political solution; and when the crimes of the Viscontis drove cities and papacy to call Charles in against them (1368), he did but use the opportunity to levy blackmail wherever he went. Later (1375) the papacy combined with Florence against the reigning

Visconti, but only to betray its ally; and now occurred what for a time must have seemed a vital revolution in Italian affairs: the infuriated Florentines suddenly allying themselves with Visconti, the enemy of the day before, against the treacherous pope, and framing a league with Siena, Lucca, and Pisa against the Church that Florence had so long sustained. Eighty towns in ten days drove out their legates; and furious reprisals broke out on all hands, till the very pope at Avignon was fain to come to stay the universal warfare. Now, however, an aristocratic and papalist party in Florence bitterly opposed "The Eight" who managed the war, the aristocracy having gravitated to the papal side; and at length exhaustion and the absolute instability of all alliances brought about a peace, in which most of the cities, freed from the papacy—now become an affair of two mutually anathematising heads—fell once more under local tyrants. In the hour of extreme need the papacy was if possible a worse influence than the emperor: nowhere was to be found a force of stability save in the tyrannies, which were merely unstable with a difference.

Florence, still republican and still obstinately prosperous, stood as a strange anomaly in the general transformation. But she had now reached the stage when the long-ignored populace—the multitude beneath the *popolo*—made up of handworkers with no nominal incorporation or franchise, was able to press its claims as against the other orders, which in turn were divided as of old by the jealousies between the major and minor middle-class guilds and between the new nobility of capital and their former equals. Refused the status of incorporation, the *ciompi* ("chums" or "mates," from the French *compère*) made *their* insurrection in turn, finding for the nonce, in a wool-carder, a leader of the best quality the time could show, who carried his point,

was chosen head magistrate, enforced order among his own partisans, and established a new magistracy with three representatives of the major arts, three of the minor (1378).

Among other things, the *ciompi* demanded that interest should no longer be paid on the public debt; that the principal be paid off in twelve years, and that no "small people" should be sued for debts under fifty florins for the next two years (see Trollope, ii. 216). The trouble was that the brains in the movement, good as they were, could not permanently control the spirit of riot. Sismondi, after arguing (*Short History*, p. 182) in the Whig manner that "those who have not learnt to think, those to whom manual labour leaves no time for meditation, ought not to undertake the guidance of their fellow-citizens," amusingly proceeds (p. 185) to point to the capacity of Lando as showing "how much a free government spreads sound sense and elevated sentiments among even the lowest classes of society." Immediately afterwards he has to record how the upper classes fell into fresh disorders.

But where the educated burgesses and nobles had failed in the science of self-government, the mass of untrained toilers could not succeed. Suborned doubtless by the other classes, they rebelled against the man whom they had made leader, and were by him promptly and capably suppressed, many being exiled; whereupon in due course he was himself deprived of his post by the old parties, and the new order was annulled (1382). After fresh strifes and proscriptions among the aristocracy themselves, all traces of the popular rising were effaced, and the aristocracy of wealth was definitely re-established.

What had happened was the attainment of the capitalistic stage and the enthronement of capital in the republican State. In place of strifes between wealth and nobility there had arisen the strife of capital and labour, the new aristocracy of wealth having in large part taken the place of that of descent. The latter transition had occurred nearly simultaneously in the other remaining republics. Genoa had substituted

factions with the names of new wealthy families for the old. In Siena, where the *bourgeoisie* dispossessed the nobles, they were in turn assailed by "reformers" of the lower class, who were finally defeated in battle and exiled wholesale (1385). Meantime the hereditary tyrants of Milan, the Visconti, with their singular continuity of capacity, had grown stronger than ever, had built up a native and scientific military system, and more than ever menaced all their neighbours. Florence called in aid successively from Germany and France (1390-91); but the Milanese army triumphed over all; and the skilled adventurer Sir John Hawkwood, the hired general of the Florentine troops, could not hold his ground. The emperor, as usual, was satisfied to take payment for non-intervention; and the reigning Visconti, Gian Galeazza, invested by the emperor with the titles of Duke of Mantua and Count of Pavia, and the lordship of twenty-six cities, had by the year 1402 further compassed, by all manner of fraud and force, the mastery of Pisa, Perugia, Genoa, Siena, Lucca, and Bologna, dying of the plague at the height of his power. His sons being boys, his power broke up among his generals, to be in large part recovered later, however, by his second son, who first assassinated the elder.

At this stage Venice once more intervenes, taking up the cause of Verona against the tyrant of Padua, whom, having defeated him by her carefully chosen and supervised mercenaries, she put to death (1406). He had been the ally of Florence; but Florence let him fall, being now wholly bent on reconquering Pisa, her natural seaport. Pisa in turn, always invincibly opposed to Florentine rule, was on commercial grounds backed by Genoa, now under the nominal rule of a representative of the King of France, who, however, sought to sell Pisa to the Florentines, and did receive from them 200,000 florins. Still resisting, the Pisans recalled an

exile to lead them; and he in turn sold them for 50,000 florins, this time to their complete undoing. Refusing all Florentine favours, the bulk of the ruling middle-class abandoned the city for ever, taking much of its special commerce with them. Meantime, the kingdom of Naples, under an energetic king, Ladislaus, had acquired most of the States of the distracted Church, menaced Florence, and was pressing her hard, despite French support, when Ladislaus died (1414). By this time the new Visconti was establishing himself at Milan by means of mercenaries, commanded for him by well-chosen captains. Six times were the Florentines defeated by his forces; till his capable general, Carmagnola, whom he had disgraced, revealed to the Council of Venice his master's intention to attack them; and Venice joined Florence to crush the tyrant. Carmagnola, acting slackly, met ill success, and was therefor executed by his Venetian masters. But the Visconti too finally died defeated, leaving his power to a new adventurer, Francesco Sforza, who had married his daughter, and had fought both for and against him in the endless imbroglio of Italian conspiracy.

Florentine republicanism was now near its euthanasia. The family of Medici, growing rapidly rich, began to use the power of capital as elsewhere less astute adventurers used the power of the sword. From the overthrow of the *ciompi* party in 1382 to 1434, the republic had been ruled by a faction of the new commercial aristocracy with substantial unity; and the period is claimed as the most prosperous, intellectually and materially, in Florentine history.[1] Cosmo de' Medici,

[1] Sismondi, in his larger and earlier work (*Républiques*, ed. 1826, xi. 2), represents that Florence *ceased* to be great under the Medici; cp. however, xii. 52, and the different note in the *Short History* (p. 224), where he deems that in this period were born and formed "all those great men" whose glory is credited to the Medici. This holds good of Brunelleschi, the architect, Masallio, the artist, and Ghiberti, the sculptor, as well as of Poggio and other scholars. Cp. Zeller, *Histoire d'Italie*, 1853, p. 309.

descendant of a democrat, was grown too rich to be one in his turn ; and between him and the Albizzi, who led the ruling faction, there grew up one of the old and typical jealousies of power-seekers. Exiled by a packed *balia*, Cosmo's wealth enabled him to turn the tables in a year and exile his exilers, taking their place and silently absorbing their power. "The moment was come when the credit of the Medici was to prevail over the legal power of the Florentine *signoria.*" Thus when the Visconti died, Cosmo and the doge of Venice combined their forces to prevent the recovery of the republican independence of Milan, whose middle class, divided by their own jealousies, speedily succumbed to the fraud and force of Sforza, the Visconti's heir.

For thirty years, Cosmo maintained at Florence, by the power of capital, prosperity and peace under the semblance of the old constitution, the richer of the ever-renewed capitalist class accepting his primacy, while the populace, being more equitably governed than of yore under the old nobility, and being steadily prosperous, saw no ground for revolt. Capital as "tyrant" had in fact done what the tyrants of early Greece and Rome are presumed to have often done—favoured the people as against the aristocracy ;[1] Cosmo's liberality giving employment and pay at the same time to the artisans and to the scholars. Under Cosmo and his political colleagues, doubtless, the subject cities were corruptly governed ; but Florence seems to have been discreetly handled. Attempts to break the capitalistic domination came to nothing, save the exile or at a pinch the death of the malcontents.

At Cosmo's death there was a dynastic strife of

[1] Under all of the Medici, it appears, "the fiscal legislation adhered to the principle of burdening the old nobility of the city" (Von Reumont, *Lorenzo de' Medici*, Eng. tr. i. 33). They however built up a fresh public debt, and their finance had crooked aspects (*id.* pp. 31-33). Lorenzo was even accused of appropriating the dowries of orphan girls.

capital, as elsewhere of blood; but the blundering financier Pitti went to the wall, and the invalid Piero de' Medici kept his father's power. At his death the group of his henchmen kept their hold on it; and in time his son Lorenzo ousted them and engrossed all, escaping the plot which was fatal to his brother. That and other plots, in Florence and elsewhere, sufficed to prove that the artisans, well employed and protected by the laws, had no concern to upset the orderly and business-like "tyranny" of one great capitalist or even of a prince, in the interest of an oligarchy which would rule no better, which gave them no more of political privilege than did he, and which was less ready than he with public gifts. Italian republicanism had always been a matter of either upper-class or middle-class rule; and when the old upper class of feudal descent was superseded by one of commercial descent, the populace had nothing to gain by supporting the bourgeoisie. A capitalistic "lord," most of whose wealth was in its nature unseizable, was thus a more stable power than any mere swordsman among swordsmen; and Lorenzo de' Medici not only crushed all the conspiracies against him, but held his own against the dangerous alliance of the republican pope Sixtus IV. and the King of Naples—the menace of Turkish invasion helping him.

After Lorenzo's death (1492) only the incompetence of his son Piero at the hazardous juncture of the new French invasion under Charles VIII. could upset the now hereditary power of the house; but such incompetence at such a crisis was sufficient, Savonarola having now set up a new democratic force, partly analogous to that of Puritanism in the England of a later age. The new party, however, brought no new political science. Republican Florence in its interim of self-government proceeded as of old to make war on indomitable Pisa, with which it could never consent to live on terms of

equality. Time after time, vanquished by force and treachery, the Pisans had again cast loose, fighting for independence as fiercely as did their fathers of a previous generation. Savonarola seems to have had no higher light for this problem than was given to the other Florentines of his age; and though his party had the wisdom to proclaim a general amnesty for Florence (1495), the war against Pisa went on, with the French king insensately admitted as a Florentine ally. Savonarola in his turn fell, on his pathetic failure to evoke the miraculous aid on the promise of which he had so desperately traded; his party of pietists went to pieces; and the upper-class party which succeeded carried on the war, destroying the Pisan harvests every year, till, under the one-man command of Loderini, Florence triumphed (1507), and the staunch sea-city fell once more. Even now the conquering city consented to pay great bribes to the kings of France and Aragon for leave to take her prey. And once more multitudes of Pisans emigrated, refusing to live in subjection, despite all attempts at conciliation.[1]

Slowly the monarchic powers closed in; France, after several campaigns, decisively defeated and captured Lodovico Sforza, lord of Milan, and proceeded by a secret treaty with Spain to partition the kingdom of Naples—a rascals' bargain, which ended in a quarrel and in the destruction of two French armies; Spain remaining master of Naples and the Sicilies, while France held the Milanese and Liguria, including Genoa. For a few years Cesare Borgia flared across the Italian sky, only to fall with his great purposes unfulfilled; and still the foreign powers encroached. France, with Swiss support,

[1] The constancy of Pisa in resisting the yoke of Florence, and the repeated self-expatriation of masses of the inhabitants, is hardly intelligible in view of the submission of so many other cities to worse tyrannies. It would seem that the sting lay in the idea that the rule of the rival city was more galling to pride than any one-man tyranny, foreign or other.

proceeded in turn to make war on Venice; and the emperor, the pope, Spain, and the smaller neighbouring despots, joined in the attack. Against these dastardly odds the invincible oligarchy of Venice held out, till Pope Julius, finding his barbarian friends worse than his Italian enemies, changed sides, joined the republic, and after many reverses got together an anti-French league of English, Swiss, and Spanish. Finally the emperor betrayed his French allies, who were once more driven out of Italy, leaving their ally, Florence, to fall into the hands of the Spaniards (1512).

Now came the restoration of the family of Medici, soon, followed by the elevation of Giovanni de' Medici to the papacy as Leo X.; whence came yet more wars, enough to ruin Italy financially had there been no other impoverishing cause. But Leo X., now the chief Italian power, misgoverned in secular affairs as badly as in ecclesiastical; and the wars, so barbarous in themselves, pressed upon dwindling resources. Venice, pressed afresh by Maximilian, made alliance with Louis, who was defeated by the Swiss, as defenders and "lords" of Milan; whereupon the Spanish, papal, and German forces successively ravaged the Venetian territories. Francis I. zealously renewed the war, grappled with the Swiss in the desperate battle of Marignano in such sort as to get them to come to terms, and compassed the sovereignty of Milan. On the succession of Charles V. to the throne of Spain and the empire (1519), war between him and Francis set in systematically, and continued under Adrian and Clement VII. as under Leo, both combatants feeding on and plundering Italy. The defeat of Francis at Pavia (1525) brought no cessation to the drain; a new league was formed between France, the papacy, Venice, and Sforza; and soon, besides the regular armies, a guerilla horde of Germans on the imperial side, receiving no pay, was living by the

plunder of Lombardy. At length, in 1527, came the sack of Rome by the imperial forces, Germans and Spanish combining for nine miserable months to outdo the brutalities and the horrors of all previous conquests, Christian or heathen. Two years more fighting "only added to the desolation of Italy, and destroyed alike in all the Italian provinces the last remains of prosperity."[1] When a fresh German army entered Lombardy in 1529 there was "nothing more to pillage."[2]

The curtain now falls rapidly on every form of "independence" in Italy. Pope Clement VII., freed of his barbarian conquerors, sent them against Florence, which fell in a fashion not unworthy of its great republican tradition, after tasting three final years of its ancient "freedom." With the dying Machiavelli to frame the ordinances of her revived military system, and Michel Angelo to construct her last fortifications, she had in her final effort bound up with her name as a republic two of the greatest Italian names of the age of the Renaissance. Then came the vengeance of the Medicean Pope, Clement VII., the ducal tyranny, and the end of a great period.

The prolonged life of the maritime and aristocratic republics of Genoa and Venice, interesting as a proof of the defensive powers of communities so placed and so ordered, was no prolongation of Italian civilisation, save in so far as a brilliant art survived at Venice till the close of the sixteenth century. It is sufficient to note that what of artistic and intellectual life Venice and Genoa had, was dependent first on Venetian contact with Byzantium, and later on the fecundity of freer Italy. The mere longer duration of Venice was due as much to her unique situation as to her system. On

[1] Sismondi, *Républiques*, xvi. 71-76, 158, 159, 170, 217; *Short History*, p. 336.

[2] As to the misery of Florence after the siege, see Napier, *Florentine History*, iv. 533, 534.

the other hand it seems substantially true that the Venetian oligarchy did rule its subjects, both at home and on the mainland, with greater wisdom and fairness than was shown by any other Italian power. There is thus an unwarrantable extravagance in the verdict of the young Macaulay that there "aristocracy had destroyed every seed of genius and virtue";[1] and in his outburst: "God forbid that there should ever again exist a powerful and civilised State which, after existing through thirteen hundred eventful years, shall not bequeath to mankind the memory of one great name or one generous action." Such actions are not rife in any history, and in mere civic selfishness of purpose the rulers of Venice were on a par with most others.[2] As citizens, or as a caste, they seem to have been not more but less self-seeking as against the rest of the community, despite their determined exclusiveness, than the same class in other States. Their history does but prove that an astute oligarchy, protectively governing a commercial and industrial State, is not helpful to civilisation in the ratio of its power and stability, and that the higher political wisdom is not the appanage of any class.

When all is said, the whole Italian civilisation of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance represents a clear political gain over that of ancient Hellas in that it had transcended slavery, while failing to attain or to aim at the equality and fraternity which alone realise liberty. But the later States and civilisations which, while so much more fortunate in their political conditions, are relatively as far as were the Italian republics from the moral liberation of their labouring masses—these are not entitled to plume themselves on their comparative success. "The petty done" is still dwarfed by "the undone vast."

[1] Review of Mitford, *Miscellaneous Writings*, ed. 1868, p. 74.

[2] Macaulay doubtless proceeded on the history of Daru, now known to be seriously erroneous. Compare that of W. C. Hazlitt, above cited, pref.

PART V

THE FORTUNES OF THE LESSER EUROPEAN STATES

CHAPTER I

THE IDEAS OF NATIONALITY AND NATIONAL GREATNESS

It lies on the face of the foregoing surveys that the very principle which gives mass-form to all politics, and which adds to the primary biological forces of strife one that tends at times to double their stress—to wit, the principle of nationality—stands in large part for an irrational instinct, if not for a positive hallucination. The nullity of the conception of "race genius" has been forced on us at every meeting with it. No less clear, however, on a critical analysis, is the irrationality of the instinct of racial pride or national solidarity which underlies that conception, and which is involved in perhaps half of the strifes of tribes, States, and nations. Yet perhaps most of the reflections made by historical writers in the way of generalisations of the history of States and peoples are in terms of the fallacy and the irrationality in question. And the instinctive persistence of both reveals itself when we come to reflect on the fortunes of what we usually call the little nations—employing a term which at once sets up a whole series of partial hallucinations.

The main practical distinction between nations being difference of language, there has spontaneously arisen

the habit of identifying language with "race," and regarding a dwindling tongue as implying a dwindling people. In the British Islands, for instance, the decline in the numbers of the people speaking Celtic dialects—the Erse, the Welsh, and the Gaelic—leads many persons, including some of the speakers of those tongues, to regard the "Celtic stock" as in course of diminution; and statesmen speak quasi-scientifically of "the Celtic fringe" as representing certain political tendencies in particular. Yet as soon as we substitute the comparatively real test of name-forms for the non-test of language, we find that the Welsh and Gaelic-speaking stocks have enormously extended within the English-speaking population, so that "Welsh blood" is very much commoner in Britain than "Saxon," relatively to the proportions between the areas and populations of Wales and England, while "Highland blood" is relatively predominant in "Saxon"-speaking Scotland; and "Irish blood" is almost similarly abundant even in England, to say nothing of its immense multiplication in the United States.

Enthusiasm for one's nation thus begins on scrutiny to resolve itself into enthusiasm for one's speech; and as our speech is a near variant of certain others held alien, as Dutch and Scandinavian and German, with a decisive control from French, enthusiasm for the speech-tie begins, on reflection, to assimilate to the enthusiasm of the district, the glen, the parish. Millions of us are at a given moment rapturous about the deeds of our non-ancestors, on the supposition that they were our ancestors, and in terms of a correlative aversion to the deeds of certain other ancients loosely supposed to have been the ancestors of certain of our contemporaries. Thus the ostensible entity which plays so large a part in the common run of thought about history, the nation considered as a continuous and personalised organism,

is essentially a metaphysical dream, and the emotion spent on it partakes much of the nature of superstition.

How hard it is for any one trained in such emotion to transcend it, is seen from the form taken by the sympathy which is bestowed by considerate members of a large community on members of a small one. "Gallant little Wales" is a phrase in English currency; and a contemporary poet, who has actually written pertinently and well in prose on the spurious conception of greatness attached to membership in a large population, has also written in verse a plea for "little peoples" in terms of the assumption of an entity conscious of relative smallness. Some of these more sympathetic pictures of the lesser States obscurely recall the anecdote of the little girl who, contemplating a picture of martyrs thrown to the lions, sorrowed for the "poor lion who hadn't any Christian." The late Sir John Seeley, on the other hand, wrote in the more normal Anglo-Saxon manner that "some countries, such as Holland and Sweden, might pardonably (*sic*) regard their history as in a manner wound up; . . . the only practical lesson of their history is a lesson of resignation."[1] The unit in a population of three millions is implicitly credited with the consciousness of a dwarf or a cripple facing a gigantic rival when he thinks of the existence of a community of thirty or sixty millions. Happily, the unit of the smaller community has no such consciousness;[2] and, inasmuch as his state is thus intellectually the more gracious, there appears to be some solid psychological basis for the paradox, lately broached by such a one, that "the future lies with the small nations." That is to say, it seems likely that a higher level of general rationality will be attained in the small

[1] *The Expansion of England*, 1883, p. 1.

[2] This though it be true, as remarked by Sismondi (*Histoire des Républiques Italiennes*, ed. 1826, i. 100, 101) that all nations spontaneously desire to be large and powerful, in disregard of all experience.

than in the large populations, in virtue of their escaping one of the most childish and most fostered hallucinations current in the latter.

Certain patriots of the wilful sort are wont to flout reason in these matters, blustering of "false cosmopolitanism" and "salutary prejudice." To all such rhetoric the fitting answer is the characterisation of it as false passion. Those who indulge in it elect wilfully to enfranchise from the mass of detected and convicted animal passions one which specially chimes with their sentiment, as if every other might not be allowed loose with as good reason. Matters are truly bad enough without such perverse endorsement of vulgar ideals by those who can see their vulgarity. Ordinary observation makes us aware that the most commonplace and contracted minds are most prone to the passion of national and racial pride; whereas the men of antiquity who first seem to have transcended it are thereby marked out once for all as a higher breed. It is in fact the proof of incapacity for any large or deep view of human life to be habitually and zealously "patriotic." Yet, in the civilisations which to-day pass for being most advanced, the majority of the units habitually batten on that quality of feeling, millions of adults for ever living the political life of the schoolboy; and, as no polity can long transcend the ideals of the great mass, national fortunes and institutions thus far tend to be determined by the habit of the lowest minds.

It is pure paralogism to point to the case of a large backward population without a national-flag idea—for instance, the Chinese—as showing that want of patriotic passion goes with backwardness in culture. There is an infinity of the raw material of patriotism among precisely the most primitive of the Chinese population, whose hatred of "foreign devils" is the very warp of "imperialism." The ideal of cosmopolitanism is at the

other end of the psychological scale from that of the ignorance which has gone through no political evolution whatever; its very appearance implies past patriotism as a stepping-stone; and its ethic is to that of patriotism what civil law is to club law. If "salutary prejudice" is to be the shibboleth of future civilisation, the due upshot will be the attainment of it one day by the now semi-civilised races, and the drowning out of European patriotisms by Mongolian.

If a saner lesson is to be widely learned, one way to it, if not the best way, may be an effort on the part of the units of the "great nations" to realise the significance of the fortunes of the "little nations," in terms not of the imagined consciousness of metaphysical entities, but of actual human conditions—material, passional, and intellectual. We have seen how erudite specialists can express themselves in terms of the fallacy of racial genius. Specialists perhaps as erudite, and certainly multitudes of educated people, seem capable of thinking as positively in terms of the hallucinations of racial entity, national consciousness, political greatness, national revenue, and imperial success. Thus we have publicists speaking of Holland as an "effete nation," of Belgium as "doomed to absorption," of the Scandinavian peoples as "having failed in the race," and of Switzerland as "impotent"; even as they call Spain "dying" and Turkey "decomposing."

Nearly every one of those nations, strictly speaking, has a fairer chance of continuance without decline of wealth and power than England, whose units in general show as little eye for the laws of decline as Romans did in the days of Augustus. Spain has boundless potentialities of rich agricultural life; Turkey needs only new habits to develop her natural resources; Belgium indeed is, like England, in part unstably founded on rapidly-exhaustible minerals; but Switzerland and Scan-

dinavia, with their restrained populations, may continue to maintain, as they do, a higher average of decent life and popular culture than the British Islands,[1] though they too have at all times a social problem to deal with. British greatness, on dissection, consists in the aggregation of much greater masses of wealth and much greater masses of misery, far larger groups of idlers and far larger hordes of degenerates, with much greater maritime power than the little nations; certainly not in a higher average of manhood and intelligence and well-being. Sir John Seeley, in a moment of misgiving, avowed that "bigness is not necessarily greatness," adding, "if by remaining in the second rank of magnitude we can hold the front rank morally and intellectually, let us sacrifice mere material magnitude."[2] But he had before used the term greatness without reserve as equivalent to "mere material magnitude"; and even now he needs must crave some sort of supremacy, some sense of the inferiority of the mass of mankind. Without any such constant reversion to the instinct of racial pride, let us say that "the things that are most excellent" have no dependence on mere material magnitude. Given a saner and juster distribution of wealth and culture-machinery, each one of the smaller States may be more civilised, more worth living in than the larger, even as Athens was better worth living in than Rome, and Goethe's Weimar than the Berlin of 1800. It was a poet of one of the larger nations—though it had to be a poet—who saw not hardship but happiness in the thought of "leaving great verse unto a little clan." And it was a Christian bishop, looking on the break-up

[1] Compare the remarks of Freeman, *History of Federal Government*, 2nd ed. p. 41.

[2] *Expansion of England*, p. 16. Compare the further vacillations in pp. 132-37, 301, 304, 306. In the concluding chapter (p. 294) comes the avowal that "we know no reason in the nature of things why a State should be any the better for being large."

of a great empire, who asked, *An congruat bonis latius velle regnare?*—Doth it beseem the good to seek to widen their rule?—and gave the judgment that if human things had gone in the happier way of righteousness, all States had remained small, happy in peaceful neighbourhood.[1]

As for the sentiment of a national greatness that is measured by acreage and census and quantity of war material, it is hard to distinguish ethically between it and that individual pride in lands and wealth which all men save those who cherish it are agreed to pronounce odious. Even the snobs of nationality have, as a rule, a saving sense which withholds them from flaunting their pride in the eyes of their "poorer" neighbours, the members of the less numerous communities. Yet the note which is thus tacitly admitted to be vulgarly jarring for alien ears is habitually struck for domestic satisfaction; few newspapers let many days pass without sounding it; and certain poets and writers of verse appear to find their chief joy in its vibrations. The men of the lesser States, then, stand a fair chance of becoming ethically and æsthetically, as well as intellectually, superior in the average to those of the larger aggregates, in that their moral codes are not vitiated nor their literary taste vulgarised by national purse-pride and the vertigo of the higher dunghill; though they too have their snares of "patriotism," with its false ideals and its vitiation of true fraternity.

To some degree, no doubt, the habit of mind of our megalophiles connects with the vague but common surmise that a small aggregate is more liable to unscrupulous aggression than a large one. If, however, there be any justice in that surmise, there is obviously implied a known disposition in the larger aggregates to commit such aggression; so that to act or rest upon it

[1] Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, iv. 15.

is simply to prefer being the wronger to being the wronged. Thus to glory in being rather on the side of the bully than on the side of the bullied, is only to give one more proof of the unworthiness of the instinct at work. All the while, there is no real ground for the hope; and as regards the small nations themselves, the apprehension does not appear to prevail. There has indeed been a recrudescence of the barbaric ethic of the Napoleonic period in the Bismarckian period; but there is no present sign of a fear of national suppression on the part of Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, Portugal, and the Scandinavian States; while, apart from Bismarck's early aggression upon Denmark, and the ill-fortune of Greece in attacking Turkey, it is not small but large aggregates—to wit, Austria, France, Russia, Turkey, Spain,—that have suffered any degree of military humiliation during the past half century; and it is precisely the large aggregates that avowedly live in the most constant apprehension either of being outnumbered in their armies and navies by single rivals or coalitions, or of losing their "prestige" by some failure to punish a supposed slight. It is a matter of historic fact that the "patriotic" consciousness in England has had its withers wrung during a long series of years by the remembrance of such military disasters as the fall of Gordon at Khartoum, and the defeat of an incompetent general at Majuba Hill. No "little nation" could exhibit a more wincing sense of humiliation and disgrace than is thus visibly felt by multitudes of a great aggregate over military repulses at the hands of extremely small and primitive groups. Politically speaking, then, the future of the small nations seems rather brighter than that of the large; and thus in the last analysis the pride of the unit of the latter is found to be still a folly.

CHAPTER II

THE SCANDINAVIAN PEOPLES

§ 1

WHEN the early history of Scandinavia is studied as a process of social evolution rather than as a chronicle of feuds and of the exploits of heroes of various grades,[1] it is found to constitute a miniature norm of a simple and instructive sort. Taken as it emerges from the stage of myth, about the time of Charlemagne, it presents a vivid phase of barbarism, acted on by powerful conditions of change. The three sections of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, stand in a certain natural gradation as regards their possibilities of

[1] As in Carlyle's *Early Kings of Norway*, the *caput mortuum* of his historical method. Much more instructive works on Scandinavian history are available to the English reader. The two volumes on *Scandinavia* by Crichton and Wheaton (1837), are not yet superseded, though savouring strongly of the conservatism of their period. Dunham, who rapidly produced, for Lardner's Cabinet Cyclopædia series, histories of *Spain and Portugal* (5 vols.); *Europe during the Middle Ages* (4 vols.); and the *Germanic Empire* (3 vols.), compiled also one of *Denmark, Sweden, and Norway* (3 vols. 1839-40), of inferior quality. But Geijer's *History of Sweden*, one of the standard modern national histories of Europe, is translated into English as far as the period of Gustavus Vasa (3 vols. of orig. in one of trans. 1845); and the competent *History of Denmark* by C.-F. Allen is available in a French translation (Copenhagen, 2 tom. 1878). Otté's *Scandinavian History*, 1874, is an unpretending and unliterary but well-informed work, which may be used to check Crichton and Wheaton. For the history of ancient Scandinavian literature, the introduction to Vigfusson and Powell's *Corpus Poeticum Boreale* (1883), and Professor Powell's article on Icelandic Literature in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, are preferable to Schweitzer's *Geschichte der Skandinavischen Literatur* (1886, 2 Bde.), which, however, is useful for the modern period.

political development. All alike were capable only of a secondary or tertiary civilisation, being at once geographically disrupted and incapable, on primitive methods, of feeding an abundant population. In their early piratical stage, the Scandinavians are not greatly different from the pre-Homeric Greeks as these were conceived by Thucydides; but whereas the Greeks came in contact with the relatively high civilisations which had preceded them, the Scandinavians of the Middle Ages had no contacts save with the primitive life of the pre-Christian Slavs, the premature and arrested cross-civilisations of Carlovingian France and Anglo-Saxon England, and, in a fuller and more fruitful degree, with the similarly arrested semi-Christian civilisation of Celtic Ireland, which latter counted for so much in their literature.

But in barbarian conditions, certain main laws of social evolution operate no less clearly than in later stages; and we see sections of the Norsemen passing from tribal anarchy to primitive monarchy, and thence to military "empire," afterwards relapsing to their stable economic basis, as every military empire sooner or later must. Of the Scandinavian sections, Denmark and the southern parts of Sweden (round the Maelar) are the least disrupted and most fertile; and these were respectively the most readily reducible to a single rule. In all, given to begin with the primordial superstition of royalism in any of its forms,[1] the establishment of a supreme and hereditary military rule was only a question of time; every successive attempt, however undone by the forces of barbaric independence, being a lead and stimulus to others. It is important to note how the process was promoted by, and in its turn promoted, the establishment of Christianity. The incomplex pheno-

[1] See Geijer's *History of the Swedes*, Eng. tr. of part i. 1 vol. ed. p. 30, as to the special persistence in Scandinavia of the early religious conception of kingship. Cp. Crichton and Wheaton's *Scandinavia*, 1837, i. 157.

mena in Scandinavia throw a new light on the more complex evolution of other parts of Christendom. Primitive polytheism is obviously unpropitious to monarchic rule; and in every ancient religion it can be seen to have undergone adaptations where such rule arose. In the widely varying systems of Homeric Greece, Babylonia, Egypt, and Rome, the same tendency is visibly at work in different degrees, the ascendant principle of earthly government being more or less directly duplicated in theological theory. Under the Roman Empire, all cults were in a measure bent to the imperial service, and it was only the primary exclusiveness of Christianity that put it in conflict with the State. Once the emperor accepted it, recognising its political use, and conceded its exclusive claims, it became a trebly effective political instrument,[1] centralising as it did the whole machinery of religion throughout the empire, and co-ordinating all to the political system. To use a modern illustration, it "syndicated" the multifold irregular activities of worship, and was thus the ideal system for a centralised and imperial State.[2] This was as readily seen by Theodoric and Charlemagne as by the rulers at Constantinople; and to such a perception, broadly speaking, is to be attributed the forcing of Christianity on the northern races by their kings. Northern paganism, more than the semi-cosmopolitan polytheism of the south in the period of Augustus, was a local and domestic faith, lending itself to separateness and independence as did the civic and family religions of early Greece and Rome. While there were communal assemblies with specially solemn sacrifices, the popular

[1] Such passages as *Rom.* xiii. 1-7 and *Titus* iii. 1 seem to have been penned or interpolated expressly to propitiate the Roman government.

[2] It is by entirely overlooking this historic fact that M. Fustel de Coulanges, in the last chapter of his *Cité Antique*, is able to propound a theory of historic Christianity as something extra-political. He here renounces the inductive method for a pure ecclesiastical apriorism, and the result is a very comprehensive sociological misconception.

beliefs were such that every district could have its holy places, and every family or group its special rites[1]; and in primitive Scandinavia, a priesthood could still less develop than even in primitive Germany, whose lack of any system corresponding to the Druidism of Gaul is still empirically ascribed to some anti-sacerdotal element in the "national character," whereas it is plainly a result of the nomadic life conditions of the scattered people. An organised priestly system can arise only on the basis of some measure of political levelling or centralisation, involving some peaceful inter-communication. But Romanised Christianity, coming ready-made from its centre, permitted of no worship save that of the consecrated church, and no ministry save that of the ordained priest.[2] Only the most obstinately conservative kings or chieftains, therefore, could fail to see their immediate advantage in adopting it.[3]

Naturally the early Christian records gloss the facts. Thus it is told in the life of Anskar (Ancharius) that "the Swedes" sent messengers to the emperor Ludovic the Pious (*circa* 825) telling that "many" of them "longed to embrace the Christian faith"—a story for which the only possible basis would be the longings and perhaps the propaganda of Christian captives of western European nationality. Still it is admitted that the king was avowedly willing to listen; and the tale of the first acceptance of Christianity in Sweden, even if true in detail, would plainly point to a carefully rehearsed plan under the king's supervision. The admission that afterwards there was a return to heathenism for nearly a century, consists entirely with the view that the first tentative was one of kingly policy. See Geijer, c. iii. pp. 34, 35. The account in Crichton and Wheaton's *Scandinavia*, 1837, i. 122, brings the king's initiative into prominence. (Cp. Otté, *Scandinavian History*, 1874, p. 34.) They also note that Charlemagne, in

[1] Geijer, pp. 31, 33; Crichton and Wheaton, i. 102, 104, 183, 184.

[2] Cp. Zschokke, *Des Schweizerlands Geschichte*, c. 7, as to the psychological effect of an organised worship in a great building on heathens without any such centre. And see the frank admission of J. R. Green, *Short History*, p. 54, that among the Anglo-Saxons "religion had told against political independence."

[3] Cp. C.-F. Allen, *History of Denmark*, French tr. Copenhagen, 1878, i. 55, 56.

treating with the Danes, "did not attempt to impose his religion" upon them; but do not glimpse the true explanation, which is that he could gain nothing by helping to organise a hostile kingdom. He had not developed the devotion or the subservience to the Church which in later ages led emperors to force the acceptance of Christianity on a defeated State that remained otherwise independent.

When in a later age Christianity was definitely established in Sweden under Olaf the Lap (or Tribute) King (*circa* 1000), whose father Erik is said to have been murdered in a tumult for his destruction of a pagan temple, the process was again strictly monarchic, the Diet resisting; but Olaf's substantial success was such as to permit of his annexing Gothland, temporarily conquering Norway, and styling himself king of all Sweden; and his son, Anund Jakob, continuing the profitable policy, earned the title of Most Christian Majesty (Crichton and Wheaton, i. 111; Geijer, p. 39). As regards Denmark, the historians incidentally make it clear that Harald Klak, usurping king of Jutland (*circa* 820), wanted to Christianise his turbulent subjects in order to subordinate them, having learned the wisdom of the policy in France; and it is no less clear that the same motive swayed Erik I., who, after having in his days of piratical adventure, as usurper of the Jute crown, destroyed the Christian settlement at Hamburg, entirely changed his attitude and favoured Christianity when, on the death of King Horda-Knut, he became king of all Denmark (Crichton and Wheaton, pp. 120-23).

So plain was the political tendency of the new creed that after the Christianisation of Denmark by Erik I. the nobility forced Erik II. to restore the pagan system; but the triumph of the Church, like that of monarchy, was only a question of time. Even kings who, being caught late in life, did not renounce their paganism, are found ready to favour the missionaries; and in Denmark such tolerance on the part of Gorm the Old (d. 941), successor of Erik II., is followed by the official Christianity of his son Harald. Danish "empire" duly succeeds, and in the next century we find Knut the Great utterly reversing[1] the pagan policy of his father, Svend (who had been enabled to dethrone *his* Christian

[1] Crichton and Wheaton, *Scandinavia*, i. 129-32.

father, Harald, by the pagan malcontents), and dying in the odour of sanctity, lord of six kingdoms—Denmark, Sweden, Norway, England, Scotland, and Wales.

The principle is established from another side in the case of Norway. There the first notable monarchic unification had been wrought by the pagan, Harold Fairhair (875), without the aid of Christianity; and the pagan resistance was so irreducible that revolters sailed off in all directions, finding footing in Scotland and Ireland, and in particular in Northern France and Iceland. In the next generation the monarchy relapsed to the old position; and Harold's Christian son Hakon (educated in England) had to cede to the determined demands of the pagan majority; a course followed by the further weakening of the power of the crown. The first king to restore it, Olaf Tryggvason, who had met with Christianity in his wanderings in Russia and England, established that creed by brute force when he attained the throne; and again the spirit of local independence, abnormally conserved in Norway by the special separateness set up by the geographical conditions, fiercely resisted the new system as it had done the rule of Harold Fairhair, many defeated pagans withdrawing to remote glens and fastnesses, where to this day their mythology thrives.[1] On Olaf's final defeat and death, his immediate successors were content to leave paganism alone, as representing a too dangerous spirit of independence; and when St. Olaf in turn again undertook to crush it, he found he had but beaten down and alienated the forces that would have enabled him to resist Knut. Danish "imperialism" had been evolved while the Norwegian kings were striving towards it; and St. Olaf was exiled, defeated, and slain (1030). His subsequent popularity is a mere posthumous church-made cult of the Christian period.

[1] Crichton and Wheaton, i. 151.

§ 2

The ultimate arrest of all aggression by the Scandinavian peoples is to be explained as a simple redressing of the balance between them and the States they had formerly plundered. To begin with, all the Scandinavian groups alike practised piracy[1] as against the more civilised States of northern Europe; and piracy showed them the way to conquest and colonisation. At home their means of subsistence were pasturage, fishing, the chase, and an agriculture which cannot have been easily extensible beyond the most fertile soils; hence a constant pressure of population, promoting piracy and aggressive emigration. How the pressure was purposively met is not clear; but as the Scandinavian father, like the Greek and Roman, was free either to expose or bring up a new-born child,[2] there is a presumption that at some periods exposure was not uncommon. There is even testimony, going back to the eighth century and recurring frequently as late as the twelfth, to the effect that a certain number of men were periodically sent away by lot[3] when

[1] Though this was often of the most brutal description, there were some comparatively "mild-mannered" pirates, who rarely "cut a throat or scuttled ship." See C.-F. Allen, *Histoire de Danemark*, i. 21.

[2] Geijer, *History of Sweden*, Eng. tr. p. 31.

[3] See, for instance, the *Roman de Rou* (1160), ed. Andresen, 1877-79, i. 18, 19, vv. 208-25 of prologue. Pluquet, in a note on the passage in his edition (1827, i. 10) remarks that the usage is often mentioned, not only by Norman but by English and French annalists of the Middle Ages, but that the oldest mention of all, in the *Tractatus* of Abbot Odo (d. 942), must be rejected, the document being apocryphal. That, however, is not the oldest mention by a long way. Paulus Diaconus (740-99) gives the statement in a very circumstantial form (cited by Rydberg, *Teutonic Mythology*, Eng. tr. p. 68) in his history of the Longobardians, his own stock, who he says came from Scandinavia. He testifies that he had actually talked with persons who had been in Scandinavia—his descriptions pointing to Scania. M. Pluquet notes (so also Crichton and Wheaton, i. 166-67) that no northern saga mentions the usage in question. But it was likely to be commemorated only by the stocks forced in that fashion to emigrate. The saga-making Icelanders were not among these. The old statement, finally, is in some measure corroborated by the statement of Geijer, p. 84, as to the long subsistence of the Swedish practice of sending forth sons to seek their fortune by sea.

the mouths had visibly multiplied beyond the meat. But without any such practice there were adventurers enough.[1] Hence colonisations and conquests in Scotland, the Hebrides, Ireland, Iceland, Russia, England, and remote plundering expeditions by land and river, some getting as far south as Italy; one conquering expedition passing from Gaul through Arab Spain (827) and along the Mediterranean coasts, north and south; another passing through Russia to Constantinople. Thus the Norwegian and Danish stocks must have rooted in nearly every part of the British Islands; and the settlement in France of a colony of revolters from Norway, in the reign of Harold Fairhair, built up one of the great provinces of France. Only in Iceland did the colonists preserve their language; hence, in terms of the hallucination of race, the assumption that they "failed," when in reality they helped to constitute new races; no more "failing" than did the British stock in its North American colonies. The amalgamated stock in Normandy, grown French-speaking, in turn overran England and part of Italy and Sicily, and, in the crusades, formed new kingdoms in the East; while in the case of England, turning English-speaking, they again modified the stock of the nation. As against the notion that in this case there was "failure" either for France or for Normans, we might almost adopt the *mot* of M. Clémenceau and call England "a French colony gone wrong."[2] In terms of realities there has been no racial decease; it is but names and language that have changed with the generations.

But there was an arrest of military exodus from Scandinavia; and thenceforward the Norse-speaking stocks figure as more or less small and retiring communities. They gave up piracy and conquest only

[1] Cp. C.-F. Allen, *Histoire de Danemark*, French tr. 1878, i. 20.
[2] "Qu'est-ce que c'est que l'Angleterre? Une colonie française mal tournée."

because they had to, Danish imperialism causing the arrest on a wide scale, as every monarchic unification had done on a small.[1] When Knut reigned over six kingdoms, piracy was necessarily checked as among these; and when Knut's empire broke up after his death through the repulsive powers of its component parts and the relative lack of resources in Denmark, the various States of north-western Europe, in the terms of the case, were more able than before to resist Norse attacks in general. In England, William the Conqueror was fain to keep them off by bribery and intrigue; but the States with the greater natural resources grew in strength while those of Scandinavia could not. When the pirates began to get the worst of it, and when the Scandinavian kings had cause to dread reprisals from those of the west, piracy began to dwindle. The last regular practitioners were the pagan Wends, and the republican pagans of the city of Jomsborg, who plundered the Scandinavians as they had of yore plundered others; and after the Christianised Danish people had for a time defended themselves by voluntary associations, both sets of pirates were overthrown by an energetic Danish king. The suppression was under Christian auspices; but it is a conventional fallacy to attribute it to the influence of Christianity. It was simply an act of necessary progressive polity, like the suppression of the Cilician pirates by Pompeius.

Messrs. Crichton and Wheaton make the regulation statement that when Christianity was introduced into Scandinavia, "it corrected the abuses of an ill-regulated freedom; it banished vindictive quarrels and bloody dissensions; it put a restraint upon robberies and piracies; it humanised the public laws and softened the ferocity of public manners; it emancipated the peasantry from a miserable servitude, restored to them their natural rights, and created a relish for the blessings of peace and the comforts of life"

[1] Thus Rolf the Ganger fared forth to France because Harold Fairhair would not suffer piracy on any territory acquired by him.

(*Scandinavia*, i. 196). For the general and decisive disproof of these assertions it is necessary only to follow Messrs. Crichton and Wheaton's own narrative, pp. 201, 213, 216, 219, 230, 240, 244, 247, 275, 278, 280, 308, 312, 322, etc., and note their contrary generalisation at pp. 324, 325. It was his "Most Christian Majesty" Anund Jakob who got the nickname of Coal-burner for his law that the houses and effects of malefactors should be burned to the value of the harm they had done. The Swedes, polygamous before Christianity, continued to be so for generations as Christians (Crichton and Wheaton, i. 197, 198, citing Adam of Bremen). Civil wars and ferocious feuds greatly multiplied in the early Christian period, apart altogether from pagan insurrections. Geijer, while erroneously attributing to Christianity the lessening of war between Scandinavia and the rest of the world, admits that the passions of strife, "hitherto turned in an external direction, now spent themselves in a domestic field of action, generating civil discord and war. Christianity, besides, dissolved the effective bond of the old social institutions" (p. 40). In that case it clearly cannot have been religious feeling that checked external war. As to piracy, that was later practised by Elizabethan Protestants and by the Huguenots of La Rochelle, when the opportunities were tempting. As to popular misery, it is told in the life of Anskar that the poor in ancient Sweden were so few that the first Christians could find a use for their alms only in foreign countries (Geijer, p. 33). That difficulty has not prevailed since. Messrs. Crichton and Wheaton later admit that the Danish peasantry, free as pagans, "gradually sunk under the increasing power and influence of the feudal chiefs and the Romish hierarchy" (p. 227), and that the crusades did not forward the emancipation of the serfs in Denmark as elsewhere, the peasantry on the contrary sinking into "a state of hopeless bondage" (pp. 251, 252).

§ 3

From the period of arrest of aggression, the economic and political history of the Scandinavian States is that of slightly expansible communities with comparatively small resources; and their high status to-day is the illustration of what civilisation may come to under such conditions. In the feudal period they made small material or intellectual progress. It is not probable that the Norse population was ever greater than last

century, though Malthus had a surmise that it might anciently have been so:[1] the old belief that Scandinavia was the great *officina gentium*, the nursery of the races which overran the Roman Empire, is a delusion; but it is certain that the increase since the twelfth century has been even slower than the European average. In the absence of emigration, this meant for past centuries constant restraint of marriage through lack of houses and livelihoods — the preventive check in its most stringent form. Emigration there must have been; but the check must also have been strong. Thus, while the lot of the common people, in so far as it remained free, was likely to be comparatively comfortable, the landowning classes, in the absence of industry and commerce, tended to become nearly all-powerful; and the Church, which inherits and does not squander, would engross most of the power if not specially checked. The conditions were thus as unfavourable to intellectual as to material progress.

Denmark was the first of the Scandinavian States to develop a considerable commerce, beginning as did Holland on the footing of the fishery;[2] and on that basis there was a certain renewal of Danish empire; but this again could not hold out against the neighbouring forces; and in the thirteenth century, the herring fishery in the Baltic failing, it had to yield its hold on the mainland cities of Hamburg and Lübeck, which began a new career of commercial power as the nucleus of the great trading federation of the Hansa cities, while Denmark itself was riven by the struggles of six claimants of the throne. The result was a

[1] *Essay on the Principle of Population*, 7th ed. p. 139.

[2] Crichton and Wheaton, i. 254. Dr. Ph. Schweitzer (*Geschichte der Skandinavischen Literatur*, § 19), makes the surprising statement that the quantity of old coins found in Scandinavia (over 100,000 within the century) proves that the ancient Scandinavian commerce was very great (*ein ganz grossartiger*). His own account of the occasional barter of the Vikings shows that there was nothing "grossartig" about it, and the coins prove nothing beyond piracy.

"feudal and sacerdotal oligarchy,"[1] leading to an era of "the complete triumph of the Romish clergy over the temporal power in Denmark," in which the peasantry were reduced to absolute predial slavery.[2] Similar evolution took place in Norway,[3] though with much less depression of the peasantry,[4] by reason of the small scope there for capitalistic agriculture; and there too the now nascent commerce was appropriated by the Hansa.[5] In Sweden, where industry remained so primitive that down till the sixteenth century there was hardly any attempt to work up the native iron,[6] Germans greatly predominated in the cities and controlled trade,[7] even before the accession of Albert of Mecklenburg (1363), who further depressed the native nobility in the German interest.[8] On the other hand, the clergy were less plenipotent than in the sister kingdoms, the people having retained more of their old power.

Cp. Schweitzer, *Geschichte der Skandinavischen Literatur*, i. 129. The Swedish peasantry, like the Norwegian, were less easy to enslave than the Danish by reason of the natural conditions; those of the remote mountain and mining districts in particular retaining their independence (Crichton and Wheaton, i. 375, 376; Geijer, pp. 50, 81, 89, 97, 103), so that they ultimately enabled Gustavus Vasa to throw off the Danish yoke. Yet they had at first refused to recognise him, being satisfied with their own liberties; and afterwards they gave him much serious trouble (Otté, *Scandinavian History*, 1874, pp. 228, 235; Geijer, pp. 109, 112, 115, 116, 118, 120-24). Slavery, too, was definitely abolished in Sweden as early as 1335 (Geijer, pp. 57, 86; Crichton and Wheaton, i. 316, 333). As regards the regal power, the once dominant theory that the Swedish kings in the thirteenth century obtained a grant of all the mines, and of the province of the four great lakes (Crichton and Wheaton, i. 332) appears to be an entire delusion (Geijer, pp. 51,

[1] Crichton and Wheaton, i. 263, 287.
[2] *Id.* pp. 251, 252, 277, 377.
[3] *Id.* pp. 304, 305, 311.
[4] *Id.* ii. 350. Cp. Laing, *Journal of a Residence in Norway* (1834-36), ed. 1851, p. 135.
[5] Crichton and Wheaton, i. 305, 310.
[6] *Id.* p. 332; Geijer, p. 135.
[7] Geijer, pp. 88, 91; Crichton and Wheaton, i. 331.
[8] Crichton and Wheaton, i. 324.

52). Such claims were first enforced by Gustavus Vasa (*id.* p. 129). As regards the clergy, they appear from the first, *qua* churchmen, to have been kept in check by the nobles, who kept the great church offices largely in the hands of their own order (Geijer, p. 109), though Magnus Ladulas strove to strengthen the Church in his own interest (*id.* pp. 52-53). Thus the nobles became specially powerful (*id.* pp. 50, 56, 108); and when in the fifteenth century Sweden was subject to Denmark, they specially resented the sacerdotal tyranny (Crichton and Wheaton, i. 356).

In Sweden, as in the rest of Scandinavia, however, physical strife and mental stagnation were the ruling conditions. Down till the sixteenth century her history is pronounced "a wretched detail of civil wars, insurrections, and revolutions, arising principally from the jealousies subsisting between the kings and the people, the one striving to augment their power, the other to maintain their independence."[1] The same may be said of the sister kingdoms, all alike being torn and drained by innumerable strifes of faction and wars with each other. The occasional forcible and dynastic unions of crowns came to nothing; and the Union of Calmar (1397), an attempt to confederate the three kingdoms under one crown, repeatedly collapsed. The marvel is that in such an age even the attempt was made. The remarkable woman who planned and first effected it, Queen Margaret of Norway, appealed in the first instance with heavy bribes for the co-operation of the clergy,[2] who, especially in Sweden, where they preferred the Danish rule to the domination of the nobles,[3] were always in favour of it for ecclesiastical reasons.

Had such a union permanently succeeded, it would have eliminated a serious source of positive political evil; but to carry forward Scandinavian civilisation under the drawbacks of the medieval difficulty of inter-communica-

[1] Crichton and Wheaton, i. 331. [2] *Id.* p. 336.
[3] Geijer, pp. 100, 109; Otté, *Scandinavian History*, 1874, p. 252.

tion (involving lack of necessary culture-contacts), the natural poverty of the soil, and the restrictive pressure of the Catholic Church, would have been a task beyond the power of a monarchy comprising three mutually jealous sections. As it was, the old strifes recurred almost as frequently before, and moral union was never developed. If historical evidence is to count for anything, the experience of the Scandinavian stocks should suffice to discredit once for all the persistent pretence that the "Teutonic races" have a faculty for union denied to the Celtic, inasmuch as they, apparently the most purely Teutonic of all, were even more irreconcilable, less fusible, than the Anglo-Saxons before the Norman Conquest and the Germans down till our own day, and much more mutually jealous than the quasi-Teutonic provinces of the Netherlands, which, after the severance of Belgium, have latterly lost their repulsions, while those of Scandinavia are not yet dead. The explanation, of course, is not racial in any case; but it is for those who affirm that capacity for union is a Teutonic gift to find a racial excuse.

With the Reformation, though that was nowhere more clearly than in Scandinavia a revolution of plunder, there began a new progress, in respect not of any friendliness of the Lutheran system to thought and culture, but of the sheer break-up of the intellectual ice of the old regimen. In Denmark, the process is curiously instructive. Christian II., personally a capable and reformative but cruel tyrant, aimed throughout his life at reducing the power alike of the clergy and the nobles, and to that end sought on the one hand to abolish serfdom and educate the poor and the burghers,[1]

[1] Otté, *Scandinavian History*, 1874, pp. 214-18. Himself an excellent Latinist, he sought to raise the learned professions, and compelled the burghers to give their children schooling under penalty of heavy fines. He further caused new and better books to be prepared for the public schools, and stopped witch-burning. Cp. Allen, *Histoire de Danemark*, i. 281.

and on the other to introduce Lutheranism (1520). From the latter attempt he was induced to desist, doubtless surmising that the remedy might for him be a new disease; but on his enforcing the reform of slavery he was rebelled against and forced to fly by the nobility, who thereupon oppressed the people more than ever.[1] His uncle and successor, Frederick of Schleswig-Holstein, accepted the mandate of the nobles to the extent of causing to be publicly burned in his presence all the laws of the last reign in favour of the peasants, closing the poor schools throughout the kingdom, burning the new books,[2] and pledging himself to expel Lutheranism. He seems, however, to have been secretly a Protestant, and to have evaded his pledge; and the rapid spread of the new heresy, especially in the cities, brought about a new birth of popular literature in the vernacular, despite the suppression of the schools.[3] In a few years' time, Frederick, recognising the obvious interest of the crown, and finding the greater nobles in alliance with the clergy, made common cause with the smaller nobility, and so was able (1527) to force on the prelates, who could hope for no better terms from the exiled king, the toleration of Protestantism, the permission of marriage to the clergy, and a surrender of a moiety of the tithes.[4] A few years later (1530) the monasteries were either stormed by the populace or abandoned by the monks, their houses and lands being divided among the municipalities, the king and his courtiers, and the secular clergy.[5] After a stormy interregnum, in which the Catholic party made a strenuous reaction, the next king, Christian III., taking

[1] Crichton and Wheaton, i. 377-79, 383; Allen, as cited, i. 286, 310.

[2] Otté, p. 222; Allen, i. 287, 290.

[3] Crichton and Wheaton, i. 384-86; Allen, pp. 287-90.

[4] Allen, i. 299, 300.

[5] Crichton and Wheaton, pp. 386, 387. These writers suppress the details as to Frederick's anti-popular action; and Otté's history, giving these, omits all mention of his act of toleration. Allen's is the best account, i. 293, 299, 301, 305.

the nobles and commons deputies into partnership, made with their help an end of the Catholic system; the remaining lands, castles, and manors of the prelates going to the crown, and the tithes being parcelled among the landowners, the king, and the clergy. Naturally a large part of the lands, as before, was divided among the nobles,[1] who were in this way converted to Protestantism. Thus whereas heathen kings had originally embraced Christianity to enable them to consolidate their power, Christian kings embraced Protestantism to enable them to recover wealth and power from the Catholic Church. Creed all along followed interest.[2]

Norway, being under the same crown, followed the course of Denmark. In Sweden, the powerful Gustavus Vasa saw himself forced at the outset of his reign to take power and wealth from the Church if he would have any of his own; and after the dramatic scene in the Diet of Westeras (1527) in which he broke out with a passionate vow to renounce the crown if he were not better supported,[3] he carried his point. The nobles, being "squared"[4] by permission to resume such of their ancestral lands as had been given to churches and convents since 1454, and by promise of further grants, forced the bishops to consent to surrender to the king their castles and strongholds, and to let him fix their revenues, all which was duly done. The monasteries were soon despoiled of nearly all their lands, many of which were seized by or granted in fief to the

[1] Crichton and Wheaton, pp. 394-96; Otté, pp. 222-24. According to some accounts, the great bulk of the spoils went to the nobility. Villers, *Essay on the Reformation*, Eng. tr. 1836, p. 105.

[2] It is notable that even in the thirteenth century there was a Norwegian king (Erik) called the Priest-hater, because of his efforts to make the clergy pay taxes.

[3] Geijer, p. 177; Otté, 234.

[4] As the king wrote later to an acquisitive noble: "To strip churches, convents, and prebends of estates, manors, and chattels, thereto are all full willing and ready; and after such a fashion is every man a Christian and evangelical," *i.e.* Lutheran. Geijer, p. 126. Cp. p. 129 as to the practice of spoliation.

barons ;[1] and the king became head of the Church in as full a degree as Henry VIII. in England ;[2] sagaciously and in part unscrupulously creating for the first time in Scandinavia a strong yet not wholly despotic monarchy, with such revenues from many sources[3] as made possible the military power and activity of Gustavus Adolphus, and later the effort of Charles XII. to create an "empire"—an effort which, necessarily failing, reduced Sweden permanently to her true economic basis.

Apart from those remarkable episodes, the development of the Scandinavian States since the sixteenth century has been, on their relatively small scale, that of the normal monarchic community with a variously vigorous democratic element ; shaken frequently by civil strife ; wasting much strength in insensate wars ; losing much through bad kings and gaining somewhat from the good ; passing painfully from bigotry to tolerance ; getting rid of their old aristocracies and developing new; exhibiting in the mass the northern vice of alcoholism, yet maintaining racial vigour ; disproportionately taxing their producers as compared with their non-producers ; aiming nevertheless at industry and commerce, and suffering from the divisive social influences they entail ; meddling in international strifes till latterly the surrounding powers preponderated too heavily ; disunited and normally jealous of each other, even when dynastically united, through stress of crude patriotic prejudice and lack of political science ; frequently retrograding, yet in the end steadily progressing in such science as well as in general culture and well-being. Losses of territory—as Finland and Schleswig-Holstein —at the hands of stronger rivals ; and the violent experiences and transitions of the Napoleonic period, have

[1] Geijer, pp. 119, 129.

[2] *Id.* p. 125 ; Otté, p. 236. The prelates were no longer admitted to any political offices, though the bishops and pastors sat together in the Diet.

[3] See Geijer, pp. 129-36.

left them on a relatively stable and safe basis, albeit still mutually jealous and unable to pass beyond the normal monarchic stage. To-day their culture is that of all the higher civilisations, as are their social problems.

§ 4

In the history of Scandinavian culture, however, lie some special illustrations of sociological law. The remarkable fact that the first great development of old Norse literature occurred in the poor and remote colonial settlement of Iceland, is significant of much. To the retrospective yearning of an exiled people, the desire to preserve every memory of the old life in the fatherland, is to be attributed the grounding of the saga-cult in Iceland; and the natural conditions, enforcing long spells of winter leisure, greatly furthered the movement. But the finest growth of the new literature, it turns out, is due to culture-contacts—an unexpected confirmation, in a most unlikely quarter, of a general principle arrived at on other data. The vigilant study of our own day has detected, standing out from the early Icelandic literature, "a group of poems which possess the very qualities of high imagination, deep pathos, fresh love of nature, passionate dramatic power, and noble simplicity of language, which Icelandic poetry lacks. The solution is that these poems do not belong to Iceland at all. They are the poetry of the 'Western Islands'"[1]—that is, the poetry of the meeting and mixing of the "Celtic" and Scandinavian stocks in Ireland and the Hebrides,—the former already much mixed, and proportionally rich in intellectual variations. It was in this area that "a magnificent school of poetry arose, to which we owe works

[1] Prof. York Powell, article on Icelandic Literature, in *Encyclopædia Britannica*, xii. 621.

that for power and beauty can be paralleled in no Teutonic language till centuries after their date. . . . This school, which is totally distinct from the Icelandic, ran its own course apart and perished before the thirteenth century." [1]

Compare Messrs. Vigfusson and Powell's *Corpus Poeticum Boreale*, 1883, vol. i. Introd. pp. lxii. lxiii., and, as regards the old Irish civilisation, the author's *Saxon and Celt*, pp. 127, 128, 131-33.

The theory of Celtic influence, though established in its essentials, is not perfectly consistent as set forth in the *Britannica* article. Thus, while the Celticised literature is remarked for "noble simplicity of language," the true Icelandic, primarily like the Old English, is said to develop "a complexity of structure and ornament, an elaborate mythological and enigmatical phraseology, and a regularity of rhyme, assonance, luxuriance, quantity, and syllabification which it caught up from the Latin and *Celtic* poets." Further, while the Celticised school is described as "totally distinct from the Icelandic," Celtic influence is also specified as affecting Norse literature in general. The first generations of Icelandic poets were men of good birth, "nearly always, too, of Celtic blood on one side at least"; and they went to Norway or Denmark, where they lived as kings' or chiefs' henchmen. The immigration of Norse settlers from Ireland, too, affected the Iceland stock very early. "It is to the west that the best sagas belong: it is to the west that nearly every classic writer whose name we know belongs; and it is precisely in the west that the admixture of Irish blood is greatest" (*ib.*). The facts seem decisive, and the statements above cited appear the more clearly to need modification. It is to be noted that Schweitzer's *Geschichte der Skandinavischen Literatur* gives no hint of the Celtic influence.

But the Icelandic civilisation as a whole could not indefinitely progress on its own basis any more than the Irish. Beyond a certain point both needed new light and leading; for the primeval spirit of strife never spontaneously weakened; the original Icelandic stock being, to begin with, a selection of revolters from overrule. So continual domestic feuds checked mental evolution in Iceland as in old Scandinavia; and the re-

[1] Powell, article on Icelandic Literature, *Ency. Brit.* xii. 621.

duction of the island to Norwegian rule in the thirteenth century could not do more for it than monarchy was doing for Norway. Mere Christianity without progressive conditions of culture availed less for imaginative art than free paganism had done; and when higher culture-contacts became possible, the extreme poverty of Iceland tended more than ever to send the enterprising people where the culture and comfort were. It is in fact not a possible seat for a relatively flourishing civilisation in the period of peaceful development. The Reformation seems there to have availed for very little indeed. It was vehemently resisted, but carried by the preponderant acquisitive forces: "nearly all who took part in it were men of low type, moved by personal motives rather than religious zeal."[1] "The glebes and hospital lands were a fresh power in the hands of the crown, and the subservient Lutheran clergy became the most powerful class in the island; while the bad system of underleasing at rack-rent and short lease with unsecured tenant-right extended in this way over at least a quarter of the better land, stopping any possible progress." For the rest, "the Reformation had produced a real poet [Hallgrim Petersen], but the material rise of Iceland"—that is, the recent improvements in the condition of the people—"has not yet done so,"[2] though poetry is still cultivated in Iceland very much as music is elsewhere.

Thus this one little community may be said to have reached the limits of its evolution, as compared with others, simply because of the strait natural conditions in which its lot was cast. But to think of it as a tragically moribund organism is merely to proceed upon the old hallucinations of race-consciousness. Men reared in Iceland have done their part in making

[1] Powell, article on Icelandic Literature, *Ency. Brit.* xii. 621.
[2] *Id.* p. 623.

European civilisation, entering the more southerly Scandinavian stocks as these entered the stocks of western Europe; and the present population, who are a remnant, have no more cause to hang their heads than any family that happens to have few members or to have missed wealth. Failure is relative only to purpose.

The modern revival of Scandinavian culture, as must needs be, is the outcome of all the European influences. At the close of the sixteenth century, in more or less friendly intercourse with the other Protestant countries of north Europe, Denmark began effectively to develop a literature such as theirs, imaginative and scientific, in the vernacular as well as in Latin; and so the development went on while Sweden was gaining military glory with little enlightenment. Then a rash attack upon Sweden ended in a loss of some of the richest Danish provinces (1658); whereafter a sudden parliamentary revolution, wrought by a league of king and people against the aristocracy, created not a constitutional but an absolute and hereditary monarchy (1660), enthroning divine right at the same instant in Denmark and Norway as in England. Thereafter, deprived of their old posts and subjected to ruinous taxes, the nobility fell rapidly into poverty; and the merchant class, equally overtaxed, withdrew their capital; the peasantry all the while remaining in a state of serfdom.[1] Then came a new series of wars with Sweden, recurring through generations, arresting, it is said, literature, law, philosophy and medicine,[2] but not the natural sciences, then so much in evidence elsewhere: Tycho Brahe being followed in astronomy by Horrebow, while chemistry, mathematics, and even anatomy made progress. But to this period belongs the brilliant dramatist and historian Holberg, the first great man of letters in modern Scandinavia (d. 1754);

[1] Crichton and Wheaton, ii. 104. [2] *Id.* ii. 321-22.

and in the latter half of the eighteenth century, the two years of ascendency of the free-thinking physician Struensee as queen's favourite (1770-72) served partially to emancipate the peasants, establish religious toleration, abolish torture, and reform the administration. Nor did his speedy overthrow and execution wholly undo his main work,[1] which outdid that of many generations of the old régime. Still, the history of his rise and fall, his vehement speed of reconstruction and the ruinous resistance it set up, is one of the most dramatic of the many warnings of history against thinking suddenly to elevate a nation by reforms imposed wholly from without.[2]

Thenceforward, with such fluctuations as mark all culture-history, the Scandinavian world has progressed mentally nearly step for step with the rest of Europe, producing scholars, historians, men of science, artists, and imaginative writers in more than due proportion. Many names which stand for solid achievement in the little-read Scandinavian tongues are unknown save to specialists elsewhere; but those of Holberg, Linnæus, Malte-Brun, Rask, Niebuhr, Madvig, Œhlenschläger, Thorwaldsen, and Swedenborg tell of a comprehensive influence on the thought and culture of Europe during a hundred years in which Europe was being reborn; and in our own day some of the greatest imaginative literature of the modern world comes from Norway, long the most backward of the group. Ibsen, one of a notable company of masters, stands at the head of the

[1] Laing in 1839 (*Tour in Sweden*, p. 13) thought the Danes as backward as they had been in 1660, quoting the ambassador Molesworth as to the effect of Lutheran Protestantism in destroying Danish liberties (pp. 10, 11). But it is hard to see that there were any popular liberties to destroy, save in so far as the party which set up the Reformation undid the popular laws of Christian II. The greatest social reforms in Denmark are certainly the work of the last half-century.

[2] It will be remembered that the Marquis of Pombal, in Portugal, at the same period was similarly overthrown after a much longer and non-scandalous reformatory rule, the queen being his enemy.

drama of the century; and the society which sustains him, however he may satirise it, is certificated abreast of its age.

§ 5

In one aspect the Scandinavian polities have a special lesson for the larger nations. They have perforce been specially exercised latterly, as of old, by the problem of population; and in Norway there was formerly made one of the notable, if not one of the best, approaches to a practical solution of it. Malthus long ago[1] noted the Norwegian marriage-rate as the lowest in Europe save that of Switzerland; and he expressed the belief that in his day Norway was "almost the only country in Europe where a traveller will hear any apprehension expressed of a redundant population, and where the danger to the happiness of the lower classes of people is in some degree seen and understood."[2] This state of things having long subsisted, there is a presumption that it persists uninterruptedly from pagan times, when, as we have seen, there existed a deliberate population-policy; for Christian habits of mind can nowhere be seen to have set up such a tendency, and it would be hard to show in the history of Norway any great political change which might effect a rapid revolution in the domestic habits of the peasantry, such as occurred in France after the Revolution. Broadly speaking, the mass of the Norwegian people had till this century continued to live under those external or domiciliary restraints on multiplication which were normal in rural Europe in the Middle Ages, and which elsewhere have been removed by industrialism; yet without suffering latterly from a continuance of the severer medieval

[1] His particulars were gathered during a tour he made in 1799. Thus the Norse practice he notes had been independent of any effect produced by his own essay.

[2] *Essay on the Principle of Population*, 7th ed., pp. 126, 133.

destructive checks. They must, therefore, have put a high degree of restraint on marriage, and probably observed parental prudence in addition.

When it is found that in Sweden, where the conditions and usages were once similar, there was latterly at once less prudential restraint on marriage and population, and a lower standard of material well-being, the two cases are seen to furnish a kind of *experimentum crucis*. The comparatively late maintenance of a powerful military system in Sweden having there prolonged the methods of aristocratic and bureaucratic control while they were being modified in Denmark-Norway, Swedish population in the last century was subject to artificial stimulus. From about the year 1748, the government set itself, on the ordinary empirical principle of militarism, to encourage population.[1] Among its measures were the variously wise ones of establishing medical colleges and lying-in and foundling hospitals, the absolute freeing of the internal trade in grain, and the withdrawal in 1748 of an old law limiting the number of persons allowed to each farm. The purpose of that law had been to stimulate population by spreading tillage; but the spare soil being too unattractive, the young people emigrated. On the law being abolished, population did increase considerably, rising between 1751 and 1800 from 1,785,727 to 2,347,308,[2] though some severe famines had occurred within the period. But in the year 1799, when he visited the country, the increased population suffered from famine very severely indeed, living mainly and miserably on bark bread.[3] It was one of

[1] This was doubtless owing to the loss of Finland (1742), a circumstance not considered by Malthus.

[2] Malthus (p. 141) gives higher and clearly erroneous figures for both periods, and contradicts them later (p. 143) with figures which he erroneously applies to Sweden *and Finland*. He seems to have introduced the latter words in the wrong passage.

[3] *Id.* p. 141.

Malthus' great object-lessons in his science. On one side a poor country was artificially over-populated; on the other, the people of Norway, an even poorer country, directly and indirectly[1] restrained their rate of increase, while the government during a long period wrought to the same end by the adjustment of its military system and by making a certificate of earning power or income necessary for all marriages.[2] The result was that, save in the fishing districts, where speculative conditions encouraged early marriages and large families, the Norwegian population were better off than the Swedish.[3]

Already in Malthus' youth the Norwegian-Danish policy had been altered, all legal and military restrictions on marriage having been withdrawn; and he notes that fears were expressed as to the probable results. It is one of his shortcomings to have entirely abstained from subsequent investigation of the subject; and in his late addendum as to the state of Sweden in 1826 he further fails to note that as a result of a creation there after 1803 of 6000 new farms from land formerly waste, the country ceased to need to import corn and was able to export a surplus.[4] It still held good, however, that the Norwegian population, being from persistence of prudential habit[5] much the slower in its rate of increase, had the higher standard of comfort, despite much spread of education in Sweden.

Within the past half-century, the general development of commerce and of industry has tended broadly

[1] See p. 131 as to the restrictions on subdivision of farms by way of safeguarding the forests.

[2] *Id.* p. 126. A priest would often refuse to marry a couple who had no good prospect of a livelihood: so far could rational custom affect even ecclesiastical practice.

[3] Cp. Crichton and Wheaton, ii. 339-50; Laing, *Journal of a Residence in Norway* (1834-36), ed. 1851, pp. 22, 23, 34, 35, 191, 214.

[4] Crichton and Wheaton, ii. 345. Laing (*Tour in Sweden*, pp. 277-82) thought the Swedish peasants better off than the Scotch, though morally inferior to the Norwegian.

[5] Laing, *Norway*, p. 213.

to equalise the condition of the Scandinavian peoples. As late as 1835, a scarcity would suffice to drive the Norwegian peasantry to the old subsistence of bark bread, a ruinous resort, seeing that it destroyed multitudes of trees of which the value, could the timber have found a market, would have far exceeded that of a quantity of flour yielding much more and better food. At that period the British market was closed by duties imposed in the interest of the Canadian timber trade.[1] Since the establishment of British free trade, Norwegian timber has become a new source of wealth; and through this and other and earlier commercial developments prudential family habits were affected. Thus, whereas the population of Sweden had all but doubled between 1800 and 1880, the population of Norway had grown even faster.[2] And whereas in 1834 the proportion of illegitimate to legitimate births in Stockholm was 1 to 2.26[3] (one of the results of foundling-hospitals, apparently), in 1890 the total Swedish rate was slightly below 1 to 10, while in Norway it was 1 to 14. The modern facilities for emigration have further affected conjugal habits. Latterly, however, there are evidences of a new growth of intelligent control.

In recent years the statistics of emigration and population tell a fairly plain story. In Norway and Sweden alike the excess of births over deaths reached nearly its highest in 1887, the figures being 63,942 for Sweden and 29,233 for Norway. In 1887, however, emigration was about its maximum in both countries, 50,786 leaving Sweden and 20,706 leaving Norway. Thereafter, the birth-rate rapidly fell, and the emigration, though fluctuating, has never again risen to the

[1] Laing, as cited, p. 220; Crichton and Wheaton, ii. 368.

[2] Sweden in 1800 stood at 2,347,303; in 1880, at 4,565,668. Norway in 1815 stood at 886,656; in 1891, at 2,001,000.

[3] Laing, as cited, p. 103, *note*.

volume of 1887-88. But when, after falling to 43,728 in 1892, the excess of Swedish births over deaths rises to 60,231 in 1895, while the emigration falls from 45,000 in 1892 to 13,000 in 1894, it is clear that the lesson of regulation is still very imperfectly learned. Norway shows the same fluctuations, the excess of births rising from 23,600 in 1892 to nearly 32,000 in 1896, doubtless because of ups and downs in the harvests, as shown in the increase of marriages from 12,742 in 1892 to 13,962 in 1896.

In Denmark the progression has been similar. There the excess of births over deaths was so far at its maximum in 1886, the figures being 29,986 in a population of a little over 2,000,000; whereafter they slowly decreased till in 1893 the excess was only 26,235. All the while emigration was active, gradually rising from 4346 in 1885 to 10,382 in 1891; then again falling to 2876 in 1896, when the surplus of births over deaths was 34,181—a development sure to force more emigration. The Scandinavians are thus still in the unstable stage of popular well-being, though probably suffering less from it than either Germany or England.

Here then is a group of kindred peoples apparently at least as capable of reaching a solution of the social problem as any other, and visibly prospering materially and morally in proportion as they bring reason to bear on the vital lines of conduct, though still in the stage of curing over-population by emigration. Given continued peaceful political evolution in the direction first of democratic federation, and further of socialisation of wealth, they may reach and keep the front rank in civilisation, while the more unmanageably large communities face risks of dire vicissitude.

CHAPTER III

THE HANSA

SYSTEMATIC commerce in the north of Europe, broadly speaking, begins with the traffic of the Hansa towns, whose rise may be traced to the sudden development of civic life forced on Germany in the tenth century by the emperor Henry I., as a means of withstanding the otherwise irresistible raids of the Hungarians.[1] Once founded, such cities for their own existence' sake gave freedom to all fugitive serfs who joined them, defending such against former masters, and giving them the chance of earning a living.[2] That is by common consent the outstanding origin of German civic industry, and the original conditions were such that the cities, once formed, were gradually forced[3] to special self-reliance. *Faustrecht*, or private war, was universal even under emperors who suppressed feudal brigandage; and the cities had to fight their own battle, like those of Italy, from the beginning. As compared with the robber baronage and separate princes, they stood for intelligence

[1] Menzel, *Geschichte der Deutschen*, B. ix. Cap. 147; Kohlrausch, *History of Germany*, Eng. tr., pp. 157, 162, 257; Dunham, *History of the Germanic Empire*, 1835, i. 108; Sharon Turner, *History of Europe during the Middle Ages*, 2nd ed. i. 13. The main authority is the old annalist Wittikind.

[2] Heeren, *Essai sur l'influence des Croisades*, 1808, pp. 269-272; Smith, *Wealth of Nations*, B. iii. c. 3.

[3] As to the process of evolution, see a good summary in Robertson's *View of the Progress of Society in Europe* (prefixed to his *Charles V.*), Note xvii. to Sect. I.

and co-operation, and supplied a basis for organisation without which the long German chaos of the Middle Ages would have been immeasurably worse. Taking their commercial cue from the cities of Italy, they reached, as against feudal enemies, a measure of peaceful union which the less differentiated Italian cities could not attain save momentarily. Thus, as early as the year 1284, seventy cities of South Germany formed the Rhenish League, on which followed that of the Swabian towns. The league of the Hansa cities, like the other early "Hansa of London," which united cities of Flanders and France with mercantile London, was a growth on all fours with these.[1] Starting, however, in maritime towns who grew to commerce from beginnings in fishing, as the earlier Scandinavians had grown to piracy, the northern League gave its main strength to trade by sea.

Its special interest for us to-day lies in the fact that it was ultra-racial, beginning in a pact between the free cities of Lübeck and Hamburg,[2] and finally including Wendish, German, Dutch, French, and even Spanish cities, in fluctuating numbers. The motive to union, as it had need be, was one of mercantile gain. Beginning, apparently, by having each its separate authorised *hansa* or trading-group in foreign cities, the earlier trading-towns of the group, perhaps from the measure of co-operation and fraternity thus forced on them abroad,[3] saw their advantage in a special league for the

[1] The Spanish *Hermandad* was originally an organisation of cities set up in similar fashion. E. Armstrong, *Introduction* to Major Martin Hume's *Spain*, 1898, p. 12.

[2] Lübeck was founded in 1140 by a count of Holstein, and won its freedom in the common medieval fashion by purchase. Hamburg bought its freedom of its bishop in 1225. Hallam, *Middle Ages*, 11th ed. iii. 324. Many Dutch, supposed to have been driven from their own land by an inundation, settled on the Baltic coast between Bremen and Dantzic in the twelfth century. Heeren, *Essai sur les Croisades*, 1808, pp. 266-69, citing Leibnitz and Hoche. Cp. G. H. Schmidt, *Zur Agrargeschichte Lübecks*, 1887, p. 30 ff.

[3] "The league . . . would scarcely have held long together or displayed any

common good as a monopoly maintained against outsiders; and this being extended, the whole League came to bear the generic name.

See Kohlrausch for the theory that contact in foreign cities is the probable cause of the policy of union (*History of Germany*, Eng. tr., p. 260; cp. Ashley, *Introd. to Economic History*, i. 104, 110). As to the origin of the word, see Stubbs, i. 447, *note*. The *hans* or *hansa* first appears historically in England as a name apparently identical with *gild;* and starting with a *hansa* or hanse-house of their own, English cities in some cases are found trading through subordinate *hansas* in other cities, not only of Normandy but of England itself. Thus arose the Flemish Hansa or "Hansa of London," ignored in so many notices of the better-known Hanseatic League. Early in the thirteenth century it included a number of the towns of Flanders engaged in the English wool-trade; and later it numbered at one time seventeen towns, including Chalons, Rheims, St. Quentin, Cambray, and Amiens (Ashley, *Introd. to Economic History*, i. 109; cp. Prof. Schanz, *Englische Handelspolitik*, 1889, i. 6, citing Varenbergh, *Hist. des relations diplomatiques entre le comte de Flandre et l'Angleterre au moyen âge*, Bruxelles, 1874, p. 146 ff.). There is some obscurity as to when the foreign Hansards were first permitted to have warehouses and residences of their own in London. Cp. Cunningham, *Growth of English Industry and Commerce*, vol. i. § 68; and Ashley, i. 105, following Schanz, who dates this privilege in the reign of Henry III., though the merchants of Cologne (*id.* p. 110) had a *hansa* or gildhall in London in the reign of Richard I. Under whatever conditions, it is clear that London was one of the first foreign cities in which the German Hansard traders came in friendly contact.

A reciprocal and normal egoism furthered as well as thwarted the Hansard enterprise. Trade in the feudal period being a ground of privilege like any other, the monopolied merchants of every city strove to force foreign traders to deal with them only. On the other hand, the English nobility sought to deal rather with the foreigner directly than with the English middlemen; and thus in each feudal country, but notably in England,[1]

real federal unity but for the pressure of external dangers" (Art. "Hanseatic League" in *Ency. Brit.* xi. 450).

[1] Cp. Ashley, as cited, i. 104-112; Schanz, as cited, i. 331.

the interest of the landed class tended to throw foreign trade substantially in foreign hands, which did their best to hold it. In the reigns of the Edwards, privileges of free trade with natives were gradually conferred on the foreign traders[1] in the interests of the landed class —the only "general consumers" who could then make their claims felt—in despite of the angry resistance of the native merchant class. For the rest, in a period when some maritime English cities, like those of France and Germany, could still carry on private wars with each other as well as with foreign cities,[2] a trader of one English town was in any other English town on all fours with a foreigner.[3] When, therefore, the foreigners combined, their advantage over the native trade was twofold.

Naturally the cities least liable to regal interference carried on a cosmopolitan co-operation to the best advantage. The Hansa of London, being made up of Flemish and French cities, was hampered by the divided allegiance of its members, and by their national jealousies;[4] while the German cities, sharing in the free German scramble under a nominal emperor much occupied in Italy, could combine with ease. Cologne, having early Hansa rights in London, sought to exclude the other cities, but had to yield and join their union;[5] and the Hansa of London dwindled and broke up before their competition. As the number of leagued cities increased, it might be thought, something in the nature of an ideal of free trade must have partly arisen, for the number of "privileged" towns was thus apparently greater than that of the outside towns traded with. To the last,

[1] Cp. W. von Ochenkowski, *Englands wirtschaftliche Entwickelung im Ausgange des Mittelalters*, 1879, pp. 177-82, 221-31.

[2] Hallam, *Middle Ages*, iii. 335. On private war in general see Robertson's *View*, Note 21 to § i.

[3] Ashley, i. 108, 109.

[4] Whereas in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries England and Flanders had freely exchanged trading privileges, in the fifteenth century they begin to withdraw them, treating each other as trading rivals (Schanz, i. 7, 8).

[5] Ashley, i. 110.

however, the faith seems to have been that without monopoly the league must perish; and in the closing Protestant period the command of the Baltic, as against the Dutch and the Scandinavians, was desperately and vainly battled for. But just as the cities could not escape the play of the other political forces of the time, and were severally clutched by this or that potentate, or biassed to their own stock, so they could not hinder that the principle of self-seeking on which they founded should divide themselves. As soon as the Dutch affiliated cities saw their opening for trade in the Baltic on their own account, they broke away.

While the league lasted, it was as remarkable a polity as any in history. With its four great foreign factories of Bruges, London, Bergen, and Novgorod, and its many minor stations, all conducted by celibate servitors living together like so many bodies of friars; with its four great circles of affiliated towns, and its triennial and other congresses, the most cosmopolitan of European parliaments; with its military and naval system, by which, turning its trading into fighting fleets, it made war on Scandinavian kings and put down piracy on every hand, it was in its self-seeking and often brutal way one of the popular civilising influences of northern Europe for some two hundred and fifty years; and the very forces of separate national commerce, which finally undermined it, were set up or stimulated by its own example. With less rapacity, indeed, it might have conciliated populations that it alienated. A lack of any higher ideals than those of zealous commerce marks its entire career; it is associated with no such growth of learning and the fine arts as took place in commercial Holland; and its members seem to have been among the most unrefined of the northern city populations.[1]

[1] In such accounts as M'Culloch's (*Treatises and Essays*) and those of the German patriotic historians, the Hansa is seen in a rather delusive abstract. The

But it made for progress on the ordinary levels. In a world wholly bent on privilege in all directions, it at least tempered its own spirit of monopoly in some measure by its principle of inclusion; and it passed away as a great power before it could dream of renewing the ideal of monopoly in the more sinister form of Oriental empire taken up by the Dutch. And while its historians have not been careful to make a comparative study of the internal civic life which flourished under the commercial union, it does not at all appear that the divisions of classes were more steep, or the lot of the lower worse, than in any northern European State of the period.

The "downfall" of such a polity, then, is conceptual only. All the realities of life evolved by the league were passed on to its constituent elements throughout northern Europe; and there survived from it what the separate States had not yet been able to offer, the adumbration, however dim, of a union reaching beyond the bounds of nationality and the jealousies of race. In an age of private war, without transcending the normal ethic, it practically limited private war as regarded its German members; and while joining battle at need with half-barbarian northern kings, or grudging foreigners, it of necessity made peace its ideal. Its dissolution, therefore, marked at once the advance of national organisation up to its level, and the persistence of the more primitive over the more rational instincts of coalition.

useful monograph of Miss Zimmern (*The Hansa Towns*: Story of the Nations Series) gives a good idea of the reality. See in particular pp. 82-147. It should be noted, however, that Lübeck is credited with being the first northern town to adopt the Oriental usage of water-pipes (Macpherson, *Annals of Commerce*, 1802, i. 381).

CHAPTER IV

HOLLAND

THE special interest of Dutch history for English and other readers led in past generations to a more general sociological study of it than was given to almost any other. L. Guicciardini's *Description of the Low Countries* (*Descrittione . . . di tutti Paesi Bassi*, etc. Anversa, folio, 1567, 1581, etc. Trans. in French, 1568, etc.; in English, 1593; in Dutch, 1582; in Latin, 1613, etc.) is one of the fullest surveys of the kind made till recent times. Sir William Temple's *Observations upon the United Provinces of the Netherlands* (1672) laid for English readers the foundations of an intelligent knowledge of the vital conditions of the State which had been in the seventeenth century the great commercial rival of England; and last century many English writers discussed the fortunes of Dutch commerce. An English translation was made of the remarkably sagacious work variously known as the *Memoirs of John de Witt*, the *True Interest of Holland*, and *Political Maxims of the State of Holland* (really written by De Witt's friend, Pierre Delacourt; De Witt, however, contributing two chapters), and much attention was given to it here and on the Continent. In addition to the many and copious histories written last century in Dutch, three or four voluminous and competent histories of the Low Countries were written in French [*e.g.* those of Dujardin (1757, etc. 8 vols. 4to.), Cerisier (1777, etc. 10 vols. 12mo.), Le Clerc (1723-28, 3 vols. folio), Wicquefort (1719, folio, proceeding from Peace of Munster)]. Of late years, though the lesson is as important as ever, it appears to be less generally attended to. In our own country, however, have appeared Davies' *History of Holland* (1841, 3 vols.), a careful but not often an illuminating work, which oddly begins with the statement that "there is scarcely any nation whose history has been so little understood or so generally neglected as that of Holland;" T. Colley Grattan's earlier and shorter book

(*The Netherlands*, 1830), which is still worth reading for a general view based on adequate learning; and the much better known works of Motley, *The Rise of the Dutch Republic* (1856) and the *History of the United Netherlands* (1861-68), which deal minutely with only a period of fifty-five years of Dutch history, and of which, as of the work of Davies, the sociological value is much below the annalistic. All three are impaired as literature by their stale rhetoric. The same malady infects the second volume of the *Industrial History of the Free Nations* (1846), by W. Torrens M'Cullagh (afterwards M'Cullagh Torrens); but this, which deals with Holland, is the better section of that treatise, and it gives distinct help to a scientific conception of the process of Dutch history, as does J. R. M'Culloch's *Essay on the Rise, Progress, and Decline of Commerce in Holland*, which is one of the best of his *Essays and Treatises* (2nd ed. 1859). The *Holland* of the late Professor Thorold Rogers has merit as a vivacious conspectus, but hardly rises to the opportunity.

Of the many French, Belgian, and German works on special periods of the history of the Low Countries, some have a special and general scientific interest. Among these are the research of M. Alphonse Wauters on *Les libertés communales* (Bruxelles, 1878). Barante's *Histoire des Ducs de Bourgogne* (4th ed. 1838-40) contains much interesting matter of the Burgundian period. The assiduous research of M. Lefèvre Pontalis, *Jean de Witt, Grand Pensionnaire de Hollande* (2 tom. 1884), throws a full light on one of the most critical periods of Dutch history.

Dutch works on the history of the Low Countries in general, and the United Provinces in particular, are many and voluminous; indeed no history has been more amply written. The good general history of the Netherlands by N. G. van Kampen, which appeared in German in the series of Heeren and Uckert (1831-33) is only partially superseded by the *Geschichte der Niederlande* of Wenzelburger (Bd. i. 1879; ii. 1886), which is not completed. But the most readable general history of the Netherlands yet produced is that of P. J. Blok, *Geschiedenis van het Nederlandsche Volk* (1892, etc.), of which a competent but unfortunately abridged English translation (Putnams, vol. i. 1898) is in progress. Standard modern Dutch works are those of J. A. Vijnne, *Geschiedenis van het Vaderland*, and J. van Lennep, *De Geschiedenis van Nederland*. For Belgian history in particular the authorities are similarly numerous. The *Manuel de l'histoire de Belgique*, by J. David (Louvain, 1847), will be found a good handbook of authorities, episodes, and chronology, though without any sociological element. The *Histoire de Belgique* of Th. Juste (Bruxelles, 1895, 3 tom. 4to) is comprehensive, but disfigured by insupportable illustrations.

§ 1. *The Rise of the Netherlands*

The case of Holland is one of those which at first sight seems to flout the sociological maxim that civilisations flourish in respect partly of natural advantages and partly of psychological pressures. On the face of things, it would seem that the original negation of natural advantage could hardly be carried farther than here. A land pieced together out of drained marshes certainly tells more of man's effort than of Nature's bounty. Yet even here the process of natural law is perfectly sequent and intelligible.

One of the least-noted influences of the sea on civilisation is the economic basis it yields in the way of food-supply. Already in Cæsar's time the Batavians were partly fishermen; and it may be taken as certain that through all the troubled ages down to the period of industry and commerce it was the resource of fishing that mainly maintained and retained population in the sea-board swamps of the Low Countries. Here was a harvest that enemies could not destroy, that demanded no ploughing and sowing, and that could not well be reaped by the labour of slaves. When war and devastation could absolutely depopulate the cultivated land, forcing all men to flee from famine, the sea for ever yielded some return to him who could but get afloat with net or line; and he who could sail the sea had a double chance of life and freedom as against land enemies. Thus a sea marsh could be humanly advantaged as against a fruitful plain, and could be a surer dwelling-place. The tables were first effectually turned when the Norse pirates attacked from the sea—an irresistible attack which seems to have driven the sea-board Frisians (as it did the coast inhabitants of France) in crowds into slavery for protection, thus laying a

broad foundation of popular serfdom.[1] When, however, the Norse empire began to fail, the sea as a source of sustenance again counted for civilisation; and when to this natural basis of population and subsistence there was added the peculiar stimulus set up by a religious inculcation or encouragement of a fish diet, the fishing grounds of the continent became relatively richer estates than mines and vineyards. Venice and Holland alike owed much to the superstition which made Christians akreophagous on Fridays and fast-days and all through the forty days of Lent. When the plan of salting herrings was hit upon,[2] all Christian Europe helped to make the fortunes of the fisheries.

Net-making may have led to weaving; in any case weaving is the first important industry developed in the Low Countries. It depended mainly on the wool of England; and on the basis of the ancient seafaring there thus arose a sea-going commerce.[3] Further, the position of Flanders,[4] as a trade-centre for northern and southern Europe, served to make it a market for all manner of produce; and round such a market population and manufactures grew together. It belonged to the conditions that, though the territory came under feudal rule like every other in the medieval military period,

[1] Motley, *Rise of the Dutch Republic*, 1 vol. ed. 1863, p. 18. For details of the different invasions see David, *Manuel de l'histoire de Beligique*, 1847, pp. 37, 39, 41, 49. Cp. van Kampen, *Geschichte der Niederlande*, Ger. ed. i. 82-89. Wenzelburger notes that the "Norsemen" included not only Norwegians and Danes but Saxons and even Frisians (*Geschichte der Niederlande*, 1879, i. 61).

[2] The Dutch claim the invention for one of their nation in the fourteenth century (cp. M'Culloch, *Treatises*, p. 342; Rogers, *Holland*, pp. 26, 27). There is clear evidence, however, that fish-salting was carried on at Yarmouth as early as 1210, one Peter Chivalier being the patentee (see Torrens M'Cullagh's *Industrial History of the Free Nations*, 1846, ii. 29; Madox, *History of the Exchequer*, c. xiii. § 4, p. 326, cited by him; and Macpherson, *Annals of Commerce*, 1802, i. 384, 385).

[3] It is noteworthy that an English navy practically begins with King John, in whose reign it was that fishing began to flourish at Yarmouth. See Macpherson, *Annals of Commerce*, i. 374, 378, 384, 532.

[4] Originally the name Flanders covered only the territory of the city of Bruges. It was extended with the extension of the domain of the Counts of Flanders (David, *Manuel*, pp. 48, 49).

the cities were relatively energetic all along,[1] theirs being (after the Dark Ages, when the work was largely done by the Church) the task of maintaining the sea-dykes[2] and water-ways, and theirs the wealth on which alone the feudal over-lords could hope to flourish in an unfruitful land. The over-lords, on their part, saw the expediency of encouraging foreigners to settle and add to their taxable population,[3] thus establishing the tradition of political tolerance long before the Protestant period. Hence arose in the Netherlands, after the Renaissance, the phenomenon of a dense industrial population flourishing on a soil which finally could not be made to feed them,[4] and carrying on a vast shipping trade without owning a single good harbour and without possessing home-grown timber wherewith to build their ships.[5]

One of the determinants of this growth on a partially democratic footing was clearly the primary and peculiar necessity for combination by the inhabitants to maintain the great sea-dykes, the canals, and the embankments of the low-lying river-lands in the interior.[6] It was a public bond in peace, over and above the normal tie of

[1] Motley, p. 20; Grattan, pp. 38-40, 43, 56. At 1286 the Flemish cities were represented side by side with the nobles in the assembly of the provincial states. The same rights were acquired by the Dutch cities in the next century.

[2] Dykes existed as early as the Roman period (Blok, *Geschiedenis van het Nederlandsche Volk*, Groningen, 1892, i. 315, Eng. tr. i. 211; Wenzelburger, *Geschichte der Niederlande*, 1878; i. 52). In the Middle Ages co-operative bodies took the work out of the Church's hands (Blok, pp. 315-17; tr. p. 212).

[3] Cp. Torrens M'Cullagh, *Industrial History*, ii. 22, 33; Motley, p. 18. The Counts of Holland seem to have led the way in encouraging towns and population. But Baldwin III. of Flanders (*circa* 960) seems to have established yearly fairs free of tolls (De Witt, *Mémoires*, French tr., ed. 1709, part i. ch. viii. p. 34).

[4] Compare the so-called *Memoirs of John de Witt*, French ed. (3e) 1709, ch. iii. p. 18; Petty, *Essays in Political Arithmetic*, ed. 1699, p. 178; Torrens M'Cullagh, as cited, ii. 26, 113-15, 270-71; M'Culloch, *Treatises*, p. 350. English corn was frequently exported to the Low Countries, as against imported textiles, in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries and early in the fifteenth (Macpherson, *Annals of Commerce*, i. 561, 644).

[5] Temple, *Observations upon the United Provinces*, cc. iii. vi. (1814 ed. of Works, i. 127, 163).

[6] Cp. De Witt, pp. 15, 16; Torrens M'Cullagh, *Industrial History*, ii. 36, 37, 46, 59; Grattan, *Netherlands*, p. 18; Blok, as above cited.

common enmities. The result was a development of civic life still more rapid and more marked in inland Flanders,[1] where the territorial feudal power was naturally greater than in the maritime Dutch provinces. Self-ruling cities, such as Ghent and Antwerp, at their meridian, were too powerful to be effectively menaced by their immediate feudal lords. But on the side of their relations with neighbouring cities or States they all exhibited the normal foible; and it was owing only to the murderous compulsion put upon them by Spain in the sixteenth century that any of the provinces of the Netherlands became a federal republic. For five centuries after Charlemagne, who subdued them to his system, the Low Countries had undergone the ordinary slow evolution from pure feudalism to the polity of municipalities. In the richer inland districts the feudal system, lay and clerical, was at its height, the baronial castles being "here more numerous than in any other part of Christendom;[2] and when the growing cities began to feel their power to buy charters, the feudal formula was unchallenged,[3] while the mass of the outside population were in the usual "Teutonic" state of serfdom. It was only by burning their suburbs and taking to the walled fortress that the people of Utrecht escaped the yoke of the Norsemen.[4]

Mr. Torrens M'Cullagh is responsible for the statement that "it seems doubtful whether any portion of the inhabitants of Holland were ever in a state of actual servitude or bondage," and that the northern provinces were more generally free from slavery than the others (*Industrial History of the Free Nations*, 1846, ii. 39). Motley (*Rise of the Dutch Republic*, 1 vol. ed. 1863, pp. 17, 18) pronounces, on the contrary, that "in the northern Netherlands

[1] As to the earlier development of the Flemish cities, cp. Blok, *Geschiedenis*, as cited, ii. 3, tr. i. 252; A. Wauters, *Les libertés communales*, Bruxelles, 1878, p. 746 and *passim*.

[2] Motley, *Rise of the Dutch Republic*, 1 vol. ed. 1863, p. 15.

[3] See the charter of Middelburg in 1217, quoted by Motley, p. 19, and by Davies, i. 65.

[4] Davies, *History of Holland*, i. 26.

the degraded condition of the mass continued longest," and that "the number of slaves throughout the Netherlands was very large; the number belonging to the bishopric of Utrecht enormous." This is substantially borne out by Grattan, *Netherlands*, pp. 18, 34; Blok, *Geschiedenis van het Nederlandsche Volk*, 1892, etc. i. 159, 160, 305-11, Eng. tr. i. 203-208; Wauters, *Les libertés communales*, 1878, pp. 222-30. As is noted by Blok, the status of the peasantry fluctuated, the thirteenth century being one of partial retrogression. Cp. pp. 318, 319, as to the general depression of the peasant class. The great impulse to slavery, as above noted, seems to have been given by the Norse pirates in general and the later Norman invaders, who, under Godfrey, forced every "free" Frisian to wear a halter. The comparative protection accruing to slaves of the Church was embraced by multitudes. In the time of the crusades, again, many serfs were sold or mortgaged to the Church by the nobles in order to obtain funds for their expedition.

The cities were thus the liberating and civilising forces;[1] and the application of townsmen's capital to the land was an early influence in improving rural conditions.[2] Flanders, having the large markets of France at hand, developed its cloth-making and other industries more rapidly than the Frisian districts, where weaving was probably earlier carried on;[3] and here serfdom disappeared comparatively early,[4] the nobility dwindling through their wars; but the new industrial strifes of classes, which grew up everywhere in the familiar fashion, naturally matured the sooner in the more advanced civilisation; and already at the beginning of the fourteenth century we find a resulting disintegration. The monopoly methods of the trade gilds drove much of the weaving industry into the villages; then the Franco-Flemish wars, wherein the townspeople, by expelling the French in despite of the nobility, greatly strengthened

[1] Cp. David, *Manuel*, p. 217; Wauters, *Les libertés communales*, pp. 36, 287; Van Kampen, *Geschichte der Niederlande*, i. 141, 142.

[2] M'Cullagh, ii. 42.

[3] De Witt (*i.e.* Delacourt), however, gives the priority to Flanders (*Mémoires*, as cited, part. i. ch. viii. p. 34).

[4] The majority of the serfs seem to have been freed about 1230; and by 1300 the chiefs of the gilds were "more powerful than the nobles" (Grattan, p. 35; cp. p. 38, and Blok, as before cited).

their position,[1] nevertheless tended, as did the subsequent civil wars, to drive trade into South Brabant. In Flemish Ghent and Bruges the clashing interests of weavers and woollen-traders, complicated by the strife of the French (aristocratic) and anti-French (popular) factions, led to riots in which citizens and magistrates were killed (1301). At Ypres (1303) a combination of workmen demanded the suppression of rival industries in neighbouring villages, and in an ensuing riot the mayor and all the magistrates were slain; at Bruges (1302) a trade riot led to the loss of fifteen hundred lives.[2] Yet when later the weaving trade had flourished in Brabant, the same fatality came about: plebeians rebelled against patrician magistrates—themselves traders or employers of labour—in the principal cities; and Brussels (1312) was for a time given up to pillage and massacre, put down only by the troops of the reigning duke. A great legislative effort was made in the "Laws of Cortenberg," framed by an assembly of nobles and city deputies, to regulate fiscal and industrial affairs in a stable fashion;[3] but after fifty years the trouble broke out afresh, and was ill-healed.[4] At length, in a riot in the rich city of Louvain (1379), sixteen of its patrician magistrates were slain, whereupon many took flight to England, but many more to Haarlem, Amsterdam, Leyden, and other Dutch cities.[5] Louvain never again recovered its trade and wealth;[6] and since the renewed Franco-Flemish wars of this period had nearly destroyed the commerce of Flanders,[7] there was a general gravitation of both merchandise and manufacture to Holland.[8] Thus arose Dutch manufactures in an organic

[1] Cp. David, *Manuel*, pp. 78-88.
[2] De Witt, as cited, pp. 34, 35; M'Cullagh, p. 66; Grattan, p. 38.
[3] David, *Manuel*, pp. 142, 143; Grattan, p. 38.
[4] David, pp. 154-57.
[5] De Witt, p. 35; M'Cullagh, p. 67.
[6] David, *Manuel*, p. 158.
[7] *Id.* p. 107.
[8] Grattan, p. 43.

connection with maritime commerce, the Dutch municipal organisation securing a balance of trade interests where that of the Flemish industrial cities had partially failed.

The commercial lead given by the Hanseatic League was followed in the Netherlands with a peculiar energy, and till the Spanish period the main part of Dutch maritime commerce was with northern Europe and the Hansa cities. So far as the language test goes, the original Hansards and the Dutch were of the same "Low Dutch" stock, which was also that of the Anglo-Saxons.[1] Thus there was seen the phenomenon of a vigorous maritime and commercial development among the continental branches of the race; while the English, having lost its early seafaring habits on its new settlement, lagged far behind in both developments. Kinship, of course, counted for nothing towards goodwill; and in the fifteenth century the Dutch cities are found at war with the Hansa, as they had been in the thirteenth with England, and were to be again. But the spirit of strife did its worst work at home. On the one hand, a physical schism had been set up in Friesland in the thirteenth century by the immense disaster of the inundation which enlarged the Zuyder Zee.[2] Of that tremendous catastrophe there are singularly few historic traces; but it had the effect of making two small countries where there had been one large one, what was left of West Friesland being absorbed in the specific province of Holland, while East Friesland, across the Zuyder Zee, remained a separate confederation of maritime districts.[3] To the south-west, again, the great Flemish cities were incurably jealous of each other's prosperity, as well as inwardly distracted by their class disputes;

[1] Earle, *Philology of the English Tongue*, 3rd ed. pp. 8, 9.

[2] On this and previous floods, see Blok, *Geschiedenis*, i. 313, 314, tr. i. 209. 210; Davies, vol. i. Note C.

[3] Motley, p. 20.

and within the cities of Holland, in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, while intelligible lines of cleavage between trades or classes are hard to find, the factions of Hoek and Kabbeljauw, the "Hooks" and the "Cod-fish," appear to have carried on a chronic strife, as irrational as any to be noted in the cities of Italy. Thus in the north as in the south, among Teutons as among "Latins" and among ancient Greeks, the primary instincts of separation checked democratic growth and coalition; though after the period of local feudal sovereignties the powerful monarchic and feudal forces in the Netherlands withheld the cities from internecine wars.

The most sympathetic historians are forced from the first to note the stress of mutual jealousy as among the cities and districts of the Netherlands. "The engrained habit of municipal isolation," says one, "was the cause why the general liberties of the Netherlands were imperilled, why the larger part of the country was ultimately ruined, and why the war of independence was conducted with so much risk and difficulty, even in the face of the most serious perils" (Thorold Rogers, *Holland*, p. 26. Cp. pp. 35, 43; Motley, pp. 29, 30, 43; Grattan, pp. 39, 50, 51). Van Kampen avows (*Geschichte der Niederlande*, i. 131) that throughout the Middle Ages Friesland was unprogressive owing to constant feuds. Even as late as 1670 Leyden refused to let the Harle Maer be drained, because it would advantage other cities; and Amsterdam in turn opposed the reopening of the old Rhine channel because it would make Leyden maritime (Temple, *Observations*, i. 130, ch. iii.)

As regards the early factions of the "Hooks" and the "Cod-fish" in the Dutch towns, the historic obscurity is so great that historians are found ascribing the names in contrary ways. Grattan (p. 49) represents the Hooks as the town party, and the Codfish as the party of the nobles; Motley (p. 21) reverses the explanation, noting, however, that there was no consistent cleavage of class or of principle (cp. M'Cullagh, pp. 99, 100). This account is supported by Van Kampen, i. 170, 171. The fullest survey of the Hook and Cod feud is given by Wenzelburger, *Geschichte der Niederlande*, i. 210-42. As to feuds of other parties in some of the cities, see Van Kampen, i. 172. They included, for example, a class feud between the rich *Vetkooper* (fat-dealers) and the poor *Schieringer* (eel-fishers). See Davies, i. 180.

Thus dissident, and with feudal wars breaking out in every generation, the cities and provinces could win concessions from their feudal chiefs when the latter were in straits, as in the famous case of the "Great Privilege" extorted from the Duchess Mary, daughter of Charles the Bold of Burgundy, after her father's overthrow by the Swiss; again in the case of her husband Maximilian after her death; and previously in the reaffirmation of the ill-observed Laws of Cortenberg, secured from the Duke of Brabant by the Louvainers in 1372; but they could never deliver themselves from the feudal superstition, never evolve the republican ideal. When the rich citizens exploited the poor, it was the local sovereign's cue to win the populace; whereupon the patricians leant to the over-lord, were he even the King of France; or it might be that the local lord himself sought the intervention of his suzerain, who again was at times the first to meddle, and against whom, as against rival potentates, the cities would at times fight desperately for their recognised head, when he was not overtaxing or thwarting them, or endangering their commerce.[1] It was a medley of clashing interests, always in unstable equilibrium. And so when sovereign powers on a great scale, as the Dukes of Burgundy, followed by the Archduke Maximilian, and later by the Emperor Charles, came into the inheritance of feudal prestige, the Dutch and Flemish cities became by degrees nearly as subordinate as those of France and Germany, losing one by one their municipal privileges.[2] The monarchic superstition overbore the passions of independence and primary interest; and a strong feudal ruler could count on a more general and durable loyalty than was ever given to any citizen-statesman. James van Arteveldt,

[1] Cp. David, pp. 77, 78, 85, 92, 99, 101, 105, 108, 149; Motley, pp. 24, 28, 29; Grattan, pp. 42, 44, 46, 50, 54, 64.

[2] The town of Hoorn seems to have been virtually ruined by the primitive exactions of Charles the Bold (Davies, i. 269, 312).

who guided Ghent in the fourteenth century, and whose policy was one of alliance with the English king against the French, the feudal over-lord, was "the greatest personality Flanders ever produced."[1] But though Arteveldt's policy was maintained even by his murderers, murdered he was by his fellow-citizens, as the great De Witt was to be murdered in Holland two hundred years later. The monarchised Netherlanders were republicans only in the last resort, as against insupportable tyranny. Philip of Burgundy, who heavily oppressed them, they called "The Good." At the end of the fifteenth century Maximilian was able, even before he became emperor, not only to crush the "bread-and-cheese" rebellion of the exasperated peasantry in Friesland and Guelderland,[2] but to put down all the oligarchs who had rebelled against him, and, finally, to behead them by the dozen,[3] leaving the land to his son as a virtually subject State.

In the sixteenth century, under Charles V., the men of Ghent, grown once again a great commercial community,[4] exhibited again the fatal instability of the undeveloped democracy of all ages. Called upon to pay their third of a huge subsidy of 1,200,000 *caroli* voted by the Flemish States to the emperor, they rang their bell of revolt and defied him, offering their allegiance to the King of France. He, by way of a bargain, promptly betrayed the intrigue to his "brother," who thereupon marched in force through France to the rebel city, now paralysed by terror; and without meeting a shadow of resistance, penalised it to the uttermost, beheading a score of leading citizens, banishing many more, annulling its remaining municipal rights and exacting an increased tribute.[5] It needed an extremity of grievance to drive

[1] David, p. 94. [2] Davies, i. 314. [3] Motley, pp. 28-30.
[4] Largely through the union between Spain and England under the Tudor kings (Grattan, p. 66).
[5] Robertson, *Charles V.*, B. vi.; Motley, *Rise*, Histor. Introd. § 11.

such communities to an enduring rebellion. When Charles V. abdicated at Brussels in favour of his son Philip in 1555, he had already caused to be put to death Netherlanders to the number at least of thousands for religious heresy ;[1] and still the provinces were absolutely submissive, and the people capable of weeping collectively out of sympathy with the despot's infirmities.[2] He, on his part, born and educated among them and knowing them well, was wont to say of them that there was not a nation under the sun which more detested the *name* of slavery, or that bore the reality more patiently when managed with discretion.[3] He spoke whereof he knew.

§ 2. *The Revolt against Spain*

That the people who endured so much at the hands of a despot should have revolted unsubduably against his son is to be explained in terms of certain circumstances little stressed in popular historiography. In the narratives of the rhetorical historians, no real explanation arises. The revolt figures as a stand for personal and religious freedom. But when Charles abdicated, after slaying his thousands, the Reformation had been in full tide for over thirty years; Calvin had built up Protestant Geneva to the point of burning Servetus ; England had been for twenty years depapalised ; France, with many scholars and nobles converted to Calvinism, was on the verge of a civil war of Huguenots and Catholics ; the Netherlands themselves had been drenched in the blood

[1] Motley, p. 60, notes that the numbers have been put often at fifty thousand, and sometimes even at a hundred thousand ; but this, as he admits, is incredible.

[2] And still the rhetorical historian, sworn to maintain the Teutonic character for "liberty," declaims in his elementary manner that that has been seen to be the "master passion" of the race from Cæsar's time to Charles's (Motley, p. 49. Compare pp. 25-29).

[3] Cited by Pufendorf, *Introduction to the History of Europe*, Eng. tr. 7th ed. 1711, i, 240.

of heretics ; and still no leading man had thought of repudiating either Spain or Rome. Yet within thirteen years they were in full revolt, led by William of Orange, now turned Protestant. Seeing that mere popular Protestantism had spread far and gone fast, religious opinion was clearly not the determining force.

In reality, the *conditio sine qua non* was the psychological reversal effected by Philip when he elected to rule as a Spaniard, where his father had in effect ruled as a Fleming. Charles had always figured as a native of the Netherlands, at home among his people, friendly to their great men, ready to employ them in his affairs, even to the extent of partly ruling Spain through them. After his punishment of Ghent they were his boon subjects ; and in his youth it was the Spaniards who were jealous of the Flemish and Dutch. This state of things had begun under his Flemish-German father, Philip I., who became King of Spain by marriage, and under whom the Netherlands nobles showed in Spain a rapacity that infuriated the Spaniards against them. It was a question simply of racial predominance ; and had the dynasty chosen to fix its capital in the north rather than in the south, it would have been the lot of the Netherlanders to exploit Spain—a task for which they were perfectly ready.

The gross rapacity of the Flemings in Spain under Philip I. is admitted by Motley (*Rise*, as cited, pp. 31, 75) ; but the same feeling was passionately strong in Spain in the earlier years of the reign of Charles. Cp. Robertson, *Charles V.*, B. i. (Works, ed. 1821, iv. 37, 40, 43, 44, 46, 47, 52, 53, 55, 77, 78). Cp. van Kampen, *Geschichte der Niederlande*, i. 277, 278. It took more than ten years to bring Charles in good relations with the Spaniards. Cp. Mr. E. Armstrong's *Introduction* to Major Martin Hume's *Spain*, 1898, pp. 31-37, 57, 76. Even in his latter years they are found protesting against his customary absence from Spain, and his perpetual wars. Robertson, B. vi. p. 494. Cp. B. xii. vol. v. p. 417, as to the disregard shown him after his abdication.

While it lasted, the Flemish exploitation of Spain was

as shameless as the Spanish exploitation of Italy. The Italian Peter Martyr Angleria, residing at the court of Spain, reckoned that in ten months the Flemings there remitted home over a million ducats (Robertson, B. i. p. 53). A lad, nephew of Charles's Flemish minister Chievres, was appointed to the archbishopric of Toledo, in defiance of general indignation. The result was a clerico-popular insurrection. Everything goes to show that but for the emperor's prudence his Flemings would have ruined him in Spain, by getting him to tyrannise for their gain, as Philip II. later did for the Church's sake in the Netherlands.

It is not unwarrantable to say that had not Charles had the sagacity to adapt himself to the Spanish situation, learning to speak the language and even to tolerate the pride of the nobles[1] to a degree to which he never yielded to the claims of the burghers of the Netherlands, and had he not in the end identified himself chiefly with his Spanish interests, the history of Spain and the Netherlands might have been entirely reversed. Had he, that is, kept his seat of rule in the Netherlands, drawing thither the unearned revenues of the Americas, and still contrived to keep Spain subject to his rule, the latter country would have been thrown back on her great natural resources, her industry, and her commerce, which, as it was, developed markedly during his reign,[2] despite the heavy burdens of his wars. And in that case Spain might conceivably have become the Protestant and rebellious territory, and the Netherlands on the contrary have remained Catholic and grown commercially decrepit, having in reality the weaker potential economic basis.

The theorem that the two races were vitally opposed in "religious sentiment," and that "it was as certain that the Netherlanders would be fierce reformers as that the Spaniards would be uncompromising persecutors" (Motley, p. 31), is part of the common pre-scientific conception of national development, and proceeds upon flat disregard of the historical evidence. It is well established that there

[1] Robertson, *Charles V.*, B. vi., ed. cited, p. 495; Armstrong, as cited, pp. 78-82.
[2] Armstrong, as cited, pp. 83, 84.

was as much heresy of the more rational Protestant and Unitarian sort in Spain, to begin with, as in Holland. Under Ferdinand and Isabella the Inquisition seems to have struck mainly at Judaic and Moorish monotheistic heresy, which was not uncommon among the upper classes, while the lower were for the most part orthodox (Armstrong, *Introd.* to Major Hume's *Spain*, pp. 14, 18). In Aragon, Valencia, and Catalonia there was general resistance to the Inquisition; in Cordova there was a riot against it; in Saragossa the Inquisitor was murdered before the altar (*id.* p. 18; cp. U. R. Burke, *History of Spain*, 1895, ii. 97, 98, 101, 103, 111, as to the general and prolonged resistance of the people). During that reign Torquemada is credited with burning ten thousand persons in eighteen years (Prescott, *History of Ferdinand and Isabella*, Kirk's ed. 1889, p. 178, citing Llorente. But see p. 746, *note*, as to possible exaggeration. Cp. Burke, ii. 113). In the early Lutheran period the spread of scholarly Protestantism in Spain was extremely rapid' (La Rigaudière, *Histoire des persécutions religieuses en Espagne*, 1860, p. 245 ff.), and in the early years of Philip II. it needed furious persecution to crush it, thousands leaving the kingdom (M'Crie, *Reformation in Spain*, ch. viii.; De Castro, *History of the Spanish Protestants*, Eng. tr. 1851, *passim*).

Had Philip II. had Flemish sympathies, and chosen to make Brussels his capital, the stress of the Inquisition could have fallen on the Netherlands as successfully as it actually did on Spain. His father's reign had proved as much. According to Motley, not only multitudes of Anabaptists but "thousands and tens of thousands of virtuous and well-disposed men and women" had then been "butchered in cold blood" (*Rise*, p. 43), without any sign of rebellion on the part of the provinces, whose leading men remained Catholic. In 1600 most of the inhabitants of Groningen were Catholics (Davies, ii. 347). A Protestant historian (Grattan, p. 93) admits that the Protestants "never, and least of all in these days, formed the mass." Another has admitted, as regards those of Germany, that "nothing had contributed more to the undisturbed progress of their opinions than the interregnum after Maximilian's death, the long absence of Charles, and the slackness of the reins of government which these occasioned" (Robertson, *Charles V.*, B. v. ed. cited of Works, vol. iv. p. 387). "It was only tanners, dyers, and apostate priests who were Protestants at that day in the Netherlands" (Motley, p. 124). The same conditions would have had similar results in Spain, where many Catholics thought Philip much too religious for his age and station (Motley, p. 76).

It seems necessary to insist on the elementary fact that it was Netherlanders who put Protestants to death in the Netherlands; and that it was Spaniards who were burnt in Spain. In the Middle

Ages "nowhere was the persecution of heretics more relentless than in the Netherlands" (Motley, p. 36; cp. p. 132). Grenvelle, most zealous of heresy-hunters, was a Burgundian; Viglius, an even bitterer persecutor, was a Frisian. As regards, further, the old hallucination of "race types," it has to be noted that Charles, a devout Catholic and persecutor, was emphatically *Teutonic*, according to the established canons. His stock was Burgundo-Austrian on the father's side; his Spanish mother was of Teutonic descent; he had the fair hair, blue eyes, and hanging jaw and lip of the Teutonic Hapsburgs (see Menzel, *Geschichte der Deutschen*, Cap. 341), and so had his descendants after him. On the other hand, William the Silent was markedly "Spanish" in his physiognomy (Motley, p. 56), and his reticence would in all ages pass for a Spanish rather than a "Teutonic" characteristic. Motley is reduced to such shifts of rhetoric concerning Philip II. as the proposition (p. 75) that "the Burgundian and Austrian elements of his blood seemed to have evaporated." But his descendant, Philip IV., in the great portraits of Velasquez, is a "typical" Teuton; and the stock preserved the Teutonic physiological tendency to gluttony, a most "un-Spanish" characteristic.

It is true that, as Buckle argues, the many earthquakes in Spain tended to promote superstitious fear; but then on his principles the Dutch seafaring habits, and the constant risks and frequent disasters of inundation, had the same primary tendency. For the rest, the one serious oversight in Buckle's theory of Spanish civilisation is his assumption (cp. 3-vol. ed. ii. 455-61) that Spanish "loyalty" was continuous from the period of the struggle with the Moors. As we have seen, it was not; Philip I. and Charles V. having set up a clear breach in the habit. Even Ferdinand, as an Aragonese, was disrespectfully treated by the Castilians (cp. Armstrong as cited, pp. 5, 31, etc.; De Castro, *History of Religious Intolerance in Spain*, Eng. tr. 1853, pp. 40, 41). An alien dynasty could set up disaffection in Spain as elsewhere.

It should be noted, finally, that the stiff ceremonialism which is held to be the special characteristic of Spanish royalty was a Burgundo-Teutonic innovation, dating from Philip I., and that even in the early days of Philip II. the Cortes petitioned "that the household of the Prince Don Carlos should be arranged on the old Spanish lines, and not in the pompous new-fangled way of the House of Burgundy" (Major Hume's *Spain*, p. 127). At the same time they petitioned against bull-fights, which appear to have originated with the Moors, were strongly opposed by Isabella the Catholic, and were much encouraged by the Teutonic Charles V. (U. R. Burke, *History of Spain*, 1895, ii. 2-4). In fine, the conventional Spain is a manufactured system, developed under a Teutonic dynasty.

No doubt the Dutch disaffection to Philip which began to reveal itself immediately after his accession may be conceived as having economic grounds. Indeed his creation of fresh bishoprics, and his manipulation of the abbey revenues, created instant and general resentment among churchmen and nobles,[1] as compared with his mere continuation of religious persecution; and despite his pledges to the contrary, certain posts in the Low Countries were conferred on Spaniards.[2] But had he shown his father's adaptability, all this could have been adjusted. Had he either lived at Brussels or made the Flemings feel that he held them an integral part of his empire, he would have had the zealous support of the upper classes in suppressing the popular heresy, which repelled them. Heresy in the Netherlands, indeed, seems thus far to have been on the whole rather licentious and anarchic than austere or "spiritual." The pre-Protestant movements of the Béguines, Beghards, and Lollards, beginning well, had turned out worse than the orders of friars in the south; and the decorous "Brethren of the Common Lot," were in the main "good churchmen," only a minority accepting Protestantism.[3] In face of the established formulas concerning the innate spirituality of the Teuton, and of the play of his "conscience" in his course at the Reformation, there stand the historic facts that in the Teutonic world alone was the Reformation accompanied by widespread antinomianism, debauchery, and destructive violence. In France, Spain, and Italy there were no such movements as the Anabaptist, which so far as it could go was almost a dissolution of sane society. From Holland that movement drew much of its strength and leadership, even as, in a previous age, the antinomian movement of Tanquelin had there had its

[1] Motley, *Rise*, p. 138. [2] *Id.* pp. 138, 139; Grattan, p. 87.
[3] Ullmann, *Reformers before the Reformation*, Eng. tr. 1855, ii. 14-17, 172-177.

main success.[1] Such was the standing of Dutch Protestantism in 1555; and no edict against heresy could be more searching and merciless than that drawn up by Charles in 1550[2] without losing any upper-class loyalty. Philip did but strive to carry it out.[3]

Had Philip, further, maintained a prospect of chronic war for the nobility of the Netherlands, the accruing chances of wealth[4] would in all likelihood have sufficed to keep them loyal. In the early wars of his reign with France immense gains had been made by them in the way of ransoms and booty. When these ceased, luxury continuing, embarrassment became general.[5] But when Philip's energies were seen to be mainly bent on killing out heresy, the discontented nobles began to lean to the side of the persecuted commonalty. At the first formation of the Confederacy of the "Beggars" in 1566, almost the only zealous Protestant among the leaders was William's impetuous brother Louis of Nassau, a Calvinist by training, who had for comrade the bibulous Brederode. The name of "Gueux," given to the malcontents in contempt by the councillor Berlaimont, had direct application to the known poverty or embarrassment of the great majority.[6] There was thus undisguisedly at work in the Netherlands the great economic force which had brought about "the Reformation" in all the Teutonic countries; and the needy nobles insensibly grew Protestant as it became more and more clear that only the lands of the Church could restore their fortunes.[7] This holds despite the

[1] Motley, *Rise*, p. 36.

[2] See it analysed in Motley, pp. 134, 135.

[3] Asked by his vicegerent Margaret of Parma to introduce the Spanish Inquisition, he pointed out that already "the Inquisition of the Netherlands is much more pitiless than that of Spain" (Motley, p. 174; cp. p. 81).

[4] It was an old source of income (Davies, i. 617; cp. Motley, p. 78).

[5] "The aristocracy of the Netherlands was excessively extravagant, dissipated, and already considerably embarrassed in circumstances" (Motley, p. 129; cp. pp. 125, 130, 131).

[6] Cp. Grattan, p. 106; Motley, as last cited.

[7] See the admissions of Motley, p. 131.

fact that the more intelligent Protestantism which latterly spread among the people was the comparatively democratic form set up by Calvin, which reached the Low Countries through France, finding the readier reception among the serious because of the prestige accruing to its austerity as against the moral disrepute which now covered the German forms.

As to the proportional success of Lutheranism and Calvinism, see Motley, pp. 132, 133; and Grattan, pp. 110, 111. (On p. 110 of Grattan there is a transposition of "second" and "third" groups, which the context corrects.) Motley, an inveterate Celtophobe, is at pains to make out that the Walloons rebelled first and were first reconciled to Rome, "exactly like their Celtic ancestors, fifteen centuries earlier." He omits to comment on the fact that it was only the French form of Protestantism, that of Calvin, that became viable in the Netherlands at all, or on the fact that indecent Anabaptism flourished mainly in Friesland; though he admits that the Lutheran movement left all religious rights in the hands of the princes, the people having to follow the creed of their rulers. The "racial" explanation is mere obscurantism, here as always. The Walloons of South Flanders were first affected simply because they were first in touch with Huguenotism. That they were never converted in large numbers to Protestantism is later admitted by Motley himself (p. 797), who thereupon speaks of the "intense attachment to the Roman ceremonial which distinguished the Walloon population." Thus his earlier statement that they had rebelled against "papal Rome" is admittedly false. They had rebelled simply against the Spanish tyranny. Yet the false statement is left standing—one more illustration of the havoc that may be worked in a historian's intelligence by a prejudice. (For other instances see, in the author's volume *The Saxon and the Celt*, the chapters dealing with Mommsen and Burton.) It was the Teutonic-speaking city populations of North Flanders and Brabant who became Protestants in mass after the troubles had begun (Motley, p. 798). When the Walloon provinces withdrew from the combination against Spain, the cities of Ghent, Antwerp, Bruges, and Ypres joined the Dutch Union of Utrecht. They were one and all reduced by the skill and power of Alexander of Parma, who thereupon abolished the freedom of Protestant worship. The Protestants fled in thousands to England and the Dutch provinces, the remaining population, albeit mostly Teutonic, becoming Catholic. At this moment one-and-a-half of the four-and-a-half

millions of Dutch are Catholics; while in Belgium, where there are hardly any Protestants, the Flemish-speaking and French-speaking populations are nearly equal in numbers.

Van Kampen, who anticipated Motley in disparaging the Walloons as being Frenchly fickle (*Geschichte*, i. 366) proceeds to contend that even the Flemings are more excitable than the Dutch and other Teutons; but noted later that as the Dutch poet Cats was much read and imitated in Belgium he was thus proved to have expressed the spirit of the whole Netherlands (ii. 109).

Thus the systematic savagery of the Inquisition under Philip, for which the people at first blamed not at all the king but his Flemish minister, Cardinal Granvelle, served rather to make a basis and pretext for organised revolt than directly to kindle it. In so far as the people spontaneously resorted to violence, in the image-breaking riots, they compromised and imperilled the nationalist movement in the act of precipitating it. The king's personal equation, finally, served to make an enemy of the masterly William of Orange, who, financially embarrassed like the lesser nobility,[1] could have been retained as an administrator by a wise monarch. A matter so overlaid with historical declamation is hard to set in a clear light; but it may serve to say of William that he was made a "patriot," as was Robert the Bruce, by stress of circumstances;[2] and that in the one case as in the other it was exceptional character and capacity that made patriotism a success;[3] William in particular having to maintain himself against continual domestic enmity, patrician as well as popular. Nothing short of the ferocity and rapacity of the Spanish attack, indeed, could have long united the Netherlands. The first confederacy dissolved at the approach of Alva, who, strong in soldiership but incapable of a statesmanlike settlement, drove the Dutch

[1] Motley, p. 125.

[2] See Davies, ii. 149, 150, for a criticism of William's development, worth considering as against the unmixed panegyric of Motley.

[3] Cp. M'Cullagh, p. 211.

provinces to extremities by his cruelty, caused a hundred thousand artisans and traders to fly with their industry and capital, exasperated even the Catholic ministers in Flanders by his proposed taxes, and finally by imposing them enraged into fresh revolt the people he had crushed and terrorised, till they were eager to offer the sovereignty to the queen of England. When Requesens came with pacificatory intentions, it was too late; and the Pacification of Ghent (1576) was but a breathing-space between grapples.

What finally determined the separation and independence of the Dutch Provinces was their maritime strength. Antwerp, trading largely on foreign bottoms, represented wealth without the then indispensable weapons. Dutch success begins significantly with the taking of Brill (1572) by the gang of William van der Marck, mostly pirates and ruffians, whose methods William of Orange could not endure.[1] But they had shown the military basis for the maritime States. It was the Dutch fleet that prevented Parma's from joining "the" Armada under Medina-Sidonia,[2] thereby perhaps saving England. Such military genius and energy as Parma's might have made things go hard with the Dutch States had he lived, or had he not been called off against his judgment to fight in France; but his death well balanced the assassination of William of Orange, who had thus far been the great sustainer and welder of the movement of independence. Plotted against and vilified by the demagogues of Ghent, betrayed by worthless fellow nobles, Teutonic and French alike; chronically insulted in his own person and humiliated in that of his brother John, whom the States treated with unexampled meanness; stupidly resisted in his own leadership by the same States, whose egoism left Maestricht to its fate when he bade them help, and who

[1] Motley, pp. 462-67, 506, 527, 829. [2] Van Kampen, i. 512.

cast on him the blame when it fell; thwarted and crippled by the fanaticism and intolerant violence of the Protestant mobs of the towns; bereaved again and again in the vicissitude of the struggle, he turned to irrelevance all imputations of self-seeking; and in his unfailing sagacity and fortitude he finally matches any aristocrat statesman in history. Doubtless he would have served Philip well had Philip chosen him and trusted him. But as it lay in one thoroughly able man, well placed for prestige in a crisis, to knit and establish a new nation, so it lay in one fanatical dullard[1] to wreck half of his own empire, with the greatest captains of his age serving him; and to bring his fabled treasury to ruin while his despised rebels grew rich.

As to the vice of the Dutch constitution, the principle of the supremacy of "State rights," see M'Cullagh, p. 215; Motley, *Rise*, pp. 794, 795 (Pt. vi. ch. ii. *end*), and *United Netherlands*, ed. 1867, iv. 564. Wicquefort (*L'histoire des Provinces-Unies*, La Haye, 1719, pp. 5, 16), following Grotius, laid stress long ago on the fact that the Estates of each province recognised no superior, not even the entire body of the Republic. It was only the measure of central government set up in the Burgundo-Austrian and Spanish periods that made the Seven Provinces capable of enough united action to repel Spanish rule during a chronic struggle of eighty years. Cp. Van Kampen (i. 304), who points out (p. 306) that the word "State" first appears in Holland in the 15th century. It arose in Flanders in the 13th, and in Brabant in the 14th. Only in 1581, after some years of war, did the United Provinces set up a General Executive Council. In the same year, the Prince of Orange was chosen sovereign (Motley, pp. 838, 841).

§ 3. *The Supremacy of Dutch Commerce*

The conquest of Flanders by Parma, reducing its plains to wolf-haunted wildernesses, and driving the great mass of the remaining artisans from its ruined

[1] While Charles V. spoke all the languages of his empire, Philip spoke only Spanish. Motley, p. 74. See the notes for a sample of his cast of mind.

towns,[1] helped to consummate the prosperity of the United Provinces, who took over the industry of Ghent with the commerce of Antwerp.[2] Getting the start of all northern Europe in trade, they had become at the date of their assured independence the chief trading State in the world. Whatever commercial common-sense the world had yet acquired was there in force. And inasmuch as the wealth and strength of these almost landless States, with their mostly poor soil and unavoidably heavy imposts, depended so visibly on quantity of trade turn-over, they not only continued to offer a special welcome to all immigrants but gradually learned to forego the congenial Protestant strife of sects. It was indeed a reluctantly learned lesson. Even as local patriotisms constantly tended to hamper unity during even the period of struggle, so the primary spirit of self-assertion set the ruling Calvinistic party upon persecuting not only Catholics and Lutherans but the new heresy of Arminianism;[3] so little does "patriotic" warfare make for fraternity in peace. The judicial murder of the statesman John van Olden Barneveldt (1619) at the hands of Maurice of Orange, whom he had guarded in childhood and trained to statesmanship, was accomplished as a sequel to the formal proscription of the Arminian heresy in the Synod of Dort; and he was formally condemned for "troubling God's Church" as well as on the charge of treason.[4] On the same pretexts Grotius was thrown into prison; and the freedom of the press was suspended.[5] It was

[1] Davies, ii. 199.

[2] M'Culloch (*Treatises*, p. 347) states that even in its prosperous period, Antwerp had little shipping of its own. He refers to Guicciardini's *Descrizzione*, but I cannot trace the testimony; and Guicciardini, while speaking of the multitudes of foreigners always at Antwerp (French tr. ed. 1625, fol. p. 114), mentions that the population included a great number of mariners (p. 95).

[3] Grattan, pp. 232, 233, 237; Davies, ii. 452-65, etc.; Motley, *United Netherlands*, ed. 1867, iv. 537.

[4] Van Kampen, ii. 35.

[5] *Id.* p. 37.

doubtless the shame of the memory of the execution of Barneveldt (the true founder of the Republic as such),[1] on an absolutely false charge of treason, and the perception that, as elsewhere, persecution drove away population, that mainly wrought for the erection of tolerance (at least as between Protestant sects) into a State principle.

The best side of the Dutch polity was its finance, which was a lesson to all Europe. Already in the early stages of the struggle with Spain, the States were able to make war on credit, in virtue of their character for commercial honour. Where the king of Spain, with all his revenues mortgaged past hope,[2] got from the Pope an absolution from the payment of interest on the sums borrowed from Spanish and Genoese merchants, and so ruined his credit,[3] the Dutch issued tin money and paper money, and found it readily pass current with friends and foes.[4]

Of all the Protestant countries, excepting Switzerland, the Dutch States alone disposed of their confiscated church lands in the public interest.[5] There was indeed comparatively little to sell,[6] and the money was sorely needed to carry on the war; but the transaction seems to have been carried through without any corruption. It was the suggestion of what might be accomplished in statecraft by the new *expertise* of trade, forced into the paths of public spirit and checked by a stress of public opinion such as had never come into play in Venice. Against such a power as Spain, energy ruled by un-

[1] Van Kampen, ii. 36.

[2] Motley, *Rise*, p. 149.

[3] Davies, ii. 304.

[4] Davies, ii. 32, 33. Cp. G. Brandt, *History of the Reformation in the Low Countries*, Eng. tr. 1720, folio, B. xi. i. 310.

[5] Cp. Motley, *Rise*, pp. 581, 646; *United Netherlands*, iv. 558; M'Cullagh, p. 206 (where the chronology is inaccurate).

[6] See Motley, *Rise*, pp. 37, 38, as to the curtailment of clerical wealth in the Netherlands from the 13th to the 15th centuries, by the feudal sovereigns who, unlike their overlords, did not need to look to the church for support.

teachable unintelligence, a world-empire financed by the expedients of provincial feudalism, the Dutch needed only an enduring resentment to sustain them, and this Philip amply elicited. Had he spent on light cruisers for the destruction of Dutch commerce the treasure he wasted on the Armadas against England and on his enormous operations by land, typified in the monstrous siege of Antwerp, he might have struck swiftly and surely at the very arteries of Dutch life; but in yielding to them the command of their primary source and channel of wealth, the sea, he insured their ultimate success. In the Franco-Spanish war of 1521-25 the French cruisers nearly ruined the herring fishery of Holland and Zealand;[1] and it was doubtless the memory of that plight that set the States on maintaining predominant power at sea.[2]

Throughout the war, which from first to last spread over eighty years, the Dutch commerce grew while that of Spain dwindled. Under Charles V. Flanders and Brabant alone had paid nearly two-thirds of the whole imperial taxation of the Netherlands;[3] but after a generation or two the United Provinces must have been on an equality of financial resources with those left under Spanish rule, even in a state of peace. Yet in this state of things there had grown up a burden which represented, in the warring commercial State, the persistent principle of class parasitism; for at the Peace of Munster (1648) the funded public debt of the province of Holland alone amounted to nearly 150,000,000 florins, bearing interest at five per cent.[4] Of this annual charge, the bulk must have gone into the

[1] Grattan, p. 69; Davies, i. 294.

[2] Cp. the *Mémoires de Jean De Witt*, as cited, p. 101, Ptie. ii. ch. 2.

[3] Grattan, p. 71.

[4] Davies, ii. 636. Already at the death of Charles V. the debt of the entire Netherlands was five or six million florins. At the armistice of 1609 the debt of the province of Holland alone was twenty-six millions. By 1648 the war was reckoned to have cost Spain in all fifteen hundred millions. M'Cullagh, ii. 330, 331.

pockets of the wealthier citizens, who had thus secured a mortgage on the entire industry of the nation. All the while, Holland was nominally rich in "possessions" beyond sea. When, in 1580, Philip annexed Portugal, with which the Dutch had hitherto carried on a profitable trade for the eastern products brought as tribute to Lisbon, they began to cast about for an Asiatic trade of their own, first seeking vainly for a north-east passage. The need was heightened when in 1586 Philip, who as a rule ignored the presence of Dutch traders in his ports under friendly flags, arrested all the Dutch shipping he could lay hands on;[1] and when in 1594 he closed to them the port of Lisbon, he forced them to a course which his successors bitterly rued. In 1595 they commenced trading by the Cape passage to the Indies, and a fleet sent out by Spain to put down their enterprise was as usual defeated.[2] Then arose a multitude of companies for the East Indian trade, which in 1602 were formed by the government into a great semi-official joint-stock concern, at once commercial and military, reminiscent of the Hanseatic League. The result was a long series of settlements and conquests. Amboyna and the Moluccas were seized from the Portuguese, now subordinate to Spain; Java, where a factory was founded in 1597, was in the next generation annexed; Henry Hudson, an English pilot in the Dutch Company's service, discovered the Hudson River and Bay in 1609, and founded New Amsterdam about 1624. In 1621 was formed the Dutch West India Company, which in fifteen years fitted out 800 ships of trade and war, captured 545 from the Spanish and Portuguese, with cargoes valued at 90,000,000 florins, and conquered the greater part of what had been the Portuguese empire in Brazil.

[1] Davies, ii. 290.

[2] Of 250 Dutchmen who sailed, however, only 90 returned.

No such commercial development had before been seen in Europe. About 1560, according to Guicciardini,[1] 500 ships had been known to come and go in a day from Antwerp harbour in the island of Walcheren; but in the spring of 1599, it is recorded, 640 ships in the Baltic trade alone discharged cargoes at Amsterdam;[2] and in 1610, according to Delacourt, there sailed from the ports of Holland in three days, on the eastward trade alone, 800 or 900 ships and 1500 herring boats.[3] At the date of the Peace of Munster these figures were left far behind, whence had arisen a reluctance to end the war, under which commerce so notably flourished. Many Hollanders, further, had been averse to peace in the belief that it would restore Antwerp and injure their commerce, even as Prince Maurice of Orange, the republic's general and stadthouder, had been averse to it as likely to lessen his power and revenue.[4] But between 1648 and 1669 the trade increased by fifty per cent,[5] Holland taking most of the Spanish trade from the shipping of England and the Hansa, and even carrying much of the trade between Spain and her colonies. When the Dutch had thus a mercantile marine of 10,000 sail and 168,000 men, the English carried only 27,196 men; and the Dutch shipping was probably greater than that of all the rest of Europe together.[6]

This body of trade, as has been seen, was built up by a State which, broadly speaking, had a surplus wealth-producing power in only one direction, that of fishing; and even of its fishing, much was done on the coasts of other nations. In that industry, about 1610,

[1] *Description des Pays Bas*, ed. 1625, p. 319.
[2] Davies, ii. 328.
[3] *Mémoires de Jean De Witt*, as cited, p. 21.
[4] Davies, ii. 407. The clergy were of the war party.
[5] *Mémoires* cited, p. 194.
[6] M'Culloch, p. 353; Macpherson, *Annals of Commerce*, 1804, ii. 596; Petty, *Essays*, ed. 1699, p. 165.

it employed over 200,000 men; and the Greenland whale fishery, which was a monopoly from 1614 to 1645, began to expand rapidly when set free,[1] till in 1670 it employed 120 ships.[2] For the rest, though the country exported dairy produce, its total food product was not equal to its consumption; and as it had no minerals and no vineyards, its surplus wealth came from the four sources of fishing, freightage, extorted colonial produce, and profits on the handling of goods bought and sold. *Par excellence*, it was in the phrase of Louis XIV. the nation of shopkeepers, of middlemen; and its long supremacy in the business of buying cheap and selling dear was due firstly to economy of means and consumption, and secondarily to command of accumulated money capital at low rates of interest. The sinking of interest was the first sign that the limits to its commercial expansion were being reached; but it belonged to the conditions that, with or without "empire," its advantage must begin to fall away as soon as rival States were able to compete with it in the economies of "production" in the sense of transport and transfer.

In such economies, the Dutch superiority grew out of the specially practical basis of their marine—habitual fishing and the constant use of canals. There is no better way than the former of building up seamanship; and just as the Portuguese grew from hardy fishers to daring navigators, so the Dutch grew from thrifty fishers and bargemen to thrifty handlers of sea-freight, surpassing in economy the shippers of England as they did in seamanship the marine of Spain. Broadly speaking, the navies which owed most to royal fostering—as those of Spain, France, and in part England—were the later to reach efficiency in the degree of their artificiality; and the loss of one great Spanish navy after

[1] *Mémoires* cited, pp. 48, 50. [2] Davies, iii. 556.

another in storms must be held to imply a lack of due experience on the part of their officers.

One of the worst military mistakes of Spain was the creation of great galleons in preference to small cruisers. The sight of the big ships terrorised the Dutch once, in 1606; but as all existing sea-craft had been built up in small vessels, there was no sufficient science for the navigation of the great ones in stress of weather, or even for the building of them on sound lines. The English and Dutch, on the other hand, fought in vessels of the kind they had always been wont to handle, increasing their size only by slow degrees. In the reign of Henry VIII., again, nothing came of the English expeditions of discovery fitted out by him (Schanz, *Englische Handelspolitik*, i. 321), but private voyages were successfully made by traders (*id.* pp. 321, 327).

In the seventeenth century, however, and until far on in the eighteenth, all Dutch shipping was more economically managed than the English. Raleigh was one of the first to point out that the broad Dutch boats carried more cargo with fewer hands than those of any other nation (*Observations touching Trade*, in Works, ed. 1829, viii. 356). Later in the century, Petty noted that the Dutch practised freight-economies and adaptations of every kind, having different sorts of vessels for different kinds of traffic (*Essays in Political Arithmetic* (1690), ed. 1699, pp. 179, 180, 182, 183). This again gave them the primacy in shipbuilding for the whole of Europe (*Mémoires de Jean de Witt*, ptie. i. ch. vi.), though they imported all the materials for the purpose. When Colbert began navy-building, his first care was to bring in Dutch shipwrights (Dussieux, *Étude biographique sur Colbert*, 1886, p. 101). Compare, as to the speedy sailing of the Dutch, Motley, *United Netherlands*, ed. 1867, iv. 556. In the next century, the English marine had similar economic advantages over the French, which was burdened by royal schemes for multiplying seamen (see Tucker, *Essay on Trade*, 4th ed. p. 37).

The frugality which pervaded the whole of Dutch life may however have had one directly disastrous effect. Sir William Temple noted that the common people were poorly fed (*Observations upon the United Provinces*, ch. iv., Works, ed. 1814, i. 133, 147); and though their fighting ships were manned by men of all nations, the tendency was to feed them in the native fashion. Such a practice would tell fatally in the sea-fights with the English. Cp. Gardiner, *Commonwealth and Protectorate*, ii. 123.

In addition to this expertness in handling, the Dutch traders seemed to have bettered the lesson taught them

by the practice of the Hansa, as to the importance of keeping up a high character for probity. At a time when British goods were open to more or less general suspicion as being of short measure or bad quality,[1] the Dutch practice was to insure by inspection the right quality and quantity of all packed goods, especially the salted herrings, which were still the largest source of Dutch income.[2] And that nothing might be left undone to secure the concourse of commerce to their ports, they maintained under almost every stress[3] of financial hardship the principle of minimum duties on imports of every description. Thus it came about that landless Amsterdam was the chief European storehouse for grain, and treeless Holland the greatest centre of the timber trade. Before such a spectacle the average man held up his hands and confessed the incomparable ingenuity of the Hollanders. But others saw and stated the causation clearly enough. "Many writing on this subject," remarks Sir William Petty, "do magnifie the Hollanders as if they were more, and all other nations less, than men, as to the matters of trade and policy; making them angels, and all others fools, brutes, and sots, as to those particulars; whereas," he continues, giving a sound lesson in social science to his generation, "I take the foundation of their achievements to be originally in the situation of the country, whereby they do things inimitable by others, and have advantages whereof others are incapable."[4] And Sir Josiah Child, of the same generation, declared similarly against transcendentalism in such matters. "If any," he roundly declares, "shall tell me it is the nature of those people

[1] Cp. Tucker, *Essay on Trade*, 4th ed., p. 57.

[2] Latterly the regulations failed to check fraud, and even hampered trade (M'Culloch, *Treatises*, p. 371). But for a long time the effect was to sustain the business credit of the Dutch.

[3] Cp. *Mémoires de Jean de Witt*, p. 103, as to exceptions.

[4] *Essays in Political Arithmetic*, ed. 1699, p. 170. Cp. p. 181.

to be thrifty, I answer, *all men by nature are alike;* it is only laws, custom, and education that differ men; their nature and disposition, and the disposition of all people in the world, proceed from their laws."[1] For "laws" read "circumstances and institutions," adding reservations as to climate and temperament and variation of capacity and bias, and the proposition is the essence of all sociology. Economic lessons which Petty and Child could not master have since been learned; but their higher wisdom has hardly yet been assimilated.

The sufficient proof that Holland had no abnormal enlightenment even in commerce was that like her rivals she continued to maintain the system of monopoly companies. Her "empire" in the East, to which was falsely ascribed so much of her wealth, in reality stood for very little sound commerce. The East India Company being conducted on high monopoly lines, the profits were made rather through the smallness than the greatness of the trade done. Thus, while the Company paid enormous dividends,[2] the imports of spice were kept at a minimum, in order to maintain the price, large quantities being actually destroyed for the purpose. For a time they contrived to raise pepper to double the old Portuguese price.[3] Such methods brought it about that when the republic had in all 10,000 sail, the East India trade employed only ten or twelve ships.[4] All the while, the small class of capitalists who owned the shares were able to satisfy the people that the merely monetary and factitious riches thus secured to the Company's shareholders was a form of public wealth.[5]

[1] *New Discourse on Trade*, 4th ed. p. 61.

[2] For the years 1605-10, an average of 36 per cent; for 1616, 62½ per cent.

[3] M'Culloch, *Treatises*, pp. 366-67, and refs. It is told in the *Mémoires de Jean de Witt* (as cited, p. 52, *note*, ptie. i. ch. xi.) that cargoes of pepper were wilfully sunk near port.

[4] *Mémoires* cited, pp. 24, 51, 52.

[5] M'Culloch, pp. 368-69. The Dutch ideal being almost necessarily one of

It is a complete error to say, as did Professor Seeley (*Expansion of England*, p. 112), that Holland "made her fortune in the world" because the war with Spain "threw open to her attack the whole boundless possessions of her antagonist in the New World, which would have been closed to her in peace. By conquest she made for herself an empire, and this empire made her rich." In the first place it was not in the New World that she mainly sought her empire, but in the East Indies, in the sphere of the Portuguese conquests. Her hold of Brazil lasted only from 1621 to 1654, and was not a great source of wealth, though she captured much Spanish and Portuguese shipping. But even her eastern trade was, as we have seen, small in quantity, and as a source of wealth was not to be compared with the herring fishery. In 1601 John Keymor demonstrated that more wealth was produced by the northern fisheries "in one year than the King of Spain hath from the Indies in four" (*Observations made upon the Dutch Fishing about the Year* 1601). The professor's statement cannot have proceeded on any comparison of the European Dutch trade with the revenue from the conquered "empire." It stands for an endorsement of the vulgar delusion that "possessions" are the great sources of a nation's wealth, though Seeley elsewhere (p. 294) protests against the "bombastic language of this school," and notes that "England is not, directly at least, any the richer" for her connection with her "dependencies."

Against this class-interest the republican party, as led and represented by De Witt, were strongly opposed. They could point to the expansion of the Greenland whaling trade that had followed on the abolition of the original monopoly in that adventure—an increase of from ten to fifteen times the old quantity of product[1]—and the treatise embodying their policy strongly condemned the remaining monopolies of all kinds. But there was no sufficient body of enlightened public opinion to support the attack; and the menaced interests spontaneously turned to the factor which could best maintain them against such pressure—the military power of the House of Orange. The capitalist mono-

small consumption and accumulation of nominal or money capital, there was no improvement in the popular standard of comfort.

[1] *Mémoires* cited, ptie. i. ch. x., xi. pp. 47, 48, 50.

polists and "imperialists" of the republic were thus the means first of artificially limiting its economic basis, and later of subverting its republican constitution—a disservice which somewhat outweighs the credit earned by them as by the merchant oligarchies of Venice for an admirable management of their army.[1]

§ 4. *Home and Foreign Policy*

The vital part played by William the Silent at the outset of the war of independence gave his house a decisive predominance in the affairs of the republic. As always, the state of war favoured the rule of the imperator. Fanatical clergy and populace alike were always loud in support of the lineage of the Deliverer; and with their help William's son Maurice was able to put to death Barneveldt. Then and afterwards, accordingly, war was more or less the Orange interest; and after the Peace of Munster we find the republican party sedulous at once to keep the peace and to limit the power of the hereditary stadthouder. The latter, William II., aged twenty-four, having on his side the great capitalists, tried force in a fashion which promised desperate trouble,[2] but died at the crisis (1650), his only child being born a week after his death.

It was substantially the pressure of the Orange interest, thus situated, that led to the first naval war between Holland and England, both then republics, and both Protestant. Orangeist mobs, zealous for Charles I. as the father of the Princess of Orange, insulted the English republican ambassadors who had come to negotiate on Cromwell's impossible scheme for a union of the two republics; and the prompt result was the

[1] Motley, *United Netherlands*, iv. 561, 562.

[2] As to the stress of party spirit in Holland about this period, see Davies, ii. 725, 726.

Navigation Act,[1] intended to hurt Dutch commerce. It was really powerless for that purpose ; but the Dutch people in general believed otherwise, and being not only independent but bellicose, they were as ready as Puritan England for a struggle at sea. While, however, they held their ground in the main as fighters, they suffered heavily in their trade. By 1653 they had lost over sixteen hundred ships through English privateering ; so that the two years of the English war had done them more injury than the eighty years of the Spanish.[2] Accordingly, though forced again to war by Charles II., the republican party put it as a maxim of policy that Dutch prosperity depended on peace.[3] It is nevertheless one of the tragedies of their history that John de Witt, the great statesman who owed most heed to this maxim,[4] was inveigled by the English Government into an ill-judged alliance against France, then deserted by England, whereupon the republic was invaded by France, and De Witt was murdered by his own people. Of all the nations of Europe the Dutch were then the best educated ; but no more than ancient Athens had their republic contrived to educate its mob. The result was a frightful moral catastrophe.

It is easy at this time of day to find fault with De Witt's policy of two hundred years ago, but hard to reckon aright the practical possibilities of his situation. Suffice it to say that the formation of the Triple Alliance

[1] See hereinafter, Part vi. ch. ii. § 5.

[2] Davies, ii. 721 ; Van Kampen, ii. 149. Cp. Temple, *Essay upon the Advancement of Trade in Ireland*, Works, iii. 15, 16.

[3] *Mémoires de Jean de Witt*, ptie. ii. ch. ii. iii. (iii. iv.). It is there noted (ch. ii. p. 113) that when in time of war the States-General gave letters of marque to privateers there were always bitter complaints that the Dutch privateers took Dutch goods as well as the enemy's. Again it is asked (p. 163) "What plunder is there for us to gain at sea when we are almost the only traffickers ? "

[4] It is to be noted that De Witt diverged fatally from the doctrine of his friend Delacourt in thus leaning to foreign alliances, which Delacourt altogether opposed. See Lefèvre Pontalis, *Jean de Witt*, 1884, i. 317-18, where an interesting account of the *Mémoires* is given.

of Holland, England, and Sweden against Louis XIV. proved a ruinous mistake. France had supported the republic against Spain; and Louis had stood by it when Charles II. invited him to join in dismembering it. Yet, after sending its fleet up the Medway and forcing Charles to the humiliating Peace of Breda, and in the full knowledge that he hated the republic which had harboured and criticised him, De Witt was persuaded by Sir William Temple, the English ambassador, to sign albeit reluctantly[1] a treaty of union (1668) which made France a strenuous enemy, and from which Charles nevertheless instantly drew back, leaving Holland open to French invasion. It was the bane of the diplomacy of the age to be perpetually planning alliances on all hands by way of maintaining the "balance of power"; and De Witt, while justly suspicious of England, could not be content to drop the system. His excuse was that Louis was avowedly bent on the acquisition or control of the Spanish Netherlands; and that after that there would be small security for the republic. Yet he had better have remained the ally of France than leant on the broken reeds of the friendship of Spain and the English king. Charles needed only to appeal to the English East India Company, whose monopoly was pitted against that of the Dutch Company, to secure a parliamentary backing for a fresh war with Holland; and the sudden invasion of the republic by France was the ruin of the De Witts. It was an Orange mob that murdered them; and the young William of Orange pensioned those who had formally accused them of treason.

The hostility of France on the one hand practically ended Dutch republicanism, and on the other hand

[1] Davies, iii. 68, 69; Rogers, *Holland*, p. 266. Temple was of course the unconscious instrument of the treachery of Charles. Cp. Lefèvre Pontalis, *Jean de Witt*, i. 451-55.

brought about the wreck of the "empire" of Louis XIV. Had he accepted the submission offered by De Witt, he might have made a sure ally of Holland as against England. But his policy of conquest, insolently formulated by his minister Louvois, first put the Dutch Government in the hands of the Prince of Orange, and then turned the English interest, despite the king, against France. It may be taken as a law of European politics that any power which arrogantly sets itself to overbear the others will itself in the course of one or two generations be beaten to its knees. The end of the insolent aggression of Louis came when, after William had become King of England and set up a new tradition of Protestant union against France, the military genius of Marlborough in the next reign reduced France to extremities. Meanwhile Holland was past its period of commercial climax, past the ideals of De Witt, past republicanism for another era. Henceforth it was to be subservient to its stadthouder, and to become ultimately a kingdom, on the failure of the republican movement at the French Revolution.

§ 5. *The Decline of Commercial Supremacy*

It follows from what has been seen of the conditions of its success that the Dutch trade could not continue to eclipse that of rival States with greater natural sources of wealth when once these had learned to compete with Dutch methods. But it belonged to the culture-conditions that the rival States should take long to learn the lesson, and that the Dutch should be the first to adapt themselves to new circumstances. The blunders of their enemies lengthened the Dutch lease. Louis XIV. gave one last vast demonstration of what Catholicism can avail to wreck States by revoking the Edict of

Nantes (1686), and so driving from France a quarter of a million of industrious subjects, part of whom went to England, many to Switzerland, but most to Holland, conveying their capital and their handicrafts with them. The stroke hastened the financial as well as the military exhaustion of France in the next twenty-five years. England, on the other hand, maintained its trade monopolies, which, with the system of imports, drove over to the Dutch and the French much trade that a better policy might have kept.[1] But all the Dutch advantages were consummated in the command of money capital at low rates of interest, and consequent capacity to trade for small profits.

This accumulation of money capital was the correlative of the main conditions of Dutch commerce. A community drawing its income—save for the great resource of fishing—from its middleman-profits and freightage, and from its manufacture of other nations' raw products in competition with their own manufacture, must needs save credit capital for its own commerce' sake. Thus, whereas the earlier Flemings were luxurious in their expenditure,[2] the Dutch middle-class were the most frugal in north-western Europe,[3] their one luxury being the laudable one of picture-buying. But when through mere increase of population and consequently of trade, interest gradually fell[4] in the rival communities, who in turn could practise fishing, who had better harbours, who extended their marine commerce, began to manufacture for themselves, and had

[1] Cp. Child, *New Discourse of Trade*, 4th ed. pref. pp. xx.-xxv.; Tucker, *Essay on Trade*, 4th ed. pp. 28, 47-57.

[2] Cp. Grattan, p. 75.

[3] "Never any country traded so much and consumed so little; they buy infinitely, but it is to sell again." "They furnish infinite luxury, which they never practise, and traffic in pleasures which they never taste." Temple, *Observations*, 1814 ed. of Works, i. 176. Cp. Motley, *United Netherlands*, iv. 559. Sometimes the citizens were taxed 50 per cent on their incomes.

[4] M'Culloch's dictum that the low rate of interest in Holland was wholly due to heavy taxation is an evident fallacy, framed in the interest of *laissez-faire*.

natural resources for barter and production that Holland wholly lacked, the Dutch trade slowly but surely fell away. And as against the sustaining force of their frugality and their systematic utilisation of their labour-power, they lay under burdens which outweighed even those imposed on France and England by bad government. Not only did the national debt force a multiplication of imposts on every article of home consumption :[1] but the constant cost of the maintenance of the sea-dykes was a grievous natural tax from which there was no escape. Nor would the creditor class on any score consent to forego their bond.

Thus it came about that after the Peace of Utrecht (1713), which left Holland deeper in debt than ever, there was an admitted decline in the national turnover from decade to decade. It is one of the fallacies of the non-economic interpretation of history to speak of the United Provinces as thenceforth showing a moral "languor :"[2] the rational explanation is that their total economic nutrition was curtailed by the competing environment. Yet it must be admitted that the merchant class themselves, when called on by the stadthouder William IV. to compare notes as to the decline, showed little recognition of the natural causes beyond dwelling on the effect of heavy taxes, which had been insisted on long before by the party of De Witt.[3] Dwelling as they do on the value of the old maxims of toleration, which were now beside the case, and failing to realise that the sheer produce of the other countries

[1] It was a common saying at Amsterdam in the seventeenth century that every dish of fish was paid for once to the fishermen and six times to the State. See *La Richesse de Hollande*, 1778, ii. 21-42, for details of the extraordinary multiplication of Dutch taxes from the war-period onwards. In Temple's time, a common fish-sauce paid thirty different duties (*Observations*, in Works, i. 187). And still taxes increased. Cp. Smith, *Wealth of Nations*, M'Culloch's ed. 1839, pp. 396, 397, 411.

[2] So Seeley, *Expansion of England*, p. 132.

[3] See the Dissertation drawn up on this occasion (1750), Eng. tr. 1751. It is largely quoted from by M'Culloch, *Treatises*, pp. 354-62.

was a decisive factor in competition, they seem to invite such a reaction in economic theory as was set up by the French Physiocrats, who laid their finger on this as the central fact in industrial life.

France, indeed, had learned other vital lessons after the great defeat of Louis XIV. Nothing in the history of that age is more remarkable than the fashion in which the immense blunder of the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes was cured under the Regency and under Louis XV. by the infiltration of fresh population. Dean Tucker noted, what the Dutch merchants apparently did not, that "Flanders, all Germany on this side of the Rhine, Switzerland, Savoy, and some parts of Italy, pour their supernumerary hands every year into France" (*Essay on Trade*, 4th ed. p. 27). At that time, (1750) there were said to be 10,000 Swiss and Germans in Lyons alone, and the numbers of immigrants in all the commercial towns were increasing (*id.* pp. 27, 28), the government having become "particularly gentle and indulgent to foreigners." At that period, too, the French peasantry were prolific (*id.* p. 45).

Above all, the Dutch Provinces were bound to be outclassed in manufactures by England when England began to manufacture by machinery and by steam. Anciently well-forested,[1] they had long been nearly bare of wood, so that their fuel had become, as it still is, scarce and expensive.[2] They had done wonders with windmills; but when coal came into play as driving power, the coal-producing State was bound to triumph. It must, however, be kept on record that when England's commerce had thus begun to distance that of her old rival in virtue of her mere economic basis, Englishmen were none the less ready to resort to wanton aggression. Throughout the eighteenth century, the ideal of monopoly markets continued to rule in Europe; and that ideal it was that inspired the struggles of France and England for the possession of India and North America. In the course of those imperialist wars, the

[1] Wenzelburger, *Geschichte der Niederlande*, i. 51.
[2] Laing, *Notes of a Traveller*, 1842, p. 15.

government of the elder Pitt gave to privateers the right to confiscate, as "contraband of war," nearly all manner of commerce between France and other nations, and in particular that of Holland, Pitt's aim being to force the Dutch into his alliance against France. The injury thus wrought to their trade was enormous. "Perhaps at no time in history were more outrageous injuries perpetuated on a neutral nation than those which the Dutch suffered from the English during the time of the elder Pitt's administration."[1] It was the method of imperialism: and the usual sequel was at hand in the revolt of the American Colonies. In that crisis also, because the Dutch Council of State, despite the wish of the stadthouder, refused to take part against the Colonies, the English Government as before gave letters of marque to privateers: and told the plundered Dutch that if they increased their fleet to protect their own commerce the action would be taken as hostile. "In 1779, the English commander, Fielding, captured the Dutch mercantile fleet, with four Dutch men-of-war; and in 1780, Yorke, the English Ambassador at the Hague, demanded subsidies from the States, whom his government had just before plundered."[2]

Needless to say, Dutch wealth and power had greatly dwindled before this insult was ventured on by the rival people. Holland's primary source of wealth, the fisheries, had been in large part appropriated by other nations, in particular by Britain, now her great competitor in that as well as in other directions.[3] But all the while, Holland's own "empire" was a main factor in her weakening. Deaf to the doctrine of De Witt, her rulers had continued to keep the East Indian trade on a monopoly basis, ruling their spice islands as

[1] Rogers, *Holland*, pp. 362, 363.
[2] Rogers, p. 365.
[3] See Smith, *Wealth of Nations*, B. iv. c. 5, as to the British encouragement of fisheries last century.

cruelly and as blindly[1] as any rival could have done; and it was the false economics and false finance bound up with their East India Company that ruined the great Bank of Amsterdam, which at the French Revolution was found to have gambled away all its funds in the affairs of the Company, in breach of the oath of the magistrates, who were the sworn custodians of the treasure. So situated, the Government could or would make no effort in the old fashion against English tyranny. The State's economic basis being in large part gone, and the capitalistic interest incapable of unifying or inspiring the nation, Holland had, so to speak, to begin life over again. But it would be a delusion to suppose that the political decline meant misery: on the contrary there was much less of that in Holland than in triumphant England. There were still wealthy citizens, as indeed always happens in times of decline of general wealth. At that very period, "the Dutch were the largest creditors of any nation in Europe";[2] and Smith in 1776 testified that Holland was "in proportion to the extent of the land and the number of its inhabitants by far the richest country in Europe," adding that it "has accordingly the greatest share of the carrying trade of Europe,"[3] and again that its capitalists had much money in British stocks. But these were not as broad foundations as the old; nor were they easily expansible, or even maintainable. As soon, indeed, as the rise of other national debts enabled them to invest abroad, they did so. Temple has recorded how, when any part of the home debt was being paid off in his time, the scripholders "received it with tears, not knowing how to dispose of it to interest with such safety and ease." England soon began to

[1] Crawford, *Eastern Archipelago*, iii. 388; (cited by M'Culloch, p. 365); Temminck, *Possessions Néerlandaises dans l'Inde Archipelagique*, 1847-49, iii. 202-11.

[2] M'Culloch, p. 363.

[3] *Wealth of Nations*, B. ii. ch. v. *end.*

relieve them of such anxiety. But though Holland could thus gain from the annual interest-tribute paid by borrowing States, as England does at this moment, such income is in the nature of things doubly precarious as well as invidious, and at a time of shrinking industry stands only for the idle life of the endowed class,[1] a factor neither industrially nor intellectually wholesome. In the main, modern Dutch life has of necessity had to find sounder bases.

§ 6. *The Culture Evolution*

From first to last, the culture-history of Holland illustrates clearly enough the importance of the freer political life to the life of the mind. It is in the period of independence that Holland begins to play a great part in European culture. Previously, the multitude of popular "chambers of rhetoric,"[2] and so forth, yielded no fine fruits; but in the stress of self-government the republic begins to produce scholars, thinkers, and men of science, who affect those of surrounding nations. Already in 1584, when nothing of the kind existed in France or England, a Dutch literary academy published a Dutch grammar;[3] and the republic was "the peculiarly learned State of Europe throughout the seventeenth century,"[4] producing more of original classical research and scholarly teaching in its small sphere than any other. Freedom and endowment of university teaching brought in such Germans as Gronovius and Graevius; and Leibnitz looked to little Holland as a model in many things for backward Ger-

[1] In 1842, Laing, who liked Holland, wrote of it as "a country full of capitalists and paupers" (*Notes of a Traveller*, p. 10). Since then has occurred the great industrial expansion.

[2] As to these see Motley, *Rise*, pp. 46-48. He admits that they were set up by French culture-contacts. But cp. Grattan, p. 75.

[3] Hallam, *Literature of Europe*, ed. 1872, iii. 249.

[4] *Id.* iv. 1.

many.[1] Printing became one of the industries of the country; and the Elzevirs were long the great classic publishers for Europe. Free universities and a free press, indeed, were the main conditions of the Dutch classical renaissance.

The conditions of progress in *belles lettres*, on the other hand, being less propitious, the development was inferior. All Europe could buy Latin books printed in Holland; but few foreigners read Dutch, and the finer native literature was sustained only by the necessarily small class which had both leisure and culture. The very devotion to culture which, as was claimed by Grotius, made the well-to-do Dutch in his youth the greatest students of languages in Europe,[2] wrought rather for the importation of foreign literature than the fostering or elevation of the native. So that though the Catholic poetess Anna Bijns,[3] and later the Catholic Spreghel, "the Dutch Ennius" (1549-1612), and Hooft, "the Dutch Tacitus" (1581-1647) made worthy beginnings, there was no great florescence. In the terms of the case, the two former represent the general Catholic culture-influence; and Hooft, eminent alike as poet and historian, owed his artistic stimulus to the three youthful years he spent in Italy, studying Italian literature.[4] Of the more celebrated native poets, Cats is prosaic, though to this day highly popular, suiting as he does the plane of taste developed under a strenuous commercialism; and Vondel alone, by his influence on Milton, enters into the blood of outside European literature.

Fanatical Calvinism,[5] again, was not primarily favourable to philosophic thought; and it is to the influence of Descartes, who made Holland his home for many years, that the possibility of the later great performance

[1] Cp. Biedermann, as cited in the author's *Buckle and his Critics*, pp. 169-173.
[2] Van Kampen, i. 608, 609. [3] Her works were issued in 1528, 1540, and 1567.
[4] Cp. Mr. Gosse's article on Dutch literature, in *Ency. Brit.* vol. xii.
[5] As to this see Cerisier, vi. 267.

of Spinoza is to be ascribed. But the impulse, once given, and sustained by such an atmosphere as was set up by Bayle and other French refugees, developed a new culture-force; and in the eighteenth century the Dutch press was a disseminator of French and English rationalism as well as of the classic erudition which still flourished. All along, though none of the supreme names in science are Dutch, scientific culture was in general higher than elsewhere.[1] Such influences made afresh for a revival of native literature, and throughout the eighteenth century it is the foreign stimulus that is seen at work. Thus Van Effen (1684-1725) read much English and wrote much French, but was also the best Dutch writer of his time; the brothers Van Haren (1710-79) were diplomatists, and friends of Voltaire; and the two lady-novelists, Wolff and Deken, produced their three admired books (1782-92) under the influence of Richardson and Goethe.

But as beside these debts to foreign example, the Dutch Republic in its time of flower produced a great and markedly native body of art, which to this day ranks in its kind with that of the great age in Italy. It may have been the example set in the Spanish Netherlands by the Austrian archdukes, after the severance, that gave the lead to the Dutch growth; but there is no imitation and nothing nationally second-rate in their total output. The Flemish Rubens (1577-1640) precedes by twenty-one years his pupil Vandyck and the great Spaniard Velasquez, and by nearly thirty years the Dutch Rembrandt; but no four contemporary masters were ever more individual; and the Dutch group of Rembrandt, Hals, Van der Helst, Gerard Dow, and the rest, will hold its own with the Flemish swarm headed by Rubens and Vandyck. It is worth while in this connection to note afresh how closely

[1] Van Kampen, i. 607, 608; ii. 106: Motley, *United Netherlands*, iv. 570.

is art florescence bound up with economic forces. Dutch and Flemish art, like Italian, is in the first place substantially a product of economic demand, the commercial aristocracy of the Netherlands commissioning and buying pictures as did the clerical aristocracy of Italy. It has been denied that there is any economic explanation for the eventual arrest of great art in the Netherlands; but when we note the special conditions of the case, the economic explanation will be found decisive.

Great art, it is true, always tends to set up a convention, which is the stoppage of greatness; but even great art can so arrest progress only when the economic and social sphere is curtailed; and the Dutch economic sphere, as we have seen, was practically non-expansive after the disaster of 1672, which date also begins a new period of ruinous war for Flanders. Rembrandt died in 1664. He and his contemporaries and their pupils had produced a body of painting immense in quantity; and the later and poorer generations, having such a body of classic work passed on to them, naturally and necessarily rested on their treasure. The population of the United Provinces, estimated to have reached a million-and-a-half in the Middle Ages,[1] had risen in the great period to three or three-and-a-half millions.[2] From this figure it positively fell away in the eighteenth century.[3] Here then was a shrinking population, loaded with old and new debt and overwhelmed with taxes, consciously growing poorer, with no prospect of recovery, and already stocked with a multitude of pictures[4] by great masters. That it should go on commissioning new pictures with the old munificence was impossible: it was more concerned to sell than to

[1] Wenzelburger, i. 54. [2] Motley, *United Netherlands*, iv. 556.

[3] At 1829 it was only 2,613,487.

[4] Some of course were destroyed by various causes. Rubens's "Descent from the Cross" at Antwerp, though repeatedly retouched, was ruined when Reynolds saw it; but the number of good pictures preserved in the Low Countries is immense.

buy; and what demand had elicited, lack of demand arrested. There is no clearer sociological case in history.

§ 7. *The Modern Situation*

After all that has come and gone, it is important to realise, in correction of the megalomaniac view of things, that Holland is to-day literally larger,[1] more populated,[2] and more productive than she was in the "palmy days"; and that her colonial "empire," now administered on just principles, includes a population of over 30,000,000. Over half-a-century ago M'Culloch wrote that "though their commerce be much decayed, the Dutch, even at this moment, are *the richest and most comfortable people of Europe.*"[3] The statement would not be very far out to-day, though popular comfort does not keep pace with population.

In detail, the commercial situation of to-day is curiously like the old at many points. The debt is still relatively great—about £90,000,000 sterling; and about a fourth of the whole expenditure is interest; another fourth going for "defence." Always making the best of their soil, alike with roots and cereals, the people go on increasing the area under cultivation, and the yield per hectare.[4] Still, as of old, much food and raw material is imported to be exported again[5]—in large part to Germany. Fishing now employs only 15,000 men with over 4000 boats; the annual product is valued at only £500,000; and of over 9000 clearances of vessels from Dutch ports in 1891, only 2644 were

[1] In 1833 there were 2,270,959 hectares of land = 8768 square miles. In 1877 there were 3,297,268 hectares = 12,731 square miles—the result of systematic reclamation from sea and river. [2] Population in 1897, slightly over 5,000,000.

[3] Compare, however, the verdict of Laing, cited above, p. 334, *note*.

[4] Chief crops, rye, oats, potatoes.

[5] The clear exports are chiefly margarine, butter, cheese, leather, paper, manufactured woollen and cotton cloths, flax, vegetables, potato-flour, oxen, and sheep. In 1891 Great Britain imported from the Netherlands £3,093,595 worth of margarine, and £770,460 worth of butter.

Dutch, representing a total mercantile navy of only 621. But of Dutch vessels engaged in the carrying trade between foreign ports there were 2177, with more than thrice the tonnage of the home navy. Thus the nation still subsists largely by playing middleman, partly by manufactures, partly by dairy and other produce, little by fishing,[1] but still largely by freightage. Java does not figure as a source of revenue for Holland, being administered in its own interest,[2] with less taxation of the people than goes on in British India.

Of the conditions which in Holland tell against increase of well-being, the most notable is the large birth-rate resulting there as elsewhere from the rapid modern expansion of industry. With a population less by 1,580,000 than that of Belgium, Holland has annually a larger surplus of births over deaths. It may be interesting to compare Dutch statistics with those of Portugal and Sweden and Norway, which have nearly the same population, as regards birth-rate and emigration. Each of the three States at 1895 had slightly over or under 5,000,000 inhabitants. Their marriages and their emigration were—

Marriages.			Emigration.		
Portugal.	Holland.	Sweden and Norway.	Portugal.	Holland.	Sweden and Norway.
33,018	35,598	28,728	44,746	1,314	14,982

The emigration from Portugal in 1895 was abnormal; but in 1896 the figures were 24,212. In Sweden and

[1] This source of wealth, as we have seen, was much curtailed last century by British competition. Laing (*Notes*, pp. 7, 8) shows how small it had become at his time; but is quite mistaken in assuming that it had never been great.

[2] About 60 per cent of the revenue is from government produce and monopolies.

Norway in 1895 the excess of births over deaths was 60,000. In Portugal it was 47,997 ; a figure which in 1896 fell to 38,134. In Holland, the average excess in 1879-84 was 54,751 ; in 1897 it had risen to 77,586. Under such circumstances it needs the alleged doubling of Dutch commerce between 1872 and 1891 to maintain well-being ; and it is not easy to see how such an increase of commerce can be maintained. As it is, despite the tradition of good management of the poor, the number of the needy annually relieved temporarily or continuously by the charitable societies and communes appears to be always over five per cent of the population—or about twice the average proportion of paupers in the United Kingdom. The Dutch figures of course do not stand for the same order of poverty; and there is certainly not in Holland a tithe of the sordid and unrelieved misery that everywhere fringes the wealth of England. But it is clear that Holland is becoming relatively over-populated ; and that the industrial conditions are not making for popular elevation, standing as they do for low wages and grinding competition in many occupations.

Nor are these conditions favourable in Holland to general culture, as apart from forms of specialism, any more than in England. Dutch experts in recognised studies hold their own with any—witness the names of Kuenen, Thiele, Scholten,—and the middle-class has probably a better average culture than prevails in England or the United States ; but the lapsed Republic, at present as complacent in its monarchism as England, has yet to prove how much a small State may achieve in the higher civilisation. Meantime, it is plainly not smallness but too rapid increase in numbers that is the stumbling-block ; and the possession of a relatively great "empire" in Java does not avail, for Holland any more than for England, to cure the social trouble at home.

CHAPTER V

SWITZERLAND

THE best general history of Switzerland available in English is Mr. E. Salisbury's translation (1899) of the *Short History* of Professor Dändliker. It has little merit as literature, but is abreast of critical research at all points. For the Reformation period, the older history of Vieusseux (Library of Useful Knowledge, 1840) is fuller and better, though now superseded as to early times. The work of Sir F. O. Adams and C. D. Cunningham on *The Swiss Confederation*, 1880 (translated and added to in French by M. Loumyer, 1890), is an excellent conspectus, especially for contemporary Swiss institutions. As regards the first half of the century, Grote's *Seven Letters concerning the Politics of Switzerland* (1847, rep. 1876) are most illuminating.

Of fuller histories there are many in French and German. The longer *Geschichte der Schweiz* of Professor Dändliker (1884-87) is good and instructive, though somewhat commonplace in its thinking. Dierauer's *Geschichte der schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft* (1887), which stops before the Reformation period, is excellent so far as it goes, and gives abundant references, which Dändliker's does not; though his *Short History* gives good bibliographies.

Zschokke's compendious *Des Schweizerlands Geschichte* (9te Aufgabe, 1853) is lucid and very readable, but is quite uncritical as to the medieval period. That is critically and decisively dealt with in Rilliet's *Les Origines de la Confédération Suisse*, 1868, and in Dierauer.

In more than one respect, the political evolution of Switzerland is the most interesting in the whole historic field. The physical basis, the determinations set up by it, the reactions, the gradual control of bias, the

creation of stability out of centrifugal forces—all go to form the completest of all political cases.[1] Happier than those of Greece, if less renowned, the little clans of Switzerland have passed through the storms of outer and inner strife to a state of something like assured republican federation. And where old Greece and Renaissance Italy and Scandinavia have failed to attain to this even on the basis of a common language and "race," the Swiss cantons have attained it in despite of a maximum diversity of speech and stock. As does Japan for Asia, they disprove for Europe a whole code of false generalisations.

The primary fact in the case, as in that of Greece, is the physical basis. Like Hellas, the Swiss land is "born divided"; and the first question that forces itself is as to how the cantons, while retaining their home rule, have contrived to escape utterly ruinous intertribal strife, and to attain federal union. The answer, it speedily appears, begins with noting the fact that Swiss federation is a growth or aggregation, as it were, from a primary "cell-form." From the early confederation of the three Forest Cantons of Schwytz, Uri, and Unterwalden, a set of specially congruous units, led to alliance by their original isolation from the rest of Helvetia and their common intercourse through the Lake of Lucerne, came the example and norm for the whole. The primary influence of mere land-division is proved by the persistence of the cantonal spirit and methods to this day;[2] but the history of Switzerland is

[1] "To one whose studies lie in the contemplation of historical phenomena [the Swiss cantons] comprise between the Rhine and the Alps a miniature of all Europe. . . . To myself in particular they present an additional . . . interest from a certain political analogy (nowhere else to be found in Europe) with . . . the ancient Greeks" (Grote, *Seven Letters concerning the Politics of Switzerland* (1847), ed. 1876, pref.).

[2] "What the Cantons mostly stand chargeable with, is the feeling of Cantonal selfishness" (Grote, as cited, p. 20). Compare, in the work of Sir F. O. Adams and C. D. Cunningham on *The Swiss Confederation* (éd. française par Loumyer, 1890, p. 29), the account of how, after the most fraternal meetings in common of the

the history of the moral union gradually forced on the cantons by varying pressures from outside. That it is due to no quality of "race" is sufficiently proved by the fact that three or four languages, and more stocks, are represented in the Republic at this moment.

§ 1. *The Beginnings of Union*

In the union of the Forest Cantons, as in the rooting of several Swiss cities and the cultivation of remote valleys, the Church has been held to have played a constructive part. At the outset, according to some historians,[1] Schwytz and Uri and Unterwalden had but one church among them ; hence a habit of congregation. But the actual records yield no evidence for this view, any more than for the other early dicta as to the racial distinctness of the people of the Forest Cantons, and their immemorial freedom. Broadly speaking, the early Swiss were for the most part serfs with customary rights. The first documentary trace of them is in the grant by Louis of Germany to the convent at Zurich, in the year 853, of his *pagellus Uroniae*, with its churches, houses, serfs, lands, and revenues.[2] This did not constitute the whole of the canton ; but it seems clear that the bulk of the population were in status serfs, though when attached to a royal convent they would have such privileges as would induce even freemen to accept the same state of dependence.[3] In the Canton of Schwytz, again, the people—there in larger part freemen—seem to have been always more or less at strife with the great

citizens of the different cantons, "each confederate, on returning home, begins to yield to his old jealousy, and thinks of hardly anything but the particular interests of his canton."

[1] Vieusseux, *History of Switzerland*, 1840, p. 39.

[2] Rilliet, *Les Origines de la Confédération Suisse*, 1868, pp. 26-28 ; Dierauer, *Geschichte der schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft*, 1887, i. 84.

[3] Rilliet, pp. 21, 27, 28.

monastery of Einsiedeln, founded about 946 by Kaiser Otto, and largely filled by men of aristocratic birth seeking a quiet life,[1] who held by the usual interests of their class as well as their corporation.[2] It was a question of ownership of pastures, the main economic basis in that region; and the descendants of the early settlers were fighting for their subsistence. Unterwalden, finally (then known only as the higher and lower valleys, *Stanz* or *Stannes* and *Sarnen* or *Sarnon*), was led in its development by Uri and Schwytz, each of which possessed some communal property, the former in respect of its beginnings as a royal domain, the latter in respect of the association of its freemen.

Whatever earlier combinations there may have been, it is in the year 1291[3] that the first recorded Pact was made between the three cantons; and it arose out of their making a stand for their customary local rights as against the House of Hapsburg.[4] Uri had in 1231 been granted by King Henry VII. of Germany, son of the emperor Frederick II., the cherished privilege of enrolment as an imperial fief, an act which in theory withdrew it from its former feudal subordination to the Count of Hapsburg; and in 1240 Frederick himself gave the same privilege to Schwytz.[5] On the unhinging of the imperial system after Frederick's death, the Hapsburgs, who even in his life had treated the cantons as contumacious vassals, fought for their own claims; whereupon in due course was formed the Pact of 1291.

[1] Johannes von Müller, *Geschichte schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft*, ed. 1824, i. 287.

[2] Müller, i. 288; Rilliet, pp. 39-42. The men of Schwytz were associated as concurrers with the powerful Counts of Lenzburg in disputes with the monastery.

[3] Rilliet, pp. 88 ff.; Dierauer, i. 78.

[4] Having sworn an oath to stand by each other, they called themselves *Eidgenossen* = Oathfellows, Confederates. The old spellings, *Eitgnozzen* and *Eidgnossschaft* (Dierauer, i. 265, *n.*; Dändliker, *Geschichte der Schweiz*, i. 636—in the old Tell song), show how easily could arise the later French form "Huguenots."

[5] Dierauer, pp. 85, 90; Rilliet, pp. 50, 67, 68.

Thus the Swiss Confederation broadly began in the special strife which arose between the new order of higher feudal princes and the civic or rural communes on the disintegration of the Germanic empire in the thirteenth century.[1] The familiar story of William Tell and the oath-taking at Rütli or Grütli in 1308 appears to be pure myth. There is no historic mention till over a hundred years later of any such acts by the Austrian bailiff as that story turns upon, or of any strife whatever in 1308. A pact of confederation had actually been made seventeen years earlier than that date; and a new and rather more definite pact was made on the same general grounds in 1315; but the romance of 1308 remains entirely unattested, and it bears the plainest marks of myth.

The histories of J. von Müller, Zschokke, Vieusseux, and others of the first half of the century are vitiated as regards the early period by acceptance of the traditions; though the untrustworthiness of the Tell story had been pointed out as early as the year 1600 by Franz Guillimann of Fribourg, and again last century by Iselin, and by Freudenberger in his *Guillaume Tell: Fable danoise*, 1760. (See Dändliker's *Short History of Switzerland*, Eng. trans., 1899, pp. 53, 54.) A full and decisive examination of it will be found in Rilliet's *Les Origines de la Confédération Suisse*, 1868. Compare Dierauer, *Geschichte der schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft*, 1887, Buch ii. Kap. i. § iii.; Cox, *Mythology of the Aryan Nations*, ed. 1882, pp. 337-341, and the essay *William Tell* in Baring-Gould's *Curious Myths of the Middle Ages*, 1888. Some very judicial attempts have been made to show that there is reason to think *some* fighting occurred in 1308. See for instance the pamphlets *Le Grütli* and *La Querelle sur les traditions concernant l'origine de la Confédération Suisse*, by Prof. H. Bordier, in reply to Prof. Rilliet, 1869. Dierauer, again, declines to go the whole way in negation, and stands for the view "not fable but legend—on some basis of fact" (as cited, i. 150). But even M. Bordier reduces Tell to a mere "somebody"; and every student surrenders the apple story, which is at least as old as the twelfth-century Danish version of it in Saxo Grammaticus.

M. Rilliet holds that the Swiss reproduction was not a local

[1] Cp. Rilliet, p. 53.

survival of the Teutonic myth but a deliberate adaptation made in Lucerne from the abridgment of Saxo Grammaticus produced by a German monk Gheysmer about 1430 (*Les Origines*, pp. 214-16, 327, 328). At Lucerne there was a local school of poetry of the kind then common in Holland; and the old ballad, which closely follows Saxo's tale, and which is the probable basis of the story as given in the later chronicles, seems to have been composed by way of securing for the Canton of Uri the main honours of the founding of the Confederation, which were being claimed by the sister cantons. Whatever be the basis, the Tell legend is finally untenable, and the tradition of an immemorial state of freedom in the Forest Cantons is abandoned even by the conservative critics. See Bordier, *La Querelle*, p. 7. The only point on which a case against the criticism of M. Rilliet seems to be made out is as regards his view that the Forest Cantons were not colonised before the eighth century. As M. Bordier contends, the grant of Louis of Germany seems to describe a long-settled district. M. Rilliet also goes somewhat beyond the evidence in assuming that Uri was mainly colonised under royal influence, Unterwalden by lay and ecclesiastical proprietors, and Schwytz by freemen (*Les Origines*, pp. 20, 21).

The rise of a durable federation in the central Swiss group is thus a product of three main factors; the first being their primary physical union through the Lake of Lucerne, their common highway. But for this they would probably have been as hostile as were Uri and Glarus, which had fought from time immemorial.[1] Next was needed the chronic hostile pressure of an outside force, creating a common political interest. The septs of pre-Norman Ireland and England, and of the Scottish Highlands down till modern times, remained at strife long after Christianisation, because within their own country they were so free to struggle, and because the examples of forcible centralisation elsewhere were so remote and so hard to assimilate. But when the Forest Cantons emerge as such in history in the thirteenth century they are already menaced by a power which, without undertaking or compassing the

[1] Rilliet, *Origines*, p. 33.

toil of conquering them, habitually drives them to formal combination by its interference. Its continued pressure evolves the definite political agreement of 1315, after the victory of Morgarten, in which was made clear the special difficulty of conquering a race of mountaineers with the normal cavalry forces and armour-clad or servile infantry of medieval feudalism [1] —a difficulty which must rank as the third factor in the beginnings of Swiss independence.

Thus far the half-feudal, half-commercial city of Lucerne, though in touch with the Forest Cantons through the uniting lake, was their enemy as being feudatory of the Hapsburgs; but as the chronic state of war was ruinous to its trade with Italy and peculiarly harassing to all industry, the commercial element forced a coalition, and in 1332 Lucerne joined the Confederation as Fourth Canton. Now emerges in the affairs of the Confederation the element of civic class strife, so familiar in the republics of Italy; for the accession of Lucerne is promptly followed in that city by a conspiracy of nobles, which is put down by the help of the allied cantons; whereupon the nobles are exiled and a civic council set up, the Duke of Austria being unable to hinder. The same trouble arises in the case of Zurich, the next accession to the union. In the ordinary medieval course there had there arisen an oligarchic government of aristocratic citizens in place of the early dominion of the Abbess; and the city was made an imperial fief by Frederick II. On this basis it made commercial treaties in the manner then common among the cities of Germany, joining the Swabian, Rhenish, and South-German Leagues, and developing a large trade with Italy and Germany, and even a silk

[1] At Morgarten the infantry of the Austrian force was in large part furnished by the other Germanic towns and Cantons of Zurich, Winterthur, Zug, Lucerne, Sempach, and Aargau. When the cavalry were discomfited, the foot would not be very energetic.

manufacture. At length the large craftsman class revolted (1336) under the leadership of a dissentient patrician, Brun or Braun, who established a constitution in which he as burgomaster held office for life, with a council of thirteen gildmasters and thirteen aristocrats, six of the latter being named by Brun. For the firm support of the gilds he duly paid them by laws checking foreign competition in manufactured goods, and denying even to the rural population the right to manufacture. The dispossessed oligarchs kept up a raiding strife on the frontiers, till at length some who were permitted to return formed a conspiracy against the burgomaster, which he suppressed with slaughter. This leading to a league against the city among the Hapsburgs and the surrounding nobles and the cantons in treaty with them, Zurich petitioned to join the Forest Confederation, and was readily accepted (1351), finally triumphing by their help.

Zurich on its part enabled the Forest Cantons to protect themselves against Austria by conquering Glarus (1351), which offered little resistance, and was ranked as a protected territory under the Confederation. This now formed a compact territorial group save for the Canton of Zug, intervening between Lucerne and Zurich. As that could not defend itself against its neighbours it joined their Confederation perforce (1352), being received as a full member. The same status was readily granted to the city of Berne, which, imperially enfranchised in 1218, had carried on a remarkable independent policy on Italian lines, acquiring territory from the decaying nobles around by mortgage, purchase, and conquest, till in 1339 they combined against her. Succour was then given by the Forest Cantons, securing for Berne the victory of Laupen ; and when in 1352 they invited her to join their union, her rulers accepted. So tepid, however, was still the spirit of union that at the Peace

of Brandenburg in 1352, confirmed by that of Regensburg in 1355, Glarus and Zug consented to withdraw, returning for a time to the Austrian allegiance;[1] and the confederation of the remaining six cantons was still one of the loosest cohesion, differing only in the fact of its territorial continuity and its organic growth from the many city-unions which flourished in Germany in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.[2] Only the three original cantons were pledged to make no separate treaties; Zurich was specifically permitted to do so; in 1352 Berne was in alliance with the towns of Fribourg and Soleure; in the next generation Lucerne made a compact with the towns of Sempach and Richensee; and in 1393 a burgomaster of Zurich carried through a treaty of alliance with the common enemy, the Duke of Austria.

In this case the mass of the citizens were induced to reverse the policy and banish those who had planned it; but the right of the city to make such an alliance was not technically challenged by the Confederation; and even in Schwytz a few loyalists paid old feudal dues to Austria up till 1394. A more serious ground of division was the jealousy duly arising between the rural and the city cantons, from which came about the forcible intervention of Schwytz in a dispute between the town and country sections of Zug. The remaining cantons insisted on subjecting the action of both Zug and Schwytz to the verdict of the union, thus effectually establishing a precedent of federal practice; but in the first decade of the fifteenth century the Cantons of Schwytz and Glarus

[1] This fact, as well as the unequal status of Glarus, was till recently slurred over in the patriotic tradition. See, for instance, the account of Vieusseux, *History of Switzerland*, pp. 58-60. Cp. the results of exact research in Dierauer, i. 217; Dändliker, *Geschichte der Schweiz*, 1884, i. 480, and *Short History*, Eng. tr., pp. 62, 63, 68, 69. Zug returned to the Confederation in 1368; Glarus, as a connection only, in 1387, and as a full member in 1394.

[2] Cp. Dierauer, i. 265, and Freeman, *History of Federal Government*, ed. 1893, pp. 5, 6.

are found on their own account helping the men of Appenzell to win their independence; and when the successful Appenzellers, who had developed a turn for aggression and confiscation, sought to join the union, they were accepted only as allies by the cantons individually, Berne holding aloof. Yet again, when the house of Austria (which had abandoned its claims on the cantons in 1412) was under the ban of the empire in 1415, and the city cantons led a movement of attack upon its territories, Uri and the Appenzellers took no part; while in 1422 Uri and Unterwalden acted alone in their unsuccessful war with the Duke of Milan.

Thus far the Confederation, in its different degrees of union, had included only German-speaking cantons; but in 1420 the French-speaking Valais (Ger. Wallis, from the Latin *Vallis Poenina?* or foreigners); in 1424 Upper Rhætia; and in the same year the Romance-speaking Engadin, also in Rhætia, won their virtual independence. In all, three leagues were formed in Rhætia, forming their own confederation, known as the Grisons (= "the Greys," the *Graubünden* or Grey League, from the colour of the peasants' smocks).

As the sphere of self-government widened, new risks of strife arose. All the while the older cantons, in particular the cities, had been acquiring lands in the feudal fashion; and in 1440 a general scramble for an inheritance in Rhætia evolved first a war between Zurich on one hand and Schwytz and Glarus on the other, and next a joint coercion of Zurich by all the other cantons. This led to a fresh alliance between Zurich and Austria, and a new and exceptionally ferocious war, lasting for four years. Meantime Basle, assailed by the Armagnacs under the dauphin of France, was succoured by the union and received into alliance. Next came the Burgundian wars, whereafter, not without much friction and quarrelling over booty, Soleure (Solothurn) and

Fribourg were taken into the union, and a new Pact framed (1481) defining afresh the general law of the Confederation. Lastly, after the Swabian war, the last in which the Swiss had to defend themselves against German aggression, the cities of Basle and Schaffhausen, become self-governing, were received into the League; and in 1513 Appenzell followed. Thus was rounded the number of thirteen cantons, which constituted the Swiss Confederation till the end of the eighteenth century. They were: Schwytz (which gradually gave its name to the whole people), Uri, Unterwalden, Zurich (the "Forest" group), Lucerne, Glarus, Zug, Berne, Fribourg, Soleure, Basle, Schaffhausen, and Appenzell. Aargau and Thurgau, conquered in the wars with Austria in 1415 and 1460, remained subject lands, the property of the allied cantons; and the Valais and the Grisons remained outside the union as connections or *Zugewandte*, the League proper being restricted to German-speaking cantons. It will be seen too that the territory of the Confederation remained a compact and connected mass; the Vaud, the Valais, Ticino, and the Grisons forming a long band of territory outside.

§ 2. *The Socio-Political Evolution*

The outstanding feature of the Swiss social evolution up to the end of the fifteenth century is the acquisition of municipal estates by the chief cities, after the manner of those of Italy. The lead given by Berne was zealously followed by Zurich [1] and Lucerne, till nearly all the old feudal lordships around them had fallen into their hands by purchase, mortgage, or conquest; and by 1477 the Hapsburgs had not a rood of land left in all Helvetia,

[1] Zurich alone is said to have spent two million francs in buying land between 1358 and 1408.

even the family castle being lost. It was impossible that the revenues thus acquired by the cities should fail in that age to enrich the patrician or ruling class, no matter how revolutions might alter its membership. Herein lay one of the effective checks to the growth of the Confederation from 1513 onwards. The rural cantons and the aristocratic governments of the cities were alike disinclined to enfranchise the rural populations they held in feudal subjection; and the status of the mass of the townspeople and subject peasantry, though probably better than in France and Germany, was that of men without political rights,[1] save those secured by feudal or civic custom.

Nor can it be said that in the pre-Reformation period the flourishing Swiss cities did much for culture: a main part of the explanation doubtless being (1) the chronic stress of war, which in such communities tended to be borne by all classes alike.[2] When the Italian cities had produced Dante, Petrarch, and Boccaccio; when England had produced Chaucer; and France the *Roman de la Rose*, Villon, Joinville, Froissart, and Comines, Switzerland had a literature only of average German lyrics and a few average medieval chronicles. But the comparison will be quite misleading if it be not kept in mind (2) that the whole Swiss population up till 1500 never amounted to a million, and that the surplus males were being constantly drained off in the fifteenth century in military service outside of Switzerland. The conditions which made for military strength and independence were entirely unfavourable to culture. There remains, however, to be noted in the case of German Switzerland (3) the fundamental drawback of relative homogeneity

[1] Cp. Zschokke, *Des Schweizerlands Geschichte*, Kap. 30, 9te Aufl., p. 147.

[2] Professor Dändliker, in his *Short History* (Eng. tr. p. 41), has the odd expression that "in those times of the surging of party strife the towns formed a quiet refuge for the cultivation of the intellectual life." The whole of his own history goes to show that no such quiet cultivation took place, or could take place.

of race. The one important aspect of "race" in sociology is as a statement of relative lack of intellectual variability; and this condition in modern Europe can be seen to exist only at certain periods, in the case of one or two peoples, chiefly the Germanic.

If the whole process of the renascence of civilisation be considered *seriatim*, it will be found that the growth took place primarily in virtue of degree of access to (*a*) the remains of Græco-Roman culture and (*b*) to Saracen lore; and, secondarily, in virtue of degree of admixture of physical type in the different communities. Thus (1) the first great new-birth (before the age of the Renaissance so-called) took place in Italy, in a population already highly mixed at the end of the Roman period and repeatedly invaded thereafter by northern stocks, from Odoaker down to the Normans. The reviving Italian culture, being communicated northwards through the Church and otherwise, is next developed by (2) the highly-mixed population of France and (3) that of England after the Norman Conquest—the Welsh element being here prominent. At the same time the literary germination set up in (4) ancient Ireland, under stormy conditions, by the early missionaries of the Græco-Roman Church, reaches after some centuries the Scandinavian peoples by way of the Hebrides and (5) Iceland, where, however, after a brilliant start, the evolution is arrested by the restrictive environment, the main body of Scandinavian life being too homogeneous (though constantly at strife) for any complex evolution. In the south, again, the populations of (6) Spain and Portugal, mixed to begin with in the Roman period and later crossed by Teutonic invasion, became specially capable of variation after the subdual of the Moors, whose reaction on their conquerors was extensive and important.

All this while the Teutonic stocks in their old

homes are noticeably backward, save where, as in (7) the Netherlands, they are in constant contact with other peoples on land and by sea. Culture begins to be at once original and brilliant in the Netherlands only in the period after (*a*) special contact with Spain and (*b*) the large immigration of Protestant refugees from other countries. At first strongly influenced by classical scholarship, it is later affected by the influence of France and England. All the more strictly Teutonic cultures were either unprogressive or similarly vitalised from without; and Germany, after the Thirty Years' War, begins almost afresh with an academic literature in Latin, to be followed by new native developments only on French and English stimuli.[1] But it is specially significant that (8) the German renascence of the eighteenth century takes place after (*a*) the large influx of French Protestant refugees at the end of the seventeenth, and after a fresh influx of French taste, French teachers, and French literature under Frederick the Great, in whose armies, it should be remembered, there fought no fewer than nine generals of French Protestant descent, as well as others of alien heredity.

The case of Switzerland is thus on this side tolerably clear. Swiss intellectual life, long primitively Teutonic, begins to become notable only at the period of the Reformation, when for the merely diplomatic and military and commercial contacts of the past there is substituted a fresh differentiation and interaction from Italian, French, and German Protestantism — a new intellectual impulse—and from the influx of refugees, as in Holland. And the French-speaking city of Geneva, not yet a member of the Confederation, at once takes the lead. The Teutonic population, from the fifteenth century onwards, had in large numbers sought subsistence in mercenary soldiership. It was

[1] Cp. the author's *Buckle and his Critics*, pp. 160-74.

the medieval analogue to the emigration of to-day, the opening even serving to curtail the agricultural and pastoral life ;[1] but the result, by the common consent of historians,[2] was disastrous to the higher life at home, the returning mercenaries being in many cases spoilt for steady industry, rural or civic. Their military success and prestige in fact tended to demoralise the Swiss as the success of Hellas against Persia tended to demoralise Athens, making them, in the words of Aristotle, unfitted to rest. Dwelling on past patriotic glories is never the way to discipline the mental life ; and the Swiss militia of the end of the fifteenth century, wont to sell their services as fighters to French and Italians, often thus opposing each other, and otherwise wont to interpose arrogantly in other people's concerns,[3] were not on the line of social or intellectual progress. Pensions to leading men from the French and Italian courts wrought a further and even more sinister corruption. But after their defeat by Francis I. in 1516 at the desperate battle of Marignano, becoming allies of France, the Swiss ceased to play the part of holders of the balances between contending neighbours ; and after their heavy share in the loss of Francis at the battle of Pavia they grew for a time loth even to play the part of auxiliaries on a national footing, though individual enlistment continued. It is at this stage that the Reformation supervenes, creating a new source of strife between canton and canton, and so paralysing the Confederation for centuries.

Nowhere is the study of the process of the Reformation more instructive, more subversive of the conventional Protestant view, than in the case of Switzerland. In the first place, it is not the old Forest

[1] Zschokke, *Des Schweizerlands Geschichte*, 9te Aufl. 1853, p. 149.

[2] Cp. Dändliker, ii. 620, 722 ; *Short History*, pp. 124, 125, 131 ; Dierauer, ii. 473 ; Vieusseux, pp. 119, 124, 211 ; Zschokke, as above cited.

[3] Cp. Freeman, *History of Federal Government*, 2nd ed. pp. 272, 273.

Cantons, with their ingrained independence and "Teutonic conscience," that do the work. They remained obstinately Catholic. Swiss Protestantism, under the independent lead of Zwingli, began indeed in Glarus and Schwytz, but became an effective movement only in the city of Zurich, and it is notable that in the primitive and poor canton of Uri[1] there was as little buying of indulgences as there was heresy. The two phenomena went together in the richer cantons, where the common desire to buy pardons evoked the protest against them. Indeed the special traffic in indulgences in Germany and Switzerland, and the special laxity of life of their priesthoods, were concomitants of the special grossness of German life;[2] for in no other country did the Reformation proceed nakedly on the basis of protest against indulgence-selling. There the pardoners shamelessly over-rode all the official and accepted teaching of the Church as to indulgences; and the protests of Luther and Zwingli were properly demands for a reform on strictly orthodox grounds, as against an abuse which was locally excessive. But it lay in the economic and political conditions that when a movement of protest began it should succeed in view rather of the economic and social impulses to break with Rome than of the spontaneous desire for reform. In Germany in particular the movement among the upper and educated classes was nakedly financial as regarded the nobles, and to a large extent the reverse of ascetic among the scholars, many of whom, however, were much more spontaneously alive to the doctrinal crudities of the orthodox system than was Luther himself. It was the facile combination, on socio-political grounds, of the five forces of (1) moral

[1] Vieusseux, p. 193.

[2] Cp. Menzel, *Geschichte der Deutschen*, Kap. 417; Dändliker, *Geschichte der Schweiz*, ii. 623-26; Zschokke, *Des Schweizerlands Geschichte*, Kap. 30, p. 148; Vieusseux, p. 118.

indignation among the more conscientious leaders, (2) gain-seeking on the part of nobles and ruling burghers, (3) racial aversion to Italian priests and Italian revenue-drawing among the people in general, (4) critical revolt against primitive superstitions among the more learned, and (5) anti-clerical freethinking and licence among many who had served in the Italian wars,[1] that made the revolt proceed so rapidly in Germany and Switzerland. If the mass of the people, in all save the most primitive Swiss cantons, were grossly eager to buy the indulgences so grossly offered by Samson and Tetzel, the people clearly were not zealous reformers to start with. Of those who most resented the traffic, many remained steady Catholics.

When, however, it became known that Samson carried away with him from Switzerland to Italy 800,000 crowns, besides other bullion and jewels, even the buyers of indulgences could share the general inclination to stop the enrichment of Italy at Swiss expense. The intellectual revolt of the educated supplied the basis of the revolution in church management; but without the accruing financial gains the former could have availed little; and while there was the usual violence on the part of the mob, the city authorities were judicious in their procedure. To the clergy they offered on the one hand freedom to marry, and on the other hand a provision for life. Thus in Zurich, under the skilful guidance of Zwingli, the whole chapter of twenty-four canons gave up their rights and property to the State, becoming preachers, teachers, or professors with life-allowances: a plan generally followed elsewhere, save where the parties fell to blows.[2] In Zurich the further steps were: 1523, ecclesiastical marriages; 1524, pictures abolished and monasteries dissolved; 1525, mass discontinued.

[1] On this see Vieusseux, p. 130.

[2] Vieusseux, pp. 128-132, 142.

In French-speaking Geneva, destined to become the leading Swiss city, the process was more stormy. Having grown to importance under its bishops, it had been made an imperial city in 1420, thereby finding a foothold in its resistance to the constant claims of the House of Savoy, which in 1519 forced it into a defensive alliance with Fribourg. There were now two Genevan parties, the Savoyards and the republicans, which latter, imitating Swiss usage, called themselves Eidgenossen, whence the French corruption *Huguenots*, ultimately applied to the Calvinistic Protestants of France. Out of the faction strife came the religious, under the fanning of Farel; and in this case the anti-democratic leaning of the Savoyards kept them, the rich, pro-Catholic, while the common people declared for Protestantism. In the end the latter took violent possession of the churches, destroying the altars and images, whereupon most of the Catholics fled, the city retaining the clerical lands; and there immigrated many French, Italian, and Savoyard Protestants. To the community thus made for him came Calvin in 1537. Meanwhile, Berne, conquering the Pays de Vaud from the Duke of Savoy, made it Protestant. Elsewhere, some communes and districts passed and repassed between Catholicism and Protestantism as neighbouring influences prevailed; in some districts the peasants, hoping for release from tithes and taxes, welcomed the revolution, but renounced it when they found it made no difference to their lot.[1] The magistrates of Berne were prompt to make it clear that their Protestantism made no difference as to their tithe-drawing from their rural subjects.[2] When the period of transformation was over—with its bitter wars, which cost the life of Zwingli, its manifold exasperations, its Anabaptist convulsions, its forlorn and fore-

[1] Zschokke, Kap. 32.

[2] Vieusseux, p. 140. Zurich, however, on Zwingli's urging, restricted villenage and lessened tithes (Dändliker, *Short History*, p. 135).

doomed peasant risings, its severance of old ties, and its profound impairment of the half-grown spirit of confederation—it was found that the old cantons of Lucerne, Uri, Unterwalden, Schwytz and Zug stood fast for Catholicism; that Soleure, after being for a time predominantly Protestant, had joined them, with Fribourg, making seven Catholic States; that the city cantons of Berne, Zurich, Basle and Schaffhausen were Protestant, as were Geneva and the Vaud, not yet in the union; and that Glarus and Appenzell were mixed. The achievement of the landamman Œbly of Glarus, in securing a peaceful and lasting compromise in his own canton—the two bodies in some parishes actually agreeing to use the same church—was beyond the moral capacity of the mass of the Swiss people, for Appenzell bitterly divided into two parts, on religious lines. Each of the other cantons imposed its ruling men's creed on its subjects. They were still as far from toleration in religion as from real democracy in politics.

While Protestantism, by dividing the realm of religion, doubtless wrought indirectly and ultimately for the intellectual freedom of Europe, it is clear that it had no such result for many generations in Switzerland. Calvin's rule in Geneva, while associated with a new activity in printing, chiefly of theological works,[1] became a byword for moral tyranny and cruelty. To say nothing of the executions of Servetus and Gruet for heresy, and the expulsions of other men, the records show that in that small population there were between 800 and 900 persons imprisoned between the years 1542 and 1546, and 58 put to death; no fewer than 34 being beheaded, hanged, or burned on charges of sedition in three months of 1545. Torture was freely applied, and any personal criticism of Calvin was more

[1] The number printed rose speedily to thirty-eight in a year, then again to sixty. Two thousand men were employed in the printing industry (Dändliker, ii. 560).

or less fiercely punished.[1] The conditions were much the same in Zurich and Berne, where a press censorship was set up (in Zurich as early as 1523), and zealously maintained for centuries. It prohibited, under heavy penalties, the sale of the works of Descartes, and in both places Cartesians were prosecuted;[2] while in Protestant Switzerland generally the Copernican theory was denounced as heresy, and the reformed Calendar, as a work of the Pope, was furiously rejected. So high did passion run that in Berne and Zurich any who married Catholics were severely punished.[3] The Zurich criminal calendar of the sixteenth century gives a sample of the Protestant city life of the period. There were 572 executions in all, 347 persons being beheaded, 61 burned, 55 hanged, 53 drowned. Only 33 were cases of murder; 2 were executed for abuse of Zwingli, who thus appears to have given a lead to Calvin; 73 for blasphemy, 56 for bestiality, and 338 for theft[4]—a clear economic clue.

Broadly speaking, the settled Protestant period is one of relapse alike from freedom and from union. Class division deepened and worsened throughout the seventeenth century;[5] the people of the subject lands were less than ever recognised as having rights,[6] Puritanism taking to oppression as spontaneously in Switzerland as in England; the stimulus given to culture and art in the controversial period died away, leaving retrogression;[7] and in the personal and the intellectual life alike clerical tyranny was universal.[8] The municipalities became more and more close corporations, as the gilds had become long before;[9] and at Berne in 1640 the city treasurer was put to death for exposing abuses.[10] After the Peasants' War of 1653 the

[1] Dändliker, ii. 558, 559; *Short History*, p. 157. [2] *Id. Geschichte*, ii. 743.
[3] *Id. Short History*, p. 192. [4] *Id. Geschichte*, ii. 626.
[5] *Id. ib.* ii. 722. [6] *Id. ib.* ii. 609-12; *Short History*, pp. 172, 203.
[7] *Id. Geschichte*, ii. 731, 742-45. [8] *Id. ib.* ii. 556 ff. 622 ff. 728, 729.
[9] *Id. ib.* i. 569-571. Only masters were admitted to membership.
[10] *Id. Short History*, pp. 169, 170, 179.

aristocratic development was still further strengthened, till in Berne, Soleure and Fribourg—Catholic and Protestant cities alike—the roll of burghers was closed (1680-90), Soleure stipulating that it should remain so till the number of reigning families was reduced to twenty-five.[1] The practice of taking pensions from France revived, for the old service of supplying mercenary troops ; so that "the Swiss were never more shamelessly sold to the highest bidder" than in the seventeenth century.[2] As of old, the municipalities amassed and invested capital, Catholic Soleure lending vast sums to France, while the still wealthier city of Berne lent money in all directions ;[3] but though they raised handsome public buildings it was the small ruling class and not the workers that were enriched. In the rural cantons even the small economic advance made at the outset of the Reformation was lost.[4] It seems difficult to dispute that as a force for social progress the Reformation was naught.

One factor there was to its credit : the establishment of secondary schools, which had not previously existed in Switzerland, and the provision of better common schools;[5] and though the ecclesiastical and religious forces, as in Scotland, prevented their being turned to any higher account at home than that of qualifying to read and write and learn catechisms, even that small tuition gave the Swiss some advantages in the neighbouring countries. All the while the higher political evolution went backwards. In 1586 the Catholic cantons of Schwytz, Uri, Unterwalden, Lucerne, Zug, Fribourg and Soleure ejected from the League the Protestant State of Mülhausen ; and, ignoring the laws of the Confederation,

[1] Dändliker, *Short History*, p. 179.

[2] *Id. ib.* p. 192. The abuse was at its height in the Catholic cantons, but the Protestant participated, even soon after the Reformation (*id.* p. 157 ; *Geschichte*, ii. 626).

[3] *Id. Short History*, p. 182.

[4] *Id. Geschichte*, i. 572 ; ii. 722 ; *Short History*, p. 169.

[5] Zschokke, as cited, p. 148 ; Dändliker, *Short History*, p. 153.

proceeded to make a separate offensive and defensive alliance among themselves, and with Spain and the Pope. As late as 1656 war broke out between Berne and Schwytz, Lucerne intervening, over a dispute about Protestant refugees ; whereafter the principle of cantonal sovereignty reigned supreme for a hundred and forty years. It would seem difficult to maintain, in the face of all the facts, that Protestantism had made for peace, freedom, or civilisation.

On the other hand, the distribution of Protestantism in the Swiss cantons disposes once for all of the theory that the "Teutonic conscience" or anything else of an ethnic order was the determining force at the Reformation. A rough conspectus of the language and religion of the cantons as at the present time will present the proof to the contrary.

Name	Language	Religion
Berne	Five-sixths German-speaking	Seven-eighths Protestant.
Zurich	Nearly all German	" "
Lucerne	" " "	Nearly all Catholic.
Vaud	Mostly French dialects	Nine-tenths Protestant.
Aargau	Mostly German	Four C. to five P.
St. Gall	" "	Three-fifths Catholic.
Ticino.	Italian dialects	Nearly all Catholic.
Fribourg	Half French, half German	Four-fifths Catholic.
Grisons	Half Romansch, three-eighths German, one-eighth Italian	Five-ninths Protestant.
Valais	(?) Half German, half French	Nearly all Catholic.
Thurgau	Nearly all German	Two-sevenths Catholic.
Basel	" " "	One-third Catholic.
Soleure	" " "	Three-fourths Catholic.
Geneva	Predominantly French	Half-and-half.
Neuchâtel	" "	Seven-eighths Protestant.
Schaffhausen	" German	" "
Appenzell (Rh. Ext.)	" "	Nine-tenths Protestant.
Do. (Rh. Int.)	" "	Nearly all Catholic.
Glarus	Nearly all German	One-fourth Catholic.
Zug	" " "	Nearly all Catholic.
Schwytz	" " "	" " "
Unterwalden	" " "	" " "
Uri	" " "	" " "

Here we have nearly every species of variation in terms of speech and creed. The one generalisation which appears to hold good to any extent in the matter is that Catholicism usually goes with an agricultural economy and Protestantism with manufactures; but here too there are exceptions, as Vaud, which, though Protestant, is predominantly agricultural or vine-rearing; Glarus, which is mainly pastoral and Protestant; the Grisons, agricultural and more than half Protestant; and Geneva, where there is a large minority of Catholics in industrial conditions. On the whole, we are warranted in assuming that in Switzerland, as in most other countries, the town workers were the readiest to innovate in religion; while race, so far as inferrible from language, had nothing to do with the choice made. What differences of life accrue to the creeds, as we shall see, depend on their one important social divergence, that of bias for and against illiteracy.

§ 3. *The Modern Renaissance*

In the earlier part of the eighteenth century, the Swiss Confederation figured as "a weather-beaten ruin, ready to fall."[1] It would be hard to point out, in the domestic conditions, any that made for beneficent change, and there were many that rigidly precluded it; but some elements of variability there were, and from other countries there came the principle of fertilisation. Theological hatreds and disputations had in a manner destroyed their own standing-ground, by the very stress of their barren activity; and even while press laws were banning new works of thought and science, the better minds were secretly yearning towards them. In cities like Geneva and Basle (the latter then

[1] Dändliker, *Short History*, p. 193.

the seat of the only Swiss university), reason must to some extent have played beneath the surface while all its open manifestations were struck at. At Basle, Erasmus spent the main part of his life ; and he must have had some congenial intercourse. But it is on the side of the physical sciences that new intellectual life is first seen to germinate in post-Reformation Switzerland. There, as elsewhere, inquiring men felt that Nature was kindlier to question than the self-appointed oracles of Deity, and that the everlasting search for real knowledge brought more peace than ever came of the insistence that the ultimate truth was known. Refugee immigrants, chiefly French, seem to have begun the ferment ; and it is at the hands of their descendants that Swiss science grows.[1] Having reason to avoid alike politics and theology in their new home, and living in many cases on incomes from investments, they turned to the sciences as occupation and solace.

With this inner movement concurred the new influences from French and English science and literature, and from the reviving culture of Germany.[2] With the rest of Europe, too, Switzerland turned in an increasing degree to industry, and in the latter half of the century had developed many new trades, involving considerable use of machinery.[3] Agriculture, too, improved,[4] and mercenary soldiering began to fall into disrepute[5] under the influence of the new pacific thought. Still the rural economic conditions were bad, and the country seemed to grow poorer while the towns grew

[1] See the extremely interesting investigation of M. de Candolle in his *Histoire des sciences et des savants depuis deux siècles*, 1873, p. 131 ff. Cp. Ph. Godet (*Histoire littéraire de la Suisse française*, 1890, p. 170) as to the general influence.

[2] Cp. Dändliker, *Geschichte*, iii. 43-103 ; *Short History*, pp. 194-99.

[3] *Id. Geschichte*, iii. 174-78.

[4] *Id. ib.* iii. 170-74.

[5] *Id. Short History*, p. 199. Under Louis XIV. there had been 28,000 Swiss troops in the French service. In 1790 there were only 15,000. But there were six Swiss regiments in the Dutch army, four at Naples, and four in Spain (Vieusseux, p. 210).

richer.[1] The population, in fact, constantly tended to exceed the not easily widened limits of rural subsistence; and in place of foreign soldiering, the old remedy, there began a peaceful industrial emigration into the neighbouring countries, Swiss beginning to figure there in increasing numbers as waiters and servants.[2] All the while the tyranny of the city aristocracies was unmitigated, and the subject lands were steadily ill-treated.[3] In Berne, in 1776, only eighteen families were represented in the Council of Two Hundred; and there and in Zurich and Lucerne the civic regulations were as flagrantly partial to the ruling class as in France itself.[4] The new industrial conditions, however, were gradually preparing a political change. In Geneva arose the abnormal figure of Jean Jacques Rousseau, descendant of a French refugee immigrant of Calvin's day; and though his city in 1762 formally burned his epoch-marking book on the *Contrat Social*, a popular reaction followed six years later. Democratic disturbances had repeatedly occurred before; but this time there was a growing force at work. An insurrection in 1770 was suppressed; another, in 1782, though at first successful, ended in the overthrow of the popular party by means of troops from France, Berne and Zurich; but in the fateful year of 1789 yet another broke out, and this time the tide turned.

With the interference of the French Republic in Switzerland in 1797 on behalf of the Pays de Vaud, then subject to Berne, began the long convulsion which broke up the old Confederation and framed a new. In 1798 began the wildly premature attempt of the more visionary republicans to create a unitary republic

[1] Dändliker, *Geschichte*, iii. 183, 184.
[2] *Id. ib.* iii. 184.
[3] *Id.* p. 204. In 1798, the French found in the Bernese treasury thirty millions of francs in gold and silver.
[4] *Id. Short History*, p. 203.

out of cantons which had retrograded even from the measure of union attained before the Reformation. It could not succeed; and the rapine inseparable from the French revolutionary methods could not but arouse an intense resistance, paralysing the aims of the progressive party. Out of years of miserable ferocious warfare, ended by Napoleon's withdrawal of the French troops in 1801, came the new Confederation of 1803, which, however, it needed the friendly but authoritative mediation of the First Consul to get the conservative cantons to accept. For once the despot had secured, in a really disinterested fashion,[1] what the Revolution ought to have brought about. The old aristocratic tyrannies were subverted; the subject lands were freed; to the thirteen cantons of the old union were added Aargau, Thurgau, St. Gall, Vaud and Ticino; through all was set up a representative system, modified in the towns by a measure of the old aristocratic element; and the whole possessed what Switzerland never had before, and could hardly otherwise have attained—a central parliamentary system. In 1814, Berne would fain have resumed its tyranny over the Vaud and Aargau, a step which would have initiated a general return to the old *régime*. The Allies, however, brought about the completion of the Confederation on the new principles; and by the addition to its roll of Geneva, Neuchâtel and the Valais, and the cession to Berne of the Basle territory formerly annexed by France, created a compact and complete Switzerland, bounded in natural fashion by the Alps, the Jura and the Rhine. And at this period, after so many vicissitudes, the culture life of Switzerland is found fully abreast of that of Europe in general. Sismondi, stand-

[1] Napoleon's sayings on Swiss politics, declaring in favour of cantonal home rule and federation, are among his most statesmanlike utterances: see them in Vieusseux, pp. 250-53. The originals are given in Thibaudeau's *Mémoires sur le Consulat*, 1827.

ing apart from France and Italy, and writing impartially the history of both, is the greatest historian of his day.

The later history of the Confederation, however, is one of the great illustrations of the perpetual possibility of strife and sunderance in communities. Sismondi lived to ban the democracy which would not be content to be ruled by the middle class. At 1820, the old spirit of class subsisted under the new institutions; the press was nearly everywhere under strict censorship; and the ideals which ruled elsewhere on the Continent seemed even more potent in Switzerland than elsewhere. There, as elsewhere, the system inevitably bred discontent; and in 1830, on the revolutionary initiative of Ticino, the most corruptly-governed of all the cantons, there ensued almost bloodless revolutions in the local governments, Radicals taking the place of Conservatives, and proceeding to reform alike administration and education. Then came the due reaction, the Catholic cantons forming the League of Sarnen, while the extremists again pressed the ideal of a military State. Though morally strong enough to enforce peace in more than one embroilment of cantons and parties, the Federal Diet was dangerously weak in the face of the new forces of religio-political reaction typified by the activity of the Jesuits, as well as the old trouble of cantonal selfishness, which affected even the tolls.[1] The resistance to Radicalism became a movement of clerical fanaticism, led by the cry of "religion in danger"; Catholics using it to foment local insurrections; Protestants, ecclesiastically led, using it to make a municipal revolution by violence at Zurich on the occasion of the proposal to give Strauss a university chair in 1839.[2] But the Jesuits—expelled from nearly every Catholic state in the eighteenth century, yet

[1] Cp. Grote's *Seven Letters*, 2nd ed. p. 21. [2] See Grote's account, pp. 34, 35.

latterly cherished by the Swiss Catholics for their anti-Protestant services — were the chief mischief-makers; and at length the violences promoted from the head-quarters at Lucerne led to Protestant reprisals which took the shape of a beginning of civil war. The collapse, however, of the Catholic "Sonderbund" or Secession-League in 1847, before the resolute military action of the Diet, marked the turning-point in modern Swiss politics. In 1848 was framed a new constitution, wholly Swiss-made, creating an effective Federal government, on a new basis of a Parliament of Two Chambers. Now were definitely nationalised the systems of coinage, weights and measures, posts and telegraphs; and the Customs system was made one of complete internal free trade.

On this footing followed "long years of happiness, and a prosperity without precedent."[1] Yet even this constitution has had to be revised, to the end of guarding afresh against religious strifes and conflict of cantonal jurisdictions. In 1872 the centralising reformers carried in the Chambers a revision of the Constitution; but under the Referendum (a specialty of Swiss democracy, instituted in or after 1831 by the Catholic Conservative party in St. Gall, the Valais and Lucerne) it was rejected by a popular vote of 261,072 citizens to 255,609, and of thirteen cantons to nine. With a few modifications, however, it was carried in 1874 by a vote of 340,199 to 198,013, and of $14\frac{1}{2}$ cantons to $7\frac{1}{2}$. The whole process is a great lesson as to the superiority of the methods of peace and persuasion to those of revolution and force. The Referendum itself, first set up locally with the most reactionary intentions,[2] has come to be

[1] Adams and Cunningham, *La Confédération Suisse*, éd. Loumyer, 1890, p. 23.

[2] Thus the Catholic clergy between 1840 and 1850 used it to reject measures of educational reform (Grote, p. 66; cp. p. 38). Adams and Cunningham do not appear to recognise this conservative origin, pointing rather (p. 87) to the fact that the Conservatives at first opposed the application of the Referendum to Federal

valued—whether wisely or unwisely—by Radicals and Conservatives alike; and while it seems to offer a possibility of appeals to demotic ignorance and passion[1] while these subsist, and to be unnecessary where they do not, it is at least a guarantee of the decisiveness of any great constitutional step taken under it. Historically speaking, the consummation thus far is a great democratic achievement, and the whole drift of Federal legislation is towards an increased stability of union. On the other hand, despite a characteristic menace from Bismarck,[2] the international position of Switzerland appears to be as safe as that of any other European State, great or small. Any attempt on its independence by any one Power would infallibly be resisted by others.

As regards the true political problems, those of domestic life, the Swiss case presents the usual elements. From dangerous religious strife (the Jesuits being excluded) it seems likely to be preserved in future by the rationalising force of the Socialist movement; but that movement in turn tells of the social problem. A country of not readily extensible resources, Switzerland exhibits nearly as clearly as does Holland the dangers of overpopulation. The old resource of foreign enlistment being done with,[3] surplus population forces a continual emigration, largely from the rural districts, where the lands are for the most part heavily mortgaged.[4] The active industrialism of the towns—with their large manu-

affairs, and attributing the first conception (p. 88) to the Radicals. There appears to be a conflict of evidence. In any case the system is now accepted all round.

[1] See the opinion of M. Droz concerning the drawbacks of the facultative Referendum—that is, the permissible demand for it by 30,000 votes in cases where it is not obligatory as affecting the constitution—as cited by Adams and Cunningham, ed. Loumyer, p. 80.

[2] See M. Loumyer's note to his translation of Adams and Cunningham's work, p. 269.

[3] In 1830 there were still Swiss regiments in the French service, and a Swiss legion was enrolled by England for the Crimean war. This seems to be the last instance of the old practice.

[4] Adams and Cunningham, as cited, p. 303.

facture of clocks and watches, cottons and silks—involves a large importation of foreign food, with which native agriculture cannot advantageously compete. Thus, as was the case last century, the pinch falls on the country, while the towns are in comparison thriving. The relatively high death-rate of recent years raises an old issue. Malthus has told [1] how last century a panic arose concerning the prudential habits of the population in the way of late marriages and small families, and how thereafter encouragements to early marriage had led to much worsening of the lot of many of the people. With a small birth-rate there had been a small death-rate; whereas the rising birth-rate went with rising misery.[2] Perhaps through the influence of his treatise, the movement of demand for increase of population seems to have died out, and the practice of prudence to have regained economic credit. It would appear, however, that within the past half-century the conditions as to population have again somewhat worsened. At 1850, when nearly half of all the men married per year in England were under twenty years of age, the normal marrying age in the Vaud was thirty or thirty-one; and there had existed in a number of the old Catholic cantons laws inflicting heavy fines on young people who married without proving their ability to support a family.[3] The modern tendency is to abandon such paternal modes of interference; and it does not appear that personal prudence thus far replaces them, though on the other hand there was in the first half of the century a marked recognition by Swiss publicists of the sociological law of the matter.

Thus M. Edward Mallet of Geneva pointed out before 1850 that the chances of life had steadily gone

[1] *Essay*, B. ii. ch. v.

[2] *Id.* 7th ed. pp. 173-75.

[3] Kay, *The Social Condition and Education of the People in England and Europe*, 1850, i. 67, 68, 74, 76. Kay unfortunately does not go into history, and we are left to conjecture as to the course of opinion between the issue of Malthus's *Essay* and 1850.

on increasing with the lessening of the birth-rate for centuries back.[1] His tables run—

Life Chances.	Years.	Months.	Days.
Towards end of 16th century	8	7	26
In 17th century	13	3	16
In the years 1701-1750	27	9	13
„ „ 1751-1800	31	3	5
„ „ 1801-1813	40	8	0
„ „ 1814-1833	45	0	29

The statistician's summary of the case is worth citing—

"As prosperity advanced, marriages became fewer and later; the proportion of births was reduced, but greater numbers of the infants born were preserved. In the early and barbarous periods, the excessive mortality was accompanied by a prodigious fecundity. In the few last years of the seventeenth century, a marriage still produced five children and more; the probable duration of life was not twenty years, and Geneva had scarcely 17,000 inhabitants. Towards the end of the eighteenth century there were scarcely three children to a marriage; and the probability of life exceeded thirty-two years. At the present time a marriage produces only $2\frac{3}{4}$ children; the probability of life is forty-five years; and Geneva, which exceeds 27,000 in population, has arrived at a high degree of civilisation and material prosperity. In 1836 the population appeared to have attained its summit: the births barely replaced the deaths."

But in 1899 the population of Geneva was 91,288; and the figures of Swiss emigration—26,000 in 1892-97—tell their own tale. Increasing industrialism, as usual, has meant conjugal improvidence. Once more the trouble is not smallness of population, but undue increase.

As Protestantism appears to increase slightly more than Catholicism, no blame can in this case be laid on the Catholic Church. But in Switzerland, as elsewhere,

[1] See Kay, as cited. Compare the earlier calculations to similar effect cited by Malthus.

Catholicism tends to illiteracy. In the Protestant cantons the proportion of school-attending children is as one to five; in the half-and-half cantons it is as one to seven; and in the Catholic it is as one to nine. This, and no tendency of race or *direct* tendency of creed, is the explanation of the relative superiority of Protestant to Catholic cantons in point of comfort and freedom from mendicancy; for the cantons remarked by travellers for their prosperity are indifferently French- and German-speaking, while the less prosperous are either German or mixed.[1] The fact that the three oldest Forest Cantons are among the more backward is a reminder that past-worship, there at its height, is always a snare to civilisation. Describing these cantons half a century ago, Grote spoke severely of "their dull and stationary intelligence, their bigotry, and their pride in bygone power and exploits."[2] The reproach is in some measure applicable to other parts of Switzerland, as to other nations in general; and it must cease to be deserved before the Republic, cultured and well administered as it is, can realise republican ideals. But the existing Federation of the Helvetic cantons, locally patriotic and self-seeking as they still are, is a hopeful spectacle for this among other reasons, that it is a perpetual reminder of the possibility of a federation of Europe, even at a stage of civilisation far short of any Utopia of altruism.

[1] Cp. Kay, as cited, i. 9-11.

[2] *Seven Letters*, p. 31.

CHAPTER VI

PORTUGAL

§ 1. *The Rise and Fall of Portuguese Empire*

For European history, Portugal is signalised in two aspects: first, as a "made" kingdom, set up by the generating of local patriotism in a medieval population not hereditarily different from that of the rest of the Peninsula; secondly, as a small state which attained and for a time wielded "empire" on a great scale. The beginnings of the local patriotism are not confidently to be gathered from the old chronicles,[1] which reduce the process for the most part to the calculated action of the Queen Theresa (fl. 1114-28), certainly one of the most interesting female figures in history. But the main process of growth is simple enough. A series of warrior kings made good their position on the one hand against Spain, and on the other conquered what is now the southern part of Portugal (the ancient Lusitania) from the Moors. Only in a limited degree did their administration realise the gains conceivable from a differentiation and rivalry of cultures in the Peninsula; but in view of the special need for such variation in a

[1] The *Story of Portugal*, by Mr. H. Morse Stephens, 1891, is the most trustworthy history of Portugal in English, giving as it does the main results of the work of the modern scientific school of Portuguese historians.

territory open to few foreign culture-contacts, the Portugese nationality has counted substantially for civilisation. It would have counted for much more if in the militant Catholic period the Portuguese crown had not followed the evil lead of Spain in the three main steps of setting up the Inquisition, expelling the Jews, and expelling the Moriscoes.

On the Portuguese as on the northern European coasts, sea-faring commerce arose on a basis of fishing ;[1] agriculturally, save as to fruits and wines, Portugal was undeveloped ; and the conquered Moorish territory, handed over by the king in vast estates to feudal lords, who gave no intelligent encouragement to cultivation, long remained sparsely populated.[2] The great commercial expansion began soon after King John II., egregiously known as "the Perfect," suddenly and violently broke the power of the feudal nobility (1483-84), a blow which made the king instantly a popular favourite, and which their feudal methods had left the nobles unable to return. In the previous generation, Prince Henry the Navigator had set up a great movement of maritime discovery, directed to commercial ends ; and from this beginning arose the remarkable but short-lived empire of Portugal in the Indies. That stands out from the later episodes of the Dutch and British empires in that, to begin with, the movement of discovery was systematically fostered and subsidised by the crown, Prince Henry giving the lead ; and that in the sequel the whole commercial fruits of the process were the crown's monopoly : a state of things as unfavourable to permanence as could well be conceived. But even under more favourable conditions, though the Portuguese empire might have overborne the Dutch, it could hardly have maintained itself

[1] Schanz, *Englische Handelspolitik*, 1881, p. 283.
[2] H. Morse Stephens, *Portugal*, 1891, pp. 53, 87, 102, 236.

against the British. The economic and military bases, as in the case of Holland, were relatively too narrow for the superstructure.

What is most memorable in the Portuguese evolution is the simple process of discovery which was scientifically and systematically conducted in the hope of sailing round Africa to India. The list of results is worth detailing. In 1419 Perestrello discovered the island of Porto Santo; in 1420 Zarco and Vaz found Madeira, not before charted; and in the next twenty years the Canary Islands, the Azores, Santa Maria and St. Miguel swelled the list. In 1434, Cape Bojador was doubled by Gil Eannes, and the Rio d'Ouro was reached in 1436 by Baldaya; in 1441 Nuno Tristan attained Cape Blanco; in 1445 he found the river Senegal; D. Dias reaching Guinea in the same year, and Cape Verde in 1446. From Tristan's voyage of 1441 dates the slave trade, which now gave a sinister stimulus to the process of discovery; every cargo of negroes being eagerly bought for the cheap cultivation of the Moorish lands, still poorly populated under the feudal regimen.[1] The commercial and slave-trading purpose may in part account for the piecemeal nature of the advance;[2] for it was not till 1471 that the islands of Fernando Po were discovered and the equator crossed; and not till 1484 that Cam reached the Congo.[3] But two years later Bartholomew Dias made the rest of the way to the Cape of Good Hope, a much greater advance than had before been made in thirty years; and after a pause in the chronicles of eleven years, Vasco da Gama sailed from Lisbon to Calcutta. Meantime the Perfect

[1] Stephens, *Portugal*, pp. 148, 149, 182.

[2] Many of the dates are to some extent in dispute. Cp. Stephens, *Portugal*, pp. 144-56; and Mr. Major's Life of *Prince Henry of Portugal*, 1868, *passim*.

[3] There is a dubious-looking record that at this time a systematic attempt was made to Christianise the natives instead of enslaving them. See it in Dunham *History of Spain and Portugal*, iii. 288-91.

king, preoccupied with the African route, made in 1493 his great mistake of dismissing Columbus from his court as a visionary. Had Portugal added the new hemisphere to her list of discoveries, it would have been stupendous indeed. As it is, this "Celtic" people, sailing in poor little vessels obviously not far developed from the primary fishing-smack, had done more for the navigation and charting of the world than all the rest of Europe besides.

And still the expansion went rapidly on; the reign of Manuel, "the Fortunate," reaping even more glory than that of his predecessor, who in turn had rewards denied to the pioneer promoter, Prince Henry. In the year 1500 Brazil was reached by Cabral, and Labrador by Corte-Real; and in 1501 Castella discovered the islands of St. Helena and Ascension. Amerigo Vespucci, whose name came into the heritage of the discovery of Columbus, explored the Rio Plata and Paraguay in 1501-53; Coutinho did as much for Madagascar and the Mauritius in 1506; Almeida in 1507 found the Maldive Islands; Malacca and Sumatra were attached by Sequiera in 1509; the Moluccas by Serrano in 1512; and the Ile de Bourbon in 1513 by Mascarenhas. In eastern Asia, again, Coelho in 1516 sailed up the coast of Cochin China and explored Siam; Andrade reached Canton in 1517 and Pekin in 1521; and in 1520 the invincible Magellan, entering the service of Spain,[1] achieved his great passage to the Pacific.[2] No such century of navigation had yet been seen; and all this dazzling enlargement of life and knowledge was being accomplished by one of the smallest of the European kingdoms, while England was laggardly passing from the point of Agincourt, by the way of the

[1] Thus the second great expansion of geographical knowledge, like the first, went to the credit of Spain through Portuguese mismanagement, Magellan being alienated by King Miguel's impolicy.

[2] I follow the dates fixed by Mr. Stephens, p. 175.

Wars of the Roses, to that of the Field of the Cloth of Gold, producing at that stage, indeed, More's *Utopia*, but yielding no fruits meet therefor.

When, however, there followed on the process of discovery the process of commerce, the advantages accruing to the monarchic impulse and control were absent. Always as rigidly restrictive in its pursuit of discovery and commerce as the ancient Carthaginians had been,[1] the Portuguese crown was as much more restrictive than they in its practice as an absolute monarchy is more concentrated than an oligarchy. Whatever progress was achieved by the Portuguese in India was in the way of vigorous conquest and administration by capable governors like Albuquerque (d. 1515) and Da Castro (d. 1548), of whom the first showed not only military but conciliatory capacity, and planned what might have been a triumphant policy of playing off Hindu princes against Mohammedan. But the restrictive home-policy was fatal to successful empire-building where the conditions called for the most constant output of energy. Though the Portuguese race has shown greater viability in India than either the Dutch or the English, it could not but suffer heavily from the climate in the first days of adaptation. The death-rate among the early governors is startling; and the rank and file cannot have fared much better.[2] All the while swarms of the more industrious Portuguese, including many Jews, were passing to Brazil and settling there.[3] To meet this drain there was needed the freest opening in India to private enterprise; whereas the Portuguese crown, keeping in its own hands the whole of the Indian products extorted by its governors, and forcing them to send cargoes of

[1] See Dunham, iii. 286, as to the anger of John II. at a pilot's remark that the voyage to Guinea was easily made. An attempted disclosure of the fact to Spain was ferociously punished.

[2] Cp. Stephens, pp. 181, 218.

[3] *Id.* p. 228.

gratis goods for the Crown to sell, limited enterprise in an unparalleled fashion.[1] The original work of discovery and factory-planting, indeed, could not have been accomplished by Portuguese private enterprise as then developed; but the monarchic monopoly prevented its growth. The Jews had been expelled (1496), and with them most of the acquired commercial skill of the nation;[2] the nobles had become as subservient to and dependent on the throne as those of Spain were later to be; and already the curse of empire was impoverishing the land as it was to do in Spain. Slave labour in the Moorish provinces drove out free; the rural population elsewhere thinned rapidly under the increasing drain of the expeditions of discovery, colonisation, and conquest; and only in the rapidly increasing population of Lisbon, which trebled in eighty years, was there any ostensible advance in wealth to show for the era of empire. Even in Lisbon, by the middle of the sixteenth century, the negro slaves outnumbered the free citizens.[3] And over these conditions of economic and political decadence reigned the Inquisition.

In Portugal, as in Spain, the period of incipient political decay is the period of brilliant literature; the reason being that in both cases middle-class and upper-class incomes were still large and the volume of trade great, while the administration was becoming inept and the empire weakening. In both cases, too, there was less waste of energy in war than in the ages preceding. As Lope de Vega and Calderon build up a brilliant drama after the Armada and the loss of half the Netherlands, and Velasquez is sustained by Philip IV., so Camoens writes his epic, Gil Vicente his plays, and Barros his history, in the reign of John III., when Portugal is within a generation of being annexed to Spain, and within two generations of being bereft of

[1] Stephens, pp. 177, 181, 192. [2] *Id.* pp. 171-73. [3] *Id.* p. 182.

her Asiatic empire by the Dutch. At such a stage, when wealth still abounds, and men for lack of science are indifferent to such phenomena as multiplication of slaves and rural depopulation, a large city public can evoke and welcome literature and art. It was so in Augustan Rome. And the sequel is congruous in all cases.

Mr. Morse Stephens in this connection affirms (*Portugal*, p. 259) that "it has always been the case in the history of a nation which can boast of a golden age, that the epoch of its greatest glory is that in which its literature chiefly flourished. . . . It was so with Portugal. The age which witnessed the careers of its famous captains and conquerors was also the age of its greatest poets and prose writers." The proposition on inquiry will be found to be inaccurate in its terms and fallacious in its implications. As thus: 1. Greek literature is, on the whole, at its highest in the period of Plato, Aristophanes, Euripides, and Aristotle; while the period of "glory" or expansion must be placed either earlier or later under Alexander, when the golden age of literature is past. 2. The synchronism equally breaks down in the case of Rome. There is little literature in the period of the triumph over Carthage; and literature does not go on growing after Augustus, despite continued military "glory." Trajan had neither a Horace nor a Virgil. 3. In England, the "glory" of Marlborough's victories evokes Addison, not Shakspere, who does most of his great work under James I. And though Chaucer chanced to flourish under Edward III., there is no fine literature whatever alongside of the conquests of Henry V. 4. In Germany, Schiller and Goethe, Fichte and Hegel, wrote in a period of political subordination, and Heine before the period of Bismarckism. Who are the great writers since? 5. In France, the period of Napoleon is nearly blank of great writers. They abounded after the fall of his empire and the loss of his conquests. 6. The great literary period of Spain begins with the decline of the Spanish empire.

It is hardly necessary to bring further evidence. It remains only to point out that in Portugal itself the brilliant literary reign is not the period of discovery, since all the great exploration had been done before John III. came to the throne. It is true that the retrospect of an age of conquest and effort *may* stimulate literature in a later generation; but the true causation is in a literary-*plus* a social sequence, though the *arrest* of literary development is always caused socially and politically. Portuguese and Spanish literature and drama alike derive proximately from the Italian Renaissance. When both polities were in full decadence, with the Inquisition

hung round their necks, their intellectual life necessarily drooped. But it is pure fallacy to suppose—and here Mr. Stephens would perhaps acquiesce—that a period of new conquest is *needed* to elicit new and original literature. Homer, Plato, Dante, Boccaccio, Montaigne, Shakspere, Bacon, Molière, Voltaire, Goethe, Leopardi, Poe, Balzac, Heine, Flaubert, Hawthorne, Tourguenief, Ruskin, Ibsen—these are in no rational sense by-products of militarism or "expansion." Given the right social and economic conditions, Spain and Portugal may in the coming century produce greater literature than they ever had, without owning a particle of foreign empire any more than do the States of Scandinavia.

The causes of the decline of the Portuguese empire are very apparent. At the best, with its narrow economic basis in home production, it would have had a hard struggle to beat off the attack of the Dutch and English; but the royal policy, reducing all Portuguese life to dependence on the throne, had withered the national energies before the Dutch attack was made. Hence the easy fall of the crown to Philip of Spain when, the succession failing, he chose to grasp it (1581): the nation had for the time lost the power of self-determination; and under the Spanish dominion the Portuguese possessions in the Indies were defended against the Dutch and English with but a moiety even of the energy that a Portuguese king might have elicited. So the imposing beginnings came well-nigh to naught, the Portuguese empire lasting in its entirety, as a trade monopoly, for just a hundred years. Within the first thirty or forty years of the seventeenth century Dutch and English, Moslems, and even Danes, had captured from Spain-ruled Portugal the Moluccas, Java, most of its Indian territory, its Persian and Chinese settlements, and much of the coast of Brazil; and the two former enemies harried at sea what Oriental trade it had kept. The rest of the Indian settlements were lost in the next generation. "Empire" had run for Portugal the usual course.

It was at this stage that the new life of the nation began. In 1640 came the successful revolt against Spain; and the Dutch power in Brazil, which had seemed decisively established under Prince Maurice of Nassau, was entirely overthrown within ten years after his recall in 1644. In Portugal the revolution was primarily the work of the nobility, exasperated by Spanish arrogance and exclusiveness; but they were effectually supported by the people for the same reason; and the state of Spain, financially decrepit and embroiled in war abroad and rebellion in Catalonia, left the new dynasty of Braganza able to maintain itself, with French help, against the clerical and other elements of pro-Spanish reaction. The overthrow of the Dutch in Brazil was almost against the new king's will, for they had at first supported him against Spain; but their movement was as spontaneous, and fully as well justified, as the revolt at home against Spain itself.

§ 2. *The Colonisation of Brazil*

Brazil was and is in fact for Portugal the analogue to the North American colonies of Britain. Where "empire" was sought in the Indies as a means of revenue, savage Brazil, after the gold-seeking rush of 1530 which first raised it above the status of a penal settlement, was a colony, resorted to by men—many of them Jews—seeking freedom from the Inquisition, and men driven from the soil by slave-labour seeking land to till for their own subsistence.[1] All things considered, it has been one of the soundest processes of colonisation in history. The low state of the autochthonous inhabitants is sufficient proof of Buckle's proposition that there the combination of great heat and

[1] Stephens, pp. 227, 228.

great moisture made impossible a successful primary civilisation, nature being too unmanageable for the natural or primitive man.[1] The much higher development of pre-European civilisation not only in Mexico and Peru but among the North American Indians[2] can be explained in no other way. But that science may not in time so exploit the natural forces as to turn them to the account of a high tertiary civilisation, is an assumption we are not entitled to make, though Buckle apparently inclined to it. When he wrote, the population of Brazil was computed at six millions. To-day it stands at nearly fifteen millions; and in Brazil the prospect has never been reckoned otherwise than hopeful. The progress all along, relatively to the obstacles, has been so great that there is no visible ground for anticipating any arrest in the near future.

In Brazil from the first, individual and collective energy had the chance that the royal monopoly denied to the Asiatic settlements. There was here no exigible revenue to arrange for; and the first colonists, being left to themselves, set up local self-government with elected military magistrates called captains[3] — an evolution more remarkable than any which took place in the first century of English colonisation in North America. The first governor-general sent out, Alfonso de Sousa, had the wisdom to preserve and develop the system of captaincies;[4] and colonisation

[1] *Introduction*, 3-vol. ed., i. 103-108. The formula of heat and moisture, however, applies only generally. One of the climatic troubles of the great province of Céará in particular is that at times there is no wet season, and now and then even a drought of whole years. See ch. iii. *Climatologie*, by Henri Morize, in the compilation *Brésil en* 1889, pp. 41, 42.

[2] Cp. the extremely interesting treatises of Mr. Lucien Carr, *The Mounds of the Mississippi Valley* (Washington, 1893), *The Position of Women among the Huron-Iroquois Tribes* (Salem, 1884), and on the *Food and Ornaments of certain American Indians* (Worcester, Mass. 1895-97).

[3] Stephens, p. 225.

[4] Mr. Stephens (p. 226) states that there were created three vast "chief captaincies." Baron de Rio-Branco, in his *Esquisse de l'histoire du Brésil*, in the compilation *Brésil en* 1889, specifies a division by the king (1532-35) into twelve

went steadily on throughout the century. It was first sought, as a matter of course, to enslave the natives; but the attempt led only to a race-war such as grew up later in the New England colonies; and in the Catholic as later in the Protestant colonies resort was had to the importation of negroes, already so common as slaves in Portugal. With a much slower rate of progress, the Brazilians have in the end come much better than the North Americans out of the social diseases thus set up.

In the first place, the Jesuits had a missionary success among the aborigines such as the Puritans never approached in North America, thus eventually arresting the race-struggle and securing the native stock as an element of population—a matter of obvious importance in view of the factor of climate. And whereas the labours of the Jesuits in India had been turned to naught by the Inquisition which they brought in their train, Brazil was by the wisdom of the early governors saved from that scourge.[1] Thus fortunately restrained by the civil power, the Jesuits did a large part of the work of civilising Brazil. So long as the stage of race-war lasted—and till far on in the seventeenth century it was chronic and murderous[2]—they strove to protect the natives whom they converted.[3] It is noteworthy, too, that just before expelling the Jesuit order from Portugal in 1759, by which time it had become a wealthy and self-seeking trading corporation in Brazil,[4] the Marquis of Pombal secured the emancipation in Brazil of all the Indians who had there been enslaved as a result of the old race wars, thus giving effect to a law which the Jesuits had got passed in 1680 without being able to

hereditary captaincies. Both statements seem true. The policy of non-interference was wisely adhered to by later governors, though Thomas de Sousa (*circa* 1550) introduced a necessary measure of centralisation.

[1] Stephens, pp. 231, 232.

[2] Baron de Rio-Branco, *Esquisse*, as cited, pp. 127-32.

[3] *Id.* p. 149; Stephens, p. 231.

[4] Stephens, p. 359.

enforce it against the slave-owners.[1] And it is apparently due in part to the culture they maintained [2] that, though the emancipation of the negroes was to be delayed till late in the present century, an energetic plea was made for them by a Portuguese advocate of Batria at the time of the emancipation of the Indians.[3] Their own degeneration into a wealth-amassing corporation was an exact economic duplication of the process that had occurred in Europe among all the monastic and chivalrous orders of the Middle Ages in succession.[4]

In the eighteenth century, Brazil, still limited, for its direct trade, to Portugal, so prospered that the loss of empire in Asia was much more than compensated even to the royal revenue of Portugal; the new discoveries of gold bringing for a time as much as £300,000 a year to the treasury under the system by which, the gold-fields remaining free to their exploiters, the crown received a fifth of the total export.[5] In Portugal itself, after the advent of the anti-clerical Marquis of Pombal, there went on as striking a regeneration of government (1750-77) as occurred in Spain under Charles III.; and though the storms of the French Revolution, and the tyrannous reactions which followed it, fell as heavily on Portugal as on the rest of the peninsula, its lot is to-day hopeful enough. In common with those of Spain and Italy, its literature shows plenty of fresh intellectual life; and, again, as in their case, its worst trouble is a heritage of bad finance, rather than any lack of progressive intelligence. With sound government, the large outlet offered by Brazil to emigration should make Portugal a place of plenty—if, that is, its burden of debt be not too great. But herein lies a problem of special importance for the people of

[1] Rio-Branco, p. 132. [2] As to which see Rio-Branco, p. 149. [3] *Id.* p. 148.
[4] As to this see the author's *Dynamics of Religion*, pp. 24-27.
[5] Stephens, pp. 348, 376.

Great Britain. Portugal, like Britain, began to accumulate a national debt in the period of chronic European war; but between 1850 and 1890 the sum has actually multiplied tenfold, rising from twenty-five to two hundred and fifty-eight millions of milreis. All the while, the balance of productivity is more and more heavily on the side of Brazil. As a similar evolution will probably take place within the next century or two in England, it will be of peculiar interest to note how Portugal handles the problem. When the English coal supply is exhausted, a vast debt, it seems probable, will be left to a population ill-capable of sustaining it; and the apparently inevitable result will be such a drift of population from Britain to the United States as now goes from Portugal to Brazil, leaving the home population all the less able to bear its financial burden. It is difficult to see how any arrangement, save a composition with creditors, can meet the case.[1] Yet within the last ten years, Lisbon has been enormously improved; and if but the law of 1844 prescribing compulsory education could be enforced, Portuguese resources might be so developed as to solve the problem progressively. As it is, the nation is still largely illiterate,—a heavy handicap.

Meanwhile Brazil, after passing from the status of colony to that of kingdom or so-called "empire," has become a republic, like the other Iberian States of South America; and throughout the century its development has been comparatively fortunate. The flight of the Portuguese king[2] thither in 1808 gave it independent standing without its paying the price of war; whence came free trade with the friendly states of Europe; and when on the return of the king it insisted on maintain-

[1] This has been repeatedly suggested. See the pamphlet of Guilherme J. C. Henriquez (W. J. C. Henry) on *Portugal*, 1880.

[2] This had been several times proposed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (Rio-Branco, p. 154).

ing its independence under his son, against the jealous effort of the Portuguese Cortes to reduce it to a group of dependent provinces,[1] the tradition of freedom set up by its past prevailed. Thus the Brazilians effected peacefully what the English colonies in North America achieved only by an embittering and exhausting war; and so far as those of us can judge who are not at home in Portuguese literature, the culture evolution in Brazil at the date of the French Revolution had on some lines equalled that of the United States.[2] But where the United States were in educative and enriching contact with the relatively high civilisations of England and France, Brazil could still draw only on the relatively small intellectual and commercial stores of Portugal, with some addition from general commerce with Europe. It is in the latter half of the century that Brazilian possibilities have begun to emphasise themselves.

North American evolution has in this century been especially rapid because of several great economic factors: (1) the tobacco and cotton culture of the period before the civil war; (2) the very large immigration from Europe; (3) the rush for gold to California, hastening the development of the West; (4) the abundant yield of coal and iron, quickening every species of manufacture. No one of these special factors is potent in Brazil, save for the now rapidly increasing immigration: there is no great staple of produce that thus far outgoes competition, unless it be caoutchouc; the precious metals are not now abundant; and there is practically no coal, though there is infinite iron. But these are conditions merely of a relatively slow development, not of unprogressiveness; and the presumption is that they will prove beneficent. The rapid com-

[1] Rio-Branco, p. 163.
[2] Cp. Rio-Branco, *Esquisse*, as cited, p. 151.

mercial development of the United States is excessively capitalistic, in virtue largely of the factor of coal, and the consequent disproportionate stress of manufactures. The outstanding result is, as in England, a feverish and hard-driven competitive life for the great mass of the population, with the prospect ahead of industrial convulsions, in addition to the nightmare of the race hatred between black and white; a desperate problem from which Brazil seems to have been saved. There the problem of slavery was later faced than in the United States, partly, perhaps, because there the slave was less cruelly treated; but the result of the delay was altogether good. There was no civil war; the process of emancipation was gradual, beginning in 1871 and finishing with a leap in 1885-88; and no race hatred has been left behind.[1] Those whose political philosophy begins and ends with a belief in the capacities of the "Anglo-Saxon race" would do well to note these facts.

In Brazil the process of emancipation, long favoured as elsewhere by the liberal minds,[2] was peacefully forced on by economic pressure. It was seen that slave labour was a constant check to the immigration of free labour, and therefore to the development of the country.[3] When this had become clear, emancipation was only a question of time. The same development would inevitably have come about in North America; and it is not a proof of any special "Anglo-Saxon" faculty for government that the process there was precipitated by one of the bloodiest wars of the modern world, and

[1] F. J. de Santa-Anna Nery, "Travail Servile et Travail Libre," in vol. *Bréuil en* 1889, pp. 205, 206; E. da Silva-Prado, "Immigration," ch. xvi. of same compilation, pp. 489, 490.

[2] Rio-Branco, p. 186, *note*.

[3] From 1857 to 1871, the fifteen years preceding the process of emancipation, the total immigration was only 170,000. From 1873 to 1887 it amounted to 400,000, and has since much increased. Cp. Santa-Anna Nery, as cited, p. 212; and E. da Silva-Prado, "Immigration" as cited, pp. 489-91.

has left behind it one of the blackest problems by which any civilisation is faced. The frequent European comments on the revolutions of South America are apt to set up an illusion. All told, they represent less evil than did the North American Civil War; and they are hardly greater moral evils than the peaceful growth of financial corruption in the North. In any case, the only revolution in Brazil since the outbreak of 1848 has been the no less peaceful than remarkable episode of 1889, which dethroned the Emperor Pedro II. and made Brazil a republic. There was as much of pathos as of promise in the event, for Pedro had been the very best monarch of the century; but at least the bloodless change was in keeping with his reign and his benign example,[1] and may indeed be reckoned a due result of them.

In fine, Brazil—in common with other parts of South America—has a fair chance of being the scene of a future civilisation morally and socially greater and higher than that now evolving in North America. What may be termed the coal-civilisations, with their factitious and joyless rapidity of exploitation, are in the nature of the case at once ugly and impermanent. That cannot well be the highest civilisation which multiplies by the myriad its serfs of the mine, and by the million its slaves of the machine. In South America the lack of coal promises escape from the worst developments of capitalism,[2] inasmuch as labour must therefore be mainly spent on and served by the living processes and forces of nature, there so immeasurable and so inexhaustible of beauty. Fuel enough for sane industry is supplied by the richest woods on the planet; and the

[1] It is interesting to note that whereas he was, for a king, an accomplished and enlightened philosopher, of the theistic school of Coleridge, the revolutionist movement was made by the Brazilian school of Positivists. It would be hard to find a revolution in which both sides stood at so high an intellectual level.

[2] See, in *Brésil en* 1889, the remarks of M. da Silva-Prado, p. 559.

Brazilian climate, even now singularly wholesome over immense areas,[1] may become still more generally so by control of vegetation. It is a suggestive fact that there the common bent, though still far short of mastery, is in an exceptional degree towards the high arts of form and sound.[2] It may take centuries to evoke from a population which quietly embraces the coloured types of South America and Africa the æsthetic progress of which it is capable[3]; but the very fact that these types play their physical and artistic part in the growth is a promise special to the case. And if thus the "Latin" races—for it is Italians, Portuguese, Spaniards, and French-speaking Belgians who chiefly make up the immigrants, though there is a German element also—build up a humanly catholic and soundly democratic life in that part of the planet most prodigally served by Nature, subduing to their need the vast living forces which overpowered the primitive man, and at the same time escaping the sinister gift of subterranean fuel—if thus they build up life rather than dead wealth, they will have furthered incomparably the general deed of man. But it is part of the hope set up by the slower rate of a progress which overtakes and keeps pace with Nature, instead of forestalling the yearly service of the sun, that when it reaches greatness it will have outlived the instincts of racial pride and hate which have been the

[1] See the section (ch. iii.) on "Climatologie," by Henri Morize, in *Brésil en* 1889; in particular the section on "Immigration" (ch. xvi.) by E. da Silva-Prado, pp. 503-505.

[2] See, in the same volume, the section (ch. xviii.) on "L'Art," by Silva-Prado. He shows that "Le Brésilien a la préoccupation de la beauté" (p. 556).

[3] The probabilities appear to be specially in favour of music, to which the native races and the negroes alike show a great predilection (*id.* pp. 545, 546). As M. da Silva-Prado urges, what is needed is a systematic home-instruction, as liberally carried out as was Pedro's policy of sending promising students of the arts to Europe. Thus far, though education is good, books are relatively scarce because of their dearness. Here again the United States had an immense preliminary advantage in their ability to reproduce at low prices the works of English authors, paying nothing to the writers; a state of things which subsisted long after the States had produced great writers of their own.

shame and the stumbling-block of the preceding ages. Should "little" Portugal be the root of such a growth her part will surely have been sufficient. But in the meantime Portugal and Brazil alike suffer from illiteracy, the bane of the Catholic countries; and that priest-wrought evil must be remedied if their higher life is to be maintained.

PART VI

ENGLISH HISTORY TILL THE CONSTITUTIONAL PERIOD

CHAPTER I

BEFORE THE GREAT REBELLION

It is after the great Civil War that English political development becomes most directly instructive, because it is thenceforward that the modern political conditions begin to be directly traceable. Constitutional or parliamentary monarchy takes at that point a virtually new departure. But we shall be better prepared to follow the play of the forces of attraction and repulsion, union and strife, in the modern period, if we first realise how in the ages of feudal monarchy and personal monarchy, as the previous periods have been conveniently named, the same fundamental forces were at work in different channels. The further we follow these forces back the better we are prepared to conceive political movement in terms of naturalist as opposed to verbalist formulas. Above all things, we must get rid of the habit of explaining each phenomenon in terms of the abstraction of itself—as, Puritanism by "the Puritan spirit," Christian civilisation by "Christianity," and English history by "the English character." We are to look for the causation of the Puritan spirit and English conduct and the religion of the hour in the interplay of general instincts and particular circumstances.

§ 1

At the very outset the conventional views as to the bias of the "Anglo-Saxon race"[1] are seen on the least scrutiny to be excluded by the facts. Credited with an innate bent to seafaring, the early English are found to have virtually abandoned the sea after settling in England;[2] the new conditions altering the seagoing bent just as the older had made it, and continued to do in the case of the Scandinavians. Credited in the same fashion with a racial bias to commerce, they are found to have been uncommercial, unadventurous, home-staying; and it took centuries of continental influences to make them otherwise. Up to the fourteenth century "almost the whole of English trade was in the hands of aliens."[3] And of what trade the "free" Anglo-Saxons did conduct, the most important branch seems to have been the slave trade.[4] In the words of a close student, English economic history "begins with the serfdom of the masses of the rural population under Saxon rule—a serfdom from which it has taken a thousand years of English economic evolution to set them free."[5]

That the mass of the "Saxon" English (who included many of non-Saxon descent) were virtually serfs, is a conclusion repeatedly reached on different lines of research. Long ago, the popular

[1] "The distinctive characteristics of the Saxon race—talents for agriculture, navigation, and commerce" (T. Colley Grattan, *The Netherlands*, 1830, p. 2).

[2] A. L. Smith, in *Social England*, i. 201, 202. When Alfred built ships he had to get "Frisian pirates" to man them. It was clearly the new agricultural facilities of England that turned the original pirates into thorough landsmen. Cp. Dr. Cunningham, *Growth of English Industry and Commerce*, 3rd ed. 1896, App. E. pp. 640, 641.

[3] H. Hall, in *Social England*, i. 464. Cp. ii. 101; Prof. Ashley, *Introduction to English Economic History*, 1888-93, i. 111; Hallam, *Middle Ages*, 11th ed. iii. 327; Schanz, *Englische Handelspolitik*, 1889, i. 1. When the Jews were expelled by Edward I., Lombards were installed in their place. Later, as we shall see, the Hansards seem to have tutored natives up to the point of undertaking their own commerce.

[4] Cp. A. L. Smith, as cited, p. 203.

[5] Seebohm, *The English Village Community*, 3rd ed. 1884, pref. p. ix. Cp. Prof. Ashley, *Introduction to English Economic History*, i. 13-16.

historian Sharon Turner wrote that "There can be no doubt that nearly three-fourths of the Anglo-Saxon population were in a state of slavery" (*History of the Anglo-Saxons*, 4th ed. 1823, iii. 255). J. M. Kemble later admitted that the "whole population in some districts were unfree" (*The Saxons in England*, reprint, 1876, i. 189). Later and closer research does but indicate gradations in the status of the unfree—gradations which seem to have varied arbitrarily in terms of local law. The Domesday Book specifies multitudes of *villani*, *servi*, *bordarii*, as well as (occasionally) large numbers of *sochmanni*, and *liberi homines*. Thus, in Cornwall there were only six chief proprietors, with 1738 *villani*, 2441 *bordarii*, and 1148 *servi*; in Devonshire, 8246 *villani*, 4814 *bordarii*, and 3210 *servi*; in Gloucestershire, 3071 *villani*, 1701 *bordarii*, and 2423 *servi*; while in Lincolnshire there were 11,322 *sochmanni*, 7168 *villani*, 3737 *bordarii*; and in Norfolk 4528 *villani*, 8679 *bordarii*, 1066 *servi*, 5521 *sochmanni*, and 4981 *liberi homines*. (Cp. Sharon Turner, as cited, vol. iii. B. viii. c. 9.) Thus the largest numbers of ostensible freemen are found in the lately settled Danish districts, and the largest number of slaves where most of the old British population survived (Ashley, *Economic History*, 1888, i. 17, 18; Cunningham, *Growth of English Industry and Commerce*, 1891, i. 88). The main totals are: *bordarii*, 82,119; *villani*, 108,407; *servi*, 25,156, all of whom were more or less "unfree": that is, 215,000 heads of families, roughly speaking, out of an entire enumerated population of 300,000. The constant tendency was to reduce all shades to one of *nativi* or born villeins (Stubbs, *Constitutional History*, 4th ed. i. 465). Professor Vinogradoff's research, which aims at correcting Mr. Seebohm's, does but disclose that villeinage in general had three aspects:—"Legal theory and political disabilities would fain make it all but slavery; the manorial system ensures it something of the character of the Roman *colonatus*; there is a stock of freedom in it which speaks of Saxon tradition" (*Villainage in England*, 1892, p. 137; Cp. Seebohm, as cited, p. 409; and, Stubbs, § 132, i. 462-65). Even the comparatively "free" socmen were tied to the land and were not independent yeomen (Ashley, i. 19). As to Teutonic slavery in general, cp. C.-F. Allen, *Histoire de Danemark*, French tr. 1878, i. 41-44; as to France, cp. Guizot, *Essais sur l'Histoire de France*, édit. 1847, pp. 162-72; *Histoire de la civilisation en France*, 13e édit. iii. 172, 190-203; and as to the Netherlands, see above, pp. 297-98.

There is a tendency on the one hand to exaggerate the significance of the data, as when we identify the lot of an ancient serf with that of a negro in the United

States of fifty years ago;[1] and on the other hand to forget, in familiarity with scholarly research, the inevitable moral bearing of all degrees of bondage. An immeasurable amount of moral history is conveyed in the simple fact that "slave" was always a term of abuse; that "villein" is just "villain"; that "caitiff" is just "captive"; and that "ceorl" is just "churl." So the *knabe* becomes the "knave"; the "scullion" the "blackguard"; and the homeless wanderer the "vagabond"; even as for the Roman the guest, *hostis*, was the enemy. The "rogue" has doubtless a similar descent, and "rogue and peasant-slave" stood for all things contemptible. Men degrade and impoverish their fellows, and out of the created fact of deprivation make their worst aspersions; never asking who or what it is that thus turns human beings into scullions, churls, blackguards, knaves, caitiffs, rogues, and villains. The Greeks knew that a man enslaved was a man demoralised; but saw in the knowledge no motive for change of social tactics. Still less did the Saxons; for their manumissions at the bidding of the priest were but penitential acts, in no way altering the general drift of things.

Green (*Short History*, ch. i. § 6, ed. 1881, p. 54, 55), laying stress on the manumissions, asserts that under Edgar, "slavery was gradually disappearing before the efforts of the Church." But this is going far beyond the evidence. Kemble rightly notes—here going deeper than Professor Vinogradoff—that there was a constant process of new slave-making (*Saxons*, i. 183-84); and in particular notes how "the honours and security of service became more anxiously desired than a needy and unsafe freedom" (p. 184). There is in short a law of worsenment in a crude polity as in an advanced one. Green himself says of the slave class that it "sprang mainly from debt or crime" (*The Making of England*, 1885, p. 192; cp. *Short History*, p. 13). But debt and "crime" were always

[1] That the serf or villein was not necessarily an abject slave, is noted by Kemble (*Saxons in England*, as cited, i. 213), and Stubbs (i. 466).

arising. Compare his admissions in *The Conquest of England*, 2nd ed. pp. 444, 445. Elsewhere he admits that slaves were multiplied by the mutual wars of the Saxons (p. 13); and Kemble, recognising "crime" as an important factor, agrees (i. 186) with Eichhorn and Grimm in seeing in war and conquest the "principal and original cause of slavery in all its branches." A battle would make more slaves in a day than were manumitted in a year. (Cp. C.-F. Allen, *Histoire de Danemark*, French tr. i. 41-44, as to the general tendencies of Teutonic slavery.) The clergy for a time promoted enfranchisement, and even set an example in order to widen their own basis of power; but as Green later notes (ch. v. § 4, p. 239) the Church in the end promoted "emancipation, as a work of piety, on all estates but its own." Green further makes the vital admission that "the decrease of slavery was more than compensated by the increasing degradation of the bulk of the people. . . . Religion had told against political independence,"—for the Church played into the hands of the king. Finally, though under the Normans the Saxon slaves appear to have gained as beside the middle grades of peasants (Ashley, i. 18), it is a plain error to state that the Bristol slave-trade was suppressed under William by "the preaching of Wulfstan, and the influence of Lanfranc" (Green, (*Short History*, p. 55; also in longer *History*, i. 127; so also Bishop Stubbs, i, 463, *note*). The historian incidentally reveals later (*Short History*, ch. vii. § 8, p. 432) that "at the time of Henry the Second's accession, Ireland was full of Englishmen who had been kidnapped and sold into slavery, in spite of Royal prohibitions and the spiritual menaces of the English Church." (Cp. Hallam, *Middle Ages*, 11th ed. iii. 316, *note*.) He admits too (p. 55) that "a hundred years later than Dunstan, the wealth of English nobles was sometimes said to spring from breeding slaves for the market." The "market" was for concubines and prostitutes, as well as for labourers. (Cp. Southey, *Book of the Church*, ed. 1824, i. 115, following William of Malmesbury; and Hallam, as last cited.) Thus, under Saxon and Norman law alike, a slave trade persisted for centuries.

In Saxondom, for centuries before the Conquest, "history" is made chiefly by the primitive forces of tribal and local animosity, the Northmen coming in to complicate the insoluble strifes of the earlier English, uniting these against them, dominating them, and getting ultimately absorbed in the population, but probably constituting for long an extra source of conflict in domestic

politics. A broad difference of accent, as in Scandinavia down to our own day, is often a strain on fellowship. And in the absence of leading and stimulus from a higher culture, so little progressive force is there in a group of struggling barbaric communities, that there was only the scantiest political and other improvement in Saxon England during hundreds of years. When Alfred strove to build up a civilisation, he turned as a matter of course to the Franks.[1] The one civilising force was that of the slight contacts kept up with the Continent, perhaps the most important being the organisation of the Church. It was the Norman Conquest, bringing with it a multitude of new contacts, and an entrance of swarms of French artificers and clerics, that decisively began the civilisation of England. The Teutonic basis, barbarous as it was, showed symptoms of degeneration rather than of development. In brief, France was civilised through Italy; England was civilised through France.

Bishop Stubbs, after admitting as much (§ 91, *i.* 269, 270) and noting the Norman "genius for every branch of organisation," proceeds to say that "the Norman polity had very little substantial organisation of its own, and that it was native energy that wrought the subsequent transformation." His own pages supply the disproof. See in particular as to the legislative and administrative activity of Henry II., § 147, i. 530-33. As to the arrest or degeneration of the Saxon civilisation, cp. § 79, i. 227, 228; Sharon Turner, *History of England during the Middle Ages*, 2nd ed. i. 1, 73; Pearson, *History of England during the Early and Middle Ages*, 1867, i. 288, 308-312, 321, 343, 346, 347. Mr. Pearson's testimony, it should be noted, is that of a partisan and eulogist of the "race."

In Normandy itself, however, half a century before the Conquest, there had arisen a state of extreme tension between the peasantry and their lords; and a projected rising was crushed in germ with horrible cruelty.[2]

[1] Green, *History* (the longer), 1885, i. 79.
[2] Thierry, *Histoire de la Conquête de l'Angleterre*, édit. 9e, 1851, i. 152-55.

William's enterprise thus stood for a pressure of need among his own subjects, as well as for an outburst of feudal ambition; and in making up his force he offered an opportunity of plunder to all classes in his own duchy, as well as to those of other provinces of France. His invasion, therefore, hardly represented the full play of the existing forces of civilisation. These, indeed, had to be renewed again and again in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. But the conditions of the Conquest were important for the direction of English political evolution. Its first social and psychological effect was to set up new class relations, and in particular a marked division between aristocracy and people, who spoke different languages. This involved a relation of distrust, and close class union. When the people's speech began to compete with that of their masters, and the nobles separately began to be on good terms with their people, there would arise wide possibilities of strife as between neighbouring nobles and their retainers; and in Scotland the weakness of the crown long gave this free play. But in England, especially after the period of anarchy under Stephen, when the early baronage was much weakened, and many estates were redivided,[1] the strength of the crown, rooted in military custom, and constantly securing itself, tended to unite the nobles as a class for their own aggrandisement and protection. King after king, therefore, sought the support of the people[2] against the baronage, as the baronage sought their help against the king; while the Church fought for its own share of power and privilege.

The history of Christendom, indeed, cannot be

[1] Stubbs, *Constitutional History*, 4th ed. i. 280; Sharon Turner, *History of England during the Middle Ages*, 2nd ed. i. 213.

[2] The Conqueror himself not only took pains to protect and attach native freemen who accepted his rule, but sought to retain their laws and usages. Cp. Stubbs, i. 281, 290, 298. The statement that he aimed specially at the manumission of serfs (Sharon Turner, as last cited, i. 135, 136) proceeds on a fabricated charter. That, however, is not later than Henry I.

understood save in the light of the fact that the Church, a continuous corporation owning much property as such, is as it were a State within the State,[1] representing a special source of strife, although its non-military character limits the danger. What the Church has repeatedly done is to throw in its lot with king or nobles, or with the democracy (as in Switzerland and Protestant Scotland), according as its economic interests dictate. The famous case of Becket, transformed from the king's friend into the king's antagonist, is the most dramatic instance of the Church's necessary tendency to fight for its own hand and to act as an independent community. And it is in large part to the check and counter-check of a church, crown, and baronage, all jealously standing on their rights as against each other, that the rise of the English constitutionalism is to be traced; the baronage and the Church, further, being withheld from preponderance by the strifes arising within their own pale. For even the Church, unified at once by its principle, its self-interest, and the pressure of outside forces, exhibits in its own sections, from time to time, the law of strife among competing interests.[2]

The mere strife of interests, however, could not evolve civilisation in such a polity without a constant grafting-on of actual civilising elements from that southern world in which the ancient seeds were again flowering. Mere mixing of Norman with Saxon blood, one Teutonic branch with another, could avail nothing in itself; and the element of French handicraft and culture introduced in the wake of the Conquest, though

[1] Cp. Milman, *Latin Christianity*, B. xiv. ch. i.

[2] *E.g.* the rivalries of mendicant friars and secular priests and monks, and of the different orders of monks and friars with each other. Cp. Milman, *Latin Christianity*, 4th ed. ix. 145, 146, 155, 156; Sharon Turner, *History of England during the Middle Ages*, iii. 123-26, 137, etc. The strifes between popes and prelates are innumerable, in all countries.

not inconsiderable,[1] could ill survive such a pandemonium as the reign of Stephen. Like Henry I., Stephen depended on the English element as against the baronage; but the struggle brought civilisation lower than it had been since the Conquest. With the accession of Henry II. (1154) came a new influx of French culture and French speech,[2] albeit without any departure from the monarchic policy of evoking the common people as against the nobles. Thenceforward for over a hundred years the administrative methods and the culture are French, down to the erection of a French-speaking Parliament by the southern Frenchman Simon de Montfort. The assumption that some inherent "Teutonic" faculty for self-government shaped the process is one of the superstitions of racial and national vanity.

Dr. C. H. Pearson's reiteration of the old "race" dogma (*History of England during the Early and Middle Ages*, i. 277) is its sufficient *reductio ad absurdum*. In the English manner, he connects with old *Welsh* usages of revenge the late *Irish* tradition of "lynch law" that has been "transplanted to *America*"—as if it were Irishmen who were to-day lynching negroes in the southern States. He explains in the same way "the contrast of French progress by revolutionary movements with the slow, constitutional, onward march of English liberty." On his own showing there was not progress, but deterioration, as regards liberty among the Saxons; and the later history of the English common people is largely one of their efforts to make revolutions. In France, the revolutions were rather fewer. In Denmark and Germany, again, there was long relapse and then revolution. For the rest, Mr. Pearson has contrasted Welsh usage of the *sixth* century with Saxon usage of the *eleventh*, this while admitting the lateness of the latter development (pp. 275, 276). We should require only to go back to the blood-feud stage in Teutondom to prove the ineradicable tendencies of the Anglo-Saxon to the *Faust-recht*, which in Germany survived till the sixteenth century, and to the fisticuffs which occurred some years

[1] As to this see Dr. Cunningham, *Growth of English Industry and Commerce*, 3rd ed. 1896, Appendix E. Cp. Green, *Short History*, ch. ii. § 6, p. 88.

[2] As to which see Earle, *Philology of the English Tongue*, 3rd ed. pp. 54-66.

ago in the English Parliament. The reasoning would be on a par with Mr. Pearson's.

Mr. J. H. Round's way of taking it for granted (*The Commune of London*, 1899, pp. 138-40) that a tendency to strife is permanently and "truly Hibernian," belongs to the same order of thought. Irishmen are represented as abnormal in inability to unite against a common foe, when just such disunion was shown through whole centuries in Saxondom and in Scandinavia and in Germany; and they are further described as peculiar in leaving their commerce in foreign hands, when such was the notorious practice of the Anglo-Saxons.

To no virtue in Norman or English character, then, but to the political circumstances, was it due that there grew up in island England, instead of an all-powerful feudal nobility and a mainly depressed peasantry, as in continental France, a certain balance of classes, in which the king's policy against the nobility restrained and feudally weakened them, and favoured the burghers and yeomen, making sub-tenants king's liegemen; while on the other hand the combination of barons and Church against the king restrained him.[1] Each factor exhibits the operation of primary instinct. A tyrant king is better for the people than the tyranny of ruffian nobles; and the destruction of feudal castles by regal jealousy restrains baronial brigandage. Regal prestige counts for something as against baronial self-assertion; but aristocratic self-esteem also rests itself, as against a reckless king, on popular sympathy. Even the class tyranny of the trade gilds, self-regarding corporations in their way, looking to their own interests and indifferent to those of the outside grades beneath them,[2] could provide a foothold for the barons in the town mobs, whom the barons could patronise.[3] Yet again, the yeomanry and burghers, fostered by the royal

[1] Cp. Buckle, 3 vol. ed. ii. 118; Green, *History* (the larger), 1885, i. 300.

[2] Cp. Green, *Short History*, ch. iv. § 4, pp. 192, 193; ch. vi. § 3, p. 285; Professor Ashley, *Introd. to English Economic History*, 1888-93, i. 71, 75, 85, 87, 89; ii. 12, 14, 19, 49. Professor Ashley notes a great change for the better in the fifteenth century (work cited, ii. 6), and a further advance in the sixteenth (ii. 42).

[3] Cp. J. H. Round, *The Commune of London*, 1899, p. 224.

policy, develop an important military force, which has its own prestige when national wars are set up.

Nothing can hinder, however, that such wars shall in the end aggrandise the upper as against the lower classes, developing as they do the relation of subjection, increasing the specifically military upper class, and setting up the spirit of force as against the spirit of law. In particular, the king's power is always aggrandised when nobility and people alike are led by him to foreign war.[1] Edward III., indeed, had to make many legislative concessions to the Commons in order to procure supplies for his wars: and the expansion of commerce in his reign,[2] furthered by the large influx of Flemish artisans[3] encouraged by him,[4] strengthened the middle classes; but all the while the "lower orders" had the worst of it; and the jealousy between traders and artisans, already vigorous in the reign of John, could not be extinguished. And when, after nearly eighty years without a great external war, Edward I. invaded Scotland, there began a military epoch in which, while national unity was promoted, the depressed class was necessarily enlarged, as it had been before the Conquest during the Danish wars;[5] and the poor went to the wall. Instinct made people and baronage alike loth at first to support the king in wars of foreign aggression; but when once the temper was developed throughout

[1] "After Crécy and Calais, Edward felt himself strong enough to disregard the Commons. . . . His power was for the most part great or small, as his foreign policy was successful or disastrous" (Pearson, *English History in the Fourteenth Century*, pp. 224, 225).

[2] Cp. Professor Ashley, i. 88.

[3] As to Flemish influence on early English progress, see Professor Thorold Rogers, *Industrial and Commercial History of England*, 1892, pp. 10, 11, 301-303.

[4] Hallam, *Middle Ages*, iii. 321, 322.

[5] Gardiner, *Student's History of England*, p. 69. Compare the same writer's *Introduction to the Study of English History*, p. 91: "Even the House of Commons, which was pushing its way to a share of power, was comparatively an aristocratic body. The labouring population in town and country had no share in its exaltation. Even the citizens, the merchants and tradesmen of the towns looked down upon those beneath them without trust or affection." Magna Carta itself was a protection only for "freemen."

the nation, as against France, the spirit of national union helped the growth of class superiority by leaving it comparatively unchecked. In the period between the Conquest and Edward I., the free population had actually increased, partly by French and Flemish immigration in the train of the Conquest; partly by Norman manumissions; partly through the arrivals of Flemish weavers;[1] partly by the new growth of towns under Norman influence; partly by reason of the development of the wool export trade, which flourished in virtue of the law and order at length established under the Angevin kings, and so stimulated other industry: but from the beginning of the epoch of systematic national war the increase was checked; and save for the period of betterment consequent on the destruction of population by the Black Death, the condition of the peasantry substantially worsened.[2] Frenchmen were struck by the number of serfs they saw in southern England as compared with France, and at the stress of their servitude.[3]

An apparently important offset to the general restriction of freedom is the beginning of a representative parliamentary system under the auspices of Simon de Montfort (1265). It is still customary to make this departure a ground for national self-felicitation, though our later historians are as a rule content to state the historical facts, without inferring any special credit to the "Anglo-Saxon race."[4] As a matter of fact,

[1] Cp. Gibbins, *Industrial History of England*, pp. 36, 37; Pearson, *History of England during the Early and Middle Ages*, ii. 378.

[2] See Pearson's *English History in the Fourteenth Century*, pp. 23, 228, 253, etc.; cp. p. 225. In the thirteenth century, Frederick II. had enfranchised all the serfs on his own domains (Milman, *Latin Christianity*, 4th ed. vi. 153); and a similar policy had become general in the Italian cities. Louis VII. of France had even enfranchised many of his serfs in the twelfth century, and Louis X. carried out the policy in 1315. England in these matters was not forward, but backward.

[3] Froissart, liv. ii. ch. 106, éd. Buchon, 1837.

[4] Compare Mackintosh's rhetoric as to Magna Carta constituting "the immortal claim of England on the esteem of mankind" (*History of England*, 1830, i. 222), and

Simon de Montfort's Parliament was the application by a naturalised Frenchman, under stress of the struggle between his party in the baronage and the king, of an expedient set up a generation before by the Emperor Frederick II. in Sicily. There, and not in England, arose the first Parliaments in which sat together barons, prelates, and representatives of cities. Simon de Montfort, son of the leader of the crusade against the Albigenses, must have been perfectly familiar with the details of the system set up in Sicily, to which English attention had been specially called by the effort of Henry III. to obtain the Sicilian crown for his son Edmund; and Simon imitated that system in England, not on any exalted principle of justice, but because the smallness of his support among the barons forced him to make the most of the burgher class, who had stood by him in the struggle. Thus accidentally[1] introduced, under a French name,[2] the representative system is one more of the civilising factors which England owed to Southern Europe; and, as it was, baronage and burgesses alike failed to maintain Simon against the power of the crown, the monarchic superstition availing to divide even the malcontents, as had previously happened after the granting of Magna Carta by King John.

Reiterated claims had secured in the last century the general acceptance of the view that England "set the example" of admitting cities to representation in national diets (so Koch, *Histor. View of the European Nations*, Crichton's tr. 3rd ed. p. 46). But as to the priority of the institution in Sicily (*circa* 1233), see Milman, *Hist. of Latin Christianity*, 4th ed. vi. 154, proceeding on Gregorio, *Considerazioni sopra la Storia di Sicilia*, 1805 (ed. 2a, 1831-39, vol. ii. cap. v.), and Von Raumer, *Geschichte der Hohenstaufen* (Aufg. 1857-58, B. vii. Haupt. 6, Bd. iii. p. 249). Frederick's assemblies, too, were

as to Simon de Montfort, whom he credits with inventing the idea of representation in Parliament for cities (p. 238).

[1] Cp. Guizot, *Essais sur l'histoire de France*, 7e édit. p. 322.

[2] This had, however, been employed as early as 1246.

called *Parlamente*. He in turn had of course been influenced by the practice of the Italian cities, which he wished his own to rival. As to Simon's object in summoning burgesses, Hallam admits (*Europe in the Middle Ages*, ed. 1855, iii. 27) that it "was merely to strengthen his own faction, which prevailed among the commonalty," though the step was too congruous with general developments not to be followed up. Compare the admissions of Green, pp. 151-53; Stubbs, ii. 96, 103. Freeman's statement (*General Sketch of European History*, p. 184) that under Simon we find "the whole English nation, nobles, clergy, and people, acting firmly together" against the king, is quite erroneous. Cp. Gneist, *Geschichte des Self-government in England*, 1863, p. 143.

As the roots of the temper of equality are weakened, the relative prestige of the king is heightened,[1] provided that in a turbulent age he is strong enough for his functions; though again he runs new risks when, in peace, he is weak enough to make favourites, and thus sets up a source of jealousy in the act of surrendering some of his own special prestige. Then he doubles the force against him. History has generally represented favourites as unworthy; but there is no need that they should be so in order to be detested; and whether we take Gaveston or Buckingham or Bute, we shall always find that the animosity of the favourite's assailants is so visibly excessive as to imply the inspiration of primordial envy quite as much as resentment of bad government. Whether it is noble denouncing favoured noble or Pym impeaching the Duke, there is always the note of primary animal jealousy.

§ 2

A very obvious and familiar general law, here to be noted afresh, is that the constant and extensive employment of energy in war retards civilisation, by leaving so much less for intellectual work. Some sociologists

[1] Cp. Pearson, as last cited, p. 8.

have arrived at the optimistic half-truths that (1) warfare yields good in the form of chivalry, and that (2) great wars like the Crusades promote civilisation by setting up communication between peoples. But it is not asked whether the good involved in chivalry could not conceivably have been attained without the warfare, and whether (as before noted) there could not have been commerce between East and West without the Crusades.[1] The ancient Phœnicians had contrived as much in their day. As a matter of fact, the rules of chivalry were but the rules of prize-fighters,[2] without which the game could not continuously be played; and they in no way affected the relations of the prize-fighters with other classes, or even their moral relations with each other save in the matter of fighting. To the "common herd" they were not only brutal but base,[3] recognising no moral obligations in that direction. So too the Crusades represent a maximum of strife yielding a minimum of intercourse, which (save for the spirit of religious hate which wrought the strife) could have been attained in peace in tenfold degree by the play of the energy spent in preliminary bloodshed.

It is, of course, idle to speak as if the age of warfare might have been different if somebody had anachronistically pointed out the possibilities; but it is worse than idle, on the other hand, to impute a laudable virtue to its impulses because other impulses followed on them. The task of the sociological historian is first to trace sequences, and then to reason from them to the problems of his own age, where most are praise and blame

[1] As to what traffic actually took place in the Dark Ages, cp. Heyd, *Histoire du commerce de Levant*, Fr. tr. 1886, i. 94-99.

[2] Down even to the points of chastity and "training."

[3] This is now pretty generally recognised. Among recent writers compare Green, *Short History*, ch. iv. § 3; Pearson, as last cited, p. 220; Gardiner, *Student's History of England*, p. 235; and *Introduction to the Study of English History*, p. 91. See also Buckle, ii. 133. The sentimental view is still extravagantly expressed by Ducoudray, *Histoire sommaire de la civilisation*, 1886.

profitable exercises. The lesson of early English history is neither that chivalry is good nor that the feudal knights and kings were ruffians ; but that certain things happened to retard civilisation because these had their way, and that similar results would tend to accrue if their ideals got uppermost among us now. Thus we have to note that during the long period of frequent dynastic and other civil war from the Conquest to the reign of Henry II. there was almost no intellectual advance in England, the only traceable gain arising when the king was fighting abroad with his foreign forces. There was no such cause at stake as thrilled into fierce song the desperately battling Welsh ; and though in the reign of Edward III. we have the great poetic florescence of which Chaucer is the crown, the inspiration of that literature had come from or through France ; and with the depression of France there came the Nemesis of depression in English culture. It may or may not have been a gain that Edward's victories over France practically determined the adoption of the middle-class, gallicised English speech[1] by the upper classes, who had hitherto been French-speaking, like the kings themselves. They had hitherto looked with true aristocratic scorn on the pretensions of the bourgeoisie—"*rustici Londonienses qui se barones vocant ad nauseam*," in the fashion satirised in all ages, down to our own ; but in their new relation of hostility and superiority to Normandy and France,[2] they insensibly adopted the language that had

[1] Cp. Thierry, *Histoire de la Conquête*, iv. 210. As Thierry notes (p. 247), John Ball's English is much less gallicised than that which became the literary tongue.

[2] Cp. Pearson, *Fourteenth Century*, pp. 222, 233. Professor Earle's quasi-theory of the cause of the recovery of the native tongue (*Philology of the English Tongue*, 3rd ed. pp. 44, 66) is purely fanciful. In the end, as he admits, it was not any native dialect, but the artificial composite "King's English," much modified by French, that survived. It is noteworthy that many locutions which pass in the Bible for specially pure archaic English, as "fourscore and ten," are simply translations of a French idiom, itself ancient Celtic translated into Romance. (Cp. the *Introduction to the Study of the History of Language*, by Strong, Logeman, and Wheeler, 1891, p. 393.) It is probable that, but for hostilities with France, French would have steadily

been framed by that very bourgeoisie out of Saxon, and French and French idioms translated into Saxon. Though, however, Chaucer's own new-English work is part of the result, the intellectual gain stops there for the time being. No nation, from Rome to Napoleonic France, ever helped its own higher culture by destroying other States. The French wars of Henry V. were not less injurious to English civilisation[1] than the desperate civil wars which followed them, when English medieval civilisation reached, relatively to the rest of Europe, its lowest point.[2] And these wars, it is always important to remember, were the result of the young king's acting on the doctrine (doubtfully ascribed to his father, but in any case all too easily acquired by kings) that whereas peace gave headway to domestic sedition, foreign war unified the mass of the people and fixed them to their leader. The shameless aggression on France did so unify them for the moment, as imperialism among an unmoralised public may always be trusted to do; and it left them more demoralised and divided than ever, in due sequence. In all likelihood it was the new bribe of foreign plunder that first drew men away from Lollardism, considered as an outcome of economic discontent, thus preparing the collapse of the movement on its moral side.[3] One man's egoism could thus sway the whole nation's evolution for evil,[4] setting

gained ground through literature, depressing and discrediting the vernacular. On this view it was the continuance of resistance by the Welsh that probably prevented the absorption of the Saxon speech by that of the conquered British; and it is similarly arguable that it was the relation of hostility between the Carlovingian Franks and the more easterly Germans that determined the supremacy of the Romance speech in French. The point is worth psychological investigation.

[1] Cp. Busch, *England unter den Tudors*, 1892, i. 6.

[2] Stubbs, *Constitutional History of England*, 4th ed. iii. 632, 633; Busch, *England unter den Tudors*, i. 81; Green, ch. vi. § 3, pp. 267, 268, 287, 288.

[3] Cp. Gardiner, *Student's History*, p. 330.

[4] The clergy and the Parliament seem to have applauded the project of an invasion of France instantly and without reservation (Sharon Turner, *History of England during the Middle Ages*, ii. 383). And already in the minority of Henry VI. "the Parliament was fast dying down into a mere representation of the baronage

up for it the ideal which haloed him, and which survived him in virtue of the accident that the Nemesis of his course fell upon his successors rather than on him.

§ 3

In the matter of plebeian subjection, the second half of the fourteenth century supplies the proof of the tendency of the period of war. The great gain to the serfs in that period was the result of the depopulation caused by the Black Death (1348-50)—a relation of cause and effect which is still ignored by some writers, in their concern to insist that English labour was once better off than at present. But it was later in the same half-century that the rising of the "Jacquerie," which appears to have been in its origin strictly a revolt against taxation,[1] was so bloodily repressed. The manner of the revolt sufficiently proves that the peasantry had gained new heart with the improvement in their lot which followed on the pestilence, in spite of laws to keep down wages; but even this improvement could not strengthen them sufficiently to make them hold their own politically in 1381 against the aristocracy, gentry, and middle class, now hardened in class insolence. After the southern and eastern risings had been crushed, the men of Essex were told by Richard, who had given them charters of freedom and immediately afterwards revoked them, inclined as he was to protect the serfs in a measure against their masters, that "bondsmen they had been and bondsmen they should remain, in worse bondage than before"; and the following Parliament declared that the landowners would never consent to the freeing of the serfs, "were they all to

and the great landowners" (Green, ch. vi. p. 265). "Never before and never again for more than two hundred years were the Commons so strong as they were under Henry IV." (Stubbs, iii. 73).

[1] Pearson, *English History in the Fourteenth Century*, pp. 250, 251.

die for it in a day." It is noteworthy, on the side of economics, that despite of this temper serfage did gradually die out, the people being for long unable to multiply up to the old level, between restraint, ill-usage, civil war, the decline of tillage and the grouping of holdings, and the high death-rate. Jack Cade's rebellion, in 1450, indicated the persistence of the democratic spirit, contending as it did for the suppression of the system under which the nobles plundered the kingdom while the king was imbecile.

The question as to the rate at which the population recovered from the Black Death has been discussed by Professor Thorold Rogers, Mr. Seebohm, and Professor Cunningham (see the latter's *Growth of English Industry and Commerce*, 1891, i. 304). Professor Rogers, on the one hand, maintains that by 1377, when the tax rolls give a population of about two and a half millions, the population had recovered all it had lost in the Plague, he being of opinion that the England of that age could not at any time support more than two and a half millions. Mr. Seebohm, with whom Dr. Cunningham substantially concurs (see also Pearson, *Fourteenth Century*, p. 249), thinks that the return of the Plague in 1361 and 1369, and the unsettled state of the country, must have prevented recuperation; and, accepting the loose calculation that the Plague destroyed half the population (Mr. Pearson says "one-half or two-thirds"), he concludes that the population before 1348 may have been five millions. The truth surely lies between these extremes. That the population should not at all have recovered in twenty-five years is extremely unlikely. That it should have restored a loss of 33 per cent in twenty-five years, which is what Professor Rogers' position amounts to, is still more unlikely (see his *Six Centuries of Work and Wages*, pp. 223, 226, where the mortality is estimated at one-third). It is besides utterly incongruous with Professor Rogers' own repeated assertion that "during the fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth centuries the population of England and Wales was almost stationary" (*Industrial and Commercial History of England*, pp. 46, 49; *Six Centuries of Work and Wages*, p. 337; *Economic Interpretation of History*, p. 53). How could a medieval population conceivably stand for half a century at a given figure, then, having been reduced by one-third, replace the loss in twenty-five years, and thereafter continue to subsist without further increase for two centuries more?

On the other hand, there is a natural tendency in every suddenly depleted population to reproduce itself for a time at a quickened rate; and in the England of the latter half of the fourteenth century the conditions would encourage such an effort. The lack of house-room and settlement which normally checked increase (cp. Stubbs, § 493) was remedied for a large number of persons; and the general feeling would be all in favour of marriage and repopulation (cp. Rogers, *Six Centuries of Work and Wages*, p. 226, where, however, evidence obviously bad is accepted as to multiplied births), though just after the Plague there would be a great stimulus to the extension of pasture, since that needed fewer hands than tillage. On the whole, we may reasonably surmise that the population before 1348 was, not five millions, but between three and four millions (so Green, ch. v. § 4, p. 241, who, however, takes the excessive view that "more than one-half were swept away," and further (p. 239), that the population "seems to have all but tripled since the Conquest"), and that it was prevented regaining that figure in the next century by the economic preference of sheep-farming to tillage. Mr. Rogers expressly admits (*Six Centuries*, p. 233) that "the price of labour, proclamations and statutes notwithstanding, did not ever fall to its old rates," and repeatedly asserts that "the labourers remained masters of the situation." On his own principles, this goes to prove that their numbers remained lower than of old. He infers a "considerable loss of life" in the famine of 1315-16 from the immediate rise of agricultural wages (from 23 to 30 per cent), of which on the average 20 per cent was permanent. Here there is a presumption that even the population before 1315 was greater than afterwards. Yet again he states (p. 326, etc.) that "the *fifteenth* century and the first quarter of the *sixteenth* were the golden age of the English labourer"—a proposition which staggers credence. Cp. W. J. Corbett, in *Social England*, ii. 382-84. It is impossible, however, to attain demonstration either on that head or as regards the numbers of the population in the periods under notice. Mr. Rogers' claims to give decisive evidence show a serious misconception of what constitutes proof; and there is special reason to distrust his conclusion that population was no greater at the end of Elizabeth's reign than in that of Henry IV. Cp. Mr. Gibbins' *Industrial History of England*, pp. 107-108. Professor J. E. Symes (*Social England*, iii. 128, 129) decides that a "great increase of the population undoubtedly took place in the reign of Henry VIII.," adopting the estimate that the total at the death of Henry VII. was about two and a half millions, and at the death of Henry VIII. about four millions. As to the population at the Conquest, see Sharon Turner's *History of the Anglo-Saxons*, B. viii. c. 9, vol. iii.

It is important to note, finally, that it was in the age of raised standard of comfort that there occurred the first wide diffusion of critical heresy in England. Wiclif's popular Lollardry was one phase of a movement that went deeper in thought and further afield in social reform than his, since he himself felt driven to confute certain opponents of belief in the Scriptures, and at the same time to repudiate the doctrine that vassals might resist tyrant lords.[1] Had he not done so, he might have had a less peaceful end ; but it is clear that many men were in the temper to apply to lay matters the demand for reform which he restricted to matters ecclesiastical.[2] John Ball's rising, however, promptly elicited the much superior strength of the feudal military class ; and though in 1395 there were still Lollards to petition to Parliament for the abolition of "unnecessary trades" as well as war and capital punishment and the Catholic practices afterwards rejected by Protestantism, their Utopia was as hopeless as that of the insurgent peasants. Even had the invasion of France not come about to bribe and demoralise the nation at large, turning it from domestic criticism to the plunder of a neighbouring State, the nobility of the period were utterly incapable of an intellectual ideal ; and any sympathy shown by any section of them for Lollardry was the merest opportunism, proceeding on resentment of Papal exactions or on a premature hope of plundering the Church.[3] The moment Lollardry openly leant towards criticism of nobility as well as clergy, they were ready to give it up to destruction ; and the determining cause of the fall of Richard II. was that, besides alien-

[1] Lewis's *Life of Wiclif*, ed. 1820, pp. 224, 225 ; Lechler's *John Wycliffe and his English Precursors*, Eng. tr. 1 vol. ed. pp. 371-76 ; Professor Montagu Burrows, *Wiclif's Place in History*, p. 19.

[2] Green, *Short History*, ch. v. § 4 ; Gardiner, *Introduction*, pp. 94-98 ; Rogers, *Six Centuries of Work and Wages*, p. 272.

[3] Cp. Sharon Turner, *England during the Middle Ages*, ii. 263 ; iii. 108 ; Milman, *Latin Christianity*, 4th ed. viii. 213, 215.

ating the nobles at once by maintaining a peace policy, and by refusing to let them go to all lengths in oppressing the labourers, he alienated the clergy by sheltering the Lollards.[1] It was the clergy who turned the balance, embracing the cause of Henry IV., who in turn systematically supported them,[2] as did his son after him. Henry V., the national hero-king, and his father were the first burners of "Protestant" heretics.

Mr. Lecky, in his theory of the English aristocracy, credits the nobility with an "eminently popular character" from time immemorial, and cites Comines as to "the singular humanity of the nobles to the people during the civil wars" (*History of England in the Eighteenth Century*, new ed. i. 212, 213). The nobility, in the circumstances, had need to treat the people better than those of France normally did (which was what Comines was thinking of). Their own wealth, what was left of it, came from the people, to whom, further, they looked for followers. Of course the difference between French and English practice dates further back, as above noted. Still more misleading is Mr. Lecky's statement that "the Great Charter had been won by the barons, but . . . it guaranteed the rights of all freemen." Mr. Gardiner expressly points out (*Student's History*, p. 182; cp. his *Introduction to English History*, pp. 66-67) that the Charter "was won by a combination between all classes of freemen." London had harboured and aided the barons' force; and the clergy were closely concerned. The representative assembly summoned by John in 1213 represented the combination of classes. Green (*Short History*, illust. ed. i. 242, 243) uses language which countenances Mr. Lecky, but shows (pp. 235-243) the need the barons felt for aid, and the influence of the Church and the traders. Compare the language of his longer history (1885, i. 244), and his express admission as to the depression the baronage had undergone a century later (*idem*, p. 300). Dr. Stubbs (*Const.*

[1] Green, ch. v. § 5, p. 255.

[2] Green, p. 258; Stubbs, iii. 32. It is plain that among the factious nobility and even the courtiers of the time there was a strong disposition to plunder the Church (Stubbs, iii. 43, 48, 53). Doubt is cast by Bishop Stubbs on Walsingham's story of the Lollard petition of 1410 for the confiscation of the lands of bishops and abbots, and the endowment therewith of 15 earls, 1500 knights, 6000 esquires, and 100 hospitals (Stubbs, iii. 65; cp. Milman, *Latin Christianity*, 4th ed. viii. 214; ix. 17-18); but in any case many laymen leant to such views, and the king's resistance was steadfast. Yet an archbishop of York, a bishop, and an abbot successively rebelled against him. On his hanging of the archbishop, see the remarkable professional reflections of Bishop Stubbs (iii. 53).

Hist. i. 571, 583) also indicates that the people co-operated, though he uses expressions (pp. 570, 579) which obscure the facts in Mr. Lecky's favour. Guizot (*Essais*, p. 282) recognises that the movement was national. Buckle, too, made the point clear long ago (ii. 114-20). But it is noted even in what he called "the wretched work of Delolme."

It is worth noting in this connection that the Magna Carta, considered in itself, is a rather deceptive historical document. Not only did it need the defeat of John and his German and Flemish allies by the French at Bouvines to enable even the combined Lords and Commons and clergy to extort the Charter, but the combination was being progressively destroyed by John, by means of his army of French mercenaries, when the barons in despair persuaded the French king to send an invading force, which was able to land owing to the ruin of John's fleet in a storm. Thereupon John's French troops deserted him. Cp. Green, pp. 122-26; Stubbs, ii. 3, 9-16, as to the weakness and inner divisions of the national combination. Thus it was indirectly to French action that England owed first the Magna Carta and then the check upon the king's vengeance, as it was to the Frenchman Simon de Montfort later that it owed the initiative of a three-class Parliament.

§ 4

The Wars of the Roses, by destroying in large part the nobility, relatively advantaged the middle class[1] as well as the king whose reign followed. Already under Edward IV. the powers of Parliament were much curtailed, and indeed paralysed;[2] this, which is charged as a sin upon the monarch, being the natural result of his gain of power on the ruin of the baronage. Edward IV. only did what Edward I. and III. would have done if in their situation it had been possible, and what Edward II. and Richard II. sought to do, but were too

[1] Schanz (*Englische Handelspolitik*, i. 349, 350) decides that the middle class was the only one which gained. The lower fared as ill as the upper.

[2] Hallam (*Constitutional History*, 10th ed. i. 10) doubts whether Henry VII. carried the power of the Crown much beyond the point reached by Edward. Busch, who substantially agrees (*England unter den Tudors*, i. 8, *note*), misreads Hallam in criticising him, overlooking the "much." Edward had so incensed the London traders by his exactions that it was by way of undertaking to redress these and similar grievances that Richard III. ingratiated himself (Green, pp. 293-94).

weak to compass. The fourth Edward's situation and his force of will together made his power. Not only was the nobility half exterminated, but the trading and middle classes alike desired a strong ruler who should maintain order, by whatever straining of constitutional forms—the invariable sequel of anarchy—at least up to the point of intolerable taxation.[1] The actual increase of commerce during the wars[2] is a good proof of the separateness of class interests, and of the decline of the military ideal. Much of it would seem to have been due to the example set by the Hansa merchants, who had factories at London,[3] Boston, and Lynn, and whose famous League was then powerful enough to force from Edward IV. a renewal of its English privileges in return for a concession of a share in the Baltic trade.[4] In any case, the new development was on the old lines of energetic self-seeking; and already in the reign of Edward IV. the cloth manufacture was carried on by capitalists in the modern spirit.[5] And as the tyrannies of the king were less general and oppressive than the tyrannies of the nobles, the erection of the regal power on the collapse of the old class cohesion gave a new scope for the strife of classes among and for themselves. No national ideal existed (as apart from the readiness to unite in hate of a foreign nation) in monarchic England any more than in old republican Greece or modern republican Italy. The trade gilds were strictly self-seeking institutions, aiming at keeping down the

[1] Cp. Green, pp. 285-86.

[2] Stubbs, iii. 283; Hallam, *Middle Ages*, iii. 326, 328; Green, ch. vi. § 3, p. 282. This, however, did not mean the maintenance of English shipping, which declined. See Acts 4 Henry VII. c. 10; and cp. Cunningham, *Growth of English Industry*, § 121. Yet fishing and seafaring ranked as the main national industries (Busch, *England unter den Tudors*, i. 251).

[3] See Stubbs, i. 675, as to the large foreign element in the London population, apart from the Hansa factory; and cp. Ashley, *Introd. to Economic History*, ii. 209.

[4] The fact that the Scandinavian kings were eager to damage the Hansa by encouraging English and Dutch traders would be a special stimulus.

[5] Cunningham, *Growth of English Industry and Commerce*, i. 392.

number of competitors in each trade, without providing in any way for the aspirants. Unitary egoism was the universal mainspring.[1] The Church sought above all things to be protected against heresy; the town and trade corporations sought protection for their privileges; and the landowners sought to be supported against the labourers, who from the time of Henry VI. are found revolting against enclosures of public land, and were temporarily reinforced by the disbanded retainers of the barons. Every modern force of social disintegration was already nascent.

§ 5

Under Henry VII. the same conditions subsisted. There was no sufficiently strong body of aristocracy left to rebel effectually against his exactions, though exactions had always been the great cause of discontent; and, all rivals collapsing, there grew up round the new dynasty that hedging superstition which had always counted for much, and which was in England to become a main factor in politics. Henry VII. wrought assiduously and astutely to build up his power, seeking no less to increase the merchant class than to depress the aristocracy. From both he thus drew his revenue; from the latter by exaction; from the former by customs duties on the trade he carefully encouraged (as Richard had done before him), finding in such revenue

[1] Cp. Cunningham, *Growth of English Industry and Commerce*, i. 395-96, 413, 425; Stubbs, *Constitutional History*, §§ 486-92 (iii. 586-616). "In every great town there was, every few years, something of a struggle, something of a crisis . . . between trade and craft, or craft and craft, or magistracy and commons" (Stubbs, iii. 616). Professor Ashley (*Introd. to Econ. Hist.* i. 79) disputes that there was "any such contest in this country between burghers and artisans" as took place on the continent; and cites another passage from Bishop Stubbs (§ 131, i. 453) partly suggesting such a view. But Prof. Ashley goes on (pp. 79-84) to show that there *was* a good deal of struggling even in England between burghers and artisans. Cp. his conclusions, pp. 6-10, 42, as to the process of evolution towards at least formal unity. It is to be noted that the gilds dispensed charity (Stubbs, iii. 616).

his surest income.[1] Gradually the monarchic system was made firm. Richard III. owed his failure mainly to the sense of the illegality of his position; and the same inversion of the superstition troubled Henry VII. in turn, as it had done Henry IV. It seems to have been his possession of the one train of artillery in the kingdom that mainly preserved his power against rebels.[2] But with Henry VIII. the dynasty was secure; and from this point onward the monarchic spell can be seen very clearly in English affairs. The instinct of "loyalty," a kind of hypnotic prepossession, becomes a social force as truly as the simpler instincts of self-seeking and class spirit. By virtue of it, and of his own force of brute will, Henry VIII. could commit violences of almost every description, his own personality having some of the characteristics most likely to intensify the spell. Energy such as his hypnotised or terrorised all but the strongest. Even his crimes were not such as revolted average sympathy: the suppression of the Church as in all the "Teutonic" countries was a direct bribe to many of the nobles and landowners,[3] and for the multitude meant the overthrow of an alien jurisdiction; and his domestic procedure satisfied the popular ethic which demurs to mistresses but respects bigamy, and finds a wife's adultery more criminal than her husband's murder of her. For the rest, he had at the beginning of his reign executed his father's minions, and conciliated the scholars, who made opinion. Yet under Henry VIII. we find middle-class England, heavily taxed for war, beginning to stand on its rights as upper-class England had done in

[1] Busch, *England unter den Tudors*, i. 250-65. Edward had actually traded extensively on his own account, freighting ships to the Mediterranean with tin, wool, and cloth (Green, p. 287).

[2] Green, p. 295.

[3] "Something like a fifth of the actual land in the kingdom was . . . transferred from the holding of the Church to that of nobles and gentry" (Green, ch. vii. § 1, p. 342).

earlier times; and in the New England as in the old the weakest class went to the wall. The ever-increasing mass of poor, thrown idle and hungry by the continuous rise of sheep-farms in the place of tillage, were the natural enemies of the governing class as well as of the landowners; and in cruelly repressing them the monarchy strengthened the landowners' allegiance. Thus arose the typical personal monarchy, employing middle-class ministers, who served it zealously and with increasing power, Thomas Cromwell far outgoing Wolsey. The passing coalition of nobles and yeomen in the north in the cause of the old religion was followed by the crushing of the remains of the old nobility, now being rapidly replaced by the new, established on the plunder of the Church. It is to be noted that in England, as in so many other countries, the virtual subjection of the old nobility to the crown was for a time followed by stirrings of new life in all directions, as if feudalism had everywhere meant a repression of possible energy. The process is seen in Spain under Ferdinand and Isabella[1]; in France under Richelieu and Mazarin; in Sweden under Gustavus Vasa; and is thus plainly a product not of Protestantism as some suppose, but of the comparative social and political liberty that follows on the restriction of ubiquitous feudal tyranny, so much more searching and pervasive a force than the simpler tyranny of the feudal king. It may be doubted, indeed, whether the Tudor suppression of the power of the old aristocracy was not as vital a determination of the nation's course as the overthrow of the Catholic Church.

As against Mr. Lecky's indiscriminating panegyric of the English nobility, it is instructive to note Hallam's judgment on the peerage under Henry VIII.: "They yielded to every mandate of his im-

[1] Cp. E. Armstrong, *Introduction* to Major Martin Hume's *Spain*, 1898, pp. 13, 19, 29; Prescott, *History of Ferdinand and Isabella*, part i. ch. vi. *end*; Hallam, *Middle Ages*, 11th ed. iii. 331.

perious will . . . they are responsible for the illegal trial, for the iniquitous attainder, for the sanguinary statute, for the tyranny which they sanctioned by law, and for that which they permitted to subsist without law. Nor was this selfish and pusillanimous subserviency more characteristic of the minions of Henry's favour than of the representatives of ancient and honourable houses, the Norfolks, the Arundels, and the Shrewsburies. We trace the noble statesmen of these reigns concurring in all the inconsistencies of the revolutions; supporting all the religions of Henry, Edward, Mary, and Elizabeth; adjudging the death of Somerset to gratify Northumberland, and of Northumberland to redeem their participation in his fault; setting up the usurpation of Lady Jane, and abandoning her on the first doubt of success, constant only in the rapacious acquisition of estates and honours from whatever source, and in adherence to the present power" (*Constitutional History*, 10th ed. i. 48).

§ 6

And now effectively arose the new political force of Protestant and Bible-worshipping fanaticism, turning the democratic instinct into its channel, and complicating afresh the old issues of classes. It is not to be forgotten that this was a beginning of popular culture, inasmuch as the desire to read the worshipped book must have counted for more than anything else in making reading common.[1]

Practically, however, the opposed causes of Lollardism and orthodoxy may at the outset be regarded as the democratic and the conservative instincts, taking these channels in the absence of political development and knowledge.[2] In imperial Rome, the spread of

[1] See Stubbs, iii. 626-28, as to the extent to which ability to read was spread among the common people. As to the general effect on mental life see the vigorous though uncritical panegyric of Hazlitt, *Lectures on the Literature of the Age of Elizabeth*, ed. 1870, pp. 12-17.

[2] As to the democratic element in Calvinism, which develops from Lollardism, see the interesting remarks of Buckle, ii. 339. Professor Gardiner sums up (*Introduction to the Study of English History*, pp. 97, 98) "that as soon as Lollardism ceased to be fostered by the indignation of the labouring class against its oppressors, it dwindled away." Compare the conclusions of Professor Thorold Rogers, *Six Centuries of Work and Wages*, p. 272, and see above, p. 413. Professor Rogers

Christianity was primarily a movement of class cohesion among the illiterate slaves, aliens, and workers, the instinct of attraction taking this form when political grounds of union were lacking. So it was in the England of the period under notice; but whereas in imperial Rome the autocracy went far to annul class distinctions, and so helped the slaves' cult to absorb superstitious patricians, especially women, whose wealth maintained the poor of the Church as the emperor's doles had maintained the poor of the State, in England the vigour of class distinctions fostered differences of sect. The phenomena of political Protestantism in the Reformation era in England, as in Germany, offer many parallels to those of the French Revolution. The revolt of many priests from the routine and restrictions of their office is notable in both epochs. On the other hand, the mass of the well-to-do classes, being unprepared for change by any educative process, were as ready to restore Catholic usages as were those of France later; and when the innovating forces, consisting in a little reasoning and much rapine, had run to seed and to corruption under the Protectorate and Edward VI., the reaction towards the old forms set in powerfully. Nothing, however, could carry it to the length of restoring the Catholic Church's property; and the failure of Mary was due not nearly so much to Protestant dislike of the ceremonial of Rome as to the grip of the new owners on the confiscated lands. In England as in Scotland, in Germany, in Scandinavia, and in Switzerland, though Henry stood for a special initiative, the popular forces of the Reformation were essentially those of wealth-seeking; and the financial records of the Protectorate show a conspiracy of

(p. 273) traces the success of the Reformation in the Eastern counties to the long work of Lollardism there. In the same district lay the chief strength of the Rebellion. Compare his *Economic Interpretation of History*, pp. 79-91.

plunder to which the annals of monarchy could offer no parallel.[1] The Protestant aristocracy simply encouraged the new Lollardism by way of gaining their personal ends as they had crushed the old because it menaced their property. A new channel had been made for the forces of union and strife.

An instructive part of the process was the movement towards a new sacerdotalism on the side of the new Calvinistic clergy—a movement much more clearly visible in Scotland than in England. Whether or not it be true that "it was by no means the intention of Knox and his fellow-labourers to erect a new hierarchy upon the ruins of the old,"[2] it is clear that his immediate successors counted on wielding a power strictly analogous to that of the papacy. Andrew Melville, in haughty colloquy with King James and his councillors, threw down his Hebrew Bible on the table as his authority for his demands. Since all alike professed to accept it, the next step in the argument plainly was that it lay with the presbyter to interpret the sacred book;[3] and Melville, who took the king by

[1] "Crown lands to the value of five millions of our modern money had been granted away to the friends of Somerset and Warwick. The royal expenditure had mounted in seventy years to more than four times its previous total" (Green, ch. vii. § 1, and p. 353). A system of wholesale corruption and waste had grown up under Henry VIII., who, after all his confiscations, was fain to seek funds by adulterating his coin. So Edward VI., the church and college plunder being gone, had to be granted taxes on manufactures which tended to stop them. "Yet I cannot find," says Sir Roger Twysden, "all this made the crown rich. Hayward observes Edward's debts were £251,000,—at least said to be so. Camden, that Queen Elizabeth received the crown *afflictissima . . . aere alieno quod Henricus VIII. et Edwardus VI. contraxerant oppressa.* . . . I cannot but reckon the treasure spent in fifteen years, more than half the kingdom to be sold" (*Historical Vindication of the Church of England*, ed. 1847, pp. 4, 5). So obviously had the treasure gone into the pockets of courtiers and their hangers-on, that the fact gives a solid excuse for the habitual miserliness of Elizabeth.

[2] Gardiner, *History of England*, 1603-42, ed. 1893, i. 45.

[3] Cp. Pulszky, *The Theory of Law and Civil Society*, p. 206. "Theocracy in itself being the hierarchical rule of a priestly class is but a species of aristocracy." And see Buckle's chapter "An Examination of the Scotch Intellect during the Seventeenth Century" (vol. iii. small ed. ch. iv. pp. 211, 212, and notes 36, 37, 38) for the express claims of the Scotch clergy to give out "the whole counsel of God."

the sleeve and called him "God's silly [= weak] vassal," was quite ready to play Gregory to James's Henry had he been able. The effective check lay in the new Church's lack of revenue, the lands of the old Church having of course been retained by the nobles, who carried through the Reformation simply in order to get them. But even in its poverty, with an indifferent nobility[1] in possession of the feudal power, the Scottish clergy were nearly as tyrannous socially as their teacher Calvin had been at Geneva; and for nearly two hundred years Scottish life was no freer and much more joyless, under the new presbyter, than under the old priest, though the democratic machinery of the Kirk obviated any need or opportunity for fiscal exaction.

§ 7

As it is with the Reformation period that the play of sheer opinion begins to appear distinctly in English politics, so it is in this period that the phenomena of reactions first begin to be in a manner traceable as distinct from military fluctuations. All faction, of course, is a form of the play of opinion; but after the fading away of feudalism the opinion is more easily to be contemplated as a force in itself, alongside of the simpler instincts; and the ebbing and flowing of causes suggests a certain consequence of action and reaction in human affairs. The gain-getting Protestant movement under the Protectorate was followed by the Catholic reaction under Mary; which again bred reaction by ferocity. Catholics grew cold in their allegiance when Romanism yielded such bloody fruits.

[1] Dr. Gardiner writes:—"Nor was it indifference alone which kept these powerful men aloof; they had an instinctive feeling that the system to which they owed their high position was doomed, and that it was from the influence which the preachers were acquiring that immediate danger was to be apprehended to their own position" (last cit.). One is at a loss to infer how the historian can know of or prove the existence of such an instinct.

Protestantism, besides, flourished on the continual poverty of the lower orders, and on the abeyance of international strife, conditions which necessarily set up new movements of combination and repulsion; and when Elizabeth succeeded to the throne, she served to represent, however incongruously, the religious leanings of the democracy, as well as to unite them in the name of patriotism against Rome and Spain. She, again, profited by the monarchic superstition, while she was menaced by its inversion; and it is to be observed that as a woman she gained immunity with her subjects for vices of character which in a man would have been odious and despicable, where her rival, Mary of Scotland, suffered deposition for actions of a kind which in a man would have been almost spontaneously forgiven. Mary's complicity in the assassination of a base and unfaithful husband was an unpardonable crime from the reigning ethical point of view, which was purely masculine; and the same ethic held in amused toleration the constant bad faith and personal absurdity of Elizabeth,[1] which rather flattered than endangered the pride of sex. Thus could monarchic politics be swayed by the prevailing psychology of a period, as well as by its class preponderances and interests. The personality of the monarch always counted for much in the determination of his power.

Where Elizabeth gained, however, James lost. Her power was consolidated by the triumph over the Armada, which in the old fashion fused religious strifes in a common warlike exultation and definitely made England Protestant by setting her in deadly enmity towards the great Catholic power[2]; just as the state of

[1] In her amours she was fully as ill-judging as Mary of Scotland. To the eye of the Spanish ambassador, Dudley was "heartless, spiritless, treacherous and false" (Bishop Creighton, *Queen Elizabeth*, ed. 1899, p. 65). Essex in turn was a furious fool.

[2] As to the change in English feeling between 1580, when the Catholic missionaries were widely welcomed, and the years after 1588, see *The Dynamics of Religion*,

aggressive hostility towards France under Edward I. and Edward III. drew Englishmen of all classes into the habit of speaking English and discarding the hitherto common use of French. At the same time the Queen's collisions with Parliament and people were always the less dangerous because she was a woman, and so could yield without indignity where a man would be humiliated and discredited—an advantage overlooked by the historians who praise her sagacity. Such as it was, it was in large part the sagacity of unscrupulousness; and her success is much more the measure of popular infatuation than of her wisdom. All the while, she had wiser councillors than almost any English monarch before or since; and much of her sagacity was theirs, perhaps even down to some of the unscrupulousness; though on the other hand her fickleness often put them in an evil aspect. Burghley might say what he would, in the loyalist manner, about her inspired judgment; but he knew that she imposed Leicester on the Dutch expedition against his advice, then starved her troops, then upset everything because of the easily predictable disobedience of Leicester in accepting the title of Governor-General from the Dutch.[1] To say in the face of such methods, as does Mr. Green, that while she had little or no political wisdom "her political tact was unerring," is to frame a bad paradox. The more than countervailing admission that "in the profusion and recklessness of her lies Elizabeth stood without a peer in Christendom" is perhaps overcharged: she could not lie more habitually and systematically than did Philip; but in both alike the constant resort to falsehoods for which their

by "M. W. Wiseman" (J. M. R.). Cp. Gardiner, *History of England*, 1603-42, ed. 1893, i. 15:—"Every threat uttered by a Spanish ambassador rallied to the national government hundreds who, in quieter times, would have looked with little satisfaction on the changed ceremonies of the Elizabethan Church."

[1] Cp. Motley, *History of the United Netherlands*, 1867, i. 391 *sq.*

antagonists were more or less prepared, is a proof of want of political tact, no less than of want of wisdom.[1] That she should have been idolised as she was is one of the best proofs of the power of the monarchic feeling; for there has rarely been a less estimable woman on a throne. In any normal circle of human beings she would be disliked and distrusted; yet English tradition celebrates her as admirably English, in the act of blackening by comparison foreign rulers who were at least not conspicuously falser,[2] meaner,[3] or more egotistic. What is true is that many of the forces with and against which she intrigued were either unscrupulous or irrational, and that her home tyrannies were no worse than those which would have been committed by Puritans or Catholics or Churchmen had these been free to go at each other's throats as religion bade. Her trickeries on the whole kept things in equilibrium. But conscienceless trickeries they were, and as such, singular grounds for historical enthusiasm. And it cannot have been any concern for her celibacy, or subtle intuition of its effects on her character, that endeared her to her subjects; for her often alleged virginity, despite the gross scandals to the contrary, was an element in the hallucination concerning her. "Loyalty" haloed her sinister personality. When, however, she was succeeded by a man certainly not worse or more ungenerous, the

[1] In his *Introduction to the Study of English History* (1881) Professor Gardiner, through a dozen pages, discusses the action of Elizabeth's government solely in terms of her personality, never once mentioning her advisers. On this line he reaches the proposition that "the homage, absurd as it came to be, which was paid to the imaginary beauties of the royal person was in the main only an expression of the consciousness that peace and justice, the punishment of wickedness and vice, and the maintenance of good order and virtue, came primarily from the queen and secondarily from the Church." One is moved to suggest that the nonsense in question was not so bottomless as it is here virtually made out.

[2] "There was no truth nor honesty in anything she said" (Bishop Creighton, *Queen Elizabeth*, p. 60; cp. pp. 76, 91, 112, 181, 216, 228-31).

[3] Her practice of leaving her truest servants to bear their own outlays in her service, begun with Cecil (Creighton, p. 63), was copied from Charles V. and Philip II., but was carried farther by her than ever by them. All the while she heaped gifts on her lovers.

spell was for the most part broken. James was a Scotchman : a member, albeit a king, of a hostile nation long evilly spoken of; a prince without personal dignity ; a pedant without gravity ; and the indulgence paid to falsehood and folly in the capriciously headstrong Elizabeth ceased to be accorded to the unmanly and unregal ways of her not unconscientious successor, whose plans for pacifying Europe were much more creditable to him than her diplomacies to her. But the very preservation of peace served to undo the king's prestige, inasmuch as it furthered the growth of sects and the spirit of criticism. And there can be no doubt that the psychological shrinkage of the monarchy in public esteem in the person of James prepared the way for the resistance to it in the reign of his son.

As against the foregoing views of Henry's and Elizabeth's characters, note should be taken of the doctrine of Dr. Gardiner (*History*, as cited, i. 43) that "Henry VIII. must be judged by" [*i.e.* in view of the merits of] "the great men who supported his daughter's throne, and who defended the land which he set free when 'he broke the bonds of Rome.' Elizabeth must be judged by the Pyms and Cromwells, who . . . owed their strength to the vigour with which she *headed* the resistance of England against Spanish aggression. She had cleared the way for liberty, though she understood it not." It seems necessary to enter a demurrer to such moral philosophy, of which there is too much in recent English historiography. Considering that the action of Henry towards all who thwarted him was one of brutal terrorism, and that, save as regards his bribes, he cowed alike his peers and his people, the courage shown by their descendants might as rationally be credited to Philip of Spain as to him. And to credit Elizabeth personally with the defeat of the Armada, and consequently with the strength of the later Pyms and Cromwells, is not only to reiterate the same paralogism but to negate common sense as regards the facts of the Armada episode, in which the nation did one half of the work, and the storm the other. Dr. Gardiner, like Mr. Froude, who preaches a similar doctrine, overlooks the consequence that Catholicism on these principles must be credited with the production of Henry and Elizabeth, and therefore with their alleged services. As against such an unmeaning theory we may note

another verdict of Dr. Gardiner's (p. 33) :—"Elizabeth has a thousand titles to our gratitude, but it should never be forgotten that she left, as a legacy to her successor, an ecclesiastical system which, unless its downward course were arrested by consummate wisdom, threatened to divide the nation into two hostile camps, and to leave England, even after necessity had compelled the rivals to accept conditions of peace, a prey to theological rancour and sectarian hatred." How then is the account to be balanced? Dr. Cunningham, we may note, sums up as to the preceding reigns that "the scandalous confiscations of Henry VIII. and Edward VI. were fatal to rural economy and disastrous to mercantile dealings. The disintegration of society became complete ; . . . with some exceptions in regard to shipping and possibly in regard to the repair of the towns, there is no improvement, no reconstruction which can be traced to the reign of the Tudor kings" (*English Industry*, i. 433). Cp. Professor Rogers' *Industrial and Commercial History*, p. 12.

§ 8

While such changes were being wrought at one end of the political organism, others no less momentous, and partly causative of those, had taken place at the other. By economic writers the period of the Reformation in England is now not uncommonly marked as that of a great alteration for the worse in the lot of the mass of the peasantry.[1] The connection between the overthrow of the Catholic Church and the agrarian trouble, however, is not of the primary character that is thus supposed : it might be rather called accidental than causal. Suppression of the monasteries could at most only throw into prominence the poverty which the monasteries relieved, but which monasteries always tend to develop.[2] The distress was there to begin with,[3] and was increasing, from what period onward it were hard to say.

[1] *E.g.* Mr. Gibbins' *Industrial History of England*, pp. 84-89, 105. The point of view seems to have been set up by Cobbett's *History of the Reformation*.

[2] Cp. Ashley, *Introd. to Economic History*, ii. 312-15.

[3] Cp. More's *Utopia*, B. i. (Arber's ed. p. 41 ; Morley's, p. 64) and Bacon's *History of Henry VII.*, Bohn ed. p. 369.

The early fifteenth-century riots against "enclosures," above mentioned, arose out of the policy of systematically extending pasture, and point to a distress set up by the gradual growth of gain-seeking methods among land-owners as against the common people,[1] whose normal tendency to multiply was a constant force making for poverty, though it was met half-way by the aggression of landlords who found it more profitable to raise and export wool than to farm.[2] A fresh source of dislocation was the enforcement of laws against the keeping of bands of retainers, a process to which Henry VII. specially devoted himself,[3] thus securing his throne on the one hand while intensifying the evil of depopulation and decreasing tillage, for which on the other hand he tried remedial measures,[4] of the customary description. Laws were passed forbidding the peasantry to seek industrial employment in the cities—this course being taken as well in the interests of the trades as with the hope of restoring agriculture. One outcome of the circumstances was that sheep-farming, like the cloth manufacture, began to be carried on by capitalists[5]; the monied classes beginning to reach out to the country, while the gentry began to draw towards the towns.[6] Thus we find in existence long before the Reformation all the economic troubles which some writers attribute to the methods of the Reformation;

[1] Cp. Green, ch. vi. § 3. Green goes on to speak of the earlier Statutes of Labourers as setting up the "terrible heritage of a pauper class" (p. 286, also p. 250). This is a fresh error of the same sort as that above dealt with. A pauper class was inevitable, whatever laws were made.

[2] Bishop Stubbs puts it (iii. 283), that the increase of commerce during the Wars of the Roses was "to some extent a refuge for exhausted families, and a safety-valve for energies shut out of their proper sphere." The proposition in this form is obscure.

[3] On this see Stubbs, ch. xxi. §§ 470, 471.

[4] Acts 4 Hen. VII. c. 12, preamble, and c. 19.

[5] Cp. Moreton on *Civilisation*, 1836, p. 106; Cunningham, *Growth of English Industry and Commerce*, i. 392.

[6] Cp. Cliffe Leslie, *Essays in Political and Moral Philosophy*, p. 267; Toynbee, *The Industrial Revolution*, pp. 63, 66; Gibbon's *Memoirs*, beginning.

though the Protestant nobles who scrambled for the plunder of the Church in the reigns of Henry and of Edward VI. seem to have done more sheep-farming and depopulation than any others, thereby disposing the people the more to welcome Mary.[1]

Even Professor Thorold Rogers, who (overlooking the Act 4 Henry VII.) seems to hold that the enclosures in the fifteenth century were not made at the expense of tillage, and that the earliest complaints are in the sixteenth century (*History of Agriculture and Prices*, iv. 63, 64 *note*, 109: cp. Cunningham, *English Industry*, i. 393 *note*), still shows that there were heavy complaints as early as 1515 (6 Hen. VIII. cc. 5, 6) of a general decay of towns and growth of pastures—long before Henry had meddled with the Church. Bishop Stubbs is explicit on the subject as regards the period of York and Lancaster:—"The price of wool enhanced the value of pasturage; the increased value of pasturage withdrew field after field from tillage; the decline of tillage, the depression of the markets, and the monopoly of the wool trade by the staple towns, reduced those country towns which had not encouraged manufacture to such poverty that they were unable to pay their contingent to the revenue, and the regular sum of tenths and fifteenths was reduced by more than a fifth in consequence. The same causes which in the sixteenth century made the enclosure of the commons a most important popular grievance, had begun to set class against class as early as the fourteenth century, although the thinning of the population by the Plague acted to some extent as a corrective" (*Constitutional History*, iii. 630; Cp. Green, ch. v. § 5, p. 251; ch. vi. § 3, p. 285).

The troubles, again, were fluctuating, the movement of depopulation and sheep-farming being followed in due course by a revival of tillage, while contrary movements might be seen in different parts of the country, according as commercial advantage lay for the moment. In one district it might pay best to rear sheep; in another, by reason of nearness to town markets, it might pay best to grow corn; but the competition of corn imported from the Baltic in return for English

[1] Gardiner, *Introduction to English History*, 1881, p. 118; Cunningham, *Growth of English Industry and Commerce*, ed. 1890, i. 434.

exports would be a generally disturbing force. The very improvement of agricultural skill, too, in which Holland led the way,[1] would tend to lessen employment in the rural districts. Peace and progress, in the absence of science, always thus provide new sources of distress, multiplying heads and hands without multiplying the employment which secures for the multitude a share in the fruits, but always aggrandising those who have contrived to become possessed of the prime monopolies. What went on was a perpetual transference and displacement of well-being, one class rising on another's distress[2]; and after the apparently steady decay of the towns under Henry VIII.,[3] the new lead given to industry in the reign of Elizabeth, by the influx of Protestant refugees from the Netherlands, went to build up an urban middle class which for the time had no political motives to discontent.

§ 9

Hence there was no continuous pressure of agrarian or industrial politics, and the stress of the instinct of strife went in other directions. The modern reader, seeking for the class politics of the later Tudor period, finds them as it were covered up, save for such an episode as the revolt of 1549, by the record of foreign policy and ecclesiastical strifes, and is apt to condemn the historian for leaving matters so. But in reality class

[1] Rogers' *Story of Holland*, p. 217, and *Six Centuries of Work and Wages*, p. 184; W. T. McCullagh's *Industrial History of the Free Nations*, 1846, ii. 42, 272; Gibbins, pp. 104, 109.

[2] "Cheapness and dearness, plenty and scarcity, of corn and other food, depopulation and rapidly increasing numbers, really co-existed in the kingdom. There were places from which the husbandman and labourer disappeared, and the beasts of the field grazed where their cottages had stood; and there were places where men were multiplying to the dismay of statesmen." Cliffe Leslie, essay on *The Distribution and Value of the Precious Metals*, vol. cited, p. 268. The whole of this essay is well worth study. Cp. Professor Ashley, *Introduction to Economic History*, ii. 50-54.

[3] Rogers, *History of Agriculture and Prices*, iv. 106, 108, citing Acts 6 Hen. VIII. c. 6, and 32 Hen. VIII. cc. 18, 19.

politics was for the most part superseded by sect politics. The new pseudo-culture of religion, virtually a sophisticated barbarism, had made new paths for feeling; and these being the more durable, the miseries of the evicted rural populations, which forced a Poor Law on the administration, never set up anything approaching to a persistent spirit of insurrection. By the suppression of the old feudal nobility, as already noted, life in general had been made freer; and the monarch for the time being was become a relatively beneficent and worshipful power in the eyes of the mass of the people, while the landowners were grown weak for harm. The destructive passions were running in other channels, and religious hate swallowed up class hate. For the rest, the new aristocracy was thoroughly established; and in the life and work of Shakspere himself we see the complete acceptance of the readjusted class relation, though we can also see in his pages the possibilities of a new upper class of rich merchants. In his impersonal way he flashes the light of Lear's tardy sympathy on the forlorn world of the homeless poor; and in many a phrase he condenses an intense criticism of the injustices of class rule; but even if, as seems certain, he did not write the Jack Cade scenes in *Henry VI.*, he has little of the purposive democrat in him: rather—though here it is hard indeed to get behind the great humanist's mask—some touch of the fastidious contempt of the noble, himself fickle enough, for the changing voice of the ignorant populace.

On one point of current psychology, however, as on the great issue of religion, Shakspere's very silence is more significant than speech. After the passionate outburst put in the mouth of the dying John of Gaunt, and the normal patriotism of *Henry V.*, utterances of his early manhood, we find in his plays a notable aloofness from current public passion. This would of course be encouraged by the regulations for the stage; but no

regulation need have hindered him from pandering habitually to popular self-righteousness in the matter of national animosities. In 1596 the multitude were all on the side of the fire-eating Essex and against the prudent Burghley in the matter of aggressive war upon Spain; hope of plunder and conquest playing as large a part in their outcry as any better sentiment. The production of *Henry V.* in 1599, with its laudatory allusion to Essex's doings in Ireland, whither he had been accompanied by Shakspere's patron Southampton, would suggest, if only the passage were genuine,[1] that the dramatist was one of Essex's partisans. But whichever way he then leaned, no man can gather from his later plays any encouragement to national passion of any species. It is not merely that he avoids politics after having been compromised by contact with them:[2] it is that he rises to a higher plane of thought and feeling.[3] He, if any man, could see the fatuity with which Englishmen denounced cruelty in Spaniards while matching Spanish cruelty in Ireland, and cursed the Inquisition while mishandling Jesuit priests in the Inquisition's own temper. The story of English cruelty in Ireland in Elizabeth's and James's day is one of the most sickening in the history of the epoch.[4] But no sense of guilt ever checked the blatant self-sufficiency with which the general run of Englishmen of the time inveighed against the misdeeds of the Spaniards: no twinge of self-criticism ever modified their righteous thanksgiving over the defeat of the Armada, which was manned partly to

[1] It is in the Prologue to Act v. ll. 30-34. I affirm without hesitation that the prologues to all five Acts are non-Shaksperean, and plainly by one other hand. In the latest biography, however (Mr. Lee's, p. 174), there is no recognition of any such possibility.

[2] Mr. Lee's *Life*, pp. 175, 176.

[3] A theory of this is suggested in the author's *Montaigne and Shakspere*.

[4] Cp. Froude, *History of England*, ed. 1875, x. 500, 507, 508, 512, xi. 197; Spenser's *View of the Present State of Ireland*, Globe ed. of Works, p. 654; Lecky's *History of Ireland in the Eighteenth Century*, i. 8; Gardiner, *History of England*, 1603-1642, ed. 1893, i. 363, 427, 429, 430; J. A. Fox, *Key to the Irish Question*, 1890, ch. xxix.; and *The Saxon and the Celt* (J. M. R.), pp. 148-54.

avenge their own massacre and torture of Catholic priests. Their Drakes and Hawkinses, playing the pirate and the slave-stealer, and holding with no qualms the conviction that they were doing God's service, made current the cant of Puritanism in the pre-Puritan generation. Godly ruffianism could not later go further than it did in "the Elizabethan dawn"; for Milton's swelling phrase of "God and his Englishmen" did not outgo the self-satisfaction of the previous age, any more than of the later period of "Teutonic" self-glorification. To Shakspere alone seems to have been possible the simple reflection that God's Spaniards, equating with God's Englishmen, left zero to the philosopher.

It seems clear that the mass of the people, and such leading men as Essex and Raleigh, desired a continuance of the state of war with Spain because of the opportunities it gave for piratical plunder. The queen, who had shared in the loot of a good many such expeditions, might have acquiesced but for Burghley's dissuasion. It was an early sign of predilection to the path of imperialism, on which Cromwell later put one foot, on which Chatham carried the nation far, and which it seems now much bent on pursuing. In Elizabeth's day enterprises of plunder, as one writer has pointed out, "became the usual adventure of the times, by which the rich expected to increase their wealth and the prodigal to repair their fortunes"; and the general imagination was fired with similar hopes, till "the people were in danger of acquiring the habits and the calculations of pirates" (J. M'Diarmid, *Lives of British Statesmen*, 1820, i. 239, 240; cp. Rogers, *Industrial and Commercial History*, p. 12, as to the contemporary lack of commercial enterprise). Cecil, in his opposition to the war policy of Essex, remarkably anticipates the view of rational historical science (see Camden's *Annales*, ed. 1717, iii. 770-71, as to the conflict). Burghley had equally been the resisting force to the popular desire for an attack on France after the Massacre of St. Bartholomew. His remarkable hostility to militarism is set forth in his *Advice* to his son, on the head of the training to be given to his children: "Neither, by my consent, shalt thou train them up in wars; for he that sets up his rest to live by that profession can hardly be an honest man or a good Christian." Yet he planned well enough against the Armada. Cp. Creighton, *Queen Elizabeth*, pp. 236, 237.

§ 10

The culture history of the period from Chaucer to Shakspere is perhaps clearer than the political. It is in the first great lull of the Wars of the Roses, under Edward IV., that we find printing established in England. Original literature had virtually died out, as in northern Europe, in the long stress of physical strife; but the love of reading took a new growth when peace intervened, and a printer found a public for reproductions of the literature of the past. This culture proceeded under Henry VII., till at the advent of Henry VIII. there was a mature movement of scholarship, a product of classical study and reflection, yielding for England the singular and memorable fruit of More's *Utopia*. That was truly a "Pallas of the brain," not "wild" as in the phrase of the conservative poet, but well-nigh pure of the blind passion of normal life,[1] and therefore no more than a radiant vision for an age in which blind passion was still plenipotent. More's mind had ripened as it were independently of his temperament; and his life is the tragedy of an intelligence, more haunting and more profoundly instructive than any *Hamlet*. The serene spirit that dreamed and planned the *Utopia* grew to be capable of a bitterness of dogmatic fanaticism on a level with the normal passions of the time.[2] It is matter for surprise that he has not ere now been studied or cited as an apparition of the "Celtic" mind on the arena of brutal English life,[3] a prematurely penetrating intelligence thrust back upon and enveloped by a temperament kept passionate by the shocks of an animal

[1] Compare the very just appreciation of Green, ch. vi. § 4, p. 311.

[2] See Isaac Disraeli's study, "The Psychological Character of Sir Thomas More," in the *Amenities of Literature*.

[3] Compared with Henry VIII., More might be pronounced a specifically "Celtic" as opposed to an aggressively "Saxon" type. Henry seems a typical English beef-eater. Yet he too was of Welsh descent!

environment. From his eyes, limned by the great Holbein, there looks out the sadness of flawed and frustrate wisdom ; even as blood and passion and fleshly madness are written in the beastlike face of the king, whose little son, ruddy and hardy in his babyhood, pales and pines away through portrait after portrait to puberty and death, the victim of some secret malady.

Neither on the psychological line of More nor on that of Henry could the national culture proceed. It went on naïvely, being for long neither Puritan nor philosophic. The Protestantism of the Protectorate was too much a matter of mere plunder to admit of a religious literature ; and nothing is more remarkable in the great imaginative efflorescence under Elizabeth than its un-Puritan secularity. It drew, indeed, from a soil too rich to be yet overrun by fanaticism. The multiplying printing-presses showered forth a hundred translations ; the new grammar-schools bore their fruit ; the nation grew by domestic peace, even while tillers of the soil were being made beggars ; the magic of discovery and travel thrilled men to new exercises of mind and speech ; the swarming life of the capital raised the theatre to fecund energy in a generation ; and transformed feudalism survived rather in the guise of a guardian to art and letters than of organised class oppression. But the secret of continuous progress had not yet been found : it lies, if anywhere, with the science of the future : and the development after the reign of Elizabeth necessarily began to take new lines.

The later profusion of the poetic drama was the profusion of decay. Artistic abundance must mean artistic change or deterioration ; but in the drama there was no recasting of the artistic formulas, no refining of the artistic sense. Rather the extraordinary eloquence of the earlier and greater dramatists, and in particular of the greatest, bred a cultus of rhetoric and declamation

in which the power and passion of the masters were lost. Powerful men could not go on attending to an infinity of blank-verse dramas; powerful men could not go on producing dramas, because the general culture of the time made no progress complementary to the great flowering of the Elizabethan peace. That was essentially a late rebirth of the classic or bookish culture of the Renaissance. The new germinal ideas, apart from those of religion, were yet to come. Already the spell of Bibliolatry was conquering part of the average intelligence, unprepared to digest Hebraism as the *élite* of the previous generation had digested classicism; and the Protestant principle led the Protestant peoples in the mass into the very attitude needed for a social hypnotism such as that of Jewry, the fatal exemplar. Bibliolatry is the culture of the ignorant; church government, the politics of the unenfranchised and the impractical; the conditions excluding them from a truer culture and more vital political interests. Already in Henry's time the newly-translated Scriptures were, to his wrath, "disputed, rhymed, sung, and jangled in every tavern and alehouse"; the very stress of his own personal rule being a main part of the cause. Under the Protectorate of Somerset, the gross rapacity of the Protestant nobles identified the new Church with upper-class selfishness as completely as the old had ever been; and the Norfolk revolt of 1549 avowedly aimed at the overthrow of the gentry. When that was stamped out in massacre, the spirit of popular independence was broken, save in so far as it could play in the new channel of personal religion and ecclesiastical polemic, always being dug by the disputation of the new clergy. And when in the reign of Mary crowds of Protestant refugees fled to Geneva, of which the polity had already been introduced to the students of Oxford by Peter Martyr, there was set up a fresh ferment of Presbyterian theory among the educated class which the ecclesiastical con-

ditions under Elizabeth could not but foster. The new dramatic literature and the new national life of anti-Spanish adventure kept it all substantially in the background for another generation; but the lack of progressive culture and the restriction of expansive enterprise at length gave the forces of pietism the predominance. Thus in ways in which the historians of our literature and politics have but imperfectly traced, the balance of the nation's intellectual activity shifted towards the ground of religion and the ecclesiastical life. And only this change of mental drift can account for the new energy of resistance incurred by Charles when he took up with greater obstinacy the lines of policy of his father, meddling with church practice and normal government on the same autocratic principles. Religion and worship were not the sole grounds of quarrel, but they commanded all the other grounds.

CHAPTER II

THE REBELLION AND THE COMMONWEALTH

§ 1

NEARLY all the conceivable materials of disaffection, save personal misconduct on the king's part,[1] went to prepare the Great Rebellion. Religious antipathies, indeed, no longer rested on the naked ground of lands taken and in danger of being re-taken;[2] but there had been developed an intense animus of Protestant against Catholic, the instinct of strife running the more violently in that channel because so few others were open, relatively to the store of restless brute force

[1] Even on this side the king was not fortunate. It would perhaps do him little harm that "he spoke and behaved with indelicacy to ladies in public" (Hallam, citing Milton's *Defensio* and Warburton's *Notes on Clarendon*, vii. 626); but his frigidity and haughtiness were more serious matters. He actually caned Vane for entering a room in the palace reserved for persons of higher rank (*id.*, citing Carte's *Ormond*, i. 356). In the next reign people contrasted his aloofness with his son's accessibility (see *Pepys' Diary*, *passim*). Hallam sums up that "he had in truth none who loved him, till his misfortunes softened his temper, and excited sympathy" (10th ed. ii. 226).

[2] That is, in England. In Scotland they did. It is quite clear that the Scotch disaffection dated from Charles's proposal and attempt, at the very outset of his reign, to recover the tithes that had been appropriated by the nobility. (On this, the main testimonies are cited in the author's *Perversion of Scotland*.) This scheme, though dropped, was naturally never renounced in the king's counsels; and the Church riots of 1637, which are specially embalmed in the egregious myth of Jenny Geddes, are explicitly recorded to have been planned by outsiders. See Guthry's *Memoirs*, 2nd ed. 1747, p. 23. Burton (vi. 153) rejects this testimony on astonishingly fallacious grounds. Of course, the resentment of English interference with Scotch affairs counted for a great deal.

in the country. Perhaps, indeed, Presbyterians hated Episcopalians, at bottom, nearly as much as they did Catholics; but the chronic panics, from the time of Elizabeth onwards, the mythology of the Marian period, and the story of the massacres of Alva and of St. Bartholomew's Day, served to unite Protestants in this one point of anti-Papalism, and had set up as it were a new human passion in the sphere of English politics. And to this passion James and Charles in turn ran counter with an infatuated persistence. James, who was so much more annoyed by Puritans than by Papists, planned for his son, with an eye to a dowry, the Spanish marriage, which of all possible matches would most offend the English people; and when that fell through, another Catholic bride was found in the daughter of the King of France. The pledges, so natural in the circumstances, to "tolerate" Catholics in England, were a standing ground of panic to the intolerant Protestants, even though unfulfilled; and the new king stood in the sinister position of sheltering in his household the religion for which he dared not claim freedom in the country. Such a ground of unpopularity could only be balanced by some signal grounds of favour; but James and Charles alike chose unpopular grounds of war, and failed badly to boot. To crown all, they exhibited to the full the hereditary unwisdom of their dynasty in the choice of favourites;[1] and the almost unexampled animosity incurred by Buckingham could not but reflect somewhat towards Charles, whose refined and artistic tastes, besides, made him the natural enemy of the text-worshipping and mostly art-hating Puritans.

[1] It is to be remembered, as explaining Charles's sacrifice of Strafford, that the latter was generally detested even at Court (Hallam, ii. 108-110). And at the outset, the general hatred of the nobility to Laud was the great cause of Charles's weakness (*id.* ii. 86). In France, soon afterwards, the aristocratic hatred to Mazarin set up the civil war of the Fronde.

Thus everything made for friction between king and subjects; and when Charles, to raise necessary funds, resorted to measures of but slight oppressiveness as compared with those of the Tudors, he was doggedly resisted by Parliaments professedly standing on law, but really actuated by a fixed suspicion of all his aims. Teeth were on edge all round. It is idle to keep up the pretence that what was at stake was the principle of freedom. The first demand of the Parliamentary Opposition was for the more thorough persecution of the Catholics. Parliamentarians such as Eliot were more oppressive in religious matters than Laud himself. He sought only uniformity of worship, they uniformity of doctrine; and they punished for heresy more unpardonably than did the Star Chamber for gross libel. After beginning a revolt against illegal taxation, Pym secured the imposition of taxes on beverages (1643), on flesh, salt, textile goods, and many other commodities, "at the sword's point," against the general resistance of the people.[1] There were at work a hundred motives of strife; and it was only the preternatural ill-luck or unwisdom of Charles that united Parliament against him so long. It needed all the infatuation of an express training in the metaphysics of divine right to enable a king of England, even after James I., to blunder through the immense network of superstition that hedged him round: indeed the very intensity of the royalist superstition best explains the royal infatuation. So fixed was the monarchic principle in the minds of the people, who, then as now, swore by monarchy but hated paying for it, that in the earlier years of the struggle not even the zealots could have dreamt of the end that was to be. Regicide entered no man's mind, even as a nightmare.

[1] Cunningham, *English Industry and Commerce*, ii. 219.

§ 2

On Charles, as the greatest "architect of ruin" in English political history, psychological interest fastens with only less intensity than on his great antagonist. The astonishing triple portrait by Vandyke reveals, with an audacity that is positively startling when we think of the other effigies by the same artist, a character stamped at once with impotence and untruth. One slight suggestion of strength lies in the look of grave self-esteem — a quality which would in Charles be fostered from the first by his refined revolt from the undignified ways of his father; but it is withal the very countenance of duplicity. Puritan prejudice could not exaggerate the testimony of the daring artist. We seem to understand at once how he deceived and alienated Holland and Spain as well as the parties among his own subjects. And it was the very excess of duplicity, or rather the fatal combination of duplicity with infirmity of purpose,[1] that destroyed the man. As the war wore on, and above all after it was closed, the discords of the Parliament and the army were such that the most ordinary practical sagacity could have turned them to the triumph of the king's cause. This is the most instructive phase of the Rebellion. The Presbyterian majority which had grown up in Parliament—a growth still imperfectly elucidated — represented only one of the great warring sects of the day; and if, after Independency, led by Cromwell, had come to daggers drawn with the despots of the Commons, Charles had only agreed to any working settlement whatever, he

[1] Hallam makes an excellent generalisation of Charles's two contrasted characteristics of obstinacy and pliability. "He was tenacious of ends, and irresolute as to means; better fitted to reason than to act; never swerving from a few main principles, but diffident of his own judgment in its application to the course of affairs" (as cited, ii. 229). He had cause to be so diffident. Hallam more than once observes how bad his judgment generally was.

might with perfect confidence have left the conflicting forces to throttle each other afterwards. Any arrangement he might have made, whether with the Presbyterians or with Cromwell, would have broken down of itself, and he might have set up his own polity in the end. But he so enjoyed his intrigues, as it were indemnifying himself by them for his weakness of will, that he thought to triumph by them alone, and would not wait for the slower chemistry of normal political development; so that the Independents, driven desperate by his deceits, had to execute him in self-preservation.

§ 3

As it was, the history of the Rebellion remains none the less the tragi-comedy of the old constitutionalism. Parliament, resisting as illegal the supremacy of the king, went from one illegality to another in resisting him, till his tyrannies became trivial in comparison. And Cromwell, who must have set out with convictions about the sanctity of law, although doubtless fundamentally moved by the all-pervading fear of Popery, was led by an ironical fate, step by step, into a series of political crimes which, if those of Charles deserved beheading, could be coped with only in the medieval hell.

Cp. Hallam, ii. 252; and Cowley's *Essays*, ed. 1868, p. 139 *et seq.* To say nothing of Cromwell's illegal exactions, his selling of Englishmen into slavery in the West Indies (on which see Cowley, p. 168)—albeit no worse than the similar selling of Irish and Scotch prisoners—was an act which, if committed earlier by any king, would have covered his name with historical infamy. (It gave the example to royalists in their later dealings with Dissenters.) As regards Ireland, it is proved that his agents captured not only youths, but girls, for export to the West Indies (Prendergast, *The Cromwellian Settlement*, 2nd ed. p. 89); and that the slavery there was of the cruellest sort (Cunningham, *Growth of English Industry*

and Commerce, vol. ii. p. 109). In the end, the Protector terrorised his own law courts as Charles had never dared to do. See Clarendon, B. xv. ed. Oxford, 1843, p. 862, and Hallam, ii. 253, 271, 272, *note*. Cromwell's language, as recorded by Clarendon, would startle some of his admirers by its indecency if they took the trouble to read the passage. Cp. Vaughan, *Hist. of England under the Stuarts*, etc., p. 524 (citing Whitelocke and Ludlow) as to the law courts. Vaughan overlooks the selling of royalists as slaves.

It was small wonder that posterity came to canonise the king ; for in terms even of the Roundhead principles of impeachment he was a political saint in comparison with the "usurper." And royalists might well imagine Cromwell as haunted by remorse ; for nothing short of the "besotted fanaticism" of which, as Hallam pronounces, he had sucked the dregs, could keep him self-complacent over the retrospect of the Civil War when he was governing by the major-generals, after failing to govern with farcically packed Parliaments. His fanaticism was, of course, in the ratio of his will-power, but each supported the other. The modern exaltation of his character, as against the earlier and rather saner habit of crediting him with great powers, relatively high purposes, and great misdeeds,[1] has tended to throw in the shade the blazing lesson of his career, which is that, like most of his colleagues, he had set out with no political insight or foresight whatever. His conscientious beginnings are so utterly at issue with his endings that it is indeed almost superfluous to condemn either—as superfluous as to denounce the infatuation of Charles. But it is of importance to remember that his very success as a Carlylean ruler only emphasises the failure of his original politics. He succeeded by way of repudiating nearly every principle

[1] It is an error to assert, as is often done, that before Carlyle's panegyric the normal English estimate of Cromwell was utterly hostile. Burnet, and even Clarendon and Hume, mixed high praise with their blame ; and Macaulay was eloquently panegyrical long before Carlyle. The subject is discussed in the author's article on "Cromwell and the Historians" in the *Reformer*, June and July, 1899.

on behalf of which he had taken up arms. Even apart from the invigorating spectacle of his executive genius,[1] he may well stir our sympathy, which is more subtly and deeply exercised by his inner tragedy, by the deadliness of his success in the light of his aims, than by the simpler ill-fortune of Charles. But as politicians our business is not to divide our sympathies between the powerful pietist who was forced to give the lie to his life to save it, and the weak liar who lost his life because he was at bottom faithful to his life's creed. The superiority of Cromwell in strength of will and in administrative faculty is too glaring to need acknowledging; and the lesson that a strong man can tyrannise grossly where a weak man cannot tyrannise trivially, is not one that particularly needs pressing. What it is essential to note is that the course of events which forced and led Cromwell into despotism was for the next generation a strong argument against free Parliamentary government.

Our generation, proceeding mainly on the work of Carlyle, who never really elucidates or even seeks to comprehend political and social developments, has in large part lost sight of the fact that Cromwell was more and more clearly becoming a military despot; and that with twenty more years of life he might have established a new military and naval empire. Yet at the time of his death his financial position was that of a military adventurer at his wits' end, and his unscrupulous attack on Spain was plainly planned by way of coming at money.[2] Dr. Gardiner, who has been the first

[1] It is to be noted that while he was trampling down all the constitutional safeguards for which he had professed to fight, he kept the English universities on relatively as sound a footing as the army. He thus wrought for the advance of reason in the next generation. But he had his share in the Puritan work of destroying the artistic taste and practice of the nation.

[2] He had, indeed, proposed to the Dutch a joint campaign for the conquest of Spanish America (Gardiner, *History of the Commonwealth*, ii. 478). But even in that case he would have counted on plunder.

English[1] historian to handle the case with comprehensive insight, rightly compares the position of Cromwell with that of Napoleon. He was in fact just another sample of the recurrent type of the military ruler establishing himself as despot on the ruins of faction. Except for four months . . . the whole of the Protectorate was a time either of war or of active preparation for war; and even during those months the Protector was hesitating, not whether he should keep the peace or not, but merely what enemy he should attack.[2] He had a standing army of 57,000 men, an immense force for the England of that day; his revenue stood at two millions and a quarter, nearly four times the figure of twenty years before; and still he was in desperate financial straits, his outlays being nearly half a million in excess of the income.[3] The result was "a war for material gains"; and it consists with all we know of history to say that with continued success in such undertakings during a lengthened life he would have won the mass of his countrymen to his allegiance. A few dates and details make the process dramatically clear. Admiral Blake won his first notable victory over Van Tromp in February 1653; and in April Cromwell felt himself in a position to expel the recalcitrant Parliament, though that had always specially favoured the navy. In this act he had the general approval of the people;[4] but he took care to change some of the naval commanders.[5] The next Parliament was the nominated one called the "Barebones," wherein none were elected, and which

[1] Villemain, however, had previously made some approach to such a view; and Sir John Seeley has left record of how Sir James Stephen suggested to students a research concerning "the buccaneering Cromwell" (*Expansion of England*, p. 115).

[2] *Cromwell's Place in History*, pp. 89, 90.

[3] *Id.* p. 97. Cp. p. 101; Burnet, *History of his Own Time*, B. i. ed. 1838, pp. 44, 49, 50; Thurloe, *State Papers*, 1742, vii. 295.

[4] Letter of De Bordeaux to Servien, 5th May 1653, given by Guizot, *Histoire de la république d'Angleterre et de Cromwell*, tom. i. *end.*

[5] Letter cited.

went to pieces in the strife of its factions, since even nomination could not secure concord among Puritans. Then came the Parliament of 1654, elected from purged constituencies. From this were excluded a hundred members who refused to sign an engagement not to alter the system in force; and finally the remnant was angrily dissolved, and military rule established under the major-generals. Yet again, in 1656, driven by need of money, the Protector called another packed Parliament, from which he nevertheless lawlessly excluded 102 elected members; and on their protesting there was a distinct increase of the already obvious public displeasure at such repeated acts of tyranny. This was in September; but in October came the news of Stayner's capture of the Spanish treasure-ships; and in November the treasure arrived—what the naval officers had left of it. On this the Parliament promptly voted everything that its master asked for;[1] new taxes were laid to carry on the wanton war with Spain; and in January 1657 it was proposed to offer him the Crown. Yet when, after a six months' adjournment, that Parliament debated points on which he wanted submission, he furiously dissolved it as he had done its predecessors. Such is the process of imperialism. With a few more years of ostensibly profitable conquest, Cromwell, acclaimed and urged on in the career of aggression by such different types of poet as Waller[2] and Marvell,[3] would as a matter of course have been made king, with the final consent of the army, and would have ruled as the crowned imperator. In that case his Puritanism, instead of putting any conscientious check on his egoism, would have fed it as Mohammed's faith did his.[4] Thus

[1] Guizot, *République d'Angleterre*, éd. 1854, ii. 216.

[2] *On a War with Spain.* Cp. the poem, *Upon the Death of the Lord Protector.*

[3] *Horatian Ode upon Cromwell's Return from Ireland.* Dryden's *Heroic Stanzas* on the death of the Protector show how he would have swelled the acclaim.

[4] A similar idea, I find, is well expressed by Seeley, *Expansion of England*, p. 114.

his early death was one of the important "accidents" of history.[1]

§ 4

As it was, Cromwell lived only long enough to create an intellectual as well as a conservative reaction. Surprise has been sometimes expressed, and must have been oftener felt, at the virtual High Toryism of the doctrine of Hobbes,[2] who was so little conservative in his general habit of mind. The truth is that in 1651, or at least in 1660, the monarchism of Hobbes was the ostensible Liberalism of the hour. Parliamentarism had meant first sectarian tyranny, then anarchy, then military despotism; and there was not the slightest prospect of a parliamentary government which should mean religious or intellectual freedom all round. Hobbes would infallibly have been at least thrown into prison by the Long Parliament if in its earlier time of power he had published his remarks on the Pentateuch. They punished for much milder exercises of critical opinion. A strong monarchy was become, from the point of view of many enlightened men, positively the best available security for general freedom of life, at a time when the spirit of religion had multiplied tenfold the normal impulses to social tyranny and furnished the deepest channel of social ill-will compatible with national unity. It lay in Christianity, as it lay earlier in Judaism, to breed an intensity of religious strife such

[1] As to the element of historic "accident," cp. MM. Langlois and Seignobos, *Introduction aux études historiques*, 2e ed. p. 253.

[2] Hallam, discriminating the shades of opinion, lays it down that "A favourer of unlimited monarchy was not a Tory, neither was a Republican a Whig. Lord Clarendon was a Tory: Hobbes was not; Bishop Hoadley was a Whig: Milton was not" (*History*, as cited, iii. 199). But though Hobbes's political doctrine was odious to the Tory clergy, and even to legitimists as such, it certainly made for Toryism in practice. In the words of Green: "If Hobbes destroyed the old ground of royal despotism, he laid a new and a firmer one." Cp. T. Whittaker, in *Social England*, iv. 280, 281, as to the conflict between "divine right," royalism, and Hobbes's principle of an absolute sovereignity set up by social consent to begin with.

as the pagan world never knew. Men had seen sects arise and grapple with each other on the score of this or that interpretation of the Hebrew sacred books, and felt that they were face to face with insane forces incompatible with a democratic system. Religious lore, above all other learning, could make men more "excellently foolish," as Hobbes put it, than was possible to mere ignorance, making new and uncontrollable motives to disunion. It is not to be assumed, indeed, that a revolution begun on any motive whatever would have maintained itself at the then developed stage of political intelligence; for the English people, which constantly accuses others of lack of faculty for union, had never shown itself any better fitted for rational compromise than the Irish, given conditions of equal stress. Scandinavian, German, Dutch, English—all the Teutonic sections alike had in all ages shown in the fullest degree the force of the primary passions of self-assertion and mutual repulsion, cordially uniting only, if at all, for purposes of aggression. But in the case under notice, it was the religious passions that dug the channels of strife; and they must be held to have added to the volume of blind emotion. Thus intensified, the principle had shown itself potent to wreck any commonwealth; and there remained only the choice between a usurper governing through an army and a "legitimate" monarch governing as of old by way of Parliament and a civil service. Parliament had been the most offensive tyrant of all, for while making most parade of legality it had been most self-seeking,[1] and least respectable as regards its *personnel.* The Liberals of the latter time had their cue given to them by the memorable Falkland, who, grievedly "ingeminating Peace, Peace," had

[1] As to the "high pretensions to religion, combined with an almost unlimited rapacity" (Petty) on the part of many leading Puritans, cp. Gardiner, *Commonwealth and Protectorate*, ii. 167, 172, 187, 194, 302, 358, etc.

recoiled from the intolerant Puritans, and sadly joined the intolerant Royalists. Macaulay's thrust at him for this, if technically just, was hardly seemly on the critic's part, for Falkland represented exactly the temper of Macaulay's own politics. He was an ideal Whig of the later school—the very saint of moderation. Where he had consented to go, albeit deliberately to his death, as a cavalier, his disciples might well become theoretic monarchists when the whole torrent of public opinion went for the Restoration. Of course, the hope of social freedom was destined to frustration under the restored monarchy just as before, since there was still no culture force sufficient to purify the animal instinct of antagonism. The Restoration only meant that the Episcopalian dog was uppermost and the Nonconformist under. But all the same, Commonwealth principles were profoundly discredited ; and it is notable that never since has republican principle ostensibly regained in England the stature it had reached in the hotbeds of the Great Rebellion and the Protectorate. The long struggle against the king educated many of the strivers into democratism, as did the later struggle of the American colonies against George III. Even in the Parliament of Richard Cromwell, after Republican hopes had been so blasted, there were forty-seven avowed Republicans,[1] the remnant of the breed. With the return of the monarchy it virtually disappears from English politics for a hundred and thirty years ;[2] when again it rises for a moment in the hot air of the French Revolution, only to disappear again for nearly another century. It was after the Rebellion, and not before, that the dogma of divine right became current orthodoxy in England.

[1] As against from 100 to 140 "neuters" and Royalists, and 170 lawyers or officers (Hallam, ii. 269, *note*, citing the Clarendon Papers, iii. 443).

[2] Republicans there still were in the reigns of William and Anne (see Hallam, iii. 120, 230 ; cp. essay on "Fletcher of Saltoun" in *Our Corner*, Jan. 1888), but they never acted openly as such.

§ 5

The collapse of Republicanism meant the collapse of the class politics that had grown up in the war and in the Commonwealth alongside of the creed politics. The creed politics itself, when carried to the lengths of the doctrine of the Independents, meant a challenge to the political system; and among the more advanced reasoners of the period were some who saw that to put down kingly tyranny was of little avail while class inequalities remained. The Long Parliament, though not going this length, went far in the way of putting down some established abuses; and there are many records of a more searching spirit of innovation. It is important to realise that alike under Charles I. and Cromwell the Parliaments tended to be partly composed of and ruled by the more audacious spirits of the time, simply because these had the advantage in discussion wherever they were. The incapacity for speech which in later times has made the Conservative party welcome adventurers as its mouthpieces, meant the partial obliteration of the Conservative class in the early days of unorganised parliamentary strife; and Cromwell's own Parliaments baffled him in virtue of their large elements of upstart intelligence. He himself, having entered the war from a mixture of motives in which there was no idea of social reconstruction, was merely irritated by the ideals of the more radical agitators, which he could not out-argue, but on which he promptly put his foot. It is true that in the immense ferment set up by the Rebellion impracticable ideas abounded, and that they suggested risks of civil anarchy, even as the multitude of sectaries threatened chaos in religion. We find indeed an express affirmation of anarchism in the literature of the period;[1] and generally the English Revolution

[1] *E.g.* Richard Overton's pamphlet (1646) entitled *An Arrow against all Tyrants and Tyranny, wherein the Original, Rise, Extent, and End of Magisterial Power, the*

had in it most of the subversive elements which later evolved the French, the determining difference being that the English was not attacked from the outside. But there were practical plans also. Lilburne had a really constructive scheme of popular enfranchisement,[1] which might have built up a democratic force of resistance to royalism as such; but Cromwell, while ready to overthrow any part of the constitution that hampered him, would build up nothing in its place. He would have no alteration of the social structure, save in so far as he must protect his Independents from the Presbyterians and Episcopalians alike. And of course, when his polity fell, the ideals of the independents of politics —who had represented only a tribe of scattered intelligences, much fewer than the mere religious sectaries, who were themselves but a vigorous minority—speedily disappeared from English affairs. The standards of the average orthodox class became the standards of public life.

On the side of international relations, finally, Cromwell and the Commonwealth did nothing to improve politics. Commerce began to spread afresh; and commercial and racial jealousy, under the Puritan as later under the Restoration rule, bred war with the Dutch, just as religious hatreds had made war between England and Spain. The final proof of Cromwell's lack of

Natural and National Rights, Freedoms, and Properties of Mankind, are discovered and undeniably maintained. Its main doctrines are that "To every individual in nature is given an individual property by nature, not to be invaded or usurped by any," and that "no man hath power over my rights and liberties, and I over no man's." See a long and interesting extract in the *History of Passive Obedience since the Reformation*, Amsterdam, 1689, i. 59. As to the other anarchists, of whom Lilburne was not one, see Gardiner, *History of the Commonwealth*, i. 47, 48.

[1] Cp. Gardiner, *Cromwell's Place in History*, pp. 37-50; *History of the Great Civil War*, 1889, ii. 53-55, 310-312, iii. 527. While grudgingly noting his straightforwardness, Dr. Gardiner assumes to discredit Lilburne as impracticable, yet is all the while demonstrating that Cromwell's constructive work utterly collapsed. Lilburne explicitly and accurately predicted that the tyrannies of the new régime would bring about the Restoration (Guizot, *Histoire de la république d'Angleterre et de Cromwell*, ed. Bruxelles, 1841, i. 52).

political wisdom is given in his utterly fantastic scheme for a constitutional union of the English and Dutch republics, a scheme which could not have worked for a week. When this proposal was declined by the Dutch States-General, he seems to have been as ready as any filibuster in England to go to war with the States;[1] and it is evident that the Navigation Act of 1651 was at once an act of revenge for the insults put upon the English ambassadors by the Dutch Orangeist populace, against the will of the Dutch Government, and a wanton effort to punish the States for declining the Protector's absurd proposals.[2] The two Protestant republics thereupon grappled like two worrying dogs; and for their first ostensible victory the English Parliament publicly thanked God as unctuously as for any of the victories of the Civil War.[3] In their hands and Cromwell's international politics sank at once to the lowest levels of primitive instinct.

Mr. Frederic Harrison (*Cromwell*, ch. xiii.) glorifies Cromwell's foreign policy on the score that it made England great in the eyes of foreign countries. Exactly so might we eulogise the foreign policy of Louis XIV. or Philip II. or Napoleon—so long as it succeeded. Cromwell, up to the time when he began to scheme an empire of naval aggression, simply aimed at a Protestant combination as other rulers aimed at Catholic combinations. There was nothing new in the idea; and it would have been astonishing if he had *not* maintained the naval power of the country. It was to this very end that the luckless Charles imposed his ship-money, which Hampden and his backers refused to pay. As regards home politics, again, Mr. Harrison praises Cromwell for preserving order with unprecedented success, making no allowance for the fact that Cromwell was the first Englishman who governed through a standing army, and making no attempt to refute Ludlow's statements (cited by Hallam, ii. 251, *note*; cp. Vaughan, p. 524, *note*) as to the

[1] Dr. Gardiner says not, but does not explain away Cromwell's acquiescence. As to the war-spirit in England see van Kampen, *Geschichte der Niederlande*, Ger. ed. ii. 140, 141.

[2] Guizot, *Histoire de la république d'Angleterre et de Cromwell*, ed. Bruxelles, 1854, i. 202-11; van Kampen, *Geschichte der Niederlande*, ii. 150, 151; Davies, *History of Holland*, 1841, ii. 709.

[3] Guizot, as cited, i. 243.

gross tyranny of the major-generals, or to meet the charge against Cromwell of selling scores of royalists into slavery at Barbadoes. Mr. Harrison finally justifies Cromwell's policy in the main on the score of "necessity," despite the proverbial quotation. It was exactly on the plea of necessity that Charles justified himself in his day, when Cromwell joined in resisting him. Mr. Harrison again extols the "generosity" and "moral elevation" of the intervention for the Vaudois, when on the same page he has to admit the infamy of the Cromwellian treatment of Ireland. He sees no incongruity in Milton's emotion over the "slaughtered saints" of Protestantism, while Catholic ecclesiastics were with his approval being slain like dogs. Moral and social science must hold the balances more evenly than this.

§ 6

While thus showing that in his foreign relations in general he had no higher principle than that which led him to protect the Protestant Vaudois, Cromwell himself could not or would not tolerate Catholicism in England. What was immeasurably worse, he had put thousands of Irish Catholics to the sword, and reduced tens of thousands more to the life conditions of wild animals. His policy in Ireland, if judged by the standards we apply to the rule of other men, must be pronounced one of blind brutality. He had helped to make a civil war in England because his class was at times arbitrarily taxed, and had fears that its worship would be interfered with; and in so doing he felt he had the support and sanction of Omnipotence. When it came to dealing with Irishmen who stood up for their race ideals and their religion, he acted as if for him principles of moral and religious right did not exist.[1] The worst tyranny of Charles is as dust in the balance with Cromwell's expropriation of myriads of conquered

[1] There is a hardly credible story (Gardiner, *History of the Commonwealth and Protectorate*, ii. 30) that in supporting Owen's scheme for a liberal religious establishment he declared: "I had rather that Mahometanism were permitted amongst us than that one of God's children should be persecuted." If the story be true, so much the worse for his treatment of Catholics.

Irish. For them he had neither the show of law nor the pretence of equity. They were treated as conquered races had been treated, not by the Romans, who normally sought to absorb in their polity the peoples they overcame, but by barbarians in their mutual wars, where the loser was driven to the wilderness. Far from seeking to grapple as a statesman with the problem of Irish disaffection, he struck into it like a Berserker, on the same inspiration of animal fury as took him into the breach at Drogheda.

Mr. Gardiner and Mr. Harrison partly defend the massacre of Drogheda as justified by the "laws of war" of the time. It is true that for the period it was not very much out of the way. The Royalist Manley, describing it, says only (*History of the Rebellions*, 1691, p. 227): "I would not condemn the promiscuous slaughter of the Citizens and Souldiers, of Cruelty, because it might be intended for Example and Terror to others, *if the like Barbarity had not been committed elsewhere*." But Manley seems to have forgotten the friars, whose slaughter neither laws of war nor European custom exonerated. There were really no "laws of war" in the case. Mr. Gardiner (*Student's History*, p. 562) puts it that these laws "left garrisons refusing, as that of Drogheda had done, to surrender an *indefensible* post . . . to the mercy or cruelty of the enemy." But (as Mr. Gardiner seems to admit in his later *History of the Commonwealth and Protectorate*, i. 32) it is unwarrantable to call Drogheda an "indefensible post." It contained 3000 foot, mostly English. Mr. Harrison (*Oliver Cromwell*, p. 136) perhaps errs in saying that its commander, Sir Arthur Aston, an officer of "great name and experience . . . at that time made little doubt of defending it against all the power of Cromwell." Cp. Gardiner, *History of the Commonwealth and Protectorate*, i. 128, as to Aston's straits. It had, however, actually resisted siege by the Catholics for three years, and it was only by desperate efforts that Cromwell carried it. He went into the breach with the forlorn hope, and he gave the order for slaughter, as he himself admits, in the fury of action. Nor did his men merely slay those taken in arms. He tells that "their friars were knocked on the head promiscuously"; and it is impossible wholly to refuse to believe the royalist statement of the time, that men, women, and children were indiscriminately slaughtered. Mr. Gardiner, on somewhat insufficient grounds (*History of the Commonwealth*, i. 135, 136, *note*), entirely

rejects the personal testimony of the brother of Anthony à Wood (Anthony's *Autobiography*, ed. Oxford, 1848, pp. 51, 52), as to Cromwell's men holding up children as shields when pursuing some soldiers of the garrison who defended themselves. Mr. Gardiner is himself in error in respect of one charge of improbability which he brings against the narrative, as quoted by himself. But in any case his own narrative, as he evidently feels, shows the Cromwellian troops to have been sufficiently ferocious. Quarter was promised, and then withheld (Gardiner, i. 131, *note*). A Puritan drunk with the lust of battle is a beast like any other. Cromwell himself had to quiet his conscience with his usual drug of religion. But if this act had been done by Cavaliers or Catholics upon a Puritan garrison and Independent priests, he and his party would have held it up to horror for ever. The only defence he could make was that this was vengeance for the great Irish Massacre—that is to say, that he had shown he could be as bloody as the Irish, who on their part had all the English massacres of the previous generation to avenge —a circumstance carefully ignored by clerical writers who still justify Cromwell in the name of Christianity, as seeking to make future massacres impossible. All the while, there was not the slightest pretence of showing that the garrison of Drogheda had been concerned in the old massacre. Compare, on this, the emphatic verdict of Mr. Gardiner, *History of the Commonwealth*, i. 139. Mr. Harrison (p. 145) quotes Cromwell's challenge to opponents to show any instance of a man "not in arms" being put to death with impunity—this after he had avowed the slaughter of all priests and chaplains! His general assertion of the scrupulousness of his party was palpably false; and it is idle to say that he must have believed it true. That Ireton's Puritan troops slew numbers of disarmed and unarmed Irish with brutal cruelty and treachery *against Ireton's reiterated orders*, is shown by Professor Gardiner; and he tells how Ireton hanged a girl who tried to escape from Limerick (*Commonwealth*, ii. 48, 53). Is it then to be supposed that Cromwell's men were more humane when he was hounding them on to massacre?

There are men who to-day will still applaud him because he quenched the Irish trouble for the time in massacre and devastation; and others, blenching at the atrocity of the cure, speak of it with bated breath as doing him discredit, while they bate nothing of their censure of the arbitrariness of Charles. Others excuse all Puritan tyranny because of its "sincerity," as if that

plea would not exculpate Philip the Second of Spain. The plain truth is that Cromwell in no way rose above the moral standards of his generation in his dealings with those whom he was able to oppress. He found in his creed his absolution for every step to which blind instinct led him, in Ireland as in England; and it seems to be his destiny to lead his admirers into the same sophistries—pious with a difference—as served to keep him on good terms with his conscience after suppressing an English Parliament or slaughtering an Irish garrison.

Take, for instance, the fashion in which D'Aubigné shuffles over the Irish massacres, after quoting Cromwell's worst cant on the subject: "This extract will suffice. Cromwell acted in Ireland like a great statesman, and the means he employed were those best calculated promptly to restore order in that unhappy country. And yet we cannot avoid regretting that a man, a Christian man, should have been called to wage so terrible a war and to show towards his enemies *greater severity than had ever, perhaps, been exercised by the pagan leaders of antiquity*. 'Blessed are the peacemakers: for they shall be called the children of God'" (*The Protector*, 3rd ed. p. 159).

It is too much even to say, as a more scrupulous critic has done,[1] that the phenomenon of the Commonwealth represented a great attempt at a higher life on the part of men nobler and wiser than their contemporaries. It was simply the self-assertion of energetic men of whom some were in some respects ahead of their time, while the others were as bad as their time, and in some respects rather behind it; men bewildered by fanaticism and incapable of a consistent ethic, whose failure was due as distinctly to their own intellectual vices as to their environment. No serious poetry of any age is more devoid of moral principle than the

[1] Mr. Harrison, as cited, p. 210. Mr. Allanson Picton, in his lectures on the *Rise and Fall of the English Commonwealth*, has with more pains and circumspection sought to make good a similar judgment. But the nature of his performance is tested by his contending on the one hand that the ideal of the Commonwealth was altogether premature, and on the other that Cromwell governed with the real consent of the nation.

verses in which Marvell and Waller exult over the wanton attack on Spain, and kindle at the prospect of a future of unscrupulous conquest. Both men were religious; both as ready to sing of "Divine Love" as of human hate; and both in their degree were good types of the so-called Puritan party. The leaders from the very outset are visibly normal agitators, full of their own grievances, and as devoid of the spirit of fellow-feeling, of concern for all-round righteousness, as any of the men they impeached. Their movement went so far as it did because, firstly, they were vigorous men resisting a weak man, and later their own natural progress to anarchy was checked by the self-assertion of the strongest of them all. Thus their and his service to progressive political science is purely negative. They showed once for all that an ignoraace guided by religious zeal and "inspiration" is more surely doomed to disaster than the ignorance of mere primary animal instinct; and that of the many forms of political optimism that of Christian pietism is for the modern world certainly not the least pernicious. The Puritan name and ideal are in these days commonly associated with high principle and conscientiousness; and it is true that in the temper and the tactic of the early revolutionary movement, despite much dark fanaticism, there was a certain masculine simplicity and sincerity not often matched in our politics since. But as the years went on, principles gave way, dragged down by fanaticism and egoism; and the Puritan temper, lacking light, bred deadly miasmas. Milton himself sinks from the level of the *Areopagitica* to that of the *Eikonoklastes*, an ignoble performance at the behest of the Government, who just then were suppressing the freedom of the press.[1] In strict historical

[1] Gardiner, *History of the Commonwealth and Protectorate*, i. 193-96; cp. Whittaker in *Social England*, iv. 288, 289.

truth the Puritan name and the ideal must stand for utter failure to carry on a free polity, in virtue of incapacity for rational association[1]; for the stifling of some of the most precious forces of civilisation—the artistic; and further for the grafting on normal self-seeking of the newer and subtler sin of solemn hypocrisy. It would be hard to show that either Cromwell or the men he used and overrode were under trial more conscientious than the average public men of later times. Well-meaning he and many of them were; but then most men are well-meaning up to their lights: the moral test for all is consistency with professed principle under changing conditions. And hardly one was stedfastly true to the principles he put forward. They prevaricated under pressure—under harder pressure, no doubt—like other politicians, with only the difference that they could cite random texts and "the Lord" in their justification. And inasmuch as their godly strifes were as blind and as insoluble as those of any factions in history, they furnished no aid and no encouragement to posterity to attempt anew the great work of social regeneration. If that is ever to be done, it must be with saner inspiration and better light than theirs. It is time that, instead of extolling them as men of superior moral stature and inspiration, we realise that they brought to a bewildering problem a vain enlightenment.

[1] This holds good of the Puritan party as a whole. It is possible, however, to take too low a view of the judgment of any given section of it. Professor Gardiner, for instance, somewhat strains the case when he says (*Student's History*, p. 567) of the Barbone Parliament: "Unfortunately these godly men [so styled by Cromwell] were the most crotchety and impracticable set ever brought together. The majority wanted to abolish the Court of Chancery without providing a substitute, *and to abolish tithes without providing any other means for the support of the clergy*." It seems clear that it was the intention of the majority to provide an equivalent for the tithes (see Vaughan, pp. 508, 509; cp. Hallam, ii. 243, 244); and the remark as to the Court of Chancery appears to miss the point. The case against that Court was that it engrossed almost all suits, and yet intolerably delayed them: the proposal was to let the other Courts do the work. Cp. Dr. Gardiner's *History of the Commonwealth and Protectorate*, ii. 241, 262; and as to the tithes, i. 192; ii. 32, 240, 275, 276.

On this view, it may be noted, we have a sufficient explanation of the dissimulations of which Cromwell was undoubtedly guilty. Between the Old-World asperity of Villemain, who, while extolling his capacity, charges him with *fourberie habituelle* (*Hist. de Cromwell*, 5e édit. p. 272), and the foregone condonations of Carlyle, there is a mean of common sense. Cromwell was a man of immense energy and practical capacity, but with no gift for abstract thought, and spellbound by an incoherent creed. Consequently he was bound to come to serious confusion when he had to deal with tense complexities of conduct and violently competing interests. Coming into desperate positions, for which his religion was worse than no preparation, and in which it could not possibly guide him aright, he must needs trip over the snares of diplomacy, and do his equivocations worse than a more intellectual man would. Mr. Gladstone, with his moral energy and his want of logic and science, is a milder case in point. Cromwell's lying sounds the more offensive because of its constant twang of pietism; but that was simply the dialect in which he had been brought up. Had he lived in our day he would have been able to prevaricate with a wider vocabulary, which makes a great difference.

§ 7

Lest such a criticism should be suspected of prejudice, it may be well to note that a contemporary Doctor of Divinity has at some points exceeded it. It is Dr. Cunningham who argues that in consequence of the Puritan bias leading to a cult of the Old Testament rather than the New, there occurred under Puritan auspices "a retrogression to a lower type of social morality, which showed itself both at home and abroad."[1] He traces Puritan influence specially "(*a*) in degrading the condition of the labourer; (*b*) in reckless treatment of the native [=lower] races; (*c*) in the development of the worst forms of slavery."[2] The present writer, who rarely finds it necessary to oppose a Protestant clergyman on such an issue, is disposed to think the charge overdrawn, for the following reasons:—(1) The English treatment of Ireland was to the full as cruel in the Elizabethan period, before

[1] *Growth of English Industry and Commerce*, i. 106. [2] *Id.* p. 107.

Puritanism had gone far, as under Cromwell; (2) The Catholic Spaniards in Mexico and Peru were as cruel as the Puritan colonists in New England. It is true that "in all the terrible story of the dealings of the white man with the savage, there are few more miserable instances of cold-blooded cruelty than the wholesale destruction of the Pequod nation—men, women, and children—by the Puritan settlers"[1] of Connecticut. But when Catholics and pre-Puritan Protestants and Dutch Protestants act similarly, the case is not to be explained on Dr. Cunningham's theory. The fallacy seems to lie in supposing that the New Testament has ever been a determinant in these matters. Mosheim confesses that in the wars of the Crusades the Christians were more ferocious than the Saracens[2]; and Seneca was at least as humane as Paul.

There is distinct validity, on the other hand, in the charge that Puritanism worsened the life of the working classes, first by taking away their ecclesiastical holidays and gild-festivals, and finally by taking all recreation out of their Sunday. The latter step may be regarded as the assertion of the economic interest of the Protestant clergy against the social needs of their flocks. It was not that the labourers were well off before the Rebellion —here again we must guard against false impressions[3] —but that "Puritan ascendancy rendered the lot of the labourer hopelessly dull."[4] The conclusion is that "neither the personal character nor the political success of the Puritans need lead us to ignore their baleful influence on society,"[5] which was, in the opinion of

[1] *Growth of English Industry and Commerce*, pp. 108, 109, citing Bancroft, i. 401, 402. Seeley ignored these and many other matters when he pronounced that the annals of Greater Britain are "conspicuously better than those of Greater Spain, which are infinitely more stained with cruelty and rapacity." In the usual English fashion, he left out of account, too, the horrors of the English conquests of Ireland.

[2] *Ecclesiastical History*, 12 cent., part i. ch. ii. § 2.

[3] See Rogers, *Industrial and Commercial History*, p. 13, as to the distress about 1630.

[4] Cunningham, as cited, p. 107.

[5] *Id.* p. 109.

Mr. Arnold, despite his passion for their favourite literature, to imprison and turn the key upon the English spirit for two hundred years. Here again the impartial naturalist will detect exaggeration, but much less than in the current hyperboles to the contrary.

For the rest, the commercial and industrial drift of England, the resort to the mineral wealth[1] that was to be the sinister basis of later commerce and empire, the pursuit of capitalistic manufacture, the building up of a class living on interest as the privileged class of the past had lived on land monopoly—all went on under Puritanism as under Catholicism,[2] Anglicanism, Calvinism, Lutheranism. The early Puritans, taking up the Catholic tradition, denounced usury; but the clergy of industrial and burgher-ruled States, beginning with Calvin, perforce receded from that veto.[3] Even under Elizabeth there was a good deal of banking,[4] and under Cromwell English merchants and money-dealers had learned all the lessons the Dutch could teach them, weighing the Protector's borrowing credit in the scales of the market as they would any other. The spirit of pitiless commercial competition flourished alike under Roundhead and Cavalier,[5] save in so far as it was manacled by invidious monopolies; the lust of "empire" was as keen among the middle class in Cromwell's day as in Elizabeth's and our own; and even the lot of the workers began to approximate to its modern aspect through the greater facility of transfer[6] which followed on the old rigidity of feudal law and medieval usage. The industrial age was coming to birth.

[1] See Rogers, *Industrial and Commercial History*, p. 14, as to the iron trade.

[2] As to usury in the reign of Henry VII., see Busch, *England unter den Tudors*, i. 257, 389. On the general canonist teaching there is a very thorough research in Professor Ashley's *Introduction to Economic History*, vol. ii. ch. vi.

[3] Cunningham, *Growth of English Industry and Commerce*, vol. ii. (*Modern Times*) pp. 74-87. [4] *Id.* p. 100. [5] *Id.* pp. 87, 88, 102.

[6] Cunningham, *op. cit.* p. 90. As to the upset of gild monopolies in the sixteenth century, see p. 76.

CHAPTER III

FROM THE RESTORATION TO ANNE

§ 1

THE broad outcome of the monarchic restoration under Charles II. is the intensifying of the royalist sentiment by way of reaction from the Rebellion and the autocracy of the Protector. It has been held that had Richard Cromwell had the energy of his father he might easily have maintained his position, so quietly was his accession at first accepted; and no doubt his irresolution made much of the difference between success and failure; but nothing can be clearer than the leaning of the mass of the people to the "lawful" dynasty. It is a proof of Cromwell's complete dislocation of the old state of touch between the official classes and the public,[1] that the army leaders had no misgivings when they commenced to intrigue against Richard, and that Monk was so slow to declare for the king when the event showed how immense was the royalist preponderance. During the Rebellion, London, led by the Puritans, had dominated the country: under the Protectorate, town and country were alike dominated by a selected official and military class, representing a minority with military force to

[1] Armand Carrel (*Histoire de la Contre-Révolution en Angleterre*, ed. Bruxelles, 1836, p. 8) notes the "apathetic indifference" to which Cromwell's imperialist rule had reduced the middle classes.

impose its rule. As soon as this class began to disrupt in factions, the released play of common sentiment began to carry all forward on a broad tide towards a Restoration; the only footing on which the English people could yet unite being one of tradition and superstition. The anarchy of a State still unfitted for republican government had before brought about the Protectorate: it now led back to the monarchy. And that the new monarchy did not become as absolute as the contemporary rule of Louis XIV., was solely owing to the accident of the later adhesion of the restored dynasty to the Church of Rome, which the mass of the people feared more than they did even the prospect of another Civil War. It was the memory of the Fronde[c] that enabled Louis to override the remains of the French constitution and set up an autocracy; and the same force was now at work in England. It was the memory of the Civil War that made the people so much more forbearing with the new king, when his private adhesion to the Catholic Church became generally suspected,[1] than their fathers had been with his father. By temperament and from experience they were disposed to do anything for the throne; but the general fear of Popery on the one hand, and the special royalist aversion to the Puritan sects on the other, plunged the State into a new ferment of ecclesiastical politics, the strifes of which so far absorbed the general energy that ill-luck in the commercial wars with Holland seems to have been almost a necessary result, even had the king ruled well. Not that the generation of Charles II. was a whit less bent on dominion and acquisition than the decade of the Protectorate.

[1] It is to be noted in this connection that at first the secret was very well kept. There can be no reasonable doubt that Shaftesbury and Lauderdale were kept in the dark as to the Treaty of Dover, in which Charles agreed with Louis to introduce Catholicism in England. Macaulay's suggestion to the contrary comes of his determination to hear nothing in Shaftesbury's defence.

In this new situation, under a king too little devoted to his trade to choose really sagacious courses, but too shrewd to ruin himself, occur the beginnings of parliamentary statesmanship, in the modern sense of government in harmony with the Crown. The powerful administration of Strafford had been a matter of helping the Crown to resist Parliament. The very capable though unforeseeing statesmanship of the Pyms and Hampdens of the Long Parliament, again, was a matter of resisting the Crown; and with Shaftesbury such resistance recurred; but the indolence of the king, joined with his sense of the dangers of the old favouritism, gave rise to the principle of Ministerial Government before partisan Cabinets had come into existence. Clarendon had in him much of the constitutionalist temper. Shaftesbury, however, was better qualified both by training and parts for the task of statesmanship in a stormy and unscrupulous generation. Read dispassionately, his story is seen to be in the main what his careful vindicator would make it, that of a man of average moral quality, with exceptional energy and resource. The legend of his wickedness[1] is somewhat puzzling, in view of his staunch hostility to Romanism, and of his political superiority to the famous Deist statesman of the next generation, Bolingbroke, who has been so little blackened in comparison. A reasonable explanation is that Shaftesbury was damned by the Church for resisting the king, while Bolingbroke's services to the Church covered his multitude of sins. But the idle rumours of Shaftesbury's debauchery[2]

[1] This is accepted by Armand Carrel, who calls him (*Histoire de la Contre-Révolution en Angleterre*, p. 6), "homme d'une immoralité profonde."

[2] It is to be regretted that the late Mr. Green, while admitting that Mr. Christie was "in some respects" successful in his vindication of Shaftesbury, should have left his own account of Shaftesbury's character glaringly unfair. Verbally following Burnet, he pronounces Ashley "at best a Deist" in his religion, and adds that his life was "that of a debauchee," going on to couple the terms "Deist and debauchee" in a very clerical fashion. And yet in the previous paragraph he admits

apparently damaged him with the Protestant Dissenters, and his reckless policy over the Popish Plot might easily secure him a share of the infamy which is the sole association of the name of Titus Oates. Here also, however, he has been calumniated. Burnet, though plainly disliking him, says nothing of debauchery in his life, and declined to believe, when Charles suggested it, that he had any part in trumping up the falsehoods about the Plot.[1] There can be no reasonable doubt that Shaftesbury honestly believed many of the tales told, as Lord Russell solemnly testified at the scaffold that he for his part had done; and to acquit Russell and criminate Shaftesbury is possible only to those who have made up their minds before trying the case. It is practically certain, moreover, that some Catholic plotting really did take place; and in the then posture of affairs nothing was more likely. Shaftesbury, like the other capable statesmen of the Restoration, was in favour of toleration of the Dissenters; but like all other Protestants of the age, he thought it impossible to tolerate Catholicism. Nor can it well be doubted that had Charles or James been able to establish the Romish system, it would have gone hard with Protestantism. It is true that the only exhibition thus far of the spirit of tolerance in Protestant and Catholic affairs had been on the part of Richelieu towards the Huguenots, themselves intensely intolerant; but it could not reasonably be supposed that an English Catholic king or statesman, once well fixed in power, would have the wisdom or forbearance of Richelieu. The two systems, in fine, aimed at each other's annihilation;

that "the debauchery of Ashley was simply a mask. He was, in fact, *temperate by nature and habit*, and his ill-health rendered any great excess impossible." The non-correction of the flat contradiction must apparently be set down to Mr. Green's ill-health. As a matter of fact, the charge of debauchery is baseless. Long before Mr. Christie, one of the annotators of Burnet's *History* (ed. 1838, p. 64, *note*) defended Shaftesbury generally, and pointed out that "in private life we have no testimony that he was depraved."

[1] *History of His Own Time*, ed. 1838, p. 290.

and Shaftesbury simply acted, politically that is, as the men of the First Rebellion would have done in similar circumstances.

For the rest, he was admitted even by the malicious and declamatory Dryden to have been a just Chancellor; it is proved that he opposed the Stop of the Exchequer; and he sharply resisted the rapacity of the royal concubines. In his earlier policy towards Holland he conformed odiously enough to the ordinary moral standard of the time[1] in politics, a standard little improved upon in the time of Palmerston, and not discarded by those Englishmen who continue to talk of Russia as England's natural enemy, or by those who speak of Germany as a trade rival that must be fought to the death. His changes of side between the outbreak of the Rebellion and his death, while showing the moral and intellectual instability of the period, were in no way dishonourable, and are not for a moment to be compared with those of Dryden, most unstable of all men of genius, whose unscrupulous but admirably artistic portrait of the statesman has doubtless gone far to keep Shaftesbury's name in disesteem. It may be, again, that his sufficient wealth takes away somewhat from the merit of his steadfast refusal of French bribes; but the fact should be kept in mind,[2] as against the other fact that not only the king and some of the Opposition but Algernon Sidney took them.[3] On the

[1] How odious it was may be gathered from Dryden's *Annus Mirabilis* and Marvell's *Character of Holland*, pieces in which two men of genius exhibit every stress of vulgar ill-feeling that we can detect in the Jingo press and poets of our own day.

[2] Dryden's charge, in *The Medal*, of "bartering his venal wit for sums of gold" during the Rebellion, is pure figment. It is an established fact that even as Councillor of State, to which office there was attached a salary of £1000, Shaftesbury, then Sir Anthony Ashley Cooper, received no salary at all. See note to Mr. Christie's (Globe) ed. of Dryden's poems, pp. 127, 128.

[3] Christie's *Life of Shaftesbury*, ii. 293, *note*. Perhaps it is not sufficiently considered by Mr. Christie that Sidney regarded France as a possible ally for the overthrow of monarchy in England. His position was not that of an ordinary Parliamentary bribe-taker. See Ludlow's *Memoirs*, iii. 165, *et seq.* And the English Government had sought to have him assassinated.

whole, Shaftesbury was the most estimable of the Ministers of his day, though his miscalculation of possibilities, in clinging to the scheme of giving Monmouth the succession, finally wrecked his career. He had almost no alternative, placed and principled as he was, save to call in the Prince of Orange; and this would really have been at that moment no more feasible a course than it was to declare Monmouth the heir, besides being more hazardous, in that William was visibly less easy to lead. Of Shaftesbury, Burnet admits that "his strength lay in the knowledge of England"; and when he took a fatal course it was because the whole situation was desperate. His fall measures not so much the capacity of Charles as the force which the royalist superstition had gathered.

§ 2

This growth can be traced in the clerical literature of the time. The conception of a "divine right" inhering in kings by heredity—a conception arising naturally as part of the general ethic of feudal inheritance—had been emphasised on the Protestant side in England[1] by way of express resistance to the Papacy, which from the time of Gregory VII. had been wont in its strifes with emperors and kings to deny their divine right and to assert its own, formally founding the latter, however, on the "natural" right inherent in masses of men to choose their own rulers, even as the citizens of Rome had been wont to elect the Popes.[2] The total effect of the English Rebellion was

[1] In 1603, Lord Mountjoy in Ireland laid it down as the doctrine of the Church of England that his master was "by right of descent an absolute king," and that it was unlawful for his subjects "upon any cause to raise arms against him." These words, says Dr. Gardiner (*History*, 1604-43, i. 370), "truly expressed the belief with which thousands of Englishmen had grown up during the long struggle with Rome." For earlier phases of the principle, see Stubbs, i. 593, and More's *Utopia*, B. i.

[2] As Hallam notes (*Middle Ages*, 11th ed. ii. 157) the French bishops in the

to give an immense stimulus to the high monarchic view, not now as against the Papacy, but as against Parliament. When the learned Usher drew up at the request of Charles I. his treatise[1] on *The Power communicated by God to the Prince, and the Obedience required of the Subject*, he proceeded almost wholly on arguments from the Scriptures and the Fathers; not that there were not already many deliverances from modern authorities on the point, but that these evidently had not entered into the ordinary stock of opinion. On the papal side, from Thomas Aquinas onwards, the negative view had been carefully set forth, not as a papal claim but as an obvious affirmation of the ancient "law of nature." Thus the Spanish Jesuit Suarez (1548-1617) had in his *Tractatus de Legibus*, while deriving all law from the will of God, expressly rejected the doctrine that the power of rule inheres by succession in single princes. Such power, he declared, "by its very nature, belongs to no one man, but to a multitude of men,"[2] adding a refutation of the patriarchal theory which "might have caused our English divines to blush before the Jesuit of Granada."[3] At the beginning of the seventeenth century, again, while leading Englishmen were affirming divine right, the German Protestant Althusius, Professor of Law at Herborn, publishing his *Politica methodice digesta* (1603), declares in a dedication to the States of Friesland that the supreme power lies in the people.[4] Hooker, too, had stamped the principle

ninth century had claimed sacerdotal rights of deposing kings in as full a degree as the Popes did later. In that period, however, bishops were often anti-papal; and the papal claim practically arose in the Roman and clerical resistance to the nomination of Popes by the Emperor, though Pope John VIII. had in his time gone even further than Gregory VII. did later, claiming power to choose the Emperor. *Id.* pp. 165-83.

[1] Buckle is wrong (i. 394) in dating the beginning of the revival of the doctrine "about 1681." Saunderson's edition of Usher was first published in 1660.

[2] *Tractatus de Legibus*, lib. ii. c. ii. § 3.

[3] Hallam, *Literature of Europe*, ed. 1872, iii. 161.

[4] Hallam, as last cited, p. 162. Bayle notes (art. "Althusius," and *notes*) that the treatise was much denounced in Germany.

of "consent" with his authority, very much as did Suarez.[1] But the compiler of *The History of Passive Obedience since the Reformation*,[2] after showing that the tenet[3] had been held by dozens of Protestant divines and jurists after the Reformation, and even strongly affirmed by Nonconformists, is able to cite nearly as many assertions of it in the reign of Charles II. as in the whole preceding period. The clergy were indeed able to show that the principle of non-resistance had been a common doctrine up to the Great Rebellion; and, though the contrary view was on the whole more common,[4] it well illustrates the instinctive character of political movement that the democratic doctrine had followed the course of action step for step, and not preceded it. There had been resistance before the right to resist was formulated in the schools. And Bishop Guthry records that at the General Assembly in Edinburgh in January 1645, "everyone had in his hand that book lately published by Mr. Samuel Rutherford, entitled *Lex Rex*, which was stuffed with positions that in the time of peace and order would have been judged damnable treasons; yet were now so idolised, that whereas in the beginning of the work Buchanan's treatise, *De Jure Regni apud Scotos*, was looked upon as an oracle, this coming forth, it was slighted as not anti-monarchical enough, and Rutherford's *Lex Rex*

[1] *Ecclesiastical Polity*, B. i. ch. x. § 8.

[2] Amsterdam, 1689-90, 2 vols.

[3] It is to be noted that "Passive Obedience" had different degrees of meaning for those who professed to believe in it. For some it meant merely not taking arms against the sovereign, and did not imply that he was entitled to active obedience in all things. See Hallam, ii. 463.

[4] Filmer begins his *Patriarcha* (1680) with the remark that the doctrine of natural freedom and the right to choose governments had been "a common opinion . . . since the time that school divinity began to flourish." Like Salmasius, he fathers the doctrine on the Papacy; and indeed the Church of Rome had notoriously employed it in its strifes with kings, at its own convenience; but it had as notoriously been put forward by many lay communities on their own behalf, and had been practically acted on in England over and over again. And it is clearly laid down in the third century by Tertullian, *Ad Scapulam*, ii.

only thought authentic."[1] So Milton's answer to Salmasius, vindicating the right of rebellion as inherent in freemen, marks the high tide of feeling that sustained the foremost regicides. But in the nature of the case the feeling swung as far the other way when they had touched their extreme limit of action; and when the royalist cause came in the ascendant the monarchical principle was perhaps more passionately cherished in England than in any of the other European States. How it normally worked may be seen in Dryden's sycophantic dedication[2] of his *All for Love* to Lord Danby (1678), sinking as it does to the extravagant baseness of the declaration that "every remonstrance of private men has the seed of treason in it." It was in this very year that Charles and Danby made the secret treaty with France, the revelation of which by Louis soon afterwards brought Danby to the Tower; and Danby it was who three years before carried through the House of Lords a bill to make all placemen declare on oath that they considered all resistance to the king unlawful.

The handful of remaining republicans and political Liberals, appealing as they did to tradition in their treatises against the traditional pleadings of the Churchmen and royalists, could have no appreciable influence on the public, because the mere spirit of tradition, when not appealed to as the sanction of a living movement of resistance, must needs make for passivity. Algernon Sidney's posthumous folio on Government in answer to Filmer's *Patriarcha*, arguing the question of self-government *versus* divine right, and going over

[1] *Memoirs*, 2nd ed. p. 177.

[2] Johnson was moved to pronounce Dryden the most excessive of the writers of his day in the "meanness and servility of hyperbolical adulation," excepting only Aphra Behn in respect of her address to "Eleanor Gwyn." But Malone vindicates the poet by citing rather worse samples, in particular Joshua Barnes's "Ode to Jefferies" (*Life*, in vol. i. of *Prose Works of Dryden*, 1800, pp. 244-47). They all indicate the same corruption of judgment and character, special to the royalist atmosphere.

all the ground from Nimrod downwards, point by point, is a far greater performance than Filmer's; and Locke in turn brought a still greater power of analysis to bear on the same refutation; but it is easy to see that Filmer's is the more readable book, and that with its straightforward dogmatism it would most readily convince the average Englishman. Nor was the philosophy all on one side, though Filmer has ten absurdities for the other's one, and was so unguarded as to commit himself to the doctrine that the possession of power gives divine right, no matter how come by. Sidney himself always argued that "Vertue" entitled men to superior power; and though he might in practice have contended that the choice of the virtuous should be made by the people, his proposition pointed rather plainly back to Cromwell, acclaimed by Milton as the worthiest to bear rule. And to be governed by a military autocrat, however virtuous and capable, was as little to the taste of that generation as it is to the taste of Carlyle's. Even a clergyman could see that the political problem was really one of the practical adjustment of crude conflicting interests, and that there could easily be as much friction under a virtuous monarch as under a dissolute one. The conscientiousness of the first Charles had wrought ruin, where the vicious indolence of the second steered safely.

As Filmer and Sidney, besides, really agreed in awarding "the tools to him who could handle them," and the most pressing practical need was to avoid civil war, the solution for most people was the more clearly a "loyal" submission to the reigning house; and no amount of abstract demonstration of the right of self-government could have hindered the habit of submission from eating deeper and deeper into the national character if it were not for the convulsion which changed the dynasty and set up a deep division of

"loyalties," keeping each other in check. In the strict sense of the term there was no class strife, no democratic movement, no democratic interest; indeed no ideal of public interest as the greatest good of the whole. Thus Harrington's *Oceana*, with its scheme of "an equal Commonwealth, a Government established upon an equal Agrarian, arising into the Superstructures or three Orders, the Senat debating and proposing, the People resolving, and the Magistracy executing by an equal Rotation through the suffrage of the People given by the Ballot"[1]—this conception, later pronounced by Hume "the only valuable model of a commonwealth that has yet been offered to the public,"[2] although the same critic exposed its weakness,—was in fact as wholly beside the case as the principle of the Second Coming. No man desired the proposed ideal; and the very irrelevance of the systematic treatises strengthened the case for use and wont. The political discussions, being thus mostly in the air, could only serve to prepare leading men to act on certain principles should events forcibly lead up to new action. But the existing restraints on freedom did not supply sufficient grievance to breed action. The dissenters themselves were almost entirely resigned to their ostracism; and the preponderance of the Church and the Tory party was complete.

Luckily the political fanaticism of Charles I. reappeared in his son James; and that king's determination to re-establish in his realm the church of his devotion, served to break a spell that nothing else could have shattered.[3] The very Church which had

[1] Toland's ed., 1700, p. 55.

[2] Essay (xvi. of Pt. II.) on the *Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth*. Cp. Essay vii. on the tendencies of the British Government, where Harrington's unpracticality is sufficiently indicated.

[3] Cp. Carrel, *Contre-Révolution*, p. 212, as to the "profound discouragement" that had fallen on the people in 1685. Cp. p. 213.

been assuring him of his irresistibility, having to choose between its own continuance and his, had perforce to desert him; and the old panic fear of Popery, fed by the spectacle of Jeffreys' Bloody Assize, swept away the monarch who had aroused it. He would have been an energetic king: his naval Memoirs exhibit zeal and application to work; and he had so much of rational humanity in him that in Scotland he pointed out to the popes of Presbyterianism how irrational as well as merciless was their treatment of sexual frailty. But his own fanaticism carried him athwart the superstition which would have sufficed to make him a secure despot in all other matters; and when the spirit of freedom seemed dying out in all forms save that of sectarian zealotry, his assault on that brought about the convulsion which gave it fresh chances of life.

§ 3

While practical politics was thus becoming more and more of a stupid war of ecclesiastical prejudices, in which the shiftiest came best off, and even theoretic politics ran to a vain disputation on the purposes of God towards Adam, some of the best intelligence of the nation, happily, was at work on more fruitful lines. The dire results of the principles which had made for union and strife of late years, drove thoughtful men back on a ground of union which did not seem to breed a correlative malignity. It was in 1660, the year of the Restoration, that the Royal Society was constituted; but its real beginnings lay in the first years of peace under Cromwell, when, as Sprat records, a "candid, unpassionate company" began to meet at Oxford in the lodgings of Dr. Wilkins, of Wadham College,[1] to

[1] The French Academy, formally founded in 1635, had in a similar way originated in a private gathering some six years before (*Relation concernant l'Histoire*

discuss questions of natural fact. "The University had, at the time, many Members of its own, who had begun a free way of reasoning; and was also frequented by some gentlemen, of Philosophical Minds, whom the misfortunes of the Kingdom, and the security and ease of a retirement amongst Gowns-men, had drawn thither."[1] In constituting the Society, the associates "freely admitted men of different religions, countries, and professions of life," taking credit to themselves for admitting an intellectual shopkeeper, though "the far greater number are Gentlemen, free, and unconfined."[2] Above all things they shunned theology and party feeling. "Their first purpose was no more then onely the satisfaction of breathing a freer air, and of conversing in quiet one with another, without being ingag'd in the passions and madness of that dismal Age;"[3] and when they formally incorporated themselves it was expressly to discuss "things and not words."[4] They

de l'Académie Françoise, ed. 1672, p. 5). There must of course have been many such private groups in England in the same period.

[1] *History of the Royal Society*, 1667, p. 53.

[2] P. 67. Sprat mentions that many physicians gave great help (p. 130).

[3] P. 53.

[4] It is noteworthy that the French Academy, which gave the immediate suggestion for the constitution of the English Royal Society, contained almost no authors save belletrists and ecclesiastics. In the list of members down to 1671 (*Relation* cited, p. 336), I find no writer on science save De la Chambre, the King's physician. And the first important undertaking of the Academy (projected about 1637) was a *Dictionary*. Sprat (p. 56) suggests that the Royal Society has usefully influenced the Academy in the direction of the study of things rather than words. (Compare the avowed literary ideal of the authors of the *Relation*, p. 373.) But although the French group from the first tended mainly to literary pursuits, they too aimed at a "free way of reasoning," "et de ce premier âge de l'Académie, ils en parlent comme d'un âge d'or, durant lequel avec toute l'innocence et toute la *liberté* des premiers siècles, sans bruit, et sans pompe, et sans autres loix que celles de l'amitié, ils goûtoient ensemble tout ce que la société des esprits, et la vie raisonnable, ont de plus doux et de plus charmant" (*Relation*, p. 7). And even while Sprat was writing, the French were making up their scientific leeway. In 1666 Colbert established the French *Académie Royale des Sciences*, for the promotion of Geometry, Astronomy, Physics, and Chemistry, building a laboratory and an observatory, and inviting to France Cassini and Huygens (Life of Colbert by Bernard, in ed. of Colbert's *Last Testament*, 1695). Colbert further founded the *Académie Royale d'Architecture* in 1671; and had set up what came to be the *Académie des Inscriptions* in his own house. All three bodies did excellent work. (See the acknowledgment, as regards science, in Lawrence's *Lectures on Comparative Anatomy*, etc., 1819, p. 13.) In

would have nothing to do with theology, "these two subjects, God and the Soul, being only forborn."[1] Reasoning from the development of military faculty in the Civil War, they decided that "greater things are produced by the free way than the formal."[2] By attending solely to results and questions of concrete fact, they were "not only free from Faction, but from the very causes and beginnings of it";[3] and in the language of the time they held that "by this means there was a race of young Men provided against the next Age, whose minds receiving from them their just Impressions of sober and generous knowledge, were invincibly arm'd against all the inchantments of Enthusiasm,"[4] that is, of religious fanaticism. And with this recoil from fanaticism there went the stirring and energetic curiosity of people habituated to action by years of war, and needing some new excitement to replace the old. While many turned to debauchery, others took to "experiment."[5]

"The late times of Civil War and confusion, to make some recompense for their infinite calamities, brought this advantage with them, that they stirr'd up men's minds from long ease and a lazy rest, and made them active, industrious, and inquisitive: it being the usual benefit that follows upon Tempests and Thunders in the State, as well as in the skie, that they purifie and cleer the

France, besides, the philosophy and science of Descartes made way from the first, and it was his works that first gave Locke "a relish for philosophical things." On the other hand, Sprat, who was not without an eye to literature, and made a reputation by his style, acutely notes (p. 42) that "in the Wars themselves (which is a time wherein all Languages use, if ever, to increase by extraordinary degrees, for in such busie and active times there arise more new thoughts of some men, which must be signifi'd and varied by new expressions)" the English speech "received many fantastical terms . . . and with all it was inlarg'd by many sound and necessary Forms and Idioms which it before wanted"; and he proposes an authoritative dictionary on the lines of the French project.

[1] *History of the Royal Society*, 1667, p. 83.

[2] P. 73. [3] P. 91. [4] P. 53.

[5] So too with the non-combatants. Note, for instance, Locke's recoil from the scholastic philosophy, and his early eager interest in chemistry, medicine, and meteorology. Anthony à Wood records him as a student "of a turbulent spirit, clamorous, and never-contented," that is to say, argumentative.

Air which they disturb. But now since the King's return, the blindness of the former Age and the miseries of this last are vanish'd away: now men are generally weary of the Relicks of Antiquity, and satiated with Religious Disputes; now not only the eyes of men but their hands are open, and prepar'd to labour; Now there is a universal desire and appetite after Knowledge, after the peaceable, the fruitful, nourishing knowledge; and not after that of antient Sects, which only yielded hard indigestible arguments, or sharp contentions, instead of food: which when the minds of men requir'd bread, gave them only a stone, and for fish a serpent."[1]

Here too then there was reaction. It could not suffice to lift the plane of national life, which was determined by the general conditions and the general culture: nor did it alter the predominance of *belles lettres* in the reading of the educated; but it served to sow in that life the seed of science, destined to work through the centuries a gradual transformation of activity and thought which should make impossible the old political strifes, and generate new. Out of experiment came invention, machinery, theory, scepticism, rationalism, democracy. It is difficult to measure, but not easy to overestimate, the gain to intellectual life from even a partial discrediting of the old preoccupation with theology, which in the centuries between Luther and Spinoza stood for an "expense of spirit" that is depressing to think of. Down even to our own day, the waste of labour and learning continues; but from the time when two-thirds of Europe had been agonised by wars set up or stimulated by theological disputes, the balance begins to lean towards saner things. The second generation after that in which there arose a "free way of reasoning"[2] saw the beginnings of "Free-

[1] *History of the Royal Society*, p. 152.

[2] Sprat, of course, carried the "free way of reasoning" only to a certain length, feeling obliged to deprecate "that some Philosophers, by their carelessness of a Future Estate, have brought a discredit on knowledge itself" (p. 367): and "that many Modern Naturalists have bin negligent in the Worship of God"; but he still insisted that "the universal Disposition of this Age is bent upon a rational Religion"

thinking" in those religious problems which were for the present laid aside, and the foundation of a new experiential philosophy. New and great reactions against these were to come; reactions of endowed clericalism, of popular sloth, of new "enthusiasm" generated in new undergrowths of ignorance, of recoil from terrific democratic revolution. But the new principle was to persist.

§ 4

It is not easy, at this time of day, to accept as a scientific product the confused theory of constitutionalism which gradually grew up in English politics from William the Third onwards. The theory in all its forms is in logic so invertebrate, and in morals so far from satisfying any fairly developed sense of political justice, that we are apt to dismiss it in derision. In so far, indeed, as it proceeds on a formulation of the "social contract" it is always severely handled by the school of Sir Henry Maine, which here represents the anxiety of the upper classes since the French Revolution to find some semblance of rational answer to the moral plea that all men are entitled to political enfranchisement and social help on the simple ground of reciprocity, supposed to be canonised for Christians in the "Golden Rule." Locke, of course, was not thinking of the working mass when he wrote his Letters on Government, any more than when he drew up a constitution for South Carolina endorsing slavery. But he was at least nearer rational morals than his antagonists; and in subsuming the "social contract" he was but following Hooker and Milton, and indeed adapting Aristotle, an authority whom his later critics are wont to magnify.

(p. 366). Compare the *Discourse of Things above Reason, by a Fellow of the Royal Society* (1681) attributed to Boyle, and published with a tract on the same theme by another Fellow.

Sir Frederick Pollock, in his *Introduction to the History of the Science of Politics* (p. 20), assumes to have saved Aristotle from the criticism which assails the "social contract" theory, by saying that Aristotle regards a "clanless and masterless man" as a monster or an impossibility, whereas the "theorists of the social contract school" take such a man to be the social unit. There is really no reason to suppose that Aristotle would have denied a pre-political state of nomadic barbarism such as is vaguely figured by Thucydides (i. 2); and as a matter of fact he does expressly posit a process of society-making by compact, first by the utility-seeking combination of families in a village, later by the villages *joining themselves* into a State, whose express purpose is "good life" (*Politics*, I. ii.). It does not cancel this to say that Aristotle also makes the State "prior" in the rational order to man, for his "prior" (I. c. ii. 12-14) is not a historical but a metaphysical or ethical proposition. In the third book, again (c. 9) he endorses a proposition of Lycophron which virtually affirms the social contract. And just as the school of Maine attacks the social contract theory for giving a false view of the origin of society, so did Bodin long ago, and at least as cogently, attack Aristotle and Cicero for defining a State as a society of men assembled to live well and happily. Bodin insists (*De la République*, 1850, l. i. c. i. p. 5; l. i. c. vi. p. 48; l. iv. c. i. *ad init.* p. 350) that all originated in violence, the earliest being found full of slaves. It is true that Aristotle at the outset implies that slavery is as old as the family, but he still speaks of States as voluntary combinations for a good end. As to the first kings he is also vague and contradictory, and is criticised by Bodin accordingly. Aristotle was doubtless adaptable to the monarchic as well as to the democratic creed; but Bodin's criticism suggests that in the sixteenth century he was felt to be too favourable to the latter. It may be worth while to note that the notion of an unsociable "state of nature" prior to a "social contract" was effectively criticised by Sir William Temple in his *Essay upon the Origin and Nature of Government* (1672). With a really scientific discrimination he points to food conditions as mainly determining gregation or segregation among animals, observing: "Nor do I know, if men are like sheep, why they need any government, or, if they are like wolves, how they can suffer it" (*Works*, ed. 1814, i. 9, 10). In the next generation, again, the ultra-Hobbesian view was keenly attacked and confuted by Shaftesbury within a few years of Locke's death (*Characteristics*, early eds. i. 109-11; ii. 310-21). As I have elsewhere pointed out (*Buckle and his Critics*, p. 395) the "contract" theory lent itself equally to Whiggism and to High Toryism. Towards the end of the eighteenth century we find the Radical Bentham (*Fragment on Government*, 1776) deriding it as held by the

Tory Blackstone. But Rousseau himself (preface to the *Discours sur l'inégalité*) avowedly handled the "State of Nature" as an ideal, not as a historical truth; and Blackstone did the same. It is therefore only a new species of abstract fallacy, and one for which there is no practical excuse, to argue as does the school of Maine (cp. Pollock, as cited, pp. 63, 75, 79, etc.) that the theories in question are responsible for the French Revolution in general, or the Reign of Terror in particular. Revolutions occur for reasons embodied in states of life: they avail themselves of the theories that lie to hand. The doctrine that "all are born equal" is laid down in so many words by the orthodox Spanish Jesuit Suarez early in the seventeenth century (*Tractatus de Legibus*, l. ii. c. ii. § 3. The passage is cited by Hallam, *Literature of Europe* iii. 160.

The derivation was bound to warp the theory, but such as it is, it represents the beginning of a new art, and therefore of a new science, of representative government. A variety of forces combined to prevent anarchy on the one hand, and on the other the fatal consolidation of the monarch's power which took place in France.[1] The new English king was a Protestant, and therefore religiously acceptable to the people: but he was a Dutchman, and therefore racially obnoxious; for fierce commercial jealousy had long smouldered between the two peoples, and war had fanned it into flames that had burned wide. In the very Church whose cause he had saved, he was unpopular not only with the out-and-out zealots of political divine right but with the zealous Churchmen as such, inasmuch as he favoured the Dissenters as far as he dared, and appointed bishops friendly to toleration. So hampered and frustrated was he that it seems as if nothing but his rare genius for fighting a losing battle could have saved him; despite the many reasons the nation had for adhering to him.

[1] Thoughtful observers already recognised in the time of James II. that if England developed on the French lines religious freedom would disappear from Europe. See the tractate *L'Europe esclave si Angleterre ne rompt ses fers*, Cologne, 1677.

One of these reasons, which counted for much, was the subtle effect of a National Debt in attaching creditors as determined supporters to the Government. The highest sagacity, perhaps, could not have framed a better device than this for establishing a new dynasty, albeit the device was itself made a ground of hostile criticism, and was of course resorted to as a financial necessity, or at least as a resource pointed to by Dutch example, not as a stroke of statecraft. What prudence and conciliation could do, William sought to do. And yet, with all his sanity and enlightenment, he failed utterly to apply his tolerant principles to that part of his administration which most sorely needed them—the government of Ireland. Even in England he could not carry tolerance nearly as far as he wished;[1] but in Ireland he was forced to acquiesce in Protestant tyranny of the worst description. The bigotry of his High Church subjects was too strong for him. On the surrender of the last adherents of James at Limerick he concluded a treaty which gave the Irish Catholics the religious freedom they had had under Charles II. when the Cromwellian oppression was removed; but the English Parliament refused to sanction it, save on the condition that nobody should sit in the Irish Parliament without first repudiating the Catholic doctrines. This was not the first virtual breach of faith by England towards Ireland; and it alone might have sufficed to poison union between the two countries; but it was only the first step in a renewal of the atrocious policy of the past.

[1] This may be taken as certain: but it is not clear how far he wished to go. Ranke (*History of England*, Eng. tr. iv. 437) and Hassencamp (*History of Ireland*, Eng. tr. p. 117) are satisfied with the evidence as to his having promised the German emperor to do his utmost to repeal the penal laws against the Catholics, and his having offered the Irish Catholics, before the battle of Aghrim, religious freedom, half the churches in Ireland, and half their old possessions. For this we have only a private letter. However this point may be decided, the Treaty of Limerick is plain evidence. On the point of William's responsibility for the breach of that Treaty, see the excellent sketch of *The Past History of Ireland* by Mr. Bouverie-Pusey (1894).

Under the tolerant and statesmanlike king, the Irish Protestant Parliament proceeded to pass law after law making the life of Catholics one of cruel humiliation and intolerable wrong. There is nothing in civilised history to compare with the process by which religious and racial hatred in combination once more set the miserable Irish nation on the rack. The extreme political insanity of the course taken is doubtless to be attributed to the propagandist madness of James, who had just before sought to give all Ireland over to Catholicism. Fanaticism bred fanaticism. But the fact remains that the Protestant fanatics began in the reign of William a labour of hate which, carried on in succeeding reigns, at length made Ireland the darkest problem in our politics.

Hassencamp (pp. 117, 125) insists that the penal laws "were not dictated by any considerations of religion, but were merely the offspring of the spirit of domination," citing for this view Burke, *Letter to a Peer* (*Works*, Bohn ed. iii. 296), and *Letter to Sir Hercules Langrishe* (*Id. ib.* p. 321). But this is an attempt to dissociate religion from persecution in the interests of religious credit, and will not bear criticism. Burke, in fact, contradicts himself, assigning the religious motive in an earlier page (292) of the *Letter to a Peer*, and again in the *Letter to Langrishe* (p. 301). When the Protestants went on heaping injuries on the Catholics in the knowledge that the people remained fixed in Catholicism, they were only acting as religious persecutors have always done. On Burke's and Hassencamp's view, persecution could never take place from religious motives at all. No doubt the race feeling was fundamental, but the two barbaric instincts were really combined. Cp. Macaulay's *History*, ch. vi. (2-vol. ed. 1877, i. 390-93).

As regards Irish trade, commercial malice had already effected all that religious malice could wish. Even in the reign of Henry VIII. a law was passed forbidding the importation of Irish wool into England; and in the next century Strafford sought further to crush the Irish woollen trade altogether in the English interest, throwing the Irish back on their linen trade and

agriculture, which he encouraged.[1] Cromwell, on his part, was sane enough to leave Irish shipping on the same footing as English under his Navigation Act; but in 1663 the Restoration Parliament put Ireland on the footing of a foreign State, thus destroying her shipping trade once for all,[2] and arresting her natural intercourse with the American colonies. In the same year, a check was placed on the English importation of Irish fat cattle: two years later, the embargo was laid on lean cattle and dead meat; still later, it was laid on sheep, swine, pork, bacon, mutton, and cheese. In William's reign, new repressions were effected. The veto on wool export having led to woollen manufactures, which were chiefly in the hands of Dissenters and Catholics,[3] the Irish Parliament, consisting of Episcopalian landlords, was induced to put heavy export duties on Irish woollens; and this failing of its full purpose, in the following year the English Parliament absolutely prohibited all export of manufactured wool from Ireland.[4]

To this policy of systematic iniquity the first offset was a measure of protection to the Irish linen trade in 1703; and this benefaction went almost solely into the hands of the Scotch settlers in Ulster.[5] Even thereafter the linen trade of Ireland was so maimed and restricted by English hindrances that it was revived only by continual bounties from 1743 to 1773. And this twice restored and subsidised industry, thus expressly struck out of native and put in Protestant and alien hands, has been in our own age repeatedly pointed to as a proof of the superiority of the Protestant and non-

[1] Cp. the author's *Saxon and Celt*, pp. 160, 161, and *note*.

[2] Lecky, *History of Ireland in the Eighteenth Century*, i. 174.

[3] See Petty, *Essays in Political Arithmetic*, ed. 1699, p. 186.

[4] The checking of the Irish wool trade was strongly urged by Temple in the English interest (*Essay on the Advancement of Trade in Ireland*, Works, iii. 10).

[5] See Dr. Hill Burton's *History of the Reign of Queen Anne*, 1880, iii. 160-63. This measure seems to have been overlooked by Mr. Lecky in his narrative, *History of Ireland*, i. 178.

Celtic inhabitants over the others in energy and enterprise. As a matter of fact many of the Scots who benefited by the bounties of 1703 in Ulster had recently immigrated because of the poverty and overpopulation of their own country, where their energy and enterprise could do nothing. Irish energy and enterprise on the other hand had been chronically strangled, during two hundred years, by English and Protestant hands, with a persevering malice to which there is no parallel in human history; and the process is seen at its worst after the "glorious Revolution" of 1688.

The beginnings of modern parliamentary government thus coincide with the recommencement, in the worst spirit, of the principal national crime thus far committed by England; and this not by the choice of, but in despite of, the king, at the hands of the Parliament. In the next reign the same sin lies at the same door, the monarch doing nothing. The fact should serve better than any monarchic special pleading to show us that the advance towards freedom is a warfare not merely with despots and despotic institutions, but with the spirit of despotism in the average man; a warfare in which, after a time, the opposing forces are seldom positive right and wrong, but as a rule only comparative right and wrong, evil being slowly eliminated by the alternate play of self-regarding instinct. Gross and wilful political evil, we say, was wrought in the first stages of the new progress towards political justice. But that is only another way of saying that even while gross political evil was being wrought, men were on the way towards political justice. A clear perception of the whole process, when men attain to it, will mean that justice is about to be attained.

§ 5

Even while the spirit of religion and the spirit of separateness were working such wrong in Ireland, the spirit of separateness was fortunately defeated in Scotland, where it had yet burned strongly enough to make perpetual division seem the destiny of the two kingdoms. We learn how much political institutions count for when we realise that in Scotland, just before the parliamentary union with England, there was as furious an aversion to all things English as there has ever been shown in France of late years to things German. The leading Scots patriots were not only bitterly averse to union, but hotly bent on securing that the line of succession in Scotland after Anne should not be the same as that in England; this because they held that Scottish liberties could never be secure under an English king. The stern Fletcher of Saltoun, a Republican at heart, had to play in part the game of the Jacobites, much as he abominated their cause. But both alike were defeated, with better results than could possibly have followed on any separation of the crowns; and the vehement opposition of the great mass of the Scots people to the Parliamentary Union was likewise defeated, in a manner hard to understand. The heat of the popular passion in Scotland is shown by the infamously unjust execution of the English Captain Green and two of his men[1] on a charge of killing a missing Scotch captain and crew who were not even proved to be dead, and were afterwards found to be alive. The fanatical remnant of the Covenanters was as bitter against Union as the Jacobites. Yet in the

[1] Green's ship and crew were first seized without form of law in reprisal for the seizure in England, by the East India Company, of a Scotch ship belonging to the old Darien Company, whose trade the India Company held to be a breach of its monopoly. The charge of slaying a Scotch captain was an afterthought.

teeth of all this violence of feeling the Union was carried, and this not wholly by bribery,[1] as was then alleged, and as might be suspected from the analogy of the later case of Ireland, but through the pressure of common-sense instinct among the less noisy. There was indeed an element of bribery in the English allowance of liberal compensation to the shareholders of the African Company (better known as the Darien Company), who thus had good cash in exchange for shares worth next to nothing; and in a certain sense the reluctant English concession to Scotland of freedom of trade was a bribe. But it is by such concessions that treaties are secured; and it needed a very clear self-interest to bring round a Scotch majority to Union in the teeth of a popular hostility much more fierce than is shown in our own day in the not altogether disparate case of Ulster, as regards Home Rule. Burton and Macaulay agreed[2] that the intense wish and need of the Scottish trading class to participate in the trade of England (as they had done to much advantage under Cromwell, but had been hindered doing after the Restoration) was what brought about the passing of the Act of Union in the Scots Parliament. No doubt the moderate Presbyterians saw that their best security lay in union;[3] but that recognition could never have overridden the stiff-necked forces of fanaticism and race hatred[4] were it not for the call of plain pecuniary advantage. A transformation had begun in Scotland. The country which for a hundred and fifty years had been distracted by fanatical strifes, losing its best elements of culture under the spell of Judaic bibliolatry,

[1] On this see Burton, viii. 178-85.

[2] Burton's *History of Scotland*, viii. 3, *note*.

[3] Burton, viii. 168.

[4] "It is a marvel how the Edinburgh press of that day could have printed the multitude of denunciatory pamphlets against the Union" (Burton, viii. 131). "The aristocratic opponents of the Union did their utmost to inflame the passions of the people" (*id.* p. 137, cp. p. 158, etc.).

had at length, under the obscure influence of English example, begun to move out of the worst toils of the secondary barbarism, not indeed into a path of pure civilisation—the harm had gone too deep for that—but towards a life of secular industry which at least prepared a soil for a better life in the centuries to come; and even for a time, under the stimulus of the new thought of France, developed a brilliant and various scientific literature. The Darien scheme may be taken as a turning-point in Scottish history; an act of commercial enterprise then arousing an amount of energy and sensation that had for centuries been seen only in connection with strokes of State and sect. It is not agreeable to idealising prejudice to accept Emerson's saying[1] that the greatest ameliorator in human affairs has been "selfish, huckstering trade"; but, barring the strict force of the superlative, the claim is valid. It is the blackest count in the indictment against England for her[2] treatment of Ireland that she deliberately closed to the sister nation the door which the Scotch, by refusing union on other terms when union was highly expedient in the view of English statesmen, forced her to open to them.

§ 6

At all times within the historic period, trade and industry have reacted profoundly on social life; and as we near the modern period in our own history the connection becomes more and more decisively determinant. In the oldest culture-history at all known to us, as we have seen, the commercial factor affects everything else; and at no time in European annals do we fail to note some special scene or area in which trade furnishes to

[1] Following Hallam, *Middle Ages*, iii. 327.

[2] Properly speaking, the action of "England" was the action of the merchant class, which in this case most exerted itself and got its way.

politicians special problems. Thus the culture-history of Italy, as we have also seen, is in past epochs inseparably bound up with her commercial history. But as regards the north of Europe, it is in the modern period that we begin specially to recognise trade as playing a leading part in politics, national and international. The Mediterranean tradition is first seen powerfully at work in the history of the Hansa towns: then comes the great development of Flanders, then that of Holland, then that of England,[1] which gained so much from the influx of Flemish and Dutch Protestant refugees in the reign of Philip II.; but which was checked in its commercial growth under Elizabeth and James alike by their policy of granting monopolies to favourites. The "Merchant Adventurers," ready enough to accept monopolies for their own incorporations, were free-traders as against those;[2] and not till they were abolished could England compete with Holland. France at times promised to rival both Holland and England; but she at length definitely fell behind England in the race, as Flanders did Holland, by reason of political misdirection. In the middle and latter half of the seventeenth century, all the northern States had their eyes fastened on the shining example of Holland[3]; and commerce, which as an occasion of warfare had since the rise of Christianity been superseded by religion, begins to give the cue for animosities of peoples, rulers, and classes.[4] The eternal principle

[1] Sir Josiah Child puts "the latter end of Elizabeth's reign" as the time when England began to be "anything in trade" (*New Discourse of Trade*, 4th ed. p. 73). Cp. Prof. Busch on English trade under Henry VII., *England unter den Tudors*, i. 71-85, with Schanz, *Englische Handelspolitik*, i. 328, where it is noted that in the latter part of the sixteenth century there were 3000 merchants engaged in the sea trade.

[2] Schanz, *Englische Handelspolitik*, i. 332 ff. The Merchant Adventurers were incorporated under Elizabeth (*id.* i. 350).

[3] Dr. Cunningham (ii. 101, 102, 104) notes the feeling under the first Stuarts.

[4] The last great religious war—if we except the strifes of Russia and Turkey, which are quasi-religious—was the Thirty Years' War. Its very atrocity doubtless

of strife, of human attraction and repulsion, plays through the phenomena of commerce as through those of creed. The profoundly insane lust for gold and silver, which had so largely determined the history of the Roman Empire, definitely shaped that of Spain; and Spain's example fired the northern nations with whom she came in contact.

Professor Thorold Rogers is responsible for the strange proposition (*Economic Interpretation of History*, p. 186; *Industrial and Commercial History of England*, p. 321) that the chief source of the silver supply of Europe, before the discovery of the New World, was *England*. He offers nothing but his own conviction in proof of his statement, to which he adds the explanation that the silver in question was extracted from sulphuret of lead. It seems well to point out that there is not a shadow of foundation for the main assertion. That the argentiferous lead mines were worked seems clear; but that they could produce the main European supply without the fact being historically noted, is incredible. On the other hand, silver mines were found in Germany in the tenth century and later, and there is reason to attribute to their output a gradual rise of prices before the fifteenth century (Anderson's *History of Commerce*, i. 67). In any case, there is no reason to doubt the statement of the historians of the precious metals that what silver was produced in Europe in the Middle Ages was mostly mined in Spain and Germany. See Del Mar, *History of the Precious Metals*, 1880, pp. 38-43 and refs.; also Menzel, *Geschichte der Deutschen*, cap. 276, *end;* and Kohlrausch, *History of Germany*, Eng tr. 1844, p. 261.

The direct search for gold as plunder developed into the pursuit of it as price; and wealthier States than Spain were raised by the more roundabout method which Spain disdained.[1] Holland in the seventeenth

went far to discredit the religious motive (see Buckle, ii. 42, and his citations, as to the anti-ecclesiastical character of the Peace of Westphalia): and it ranks as the worst war of the modern world. Commerce, however, for centuries supplied new motives for war to men whose ideas of economics were still at the theological stage. Cp. Storch, quoted by M'Culloch, *Principles of Political Economy*, Introd., and Schoell's addition to Koch, *Hist. of Europe*, Eng. tr. 3rd ed. p. 110. On the tendency of economic science to promote peace, see Buckle, i. 217, 218.

[1] This was soon recognised by Spanish economists. See the passage from Bernand of Ulloa (1753) cited by Blanqui, *Hist. de l'Econ. Polit.*, 2e édit. ii. 28.

century presented to the European world, as we have seen, the new and striking spectacle of a dense population thriving on a soil which could not possibly be made to feed them. "Trade" became the watchword of French statesmanship; and Colbert pressed it against a froward nobility;[1] while in England a generation later it had acquired the deeper rooting that goes with the voluntary activity and self-seeking of a numerous class; and already the gentry freely devoted their younger sons to the pursuits which those of France contemned.[2]

The turn seems to have been taken in the most natural way, after Parliament was able to force on James I. a stoppage of the practice of granting monopolies. At his accession, the king had sought popularity by calling-in and scrutinising the many monopolies granted by Elizabeth, which constituted the main grievance of the time.[3] Soon, however, he conformed to the old usage, which had the strenuous support of Bacon[4]; and in 1621 it was declared that he had multiplied monopolies twenty-fold.[5] The most careful historian of the period reports that though they

Cp. Samber, *Memoirs of the Dutch Trade*, Eng. tr. 1719, *Pref.* Apart from the habits set up by imperialism, the Spaniards were in part anti-industrial because industry was so closely associated with the Moriscoes (Major Hume, *Spain*, p. 195); and the innumerable Church holidays counted for much. Yet in the first half of the sixteenth century Spain had a great development of town industrial life (Armstrong, *Introduction* to same vol. pp. 83-84). This is partly attributable to the new colonial trade; but probably more to the connection with Flanders. Cp. Grattan, *The Netherlands*, pp. 66, 88. About 1670, however, manufacture for export had entirely ceased; the trade of Madrid, such as it was, was mainly in the hands of Frenchmen; the Church and the bureaucracy alone flourished; and although discharged soldiers swarmed in the cities, what harvests there were had to be reaped by the hands of French labourers who came each season for the purpose. Hume, as cited, p. 285. This usage subsisted nearly a century later (Tucker, *Essay on Trade*, ed. 1756, p. 25).

[1] See the so-called *Political Testament of Colbert*, Eng. tr. 1695, p. 351.

[2] Petty, *Political Arithmetic*, ch. x. (*Essays*, ed. 1699, p. 273). Even noblemen are mentioned as sometimes putting their younger sons to merchandise. Cp. Toynbee, *Industrial Revolution*, p. 63; and Josiah Tucker, *Essay on Trade* (1751), 4th ed. p. 43.

[3] Gardiner, *History of England*, 1603-42, ed. 1893, i. 100.

[4] *Id.* iv. 2.

[5] *Id.* iv. 1.

were continually being abused,[1] they were granted on no corrupt motives, but in sheer mistaken zeal for the spread of commerce.[2] It would be more plausible to say that when interests either of purse or of patronage lay in a certain direction, those concerned were very easily satisfied that the interests of commerce pointed the same way. At length, after much dispute, the Lords passed in 1624[3] a Monopoly Bill previously passed by the Commons in 1621[4]; and though some of the chief monopolies were left standing, either as involving patents for inventions, or as being vested in corporations,[5] mere private trade monopolies were for the future prevented.

It was a triumph of the trading class over the upper, nothing more. As for the corporations, they were as avid of monopolies as the courtiers had ever been; and independent traders hampered by monopolist corporations were only too ready to become monopolist corporations themselves.[6] Part of the result was that about 1635 "there were more merchants to be found upon the exchange worth each one thousand pounds and upwards, than there were in the former days, before the year 1600, to be found worth one hundred pounds each."[7] The upper classes, as capitalists and even as traders, were not now likely to remain aloof. But all the while there was no betterment of the lot of the poor. "That our poor in England," writes Child after the Restoration, "have always been in a most sad and wretched condition . . . is confessed and lamented by all men."[8] Yet, though it was also confessed that among the Dutch, and even in Hamburg and Paris,

[1] See *id.* iv. 8, for a sample, and in particular pp. 41-43 for the notorious case of of Sir Giles Mompesson and the inn licences.

[2] *Id.* iv. 6, 7. [3] *Id.* v. 233. [4] *Id.* iv. 125.

[5] *Id.* vii. 71. [6] *Id.* viii. 74, 75.

[7] Sir Josiah Child, *New Discourse of Trade*, 4th ed. p. 9. Child's theory of the effect of usury laws in the matter is pure fallacy.

[8] *Id.* p. 87.

the poor were intelligently provided for,[1] no such necessity was practically recognised in England,[2] either by Puritan or by Cavalier; and a century later there were the same conditions of popular misery and vice, with a new plague of drunkenness added.[3] By that time, too, the corporation monopolies were strangling trade just as the private monopolies had formerly done[4]; while France, which in the latter part of the seventeenth century gave such a suicidal stimulus to English and Dutch industry by the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, had recovered both population and trade,[5] and was on a commercial footing which, well developed, might have given her the victory over England in the race for empire.

Everywhere in the seventeenth century, however, the new development meant new strife. Protestant England and Holland, Catholic France and Protestant Holland, flew at each other's throat in quarrels of trade and tariffs; and for the monopoly of the trade in cloves Dutch and Spanish and English battled as furiously as for constraint and freedom of conscience. The primitively selfish and mistaken notion men had formed of commercial economy was on a level with the religious impulse as it had subsisted from the beginning of Christendom; and even as each Christian sect had felt it necessary to throttle the rest, each nation felt that its prosperity depended on the others' impoverishment. To spite the Dutch, the Cromwellian party in 1651 passed the Navigation Act, prohibiting

[1] Child, *New Discourse of Trade*, p. 88.

[2] Child, whose main concern was to reduce the rate of interest by law, proposed (p. 98) to sell paupers as slaves on the plantations, "taking security for . . . their freedom afterwards." An antagonist (see pref. p. xi) proposed a law limiting wages.

[3] Josiah Tucker, *Essay on Trade*, 4th ed. pp. 46, 105.

[4] *Id.* pp. 28, 50, 51; Richardson's *Essay on the Decline of the Foreign Trade* (often attributed to Decker), ed. 1756, pp. 46-64.

[5] France also, of course, still kept up trade monopolies (Tucker, p. 36).

all imports of foreign goods save in English ships or those of the nations producing them. In practice it was a total failure, the effect being to injure the English rather than the Dutch trade;[1] but the Dutch themselves, who were fanatical for their own Asiatic monopoly trade, believed it would injure them, and went to war accordingly. Even among expert merchants there was no true economic science, only a certain empirical knowledge, reduced to rule of thumb. Hence the traders were for ever tending to strangle trade, and the ablest administrators fell into the snare. Everywhere they tended to be possessed by the gross fallacy that they could to some extent sell without buying,[2] and so heap up gold and silver; and to secure at least a balance in bullion was considered an absolute necessity. This was the most serious error of the policy of Colbert, who secured a balance of social gain to France by stimulating and protecting shipping and new industries,[3] but failed to learn the lesson that foreign commerce in

[1] The eulogy of the Navigation Act as "wise" by Adam Smith is one of his worst mistakes. Sir Josiah Child's *New Discourse of Trade* shows in detail that the English by about 1670 or 1690 had lost to the Dutch even some of the trade they formerly had. (See Preface to second and later editions, and compare M'Culloch, Note XI. to his edition of the *Wealth of Nations*, and McCullagh, *Industrial History*, ii. 340.) The one direction in which the Act seems to have been successful was in stimulating shipbuilding and seafaring in the American colonies. (See Professor Ashley in the *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Boston, November 1899, pp. 4-6.) Joshua Gee, in his *Trade and Navigation of Great Britain Considered* (1730, 6th ed. p. 113) expressly ascribes a "prodigious increase of our shipping" to "the timber trade between Portugal, etc., and our plantations," one result being that English ships have "become the common carriers in the Mediterranean, as well as between the Mediterranean, Holland, Hambro', and the Baltic." He says nothing of the Navigation Act, but lays stress on the cheap building of ships in New England, and notes (p. 114) that the Dutch habitually hire English ships "to transport their goods from Spain, etc., to Amsterdam, and other places."

[2] The fallacy was indeed soon exposed as such by the more enlightened economists. Thus the French writer Samber, in his *Memoirs of the Dutch Trade* (Eng. tr. ed. 1719, p. 75), speaks of the French rulers of Colbert's day as having "entertained a notion that they could carry on trade after a new unheard-of method: they proposed to sell their goods to their neighbours, and buy none of theirs." But this was none the less the prevailing ideal of the age. Cp. Jansen's *General Maxims of Trade*, 1713, cited by Buckle, i. 217.

[3] Cp. A. von Brandt, *Beiträge zur Geschichte der französischen Handelspolitik*, 1896, pp. 25-28.

the end must consist in an exchange of goods. Thus, though he resisted the ruinous methods of Louis XIV.[1] he lent himself to the theory which, next to the hope of making the Netherlands a province of France and so an arm of French naval strength, stimulated the policy of war. By repeatedly raising his tariffs he forced the Dutch to raise theirs; whereupon France went to war. Had he known that the Dutch could not sell to France without buying thence, and *vice versa*, he would have rested content with establishing his new industries.

M. Dussieux (as cited, p. 127) frames a deplorable demonstration that Holland was impoverishing France and destroying all industry there by selling more articles than she bought. As if any country could go on buying in perpetuity without selling in payment. M. Dussieux goes on to admit that France before Colbert had some great industries, and a great agricultural export trade, as must needs have been. His argument shows the survival of the mercantilist delusion that trade can drain a productive country of its bullion. It is probable that Colbert helped trade as much by checking fiscal abuses as by protecting new industries. On the whole he seems to have injured agriculture (*id.* pp. 89, *note*, and 133). The presumption is that his import duties, in so far as they excluded foreign products, checked the grain exports which had formerly paid for these. Thus, as M. Dussieux admits, Colbert failed to secure prosperity for the peasantry while he was helping industry. Cp. Brandt, *Beiträge*, as cited.

Of course the rival nations were equally self-seeking. Prohibitive tariffs were necessarily lowest with the most specifically commercial State, the Dutch; and the Free Trade doctrine began early to be heard in England[2];

[1] L. Dussieux, *Étude biographique sur Colbert*, 1886, ch. vi. § 2.

[2] *E.g.*, from Dudley North. Macaulay, ed. cited, i. 253. See the quotations in M'Culloch, as above cited. Pepys, in his *Diary*, under date 1664, February 29, tells how Sir Philip Warwick expounded to him the "paradox" that it does not impoverish the nation to export less than it imports. I can recall no earlier instance of right thinking on the subject in England. The repeal in 1663 of statutes against exporting bullion was carried in the interests of the East India Company, and apparently on a false theory; see it in Child, *New Discourse*, p. 173. Cp. Shaftesbury, *Characteristics*, Treatise II. part i. § 2, *end*, as to the advantage of a "free port." This had been partially insisted on, as we have seen, by the Merchant

but whether rulers leant in that direction or strove to heap up import duties as did France, they went to war for monopolies and for imposts. Holland had as determinedly sought the ruin of Antwerp as England did that of Holland. And as the race-principle embroiled nations on the score of trade, so the class-principle set up new feuds of class in all the nations concerned. The new trading class fought for its own hand as the trade gilds of the Middle Ages had done; and the fact of its connections with the gentry did not prevent animosity between gentry and traders or investors in the mass. Thus were the old issues complicated, for good or for ill.

Professor Cunningham (*Growth of English Industry and Commerce*, ii. 16-17) offers an unexpected defence of the "Mercantile System," under which bullion was striven for as "the direct means of securing power." "The wisdom of the whole scheme," he writes, "is apparently justified by the striking development of national power which took place during the period when it lasted. England first outstripped Holland and then raised an empire in the East on the ruins of French dependencies." After this argument Dr. Cunningham falters, observing: "But even if the logic of facts seems to tell in its favour, there is a danger of fallacy: success was attained, but how far was it due to the working of coal, and the age of mechanical invention, and how far to the policy pursued?" There is really no need to suppose such an antinomy between "the logic of facts" and any other logic. The only legitimate logic of facts is that which takes in all the facts. Now, seeing that Holland and France were as much devoted as England to the Mercantile System, and that in the terms of the case they failed, it cannot have been the Mercantile System that secured success to England. The logic of facts excludes the hypothesis. The working of coal, on the other hand, was a real wealth-making force, certainly conducive to naval and other empire. But more allowance is to be made for the fact that France had heavy continental quarrels on hand while she was fighting England in Asia and America.

Adventurers in the days of Elizabeth and James; and Raleigh strongly pressed it in his *Observations touching Trade and Commerce with the Hollander and other Nations*, presented to James. *Works*, ed. 1829, viii. 356-57. Raleigh, however, was a bullionist.

If at this stage we seek to discover the manner of life of the working-class in England, we shall find it hard to reach a confident conception. Many phrases in Shakspere remind us that as towns grew there grew with them a nondescript semi-industrial class, untrained for any regular industry and unable to subsist without industry of some sort. In the latter part of the seventeenth century we seem to see a process of elimination at work by which the organisms capable of enduring toil are selected from a mass to which such toil was too irksome. In 1668 Sir Josiah Child writes that the English poor in a cheap year "will not work above two days in a week; their humour being such that they will . . . just work so much and no more as may maintain them in that mean condition to which they have been accustomed." That, accordingly, a high price for bread was a good thing, as forcing the poor to industry, became the standing doctrine of such publicists as Petty.[1] When late in the eighteenth century we find Adam Smith, with French testimony to support him, denying that the pinch of poverty makes for industry, we are left in doubt as to whether the improvement came by a positive dying out of the lazy types through the new plague of alcoholism, or through the gradual exemplary force of a higher standard of comfort as seen among the more industrious. Probably both influences were at work. But it was at best in a grimy under-world of degeneracy and hunger, squalor and riot, that there were laid the roots of the new mechanical industries which were to make England the chief mill and counter of Europe.[2] And when we find

[1] Cp. Child, *New Discourse*, p. 17; Petty, *Essays*, p. 205; Tucker, *Essay on Trade*, 4th ed. pp. 45-57. For a general view of the discussion, see Schulze-Gävernitz, *Der Grossbetrieb*, 1892, Einleitung.

[2] As early as 1641, the Manchester woollen industry is noted as flourishing. Early in the next century it had immensely increased. Schulze-Gävernitz, as cited, pp. 26, 27.

one of the acutest observers of the next generation arguing that a large body of the needy poor is the right and necessary basis of industry and public wealth,[1] we realise that the new life was to be as hard for the toilers as that of any earlier age.

§ 7

It is in the reign of the last of the Stuarts, whose sex made her perforce rely on ministers to rule for her, and whose unenlightened zeal[2] thus missed the disaster which similar qualities had brought upon two of her predecessors—it is the reign of Anne, swayed by favourites to an extent that might have made monarchy ridiculous[3] if monarchists went by reason and not by superstition—that there begins recognisably the era of government by parliamentary leaders, representing at once, in varying degrees, monarch and people; and it is at this point that we begin the biographical studies[4] to which the foregoing pages offer an introduction. But under new conditions and phases we are to meet for the most part repetitions and developments of the forces already recognised as at work from time immemorial. Thus early have we seen in action, on the field of English history, most of those primary forces of strife whose play makes the warp of politics, ancient and modern; and the distinct emergence, withal, of that

[1] Mandeville, *Fable of the Bees*, Remarks Q and Y.

[2] "That narrow and foolish woman." Hallam, *Constitutional History*, iii. 124, *note*. Cp. Buckle, i. 419: "a foolish and ignorant woman."

[3] "It seems rather a humiliating proof of the sway which the feeblest prince enjoys even in a limited monarchy, that the fortunes of Europe should have been changed by nothing more noble than the insolence of one waiting-woman and the cunning of another. It is true that this was effected by throwing the weight of the crown into the scale of a powerful faction; yet the house of Bourbon would probably not have reigned beyond the Pyrenees but for Sarah and Abigail at Queen Anne's toilet" (Hallam, iii. 210).

[4] A work in course of preparation.

spirit which, rare and transient in ancient times, seems destined to inherit the later earth—the spirit of science, which slowly transmutes politics from an animal to an intellectual process, raising it from the stage of mere passional life to the stage of constructive art, and from the social relation of rule and subjection towards the relation of mutuality and corporate intelligence. Politics, we formally say, is the process of the clash of wills, sympathies, interests, striving for social adjustment in the sphere of legislation and government. The earlier phases are crude and animalistic, and involve much resort to physical strife. The later phases are gradually humanised and intelligised, till at length the science of the past process builds up a new phase of consciousness, which evolves a conscious progressive art. That is to say, the conscious progressive art develops in course of time: it had not really arisen in any valid form at the period to which we have brought our bird's-eye view. It had transiently arisen in the ancient world, as in Solon and in the Gracchi; but the conditions were too evil for its growth, and the course of things political was downward, the animal instincts overriding science, till even when there was compulsory peace the spirit of science could no more blossom. In English politics, soon after the beginning of the eighteenth century, the conditions brought about civil peace under a new dynasty, which it was the function of the statesmanship of the dynasty to maintain. At the same time the spirit of science had entered on a new life. It remains to trace, under successive statesmen and in the doctrine of successive politicians, the fluctuations of English progress towards the great Utopia, the state of reconciliation of all the lower social antipathies and interests, and of free scope for the inevitable but haply bloodless strifes of ideals, which must needs clash so far as we can foresee human affairs. The progress, we shall

see, is only in our own century beginning to be conscious or calculated: it has truly been, so far as most of the actors are concerned, by unpath'd waters to undream'd shores. The hope is that the very recognition of the past course of the voyage will establish a new art and a new science of social navigation.

To make a new aspiration pass for a law of progress merely because it is new, would of course be only a fresh dressing of old error. There is no security that the scientific form will make any ideal more viable than another: every ideal, after all, has stood for what social science there was among its devotees. The hope of a moral transformation of the world is a state of mind so often seen arising in human history that some distrust of it is almost a foregone condition of reflection on any new ideal for thoughtful men. A dream of deliverance pervades the earliest purposive literature of the Hebrews: a fabled salvation in the past is made the ground for trust in one to come. Wherever the sense of present hardship and suffering outweighs the energetic spirit of life, in the ancient world, the young men are found seeing visions, and the old men dreaming dreams; and the thought of "the far serenity of Saturn's days" becomes a foothold for the Virgilian hope of a golden age to come. A hundred times has the hope flowered, and withered again. Confident rebellions, eager revolutions, mark at once its rise and its fall. In our own age the new birth of hope arises in the face of what might have seemed the most definitive frustration: it becomes an ideal of peaceful transformation under the sole spell of social science, with no weapons save those of reason and persuasion. The science of natural forces has widened and varied life without raising it in mass. Yet the new science, we would fain believe, will conquer the heightened task. In the fulfilment or non-fulfilment of that hope lies for

the coming age the practical answer to the riddle of existence.

Without such a hope, the study of the past would indeed be desolating to the tired spectator. Followed through cycle after cycle of illusory progress and conscious decline, all nevertheless as full of pulsation, of the pride of life and the passion of suffering, as the human tide that beats to-day on the shores of our own senses, the history of organised mankind, in its trivially long-drawn immensity, grows to be unspeakably disenchanting. Considered as a tale that is told, it seems to speak of nothing but blind impulse, narrow horizons, insane satisfactions in evil achievement, grotesque miscalculation, and vain desire, till it is almost a relief to reflect how little we know of it all, how immeasurable are the crowded distances beyond the reach of our search-light. Alike the known and the unknown, when all is said, figure for us as fruitless, purposeless, meaningless moments in some vast, eternal dream.

> Poi di tanto adoprar, di tanti moti
> D' ogni celeste, ogni terrena cosa
> Girando senza posa,
> Per tornar sempre là donde son mosse ;
> Uso alcuno, alcun frutto,
> Indovinar non so.[1]

The untranslatable cadence of Leopardi has the very pulse of the wearied seeker's spirit. Yet, through all, the fascination of the inquiry holds us, as if in the insistent craving to understand there lay some of the springs of movement towards better days. We brood over the nearer remains, so near and yet so far, till out of the ruins of Rome there rise for us in hosts the serried

[1] "Then as to so much activity, so many movements of all things celestial and all things earthly, turning without ceasing, only to return forever there whence they set forth, I can divine no use and no fruition" (Leopardi's *Nocturnal Song of a Nomad Shepherd in Asia*).

phantoms of her tremendous drama ; till we seem to catch the very rasp of Cato's voice, and the gleam of Cæsar's eye, swaying the tide of things. Still the sensation yields no sense of fruition : Rome the dead, and Greece the undying, drift from our reach into the desert distance. Beyond their sunlit fragments lies a shoreless and desolate twilight-land, receding towards the making of the world ; and there in the shadows we dimly divine the wraiths of a million million forms, thronging a hundred civilisations. The vision of that vanished eternity renews the intolerable burden of the spirit baffled of all solution. For assuredly, in the remotest vistas of all, men and women desired and loved, and reared their young, and toiled unspeakably, and wept for their happier dead ; and the evening and the morning, then as now, wove their sad and splendid pageantries with the slow serenity of cosmic change. Great empires waxed to the power of wreaking infinite slaughter, through the infinite labour of harmless animal souls ; and seas of blood alternately cemented and sapped their brutal foundations ; and all that remains of them is a tradition of a tradition of their destruction, and the shards of their uttermost decay. Not an echo of them lives, save where perchance some poet with struggling tongue murmurs the thought of them into tremulous form ; or when music with its more mysterious spell gathers from out the inscrutable vibration of things strange semblances of memories, that come to us as an ancient and lost experience re-won, grey with time and weary with pilgrimage. But to what end, of knowledge or of feeling, if the future is not therefore to be changed ?

Save for such a conception and such a purpose, the civilisations of to-day are but variant copies of those of the past—less brutal, less simple, sophisticated by science and philosophy and humour, but collectively ignoble,

veined throughout with black misery, indescribably unworthy, as wholes, of the science, and the humour, and the philosophy. Between the "youngest" and the "oldest," so called, between the best and the worst, between the United States and China, or England and Turkey, there is but a difference of grade, none in point of illusoriness, bravado, and failure. Each in its degree has its preposterous optimism, its invincible evasion of the realities it had need recognise, its gulf between ideal and actuality; nay, in the advanced societies the gulf is in a sense the more profound. Culture, like wealth, is as ill-distributed in the high society as in the low; and the ill-distribution of culture in the high society of to-day is as gross an evil relatively to its ideals as was the ill-distribution of wealth in the past. Yet even as to wealth, inequality is to-day almost as steep as ever; and the mental and physical lot of the proletariat in America and England is no brighter, relatively to possibilities, than that of multitudes of the slaves of antiquity. The one radical gain is that the status of the slave is abolished; and in exultation over that, men tend to lose sight of the evil realities that remain.

The truth must be told, that while some sides of social science have been closely studied, with some effects on polity, and while social ethic has been newly agitated, with some effects on political temper and tactic in the constitutional countries, the courses of nations are still in the main ruled as of old, not by their wisdom but by their unwisdom, not by the science of the few but by the instincts and the passions and the habits of the many. It cannot be too strongly affirmed that the course of England is being taken at this moment with no more of scientific foresight or rational provision against future social disease than there was in the Rome of the emperors. It may be that this will hold true for long, or for ever: who shall predict? But while we

continue at all to take interest in knowledge, we must needs strive to act upon that even as we do upon passion; and be the hope for betterment vain or not, it is a hope "that nature makes," like another. The alternatives are cynicism and conformity, both more burdensome, and both poorer states of mind.

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